Ms. Remedios I. Rikken

October 4, 1993 Ms. Remedios I. Rikken Executive Director National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) Office of the President 1145 J.P. Laurel St., San Miguel, Metro Manila M a d a m : This refers to your letter of September 21, 1993 relative to the Memo of Atty. Myrna Feliciano of the UP Law Center and Commissioner of the NCRFW dated July 27, 1993 clarifying certain issues raised in our previous letter dated July 14, 1993 on the interpretation of the following provision of R.A. 7192, otherwise known as the "Women Development and Nation-Building Act. "SECTION 6. Equal Membership in Clubs . Women shall enjoy equal access to membership in all social, civic and recreational clubs, committees, associations and similar other organizations devoted to public purpose . They shall be entitled to the same rights and privileges accorded to their spouses if they belong to the same organization." (Emphasis supplied) In our previous letter we opined that: "The right referred to in the above provision should not be strictly construed to mean "equal membership" in an association or organization. Rather, it should be interpreted merely to mean "equal access" to membership. It would be absurd to construe it in terms of equality in number, as there are types or kinds of organizations wherein not all sexes or persons, by the nature of their objectives, are acceptable or qualified to become members. It is also a matter of general knowledge that corporations may validly prescribe certain qualifications necessary for membership and the mode of procedure in which it may require to comply. Moreover, it is very clear from the above provision that women are given equal access to membership only in associations or organizations devoted to "public purpose" Thus, where the very nature of the objective(s) of a proposed association or organization would not allow women membership or where the objective of the organization is not for public purpose, the same may be registered, even in the absence of a provision giving women equal access to membership, provided its purpose is not contrary to law and the application for registration is in accordance with the Corporation Code and other pertinent laws. The Commission will apply the above mentioned provision allowing women "equal access to membership" only in cases where the objectives or purposes of the organization are for public purposes." However, it appears from the above-mentioned memorandum of Atty. Feliciano that she disagrees with the foregoing SEC Opinion. She claims that the SEC interpretation that "women be given equal access to membership only in associations or organizations devoted to "public purpose" is a narrow one and this should not be used to defeat the intent or purpose of the law; that the rule of "ejusdem generis", followed by the SEC in interpreting the provision, which states that if there is an enumeration, the members of which belong to a class, and the enumeration is followed by a general term, the general term should be limited to the class to which members belong, does not apply when the legislative intent is otherwise. She commented that it is mandated in the Constitution that the State shall provide women with rights and opportunities equal to that of men, and to attain this policy, all government departments and agencies shall review and revise all their regulations, circulars, issuances and procedures to remove gender bias; that what the Constitutional provision mandates is to give impetus to the removal, through legislation, of existing inequalities and the general idea is for the law to ignore sex when sex is not a relevant factor in determining rights and duties. (Citing the Philippine Constitution and J. G. Bernas, the 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Reviewer-Primer 22 (end ed. 1992), and this is precisely why the aforecited Section 6 of RA 7192 was adopted. LexLib She further commented that if we look at the American experience after which our constitutional provision was patterned, we will find that the "U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the archaic and overboard assumption based on gender actually deprived individuals of their personal dignity and deny society of benefits of wide and diverse participation in political, economic, and cultural life; that the court has held that even if a statute does work on slight infringement on a member's right to expressive association, that infringement is justified because it serves the state's compelling interest in eliminating discrimination against women; that the state's compelling interest in assuring equal access of women extends to the acquisition of leadership skills and business contracts as well as tangible goods and services"; that the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the rule that laws do not infringe upon private associational rights of each and every club covered by it where (a) the law, on its face, does not affect the ability of individuals to form associations that will advocate public or private viewpoints, and does not require clubs to abandon or alter any activities that are protected by law; and (b) there is no specific evidence that any of the clubs covered by the law are organized for specific expressive purposes and will not be able to advocate their desired viewpoints as effectively if they cannot confine their membership or those who have the same characteristics such as sex or religion. (Citing several U.S. authorities) It is admitted that the equal protection clause is a specific Constitutional guarantee of the equality of all persons. But this Constitutional mandate should not be interpreted to mean that women should always be afforded with equal rights or opportunities with men, or vice versa, in all cases and under all circumstances. The equality guaranteed under the Constitution "is not a disembodied equality." It does not deny to the state the power to recognize and act upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify. The problem, thus, in equal protection cases is one of determining the validity of the classification made by law. The guarantee of equal protection, according to Tolentino v. Board of Accountancy, simply means "that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other persons of other classes in the same place and in like circumstances". People v. Cayat, G.R. No. 45987, May 5, 1939 summarized the jurisprudence on equal protection thus: "It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class." (Authorities cited in Joaquin G. Bernas S.J. Constitutional Rights) Accordingly, the "equal protection clause signifies that all persons subject to legislations should only be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges and liabilities imposed. It does not require that persons different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. Where there are reasonable grounds for so doing, persons or their properties may be grouped into classes to each of which special legal rights or liabilities may be attached. No violation is committed as long as the classification is reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious. Thus, it was held that there is no denial of the equal protection where under the law certain professions are limited to persons of the male sex; that certain privileges for leaves and hours of labor extended to women (by reason of the physical structure and maternal functions of women) are not extended to men. (Textbook on The New Philippine Constitution by Hector S. De Leon citing 12 Am. Jur. 177-178) Thus, applying the foregoing authorities and legal principles on "equal protection clause", we are of the view that the above-mentioned law should not be interpreted in such a way that women should, in all cases, be afforded the equal opportunity or right to become members in any club, association or organization. The use of the word "similar" in the above-cited provision connotes of organizations whose purposes are related to the preceding enumerations (clubs, committees or associations organized for social, civil and recreational purposes), and therefore, under the rule of "ejusdem generis", the phrase "devoted to public purpose" which is a general term following the enumerations, should be made to refer to all preceding enumerations. In other words the clubs, committees or associations referred to by the Law are those organized for social, civic or recreational purposes which are intended for the benefit of the public in general. Had it been the intention of the lawmakers to apply the provision to all associations, organizations, clubs, committees or groups, the word "similar" and the phrase "devoted to public purpose" should not have been placed therein. It would be an unfair and impractical law if such is the intention, taking into consideration, as previously mentioned in our previous letter, that there are types or kinds of non-stock associations or organizations wherein not all sexes, by the very nature of their objectives, are fit, qualified or acceptable as members thereof. In the light of the foregoing arguments, we maintain our previous view on the matter. Accordingly, any non-stock corporation, association or organization whose purpose is other than for "public purpose or benefit" are free to determine and fix qualifications for membership and has the right to adopt rules prescribing the mode in which the membership therein can be maintained, including the right to limit membership to persons of certain age, sex or of a certain religious denomination or persons engaged in certain occupations, and no one can rightfully claim membership thereof who is not qualified or has not been admitted in the mode prescribed. cdlex If you are still in doubt as to the correct legal interpretation on the matter, we suggest that you refer the same to the Department of Justice for a definite ruling. Please be advised accordingly. Very truly yours, (SGD.) ROSARIO N. LOPEZ Chairman