AAA v. BBB

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 232900. August 28, 2019.]

AAA, petitioner, vs.BBB, respondent.

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames :

Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution datedAugust 28, 2019, which reads as follows:

"G.R. No. 232900 (AAA vs. BBB). — The instant petition arose from a complaint filed by BBB * (respondent) against AAA (petitioner) for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, particularly Section 5 (i) which states:

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.

In the Complaint-Affidavit 1 dated July 11, 2011, respondent alleged, among others, that: (1) petitioner was a general surgeon and practicing at the Manila Adventist Medical Center; (2) petitioner and respondent got married on February 1, 1988 and had three children; (3) petitioner had an extramarital affair and fathered a son with CCC, a nurse; (4) in April 2011, she came across petitioner's Facebook account and discovered that he was indeed having an affair with CCC; (5) a month after, she found several SD memory cards in their family car containing more than 160 sex videos and photos of petitioner and CCC; (6) the videos showed the two having scandalous sexual activity in petitioner's car, in full public view, as well as inside the rooms of a motel; and (7) before leaving their family home, petitioner threatened her with physical violence and withholding of support. According to respondent, these acts of petitioner caused emotional and psychological distress, harm and suffering to her and their children. 2

Petitioner denied all the allegations for being mere hearsay.

In a Resolution 3 dated January 10, 2012, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati found probable cause against petitioner for violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262. An Information was thereby filed in court. 4

During the hearing, the prosecution sought to present CCC and her brother, DDD (who was also working in the same hospital), as witnesses, to prove that the former and petitioner had a son named EEE. Despite receipt of the subpoena ad testificandum, however, both failed to appear. Consequently, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued show cause orders directing them to explain why they should not be cited in contempt of court for their non-appearance despite due notice. 5

In January 2016, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence which was opposed. 6 Meanwhile, respondent filed a Manifestation praying that CCC and DDD be cited in contempt of court for failure to submit an explanation for their continuous disregard of the subpoena served on them. On September 1, 2016, 7 the RTC issued bench warrants of arrest against the two contumacious witnesses. 8

On September 16, 2016, 9 the RTC issued an Order recalling the bench warrants. Considering that the prosecution already rested its case, to allow the admission of any other evidence would be a deprivation of petitioner's right to due process since his demurrer to evidence is largely based on the formal offer already made by the prosecution. 10

Unperturbed, respondent sought recourse from the Court of Appeals (CA). In its Decision 11 dated May 26, 2017, the CA nullified the said Order of the RTC. It directed the RTC to issue bench warrants of arrest on the witnesses and keep them in custody until they shall have complied with the corresponding subpoenaadtestificandum.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied; 12 hence, this petition.

Petitioner insists that the CA Decision directing the re-issuance of bench warrants against CCC and DDD constitutes a blatant disregard and violation of his constitutional right to due process. It would inimically affect the status of the proceedings before the lower court considering that the prosecution has already rested its case. 13

In her Comment, 14 respondent argues that the presentation of additional evidence may still be considered by the court and integrated in the judgment disposing of all the claims advanced therein. The records show that the prosecution made a reservation to present the testimonies of the witnesses and availed of the remedy provided in Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 15 Respondent further asserts that the testimonies of CCC and DDD, whom she had sought to present, cannot be belittled as they may suffice for conviction if found trustworthy and reliable. 16

In the Resolution 17 dated July 23, 2018, the Court required the petitioner to file a Reply thereto. To date, no reply has been filed.

The petition is denied.

