Antonio K. Litonjua, et al. vs. Wack Wack Golf and Coountry Club, et al.

[SEC CASE NO. 2811. July 24, 1987.] ANTONIO K. LITONJUA, ET AL. , complainants , vs . WACK WACK GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, ET AL. , respondents . O R D E R This resolves respondents' motion to admit amended answer dated June 1, 1987, the opposition thereto dated June 18, 1987 and the reply to the opposition dated July 2, 1987. EAaHTI Respondents' motion is predicated on the alleged need to clarify/make the averments on sub-paragraphs 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.8 of the answer conform to the specific denial under paragraph 4 thereof. In opposition thereto, complainants maintain that the admission of the amended answer will in effect substantially amend respondents' theory of defense and will unduly prejudice them in maintaining their action. In resolving the incident at bar, it is most relevant to reproduce herein the pertinent provisions of the answer, to wit: "4. They specifically deny the averments in paragraph 5 and sub-paragraphs . . . 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, . . ., 5.8, . . . the truth of the matter being as follows: xxx xxx xxx "4.4. In answer to the averments in sub-paragraph 5.4, respondents state that the alleged acts of Mr. Oscar Santos and a certain Jessie of the Cashier's Office immediately deleting the said complainant's name from the list of delinquent members' was unauthorized and was not binding on the Club because only the Membership Committee with the approval of the Board of Directors has the power to delete complainant's name from the list of delinquent members . . . . "4.5. In answer to the averments of sub-paragraph 5.5., respondents state that complainant Antonio Litonjua had no right to assume that the problem has already been satisfactorily settled by the striking out of his name from the delinquent list through the unauthorized act of Mr. Oscar Santos and a certain Jessie of the Cashier's Office and if the said complainant entertained such belief, he did so at his own risk because the unauthorized act of the aforementioned employees was not binding on the Club. "4.6. In answer to the averments in sub-paragraph 5.6, respondents state that the letter dated February 9, 1985 of Atty. Vicente Felix, General Manager of the Club, confirmed the fact that the deletion of complainant's name from the list of delinquent members by Mr. Oscar Santos and Jessie of the Cashier's Office was not binding on the Club . . . . xxx xxx xxx "4.8. . . . The striking out of complainant's name from the delinquent list was unauthorized as earlier stated and the act of Mr. Oscar Santos and Jessie in deleting complainant's name was not binding on the Club since it is only the Membership Committee with the approval of the Board of Directors that has the power to do so." (emphasis supplied) From the context of the aforequoted portions of the answer, it could be readily seen that the deletion of complainant Antonio Litonjua's name from the list of delinquent members of the Club was never put in issue. There is absolutely nothing in the said averments from which it may be remotely inferred that the respondents denied the material allegations of the complaint regarding the deletion. The denial set forth in the answer hinges upon the contention that, "although Litonjua's name was really deleted, the person or persons who made the deletion were unauthorized because only the membership committee with the approval of the board of directors has the power to delete complainants' name. TaDAIS We find reason to agree with complainant's observation and take particular note of the fact that the deletion of complainant Antonio Litonjua's name has been repeatedly mentioned by the respondents in practically all the aforequoted averments of the answer. The mere statement in paragraph 4 of the answer that "they specifically deny the averments in paragraph 5 and sub-paragraphs 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 . . ." of the complaint without considering the particulars in sub-paragraphs 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, and 4.8 can only be taken as a general denial and is not sufficient compliance with Section 12 of Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure in the SEC. "A denial does not become "specific" merely because it is qualified by that word, but because it specifies the allegations that are not admitted, setting forth, if practicable the matters relied upon to support the denial." (Daconay, et al. vs. Lucero, et al., 76 Phil. 139) Thus, the contention of the respondents that they made specific denial under paragraph 4 of the answer is in the language of the Supreme Court "naive if not puerile arguments". (Beatano vs. Amador, et al., 74 Phil. 755) As a general rule, amendment to a pleading may not be permitted when it appears that the motion was made with intent to delay the action, or that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered. (Section 16, Rule IV of the New Rules of Procedure in SEC). Respondents' motion for leave to amend its answer, at this point in time, when the complainants have already presented their evidence and rested their case, will not delay the proceedings at bar but also will in effect radically change and/or materially vary the issues already formulated and tried. And if amendments, asserting new matters, are allowed, the same would operate as an unfair advantage to the prejudice of the complainants. SECHIA It is clear from all the foregoing that the respondents failed to establish any cogent reason for the admission of its amended answer. WHEREFORE, respondents' Motion To Admit Amended Answer is, as it is hereby, DENIED for lack of merit. Let the continuation of the hearing in the above-entitled case be set on July 30, 1987 and August 6, 1987 both at 9:30 in the morning. SO ORDERED. (SGD.) ANTONIO M. ESTEVES Hearing Officer