FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 234696. October 3, 2022.]
MAXY S. ABAD, FRANCISCO A. RIVERA AND MARY LOU A. VASQUEZ, petitioners,vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AMANDO M. TETANGCO, JR., NESTOR A. ESPENILLA, JR., JUAN DE ZUNIGA, JR., JUANITA D. AMATONG, ALFREDO C. ANTONIO, IGNACIO R. BUNYE AND PETER B. FAVILA, respondents.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court's First Division issued a Resolution datedOctober 3, 2022which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 234696 (Maxy S. Abad, Francisco A. Rivera and Mary Lou A. Vasquez vs. Office of the Ombudsman, Amando M. Tetangco, Jr., Nestor A. Espenilla, Jr., Juan de Zuniga, Jr., Juanita D. Amatong, Alfredo C. Antonio, Ignacio R. Bunye and Peter B. Favila). — This is an Appeal by Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the May 15, 2017 Decision 2 and the October 4, 2017 Resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 144038, which denied the petition for certiorari assailing the Review Resolution 4 dated June 3, 2014 and the Order 5 dated October 1, 2015 of the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) in OMB-C-C-13-0092.
Antecedents
The facts, as culled from the records and as gathered from the decisions of the Court in Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 6Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 7and Central Bank Board of Liquidators v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, 8 are as follows:
On January 25, 1985, the then Central Bank issued Monetary Board (MB) Resolution No. 75 ordering the closure of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank (BFSMB) and placing the bank under receivership. This spawned multiple suits between the bank and officials of the Central Bank and the MB, foremost of which is the main case in the consolidated petitions in Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. The Monetary Board, 9 wherein the Court ruled that the bank's closure was illegal.
Several other cases then pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati were consolidated before Branch 136 thereof. BFSMB amended its complaints, seeking, among others, to recover damages in the amount of P18.8 Billion from Central Bank authorities and other individuals who allegedly acted with malice and evident bad faith in placing the bank under conservatorship and eventually closing it down in 1985.
Meanwhile, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653 10 established the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) as the new monetary authority.
In 1993, the MB allowed BFSMB to resume its business. In 2002, due to heavy withdrawals, BFSMB asked BSP for emergency loans and credit easement terms. However, BSP informed BFSMB that it should comply with certain conditions imposed by R.A. No. 7653 before financial assistance could be extended, such as the submission of a rehabilitation plan approved by BSP.
On April 8, 2009, BFSMB submitted a revised business plan to BSP for evaluation. An ad hoc committee composed of representatives from both parties was constituted, which then came up with an alternative business plan.
In a Letter dated December 4, 2009, BSP informed BFSMB that the MB issued Resolution No. 1668 granting BFSMB's request for financial assistance and regulatory reliefs to form part of its revised business plan and alternative business plan. The approval was subject to certain terms and conditions, among which was the withdrawal or dismissal with prejudice of all pending cases filed by BFSMB against BSP and its officials. It further required BFSMB's principal stockholders, Board of Directors, and duly authorized officers to execute quitclaims, as well as commitments not to revive or refile such similar cases in the future. The parties, however, failed to reach a mutually acceptable settlement due to BFSMB's refusal to agree to the foregoing conditions.
On March 17, 2011, the MB, after having determined the inability of BFSMB to continue operating with safety to its depositors and creditors, issued MB Resolution No. 372.A 11 which prohibited the bank from doing business in the Philippines, placing it under receivership, and designating the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) as its receiver.
Criminal Complaint before the
On April 1, 2011, BFSMB's Executive Vice-Presidents Maxy S. Abad and Francisco A. Rivera, together with Mary Lou A. Vasquez (petitioners), who represented the various corporate stockholders of the bank, filed a Complaint-Affidavit 12 before the DOJ with NPS Docket No. XVI-INV-11D-00141 for violation of Section 3 (e) 13 of R.A. No. 3019 14 against private respondents BSP Governor Amando M. Tetangco, Jr. (Tetangco, Jr.), BSP Deputy Governor Nestor A. Espenilla, Jr. (Espenilla, Jr.), BSP Deputy Governor and General Counsel Juan De Zuniga, Jr. (Zuniga, Jr.), and MB members Juanita D. Amatong (Amatong), Alfredo C. Antonio (Antonio), Ignacio R. Bunye (Bunye), and Peter B. Favila (Favila).
