Filing/Submission of BIR Form 2316 for Calendar Year 2021 to the Bureau of Internal Revenue

EN BANC [C.T.A. EB CASE NO. 1298. September 20, 2016.] (C.T.A. Case No. 8377) THE ABBA'S ORCHARD SCHOOL, INC. , petitioner , vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondent . DECISION CASANOVA , J p : This is an appeal, by way of Petition for Review, 1 filed by petitioner-The Abba's Orchard School, Inc., pursuant to Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 ("Assailed Decision") dated November 4, 2014, and Resolution 3 ("Assailed Resolution") dated April 6, 2015, both rendered by the CTA Third Division in CTA Case No. 8377. Petitioner is a non-stock, non-profit educational corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, with principal address at Alwana Business Park, Caguman, Cagayan de Oro City, where it may be served with orders, notices, resolutions and other processes. It is engaged in the operation of schools which offers formal academic instructions to the following levels: Pre-school, Elementary and High School in the different parts of the Philippines, particularly Cagayan de Oro City, Bukidnon, Davao, and Metro Manila. 4 On the other hand, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("CIR") is the duly appointed Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR"), vested with the authority to act as such, including the power to assess and collect internal revenue taxes, as well as the power to decide disputed assessments, among others, subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Respondent holds office at the BIR National Office Building, Diliman, Quezon City. 5 The facts of the case, as narrated in the Assailed Decision, are as follows: "On January 31, 2011, the Bureau of Internal Revenue ('BIR') issued a Preliminary Assessment Notice ('PAN') against petitioner for deficiency income tax and expanded withholding tax ('EWT') in the amount of Php2,062,676.98 and Php113,912.15, respectively, inclusive of surcharges, interest and compromise penalties, for the taxable year 2008. On February 14, 2011, petitioner filed a protest letter in response to the PAN, stating that it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution, therefore exempt from the payment of tax on income solely derived from its school related activities. Petitioner further explains that the alleged failure to withhold the necessary taxes from services were payments from professional fees made in favor of a general professional partnership, which is considered exempt from EWT. TIADCc On July 29, 2011, the BIR issued a Formal Letter of Demand reiterating its demand on the payment of the said taxes, but in an increase amount of Php2,169,430.38 and Php98,176.15, representing deficiency on income tax and EWT, inclusive of surcharges, interest and compromise penalties. In response thereto, on August 9, 2011, petitioner filed its protest and specifically states that it already paid the amount of Php98,176.15 for the EWT. On September 1, 2011, the BIR issued her Final Decision on Disputed Assessment ('FDDA') assessing petitioner for deficiency income tax in the amount of Php2,169,430.39. Having received the FDDA on October 14, 2011, petitioner filed this Petition for Review on November 14, 2011. In her Answer, respondent interposed the following special and affirmative defenses: '4. Petitioner The Abbas Orchard School, Inc. is liable to pay its deficiency income tax assessment in the total amount of Two Million, One Hundred Sixty Nine Thousand, Four Hundred Thirty and 39/100 (P2,169,430.39) as the said assessment was issued in accordance with law and jurisprudence. 5. Comprehensive study disclosed that petitioner is liable to pay the total deficiency income tax assessment. A non-stock, non-profit educational institution is governed by Section 4(3), Article XIV of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which provides: 'All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law.' While Article 8 Section 17 of the 1973 Philippine Constitution provides: (3) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques and non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious or charitable purposes shall be exempt from taxation. The foregoing provisions are revisions of Article VI Section 22 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution which reads: (3) Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation. Evidently, under the 1935 Constitution, all lands, buildings and improvements are only required to be used exclusively for educational purpose to be exempt from taxation. Yet, with the advent of the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitution, the words 'actually and directly' are included in the provision. 'Exclusive' is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or enjoyment; and 'exclusivity' is defined, 'in a manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively.' 