De Castro v. Atienza

July 21, 2015 SEC EB CASE NO. 06-13-293 (SICD Case No. 4295; SEC AC Case No. 667) YOLANDA DE CASTRO , respondent-appellant , vs. CAPT. LOU ATIENZA , petitioner-appellee . DECISION Before the Commission En Banc is an Appeal 1 filed on 14 June 2013 by Yolanda De Castro (Appellant De Castro) seeking to reverse and set aside the Omnibus Order dated 27 May 2013 (Assailed Order) by the Office of the General Counsel (OGC) resolving the former's: i.) Motion to Cancel Levy and Remove Levy from Title dated 02 June 2010; and ii.) Supplement to Motion to Cancel Levy dated 04 August 2010; and the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ of Execution (Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ) dated 11 June 2010 filed by Petitioner-Appellee Capt. Lou Atienza (Appellee Atienza) . Appellant De Castro is the President and Chairman of the Board of Philippine Muslim Promotion and Placement Agency, Inc. (PHILMUS), a corporation duly registered under Philippine laws and engaged in the business of manpower placement. Appellee Atienza is a stockholder of PHILMUS. 2 On 13 August 1992, Appellee Atienza filed a Petition for Mandamus against PHILMUS with the Commission's Securities and Investigations and Clearing Department (SICD). On 23 February 1999, the SICD Hearing Officer rendered a Decision ruling in favor of Appellee Atienza. However, PHILMUS and Appellee De Castro filed an Appeal with the Commission En Banc . In a Decision dated 16 May 2000, the Commission En Banc 3 affirmed the Decision of the Hearing Officer, to wit: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Ordering respondents to register the 300 shares of stock which petitioner acquired from Juvy Dimaymay-Heruela in the Stock and Transfer Book of PHILMUS and issue the corresponding Stock Certificate. 2. Declaring the Deed of Assignments both dated February 22, 1988 in favor of respondents Yolanda de Castro and Nova Mangasang as null and void. 3. Ordering respondents jointly and solidarily to pay the petitioner the following: (a) Actual dividends/fruits earned on petitioner's 3,060 shares from 1988 up to the present; (b) Moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 Pesos; and (c) Attorney's fees in the amount of P50,000.00 Pesos. SO ORDERED." Thereafter, Appellee Atienza moved for the issuance of a Writ of Execution which was issued by the Commission on 02 February 2004. On 08 October 2004, Nathaniel F. Abaya (Sheriff Abaya) , Sheriff of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), was able to partially serve the writ to the respondents, to wit: CAIHTE 1. To PHILMUS service of the writ was not successful because the said corporation was no longer holding office at the given address; 2. To Appellant De Castro service of the writ was made to Appellant De Castro's personal secretary, who was authorized to receive court processes, since the former was in a meeting and cannot be disturbed. Sheriff Abaya also caused a levy on the real property of Appellant De Castro. 4 On 20 October 2004, PHILMUS and Appellant De Castro filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution and/or to Suspend its Implementation 5 (1st Motion to Quash) alleging that there was a pending criminal case for estafa against her. In an Order dated 08 December 2005, the Commission denied Appellant De Castro's motion for lack of merit. 6 On 01 December 2009, Appellant De Castro to filed a Reiterative Motion to Quash 7 (2nd Motion to Quash) when the criminal case for estafa filed against her was dismissed. In an Order dated 01 December 2009, the Commission denied Appellant De Castro's 2nd motion on the ground that a judgment in a criminal case does not mean that the findings of the administrative proceedings by the Commission are without legal basis because the quantum of evidence in an administrative case is less than that required in the criminal case. 8 On 04 June 2010, Appellant De Castro and PHILMUS filed a Motion to Cancel Levy and Remove Levy in the Title 9 alleging that the levy made pursuant to the Writ of Execution was illegal because Sheriff Abaya should have first demanded the payment of money to satisfy the judgment before levying on real properties of Appellant De Castro. On 11 June 2010, Appellee Atienza moved for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the implementation of the SICD Hearing Officer's Decision dated 23 February 1999, which was affirmed by the Commission En Banc , the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. 10 On 04 August 2010, Appellant De Castro filed a Supplement to the Motion to Cancel Levy alleging that she had personal properties when Sheriff Abaya levied her real property. Thus, the cancellation of the same is in order. 11 On 06 September 2010, Appellee Atienza filed a Consolidated Comment arguing that that PHILMUS and Appellant De Castro are estopped by laches for failing to question the irregularities in the implementation of the subject Writ of Execution. 