Respondents were alleged to have violated Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the performance of their supervisory and regulatory functions, when they denied BFSMB's application for emergency loans and ordered the closure of the bank. According to petitioners, respondents' actions of deliberately delaying the approval and the subsequent implementation of the rehabilitation plan were done with manifest partiality and evident bad faith causing injury or damage to BFSMB. 15
Petitioners deplored the misinformation portraying BFSMB as mismanaged and insolvent, with some news items containing confidential information which they alleged could only have been sourced from the respondents. They claimed that the smear campaign against BFSMB is evident from the false and damaging articles published in various tabloids which were designed to cause, as it did cause, a bank run. They also manifested that on February 15, 2011, without prior notice and opportunity to be heard, BFSMB was delisted from the Philippine Stock Exchange. 16
Petitioners averred that they complied with the conditions imposed for the grant of emergency loans, but respondents still denied BFSMB's application. For the wrongful closure of BFSMB through the issuance of MB Resolution 372.A and non-implementation of the alternative business plan, petitioners sought to hold the respondents criminally liable. 17
Resolution of the DOJ
The DOJ, through its Task Force on Financial Fraud, resolved the Complaint via its Resolution 18 dated June 14, 2012. First, the DOJ addressed the issue of jurisdiction raised by respondents. It held that it was vested with authority to conduct a preliminary investigation concurrent with the OMB. While the OMB has primary jurisdiction over cases within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, this will not prevent the DOJ from conducting investigation on cases filed before it at first instance, without prejudice to the OMB taking over at any stage of the investigation. If the DOJ proceeds to conduct preliminary investigation in cases where the OMB has primary jurisdiction, Sec. 4, 19 Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure mandates that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor shall be forwarded, together with the case records, to the Ombudsman or his deputy within five days from its promulgation. 20
Apropos the alleged violation of Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, the DOJ found no manifest and evident bad faith nor violation of pertinent banking laws when respondent BSP officials issued MB Resolution No. 372.A. 21 It cited the findings contained in the BSP Examiners' Report of Examination as of September 30, 2010 as the basis for the MB's decision to order the closure of BFSMB, viz.:
The report and findings of the BSP examiners contained in their "Report of Examination" as of September 30, 2010, is undisputed. That BFSMB: a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business; b) has insufficient unrealizable assets to meet its liabilities; and c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors and creditors, and its board of directors/management failed to restore the bank's financial health and viability despite considerable time given to address the problem, are all conclusive findings that even some BFSMB officials would undoubtedly admit, except of course for their adamant belief that respondents acted with evident bad faith in closing BFSMB.
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The foregoing findings are substantiated by the testimony of Atty. Francisco Rivera, Executive Vice President of the BFSMB. Atty. Rivera testified on November 11, 2010 in Civil Case No. 10-1042, RTC Makati as he confirmed and admitted the fact that BFSMB had been losing about [P]800 to [P]900 Million a year, with an aggregate loss of about [P]12 Billion. On the same date, Atty. Rivera likewise admitted that BFSMB was operating without safety to its creditors, depositors and to the general public.
Accordingly, Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 or the New Central Bank Act appropriately provides:
"Proceedings in Receivership and Liquidation. — Whenever, upon report of the head of the supervising or examining department, the Monetary Board finds that a bank or quasi-bank:
(a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business; provided, that this shall not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial panic in the banking community;
(b) has insufficient realizable assets, as determined by the Bangko Sentral, to meet its liabilities; or
(c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its depositors or creditors; or
(d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order under Section 37 that has become final, involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets of the institution.
