In the Matter of Lyceum of the Phils. vs. Lyceum of Aparri
SEC-AC No. 261 (Order) • Securities and Exchange Commission • Commission En Banc • Feb 13, 1990
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[SEC-AC NO. 261. February 13, 1990.] IN THE MATTER OF LYCEUM OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. , petitioner , vs . LYCEUM OF APARRI, ET. AT. , respondents . WESTERN PANGASINAN LYCEUM , cross-claimant , vs . LYCEUM OF APARRI, ET AL. , cross-respondents . O R D E R For resolution is the appeal of cross-defendants in the above-entitled case from the order of the hearing officer dated November 21, 1988 finding the corporate names of petitioner, respondents and cross-claimant confusingly similar and pursuant to their undertakings, respondents and cross-claimant are ordered to amend their respective Articles of Incorporation by deleting the word "LYCEUM" in their corporate names and substituting another word in lieu thereof. LLphil The petition a quo was filed on February 24, 1984 by Lyceum of the Philippines seeking to compel all the respondents to change their corporate names in accordance with their respective undertakings and to permanently enjoin them from using the word "LYCEUM" in their corporate names. Petitioner alleged that all the parties are corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines and are educational institutions registered with the Commission; that by prior appropriation and continuous use, petitioner has acquired a vested right to the name "Lyceum"; that the corporate names of the respondents are similar and identical with that of the petitioner as to cause confusion and mislead the public into believing that respondents are identical with petitioner or are in one way or another connected with the petitioner. Respondent cross-claimant Western Pangasinan Lyceum, Inc. in its answer alleged that it was originally registered as a non-stock corporation on April 17, 1933 with the Bureau of Commerce. On October 27, 1950, respondent cross-claimant was transformed or converted into a stock corporation using the same name "Western Pangasinan Lyceum" but added the word "Incorporated". That being the first to make use of the name "LYCEUM" by prior appropriation and continuous use, cross-claimant has acquired vested right to use its corporate name. Respondents Lyceum of Aparri, Lyceum of Cabagan, Lyceum of Camalaniugan, Inc., Lyceum of Lallo, Inc., and Lyceum of Tuao, Inc. in their answer alleged that the word LYCEUM" is a generic word descriptive of an institution of learning like "university", "college", or "institute", so that cross-claimant cannot claim to have acquired exclusive right to the use of said word. That petitioner and cross-claimant are estopped from claiming exclusive right to said word due to the prior existence of the "Liceo de Manila". The hearing officer held that the word "LYCEUM" can be appropriated and that the petitioner has the right over the said word as it was registered ahead of all the respondents. Thus, on November 21, 1988, an Order was issued finding the corporate names of petitioner, respondents and cross-claimant confusingly similar and therefore, to amend their respective Articles of Incorporation by deleting the word "LYCEUM" and substituting another word in lieu thereof. Hence, this appeal by the cross-claimant and cross-respondents. The issue to be resolved is whether or not the word "LYCEUM" can be appropriated. LLjur "Lyceum" as defined is a grove near Athens in which Aristotle taught (Webster Dictionary). An institution or movement providing public lectures, concerts and entertainments and generally furthering education. In other words, it is a generic word for an institution of learning like "university", "college", "school", or "institute". The general rule is generic or descriptive and geographical names and words can not be appropriated. However, this rule is not without exception. So that under the doctrine of secondary meaning, a word or phrase originally incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article on the market, because geographically or otherwise descriptive, might nevertheless have been used so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to his article that, in that trade and to that branch of the purchasing public, the word or phrase has come to mean that the article was his products (Ana Ang vs. Toribio Teodoro, G.R. No. 48226, December 14, 1942, 74 Phil. 50). But before a word or phrase may acquire a secondary meaning, the word or phrase must have been used so long and so exclusively by one person or entity so much so that the word or phrase has been so identified to his product in the minds of the public that confusion will result by the use of the disputed word or phrase by another person or entity. The question here is has the word "LYCEUM" been so identified with either the petitioner or the cross-claimant that subsequent use by the cross-respondent would cause confusion? The records of the case would show that no evidence was adduced to prove that the word "LYCEUM" has been so identified with either the petitioner or the cross-claimant that subsequent use by the cross-respondents would cause confusion in the minds of the public. There is no confusion by the subsequent use considering the prefixes or suffixes attached to the respective corporate names and the distance separating one from the other. The corporate names of petitioner, cross-claimant and cross respondents are not confusingly similar. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is REVERSED. The petition is hereby DISMISSED. llcd SO ORDERED. (SGD.) ROSARIO N. LOPEZ Chairman (SGD.) GONZALO T. SANTOS, JR. (SGD.) RODOLFO L. SAMARISTA Associate Commissioner Associate Commissioner (SGD.) ARMANDO Z. GONZALES (SGD.) MERLE O. MANUEL Associate Commissioner Associate Commissioner
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