12 In an Order dated 19 June 2012, the Commission directed the parties to submit their respective Memoranda on the pleadings that they filed, alleging their respective positions, bases, defenses and reliefs sought, supported by their pieces of evidence. Both parties submitted their respective Memoranda. Thereafter, Clarificatory Conferences were also conducted by the Commission. On 27 May 2013, the Commission, through the OGC, issued the Assailed Order denying Appellant De Castro and PHILMUS' Motion to Cancel Levy and Remove Levy from Title and ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution . Hence, this Appeal . Appellant De Castro asserts the following errors: 1.) the General Counsel gravely erred in ruling that Appellee's motion for execution is not barred by five-year rule; and 2.) the General Counsel gravely erred in ruling that respondents (one of them is appellant De Castro) are estopped from asserting improper implementation of the Writ of Execution. Appellee Atienza filed his comment, opposing the instant Appeal on the ground that the SICD Hearing Officer's Decision dated 23 February 1999 has already attained finality and that the Motion for Writ of Execution was already granted on 02 February 2004. The issues herein are: 1.) Whether the Motion for Execution is barred by the Five-Year Rule; and 2.) Whether Appellant De Castro is not estopped from assailing the implementation of the Writ of Execution. The instant Appeal is bereft of merit. As to the first issue, the OGC already ruled that: "Records show that the judgment sought to be executed by petitioner became final on 30 April 2003. Accordingly, petitioner moved for the issuance of a writ of execution on 8 November 2003, which was issued by the Commission on 2 February 2004. Per Sheriff's Partial Report, the writ was served on Ms. De Castro and partially implemented by means of the levy on real property on 8 October 2004. DETACa xxx xxx xxx Based on the foregoing chronology of events, it can be observed that petitioner moved for the execution of the Commission's decision as early as 8 November 2003 or less than a year after said decision became final , and it was only after the motions to quash filed by respondents have been resolved that petitioner sought to resume the execution of 16 May 2000 Decision of the Commission En Banc by filing the subject Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ dated 11 June 2010. Clearly, petitioner's motion for execution was filed well within the five (5)-year period prescribed by the Rules. It must be emphasized that what Section 6, Rule 39 bars is the filing of a motion for execution more than five (5) years from the date of the judgment's finality. This contemplates a situation where no motion has been filed within the given period, no writ has been issued and the judgment has not yet been implemented. Thus, the fact that the Motion for Issuance of Alias Writ was filed by petitioner more than five years after the judgment became final is immaterial since an earlier motion for execution has already been filed on 8 November 2003. Moreover, there is already a writ of execution issued by the Commission and the execution of the decision has actually commenced. In any case, the filing of the original motion for execution on 8 November 2003 effectively tolled the running of the five (5)-year period , and the delay caused by respondents' subsequent pleadings cannot operate to deny petitioner of his right to seek the thorough enforcement of the Commission's decision." 13 We agree with the OGC's ruling that the five-year bar as provided under Section 6, Rule 39 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to situations where no motion has been filed by the winning party for five (5) years from the time when the judgment has attained finality. This is in consonance with the rulings of the Supreme Court, to wit: In Torralba v. delos Angeles , the running of the period was interrupted when the winning party filed a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution . The order of ejectment was not carried out, however, due to the judgment debtor's begging to withhold the execution of judgment because of financial difficulties. The agreement of the parties to defer or suspend the enforcement of the judgment interrupted the period of prescription. 15 Thus, when Appellee Atienza filed on 08 November 2003 (less than a year after the decision became final and executory) a motion to execute the SICD Hearing Officer's Decision (which was affirmed by the Commission En Banc , the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court), the running of the prescriptive period (5-year) was already interrupted. In fact, the writ was already partially implemented. Hence, Appellee Atienza was able to timely execute the judgment and he is not barred as what Appellant De Castro claims. Appellant De Castro did not offer nor present any new arguments or evidence that would warrant a reversal of the OGC's ruling. As to the second issue, the OGC was likewise correct in ruling that Appellant De Castro was estopped by laches from raising the alleged irregularity since it took her a considerable amount of time to question the implementation of the writ. Appellant De Castro had several opportunities to question the implementation of the said Writ of Execution. She never raised the issue immediately in the 1st Motion to