THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 198514. July 24, 2017.]
A & W MULTI-STEEL CORPORATION, petitioner,vs. ELIZA M. ACUYAN, respondent.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, Third Division, issued a Resolution dated July 24, 2017, which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 198514 (A & W MULTI-STEEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. ELIZA M. ACUYAN, Respondent.) — The petitioner appeals the adverse decision and resolution promulgated on April 28, 2011 and September 9, 2011, 1 respectively, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision rendered on August 26, 2010 by the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) 2 upholding the ruling of the Labor Arbiter to the effect that the respondent had been constructively dismissed from her employment with modification on the award of damages. 3
Antecedents
The relevant facts, as summarized by the CA, follow: SDHTEC
On January 14, 1997, private respondent Eliza M. Acuyan was employed as sales secretary with a monthly salary of P11,500.00 by Sonic Steel Industries, Inc., a company that is engaged in the manufacture of roofing materials. On July 30, 2004, private respondent executed a pro-formaAffidavit of Quitclaim with Renunciation of Rights of even date whereby she stated that she voluntarily tendered her resignation from Sonic Steel and that she received all the benefits due her from the company. Two (2) days later, or on August 1, 2004, private respondent commenced her employment with Sonic Steel's sister company, petitioner A & W Multi-Steel Corporation which is engaged in the marketing and selling of roofing materials and iron bars. She held the same position and earned the same salary. On January 8, 2008, private respondent executed another proformaAffidavit of Quitclaim with Renunciation of Rights, this time expressing her resignation from A & W Multi-Steel, including her receipt of benefits due her and the release of the corporation from any liability.
On January 29, 2008, or twenty-one (21) days from the execution of the second affidavit of quitclaim, private respondent lodged with the Arbitration Branch of Public respondent NLRC the instant complaint for illegal dismissal, underpayment of salary, non-payment of overtime pay and illegal deductions against petitioners A & W Multi-Steel and its officer Anthony Ong and Sonic Steel. It was alleged that she worked for the two companies as sales secretary for eleven years. However, through force and intimidation, she was constrained to execute the Affidavit of Quitclaim with Renunciation of Rights dated January 8, 2008 whereby she purportedly expressed her intention to resign and released petitioner A & W Multi-Steel from all liability. Before signing the document, the officers of A & W Multi-Steel asked her to execute a falsified affidavit and to testify against her fellow employee, sales coordinator Anna Lissa P. Jimeno, against whom petitioner A & W Multi-Steel filed a complaint for estafa with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. When she refused to accede to the demands of the company officers, she was told to resign, otherwise, she would suffer the same fate as that of Jimeno. The complaint thus prayed that her dismissal be declared illegal and that she be paid moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees.
In their traverse, petitioners denied that private respondent was dismissed. Instead, she voluntarily resigned, first from Sonic Steel when she executed the Affidavitof Quitclaim & Renunciation of Rights dated July 30, 2004 and, again from petitioner A & W Multi-Steel when she executed the Affidavit of Quitclaim & Renunciation of Rights dated January 8, 2008. In both affidavits, private respondent acknowledged that she received all the benefits due her under the Labor Code. Since private respondent voluntarily resigned, all her other claims have no basis. 4
On January 16, 2009, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the respondent, and declared her to have been illegally dismissed. 5 The Labor Arbiter opined that her resignation from employment had been involuntary; that the petitioner did not present sufficient evidence to show the voluntariness of the resignation; that all that the petitioner had presented were two notarized affidavits of quitclaim and renunciation of rights, but such affidavits, being proforma, did not establish the voluntariness of the quitclaim and renunciation of rights; that the liability for the illegal dismissal inhered only to the petitioner and its co-respondent Anthony Ong; and that Sonic Steel was absolved from liability because her resignation in respect of the latter had been voluntary. The Labor Arbiter disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that Complainant was illegally dismissed from her employment and in accordance therewith, holding Respondents A & W Multi-Steel Corp. and Anthony Ong jointly and severally liable to pay separation pay and full backwages from date of dismissal to date of finality of this Decision, including moral and exemplary damages of P20,000 each, as contained in the Computation and Examination Unit's schedule of computation herein adopted and attached as Annex 'A'.
All other claims are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
The NLRC initially dismissed the appeal by the petitioner due to a technical infirmity. On motion for reconsideration, however, the NLRC reinstated the appeal and on August 26, 2010 ultimately decided it on the merits 7 by upholding the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. 8
The petitioner challenged the adverse ruling of the NLRC on certiorari in the CA on the basis that the NLRC had gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding that the respondent's resignation had not been voluntary.
