Christian Catholic Church (EVANGELICAL) of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Roberto n. Dizon, Jr., et al.

[SEC-SICD * CASE NO. 3850. June 29, 1992.] CHRISTIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH (EVANGELICAL) OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. , petitioner , vs . ROBERTO N. DIZON, JR., ET AL. , respondents . DECISION When the respondents' MOTION TO SET ASIDE COMPROMISE AGREEMENT was heard last May 20, 1992, respondents' oral motion to postpone said hearing was denied. Thereupon, the said motion was considered submitted for resolution. cdll It appears that on October 29, 1990, the parties assisted by their respective counsel, submitted a Compromise Agreement, to wit: I The parties herein or any member of their group renounces, relinquishes, and quits rights of membership in said church and/ or corporation; II Both parties and any member of the corporation will not be allowed to use any of the following names: 1. Christian Catholic Church (Evangelical) Philippines Inc.; 2. Christian Catholic Church Evangelical Protestant; 3. Christian Catholic Protestant; 4. Christian Catholic Church; 5. Christian Catholic; 6. Catholic Christian or any name containing variations of the above or deleting one or two names therein; III The churches which shall remain under the ownership and administration of the group headed by Rev. Pat Hermosilla are those listed in Annex "A" hereof, one of the assets of said churches in the name of the petitioner are hereby assigned, transferred and ceded by this instrument to said group; and those churches which opt to join the group of Rev. Dizon, Jr. are those listed in Annex "B" hereof and similarly, the assets of said churches in the name of the petitioner are hereby assigned, transferred and ceded by this instrument to said group; and the Register of Deeds shall cancel the title of the petitioner and issue new title to the group to whom the assets have been ceded in the name of the new corporation. IV Each of the two groups may incorporate separately and independently and shall have no further dealing with the petitioner, and the petitioner is declared dissolved pursuant to the Corporation Law; V The so-called Cathedral money in the amount of 62,378.12 shall be returned by Rev. Dizon's group to Rev. Hermosilla's group immediately upon the signing of the Agreement; VI The group of Rev. Dizon shall pay the group of Bishop Hermosilla the sum of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND (P125,000.00) PESOS within one month from the signing of this Agreement to compensate the latter group for its rights, interests, and participation ones the so-called "Mission Land", and within sixty (60) days upon receipt of payment, the members of the group of Bishop Hermosilla shall vacate the premises occupied by them. Respondent thru counsel, filed a motion to set aside the Compromise Agreement, alleging inter alia, that they discovered that petitioner fraudulently included certain churches and properties in its list, which churches have not joined their group nor have manifested any intention of doing so in the future; that the said churches and properties belong to and follow the group headed by respondent Rev. Roberto Dizon; that the aforesaid "Mission Land" is understood by the parties to be a 15.4 hectare lot situated in Visares Capoocan, Leyte with TCT No. 1768 of the Register of Deeds, Tacloban City, including all buildings improvements and growing crops thereon. By way of opposition, petitioner contends that the allegations in the motion that the petitioner included churches and properties which "have not joined their (Hermosilla's) group nor have manifested any intention of doing so in the future" is not fraudulent act to set aside the Compromise Agreement because if the respondents can prove that they really form part of their group, then they can have them, but document in the possession of petitioner show otherwise; that the respondents are estopped to ask for setting aside the Compromise Agreement because they have already complied with a portion thereof, namely, the return of P62,000.00 representing portion of the Cathedral money. We find no sufficient basis to sustain the respondents' plea. Respondents despite the opportunity to do so, have not substantiated their motion with clear satisfactory and convincing evidence to set aside the Compromise Agreement. A Compromise Agreement upon its perfection became binding upon the parties and has the effect and authority of res judicata even if not judicially approved. It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A Compromise is a consensual contract. As such it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract. (Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46953, September 28, 1987). And from that moment not only does it become binding upon the parties (De los Reyes vs. De Ugarte, G.R. No. L-82, December 1, 1945, Supra;) it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially approved (Meneses v. de la Rosa, G.R. No. L-700, August 26, 1946, 77 Phil. 46 ). prLL Conformably, as correctly pointed out by the petitioner, in order to set aside any Compromise Agreement on ground of fraud, there must be extrinsic fraud, which is absent in the instant motion. Considering the foregoing, the respondents' Motion to Set Aside Compromise Agreement should be, as it is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, finding the aforementioned Compromise Agreement not contrary to law, morals and public policy the same is hereby APPROVED and judgment is hereby rendered in accordance therewith. The parties are hereby enjoined to comply strictly with the aforementioned terms and conditions thereof. SO ORDERED. (SGD.) ENRIQUE L. FLORES, JR. Hearing Officer * Copied verbatim from documents obtained directly from the Securities and Exchange Commission .