Contrary to the petitioner's claim, the re-issuance of the bench warrants against CCC and DDD will not violate his right to due process. It has been held that, in the furtherance of justice, the court may grant the parties the opportunity to adduce additional evidence bearing upon the main issue in question. 18

In Hon. Vega, etc., et al. vs. Hon. Panis, etc., et al., 19 the Court sustained the order of the trial court allowing the prosecution to present additional evidence after it had offered its evidence and rested its case, and after the defense filed a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, while the prosecution had rested, the trial was not yet terminated and the case was still under the control and jurisdiction of the court. Under the circumstances, in the exercise of its discretion, the trial court may receive additional evidence. 20

Similarly, in Valenciavs. Sandiganbayan, 21 the Court allowed the prosecution to present evidence even after it orally manifested its intention to rest its case. It was stressed therein that the State should not be prejudiced and deprived of its right to prosecute cases simply because of the ineptitude or nonchalance of the Special Prosecutor. A contrary ruling would result in void proceedings. 22 Moreover, the trial procedure, as outlined in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, is ordinarily followed to ensure the orderly conduct of litigation. Nonetheless, strict observance of the Rules depends upon the circumstances obtaining in each case at the discretion of the trial judge. Depending on the nature of the case, a judge may allow a party, who had closed his case or after the defense moved for dismissal, to present involuntarily omitted evidence. 23

In this case, CCC and DDD have been summoned several times by the trial court to attend the March 5, 2015, April 30, 2015, November 5, 2015 and November 26, 2015 hearings, but both failed to appear despite receipt of the subpoena adtestificandum. As properly observed by the CA, calling CCC and DDD to the witness stand will not violate petitioner's right to due process because he will have the opportunity to contest the evidence adduced against him, and to prove his defenses after the prosecution concludes the presentation of its evidence. He can likewise raise his objections to the questions propounded on them by the prosecution. If the Court sanctions the admission of additional evidence after the case had been submitted for resolution but before judgment, with more reason that we should sustain the "recall" of the recalcitrant witnesses at this early stage of the proceedings. 24

As significant as the rights of an accused to speedy trial and due process is the right of the prosecution to prosecute people who violate the State's penal laws. The right to speedy trial is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. Here, the issuance of the bench warrants by the trial court against CCC and DDD is a lawful exercise of due process. It is clearly not intended to vex or oppress the petitioner. It is rather an elemental component of the trial court's authority to enforce its orders and issuance with the ultimate objective of preserving order in judicial proceedings and upholding the administration of justice. Verily, in the balancing test used to determine whether an accused had been denied speedy disposition of cases, the scales tilt in favor of allowing the prosecution to adduce further evidence. Slowly but surely, justice and due process would be afforded to the prosecution and to petitioner who would have the chance to present counter evidence. 25

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED. The May 26, 2017 Decision and July 13, 2017 Resolution 26 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 149018 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED." (Hernando, J., on leave).

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) MISAEL DOMINGO C. BATTUNG IIIDeputy Division Clerk of Court

 

Footnotes

* Pursuant to Amended Administrative Circular No. 83-2015; confidentiality of the identities of the parties, records and court proceedings is mandated in cases involving Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act of 2004).

1.Rollo, pp. 172-176.

2.Id. at 29-32.

3.Id. at 56-60.

4.Id. at 33.

5.Id. at 34.

6.Id. at 82-97.

7. See Order, id. at 113.

8.Id. at 35-36.

9. See Order, id. at 117.

10.Id. at 37.

11.Id. at 28-47. Penned by Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro-Javier (now a Member of this Court), and concurred in by Associate Justices Manuel M. Barrios and Pedro B. Corales.

12. See Resolution dated July 13, 2017, id. at 50.

13.Id. at 14.

14.Id. at 286-303.

15. Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. — If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony. (n)

16.Rollo, pp. 295-296.

17.Id. at 306.

18. Valenciavs. Sandiganbayan, 510 Phil. 70, 82 (2005) citing UnitedStatesvs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289, 293-294 (1917).

19. 202 Phil. 587 (1982).

20. Id. at 598.

21. Supra note 18.

22. Id. at 84.

23. Id. at 82 citing People vs. Januario, 335 Phil. 268, 291 (1997) and UnitedStatesvs. Alviar, 36 Phil. 804, 806 (1917).

24. Id. at 84.

25. Id. at 86-87.

26. Rollo, p. 50.