As stated, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that the employer raising the defense of resignation by the employee should prove that the resignation was voluntary; that the notarized affidavits of quitclaim and renunciation of right did not prove voluntariness on the part of the respondent because: (a) the affidavits were mere proforma documents; and (2) the affidavits were more of quitclaim and waiver instead of a resignation; that for lack of substantial evidence to prove voluntariness, the respondent's resignation was involuntary; and that, nonetheless, the liability pertained solely to the petitioner, to the exclusion of its co-respondent Ong. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision dated August 26, 2010 is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION in that only petitioner A & W Multi-Steel Corporation is liable to pay private respondent Eliza M. Acuyan her separation pay, full backwages from the date of dismissal to the date of finality of this decision, moral damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00). AScHCD
SOORDERED.9
Issue
In this appeal, the petitioner insists on the validity of the resignation of the respondent as borne out by the notarized affidavits of quitclaim and renunciation of rights; and that she should be barred from receiving any monetary benefit. The query is, therefore: Did the respondent voluntarily resign from employment?
Ruling of the Court
The petition for review on certiorari is denied.
The petitioner hereby seeks the examination and consideration of the evidence it presented to establish the voluntariness of the respondent's resignation. But such examination and consideration of the evidence are beyond the ambit of the review undertaken pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because the Court is not a trier of facts. 10 Section 1 of Rule 45 expressly limits the issues to be raised and resolved to questions of law, viz.:
Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. — A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
What a question of law, as distinguished from a question of fact, is in the context of Section 1 of Rule 45 has been amply explained thusly:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise it is a question of fact. 11
Worth reiterating, too, is that the factual findings of the labor tribunals, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded great respect, even finality. 12 While this rule is subject to several exceptions, such as: (1) when the findings were grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made was manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there was grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment was based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts were conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings were contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings were contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings were conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they were based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs were not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact were premised on the supposed absence of evidence and were contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion, 13 the petition for review on certiorari does not show that this case comes under any of the exceptions.
Further, the employer who raises resignation as a defense in a case for illegal dismissal bears the burden to prove that the resignation was voluntary 14 In this case, the petitioner has kept on pointing to the notarized affidavits of quitclaim and renunciation of rights for that purpose. Yet, the affidavits alone would not establish that the quitclaim and renunciation of rights were voluntary. The CA rightly observed that the affidavits, being proforma documents, did not necessarily support the allegation of their having been executed voluntarily. Consequently, the act therein imputed to the respondent was not a voluntary resignation.
Verily, a resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service; and that he has no other choice but to disassociate himself from his employment. 15 Resignation is a formal relinquishment of an office. Inasmuch as the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before and after the resignation must be considered in determining whether, in fact, the employee intended to sever from his or her employment. 16
The CA justly concluded that the respondent had no intention to resign from her employment. That she refused to testify against her co-employee and filed her complaint for illegal dismissal supported the conclusion. AcICHD
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; AFFIRMS the assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals; and orders the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO V. LAPITANDivision Clerk of Court
Footnotes
1.Rollo, pp. 32-45; penned by Associate Justice Ramon R. Garcia and concurred in by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan.
2.Id. at 181-185.
3.Id. at 71-83.
4.Id. at 33-35.
5.Id. at 71-83.
6.Id. at 82-83.
7.Id. at 181-185.
8.Id.
9.Id. at 44-45.
10.Co v. Vargas, G.R. No. 195167, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 451, 458.
11.Tongonan Holdings and Development Corporation v. Escaño, Jr., G.R. No. 190994, September 7, 2011, 657 SCRA 306, 314; Republic v. Malabanan, G.R. No. 169067, October 6, 2010, 632 SCRA 338.
12.Andaya v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 157371, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 577, 582.
13.New City Builders, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 149281, June 15, 2005, 460 SCRA 220, 227, citing Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, 28 April 2004, 401 SCRA 79.
14.Nationwide Security and Allied Services, Inc. v. Valderama, G.R. No. 186614, February 23, 2011, 644 SCRA 299, 308, citing Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad, G.R. No. 159195, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 308, and Mora v. Avesco Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 177414, November 14, 2008, 571 SCRA 226.
15.Villaruel v. Yeo Han Guan, G.R. No. 169191, June 1, 2011, 650 SCRA 64, 71-72.
16.BMG Records (Phils.), Inc. v. Aparecio, G.R. No. 153290, September 5, 2007, 532 SCRA 300, 313-314.