Quash dated 20 October 2004, nor did she do it in the 2nd Motion to Quash dated 01 December 2009. She only raised the same on 04 June 2010, or 5 & 1/2 years from the date of the writ of execution, after the two (2) motions to quash were denied. In the case aptly quoted by the OGC, the Supreme Court held that: " This is the first time that petitioners raised the foregoing argument. Records show that petitioners never questioned before the trial court the validity of the writ of execution dated January 20, 1970. What the petitioners sought to annul or set aside before the trial court was the subsequent or alias writ of the execution, on the ground that it was issued after the death of the judgment debtor on June 6, 1971 and therefore, cannot be enforced by levy on the properties or the deceased debtor pursuant to Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner having failed to challenged the order of the court directing the issuance of the first writ of execution, they are now ESTOPPED from asserting that the said writ was null and void . " 16 (Emphasis ours) Clearly, Appellant De Castro is exploiting legal technicalities to frustrate the implementation of a Writ of Execution which is based on a judgment that had long attained finality. In one protracted case, the Supreme Court ruled that: aDSIHc "As a final note, it bears to point out that this case has been dragging for more than 15 years and the execution of this Courts judgment in PEA v. CA has been delayed for almost ten years now simply because De Leon filed a frivolous appeal against the RTCs order of execution based on arguments that cannot hold water. As a consequence, PEA is prevented from enjoying the fruits of the final judgment in its favor. The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its contention that every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the "life of the law." To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, time and expenditure of the courts . It is in the interest of justice that this Court should write finis to this litigation." 17 It has been more than twelve (12) years since the Commission issued a Writ of Execution in favor of Appellee Atienza. However, due to the motions and issues raised by Appellant De Castro, the implementation of the said writ has been unduly delayed. Appellee Atienza has long been deprived of the judgment in his favor. Time and again, the Supreme has ruled that: "It is almost trite to say that execution is the fruit and end of the suit and is the life of the law. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty victory for the prevailing party . Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. An effective and efficient administration of justice requires that once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Courts must, therefore, guard against any scheme calculated to bring about that result. Constituted as they are to put an end to controversies, courts should frown upon any attempt to prolong them. " 18 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Office of the General Counsel's Omnibus Order dated 27 May 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Mandaluyong City, Philippines, July 21, 2015. (SGD.) TERESITA J. HERBOSA Chairperson (SGD.) ANTONIETA F. IBE Commissioner (SGD.) MANUEL HUBERTO B. GAITE Commissioner (SGD.) EPHYRO LUIS B. AMATONG Commissioner (SGD.) BLAS JAMES G. VITERBO Commissioner Footnotes 1. Dated 14 June 2013. 2. Rollo , page 7. 3. As upheld by the Court of Appeals in Philippine Muslim Promotion and Placement Agency and Yolanda De Castro v. Lou Atienza , CA-G.R. SP No. 60147, promulgated on 5 September 2002, and by the Supreme Court in Philippine Muslim Promotion and Placement Agency and Yolanda De Castro v. Lou Atienza , G.R. No. 157204, promulgated on 30 April 2003. 4. Sheriff's Partial Report dated 08 February 2005 by Nathaniel F. Abaya, Sheriff IV of the Regional Trial Court Office of the Clerk of Court Manila, Records of SICD Case Vol. II, p. 206. 5. Dated 20 October 2004, 1st Motion to Quash, Records of SICD Case Vol. II, pp. 82-83. 6. Records of SICD Case Vol. II, pp. 207-210. 7. Dated 01 December 2009, 2nd Motion to Quash, Records of SICD Case Vol. II, pp. 207-210. 8. Records of SICD Case, Vol. II. pp. 346-347. 9. Dated 02 June 2010, Records of SICD Case, Vol. II. pp. 356-357. 10. SICD Records, Vol. II, pp. 358a-358f. 11. SICD Records, Vol. II, pp. 358-359. 12. Consolidated Comment dated 02 September 2010, SICD Records, Vol. II, pp. 370-379. 13. Assailed Order dated 27 May 2013, p. 5. 14. Sec. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A final and executory judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of limitations. 15. Ernesto Villeza vs. German Management and Services, Inc. , G.R. No. 182937, August 8, 2010 citing Torralba vs. Delos Angeles , 185 Phil. 40, 47 (1980). 16. Ibatan, et al. vs. Melicor, et al. , G.R. No. L-39125, August 20, 1990. 17. Bernardo De Leon v. Public Estates Authority , G.R. No. 181970, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 547, 565-566. 18. Vicente Florentino vs. Mariano, Cynthia, Adelfa, all surnamed Rivera, et al. , G.R. No. 167968, January 23, 2006.