In which cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as receiver of the banking institution.["] x x x
Based on the above provision of the law, the Monetary Board may summarily forbid BFSMB from doing business in the Philippines on the basis of the report of their examiners who performed their duties according to their mandate. x x x [T]he Monetary Board, in an effort to give BFSMB a chance, still entertained the possibility of giving the bank the [P]25 Billion financial assistance under a concession contained in MB Resolution No. [1668] that would ensure the proper use of fresh capital without compromising BSP's position as a creditor and regulator of BFSMB. At such time, since BFSMB was overleveraged, its only hope for possible salvation is the financial assistance that would come from BSP. Thus, months before the Monetary Board prohibited BFSMB from doing business in the Philippines beginning March 17, 2011, it earnestly attempted to rehabilitate BFSMB by allowing the latter to submit successive workable rehabilitation plans. While in the process of entertaining BFSMB's proposal for its rehabilitation, the Monetary Board and the BSP cannot be said to have abandoned its prerogative to summarily close BFSMB under Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 based on the BSP examiners' Report of Examination dated September 30, 2010. 22 (underscoring in the original)
The DOJ also found that respondents' acts did not cause undue prejudice nor constitute abuse of authority when respondent BSP officials did not release the P25 Billion financial assistance pursuant to MB Resolution No. 1668 dated November 19, 2009. 23
As to the additional condition imposed by respondents for petitioners to withdraw all cases filed against BSP officials, the DOJ explained that the BSP, through the MB, is allowed to compromise, in such terms and conditions, all that is necessary to protect BSP's interest in BFSMB. Moreover, the precondition to waive the damage suits is in consonance with BSP's civil right on freedom to contract. Since the precondition was not accepted by BFSMB, through its officials, it is but proper for the MB to rightfully consider MB Resolution No. 1668 as unenforceable because all its terms and conditions must be accepted by both parties before it could be legally binding and enforceable. 24
On the allegation of petitioners that respondents orchestrated the smear campaign against BFSMB during the weeks prior to its closure, the DOJ found no evidence to support such claim. 25
Given the foregoing findings, the DOJ recommended that charges against respondents be dismissed for lack of probable cause. 26
Ruling of the OMB
In its Review Resolution dated June 3, 2014, the OMB approved the recommendation of the DOJ, concurring with its June 14, 2012 Resolution and held that the assailed acts of respondents were performed in their official capacities and in accordance with existing laws and procedures. It noted that MB Resolution No. 372.A was issued only after an investigation and assessment of the actual state and condition of BFSMB. Said investigation was factual and conducted by BSP Examiners, which was detailed in the Report of Examination as of September 30, 2010. 27
The OMB found that respondents' refusal to implement MB Resolution No. 1668 containing the alternative business plan and to release the P25 Billion financial assistance to BFSMB was due to the latter's refusal to comply with the preconditions imposed by the BSP. It held that the precondition to waive or cause the dismissal of the damage claims filed by BFSMB against the MB and BSP officials is in keeping with BSP's freedom to contract; is in accordance with law and public policy; and is for the protection of BSP's interest as a creditor. 28
The OMB likewise found petitioners' allegation that respondents orchestrated a media smear campaign against BFSMB, to be devoid of factual and legal basis. 29
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the OMB denied the same in its October 1, 2015 Order.
Petitioners then filed with the CA a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, 30 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 144038, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the OMB when it dismissed the criminal complaint against respondents for lack of probable cause.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed May 15, 2017 Decision, the CA denied the petition for certiorari for being a wrong remedy to question the June 3, 2014 Review Resolution and the October 1, 2015 Order rendered by the OMB in OMB-C-C-13-0092. It also held that the petition for certiorari cannot be treated as a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court, because it was filed beyond the 15-day period for the filing of a petition for review. With petitioners' failure to file a petition for certiorari before this Court, the CA declared that the questioned OMB review resolution and order have become final and executory, and hence, can no longer be disturbed, altered or modified. 31
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied under the CA's October 4, 2017 Resolution. Hence, this appeal.