'Actual is defined as existing in fact; real.' While direct is defined as straight; undeviating, free from extraneous influence, immediately. Hence, actual, direct, and exclusive use means real, immediate and sole application of the lands, building and improvement to the purpose for which the educational institution is established. The intendment of the Constitutional framers to prevent evasion and deviation from the strict letter of the law is plainly apparent. The exemption granted to the non-stock, non-profit institution is not automatically and necessarily granted owing to the 'Lifeblood Doctrine.' Clear and convincing evidence must be presented to show that indeed the 'lands, buildings and improvements are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY AND EXCLUSIVELY used for educational purposes.' Distinctly, the Constitution does not undertake to exempt all income of the institution from taxability; the qualification of the phrase 'actually, directly and exclusively,' is of utmost importance. It cannot be simply ignored. Petitioner cannot just rely and cloak itself with the Constitutional grant without showing proof of its entitlement thereto. Time and again, the basic rule remains Taxation is the rule; Exemption is the exception. Accordingly, statutes granting tax exemptions must be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. To him, thereof, who claims a refund or exemption from tax payments rests the burden of justifying the exemption by words too plain to be mistaken and too categorical to be misinterpreted. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. PLDT, G.R. No. 140230, December 2005) AIDSTE In the instant case, petitioner failed to present proof of exemption, one of which is the Certificate of Tax Exemption pursuant to Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 14-2001. This prompted respondent to subject it to 10% income tax in accordance with Section 27(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 which provides: ' SECTION 27. Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporations. xxx xxx xxx (B) Proprietary Education Institutions and Hospitals. Proprietary educational institutions and hospitals which are nonprofit shall pay a tax of ten percent (10%) on their taxable income except those covered by Subsection (D) hereof: Provided, that if the gross income from unrelated trade, business or other activity exceeds fifty percent (50%) of the total gross income derived by such educational institutions or hospitals from all sources, the tax prescribed in Subsection (A) hereof shall be imposed on the entire taxable income. For purposes of this Subsection, the term 'unrelated trade, business or other activity' means any trade, business or other activity, the conduct of which is not substantially related to the exercise or performance by such educational institution or hospital of its primary purpose or function. A 'proprietary educational institution' is any private school maintained and administered by private individuals or groups with an issued permit to operate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),or the Commission on Higher Education (CHED),or the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA),as the case may be, in accordance with existing laws and regulations.' 6. In the case of De La Salle University vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.T.A. EB No. 671 (C.T.A. Case No. 7303), June 08, 2011) the Honorable Court citing the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 298 SCRA 97 ,laid down the requirements for an educational institution to be entitled to the exemption in the afore-cited constitutional provision, to wit: 1) it falls under the classification of non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and 2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes. Whether the income of petitioner was used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes remains to be proven by such quantum of proof required in the courts of law. 7. Taxes are essential to government's very existence; (CIR v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 148191, November 25, 2003) hence, the dictum that 'taxes are the lifeblood of the government.' For this reason, the right of taxation cannot easily be surrendered; statutes granting tax exemptions are considered as a derogation of the sovereign authority. (CIR v. Fortune Tobacco Corporation, G.R. Nos. 167274-75, July 21, 2008) Tax exemptions are to be construed strictissimi juris against the person or entity claiming the exemption. (Philippine Phospate Fertilizer Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. 141973, June 28, 2005) A tax exemption cannot arise from vague inference. Tax exemptions must be clear and unequivocal. A taxpayer claiming a tax exemption must point to a specific provision of law conferring on the taxpayer, in clear and plain terms, exemption from a common burden. Any doubt whether a tax exemption exists is resolved against the taxpayer. (City of Iloilo vs. Smart, G.R. No. 167260, February 2009) It cannot be over-emphasized that tax exemption represents a loss of revenue to the government and must, therefore, not rest on vague inference. Exemption from taxation is never presumed. For tax exemption to be recognized, the grant must be clear and express; it cannot be made to rest on doubtful implications. (Antam Pawnshop vs. CIR, G.R. No. 167962, September 2008) 8. Assessments are presumed correct and made in good faith. The taxpayer has the duty of proving otherwise. In the absence of proof of any irregularities in the performance of official duties, an assessment will not be disturbed. Even an assessment based on estimates is prima facie valid and lawful where it does not appear to have been arrived at arbitrarily or capriciously. (Marcos II vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120880, June 5, 1997) AaCTcI 9. The burden of proof is on the taxpayer contesting the validity or correctness of an assessment to prove not only that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is wrong but the taxpayer is right. Otherwise the presumption of correctness of tax assessment stands (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Hantex Trading Co., Inc., G.R. No. 136975, March 31, 2005) 10. Petitioner has not pointed out any provision or item in the assessment notice which bears a trace of falsity. Its averments were based on conjectures, surmises and