Issue
The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether the CA erred in denying the petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy to assail the OMB Review Resolution and Order in OMB-C-C-13-0092. 32
Petitioners' Arguments
Petitioners insist that the petition for certiorari they filed before the CA is the correct remedy in assailing the OMB's determination of absence of probable cause considering the settled rule that patent violation of the law is correctible by certiorari. 33
They point out that before Ombudsman Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals34(Carpio-Morales) was decided, Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770 35 originally provided that "any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman" shall be heard by this Court. When Fabian v. Hon. Desierto36(Fabian) was promulgated in September 1998, the rule changed with this Court's declaration that the fourth paragraph of Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770 37 was unconstitutional. Since Fabian therefore, there has been a distinction between the remedies in administrative and criminal cases decided by the OMB: the former are lodged with the CA under Rule 43, while the latter can be questioned only before this Court. 38
However, petitioners recall that in Carpio-Morales, the Court declared unconstitutional the second paragraph of Sec. 14, R.A. No. 6770, mandating direct resort to this Court, and thus, held that the CA had subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari filed before it by former Makati City Mayor Jejomar Binay, who sought for the nullification of the preventive suspension order of the OMB and prayed for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin its implementation. It was further clarified in Carpio-Morales that Rule 65 petitions against unappealable issuances of the OMB should be filed with the CA and not directly before this Court. 39
Petitioners contend that the CA erroneously relied on the ruling in Fabian, which is an administrative case. Applying the necessary consequence of the declaration of unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Sec. 14, R.A. No. 6770, together with the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, as well as considering the unappealable nature of the OMB decision in criminal cases, petitioners posit that in criminal cases decided by the OMB, certiorari before the CA is available when there is grave abuse of discretion. 40
Respondents' Arguments
In their separate Comments, 41 respondents Tetangco, Jr., Espenilla, Jr., Zuniga, Jr., Amatong, Antonio, Bunye, and Favila adopt the common position that the CA has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases only. The CA, therefore, cannot review the orders, directives or decisions of the OMB in criminal or non-administrative cases. They stress that there is nothing in the pronouncements of this Court in Carpio-Morales that can be construed as an abrogation or amendment of the settled rule that the CA has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the OMB in criminal cases, and any appeal therefrom must be brought directly to this Court viacertiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In its Comment, 42 the OMB, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), contends that Carpio-Morales did not abrogate the ruling in Fabian, but effectively reinforced it. The OMB maintains that the CA has jurisdiction in cases where its decisions in the determination of administrative liability of government employees and public officials are being assailed. On the other hand, where the OMB's determination of the existence of probable cause is sought to be assailed, the petition shall be lodged before this Court upon sufficient allegation and proof that it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Having filed their petition for certiorari before the wrong court, petitioners lost their remedy to question the review resolution of the OMB finding no probable cause against respondents.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is without merit.
The issue on the proper remedy from decisions of the OMB in criminal cases is not controversial, and petitioners' contentions are not novel. It is settled that the orders and decisions of the OMB in criminal cases may be elevated to this Court via Rule 65 petition, while its orders and decisions in administrative disciplinary cases may be appealed to the CA under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Court explained in Ornales v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon43 that the OMB is a quasi-judicial agency falling under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Fabian struck down the portion of Sec. 27 of R.A. No. 6770, which increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases. Thus, decisions of the OMB in administrative disciplinary cases may only be appealed to the CA through a Rule 43 petition for review. 44
R.A. No. 6770 is silent on remedies available to parties aggrieved by the OMB's findings of probable cause in criminal cases. The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by and in accordance with the provisions of law. Hence, there must be a law granting such privilege. However, an aggrieved party is not without recourse where the finding of the OMB as to the existence of probable cause is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 45
The question as to whether the CA has concurrent jurisdiction with this Court on special civil actions for certiorari questioning resolutions or orders of the OMB in criminal cases had already been passed upon in Kuizon v. Hon. Desierto46(Kuizon). The Court therein ruled in the negative, stating that where certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy from an incident in a criminal action before the OMB, the petition should be filed with this Court. 47 This procedure was reaffirmed by the Court in Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas)48(Mendoza-Arce) and Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman49(Perez).
The invocation of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts by petitioners is likewise unavailing, as the same argument had already been raised before this Court and shot down in Estrada v. Hon. Desierto50(Estrada), citing the established procedure in Kuizon, Mendoza-Arce, and Perez. In Estrada, it was reiterated that the original action for certiorari should be filed with this Court and not with the CA. Significantly, the parties in Perez and Estrada likewise questioned the OMB's finding of lack of probable cause, as in this case.
Petitioners' interpretation of our ruling in Carpio-Morales — that it outlawed direct resort to this Court, leaving criminal cases decided by the OMB subject to review only via petition for certiorari before the CA — is untenable.
The matter has already been clarified and exhaustively discussed in Gatchalian v. Office of the Ombudsman51(Gatchalian), wherein it was argued that the consequence of the Carpio-Morales case is that all orders, directives, and decisions of the OMB — whether it be an incident of administrative or criminal cases — are now reviewable by the CA. In finding such contention untenable, the ponencia in Gatchalian pointed out that Carpio-Morales involved an interlocutory order issued in an administrative case, and was thus limited in its application; it cannot be read to apply to decisions or orders of the OMB in non-administrative or criminal cases. The CA had subject matter jurisdiction over the Rule 65 petition in Carpio-Morales because what was being assailed was an interlocutory order. It was also held therein that the petition was correctly filed with the CA because it was an administrative matter. The Court in Carpio-Morales was thus applying only what was well-established in jurisprudence. It never even intimated that it was abandoning the rulings in Kuizon and Estrada and the distinctions made therein between the appellate recourse for decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative and non-administrative cases. 52
The unconstitutionality of Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770 did not necessarily have an effect over the appellate procedure for orders and decisions arising from criminal cases precisely because said procedure was not prescribed by the aforementioned section. The rule that decisions or orders of the OMB finding the existence or absence of probable cause should be questioned through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with this Court was laid down by the Court itself, and not anchored on Sec. 14 of R.A. No. 6770. Thus, the declaration of unconstitutionality of Sec. 14 is immaterial insofar as the appellate procedure for orders and decisions by the OMB in criminal cases is concerned. 53
Having filed a petition for certiorari with the CA instead of this Court, petitioners clearly raised their case before the wrong forum resulting in the finality of the OMB's June 3, 2014 Review Resolution approving the DOJ's recommendation. Clearly, petitioners have already lost their right to assail the OMB's finding of absence of probable cause. The CA, therefore, did not commit any reversible error in denying their petition for availing of the wrong remedy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 15, 2017 Decision and October 4, 2017 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 144038 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED."
By authority of the Court:
(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENADivision Clerk of Court
By:
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULODeputy Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 10-43.
2. Id. at 49-55; penned by Associate Justice Stephen C. Cruz, with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr. (a retired Member of the Court) and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, concurring.
3. Id. at 57-60.
4. Id. at 79-82; penned by Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer I (GIPO I) Cherry Chiara L. Hernando, reviewed by Preliminary Investigation, Administrative Adjudication, and Review Bureau (PARB) Director James G. Viernes, and approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.
5. Id. at 103-107; penned by GIPO I Anthea A. Magpantay, reviewed by PARB Director James G. Viernes, and approved by Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales.
6. G.R. No. 200642, April 26, 2021.
7. 832 Phil. 27 (2018).
8. 806 Phil. 156 (2017).
9. 281 Phil. 847 (1991).
10. Entitled "THE NEW CENTRAL BANK ACT." Approved: June 14, 1993.
11. Pursuant to Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Memorandum No. M-2011-016, Monetary Board Resolution No. 372.A, entitled "Placement of the Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank under Receivership." Approved: March 17, 2011.
12. Rollo, pp. 108-137.
13. Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
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(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
14. Entitled "ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT." Approved: August 17, 1960.
15. Rollo, p. 109.
16. Id. at 132-134.
17. Id. at 135-136.
18. Id. at 83-100; signed by Assistant State Prosecutor Agapito F. Fajardo, Jr., Assistant State Prosecutor Bernardo L. Parico, and Senior Assistant State Prosecutor Rosanne G. Elepano-Balauag, with the recommending approval of Senior Deputy State Prosecutor Miguel F. Gudio, Jr., and approved by Prosecutor General Claro A. Arellano.
19. Section 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. — If the investigating prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt x x x.
20. Rollo, pp. 87-89.
21. Id. at 90.
22. Id. at 90-93.
23. Id. at 93.
24. Id. at 94-97.
25. Id. at 98.
26. Id. at 99.
27. Id. at 81.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 62-78.
31. Id. at 62-64.
32. Id. at 14.
33. Id. at 14-15.
34. 772 Phil. 672 (2015).
35. Entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS 'THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989.'" Approved: November 17, 1989.
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Section 14. Restrictions. — No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.
No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure questions of law.
36. 356 Phil. 787 (1998).
37. Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — x x x
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In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
38. Rollo, pp. 15-16.
39. Id. at 18-22.
40. Id. at 22-26.
41. Id. at 632-671, 686-723, and 945-987.
42. Id. at 999-1017.
43. 839 Phil. 882 (2018).
44. Id. at 895-897, citing Namuhe v. The Ombudsman, 358 Phil. 781, 788-789 (1998).
45. Id. at 897-898, citing Tirol, Jr. v. Justice Del Rosario, 376 Phil. 115, 122 (1999).
46. 406 Phil. 611 (2001).
47. Id. at 625-626.
48. 430 Phil. 101, 112 (2002).
49. 473 Phil. 372, 376-377 (2004).
50. 487 Phil. 169, 179-180 (2004).
51. 838 Phil. 140 (2018).
52. Id. at 153-154.
53. Id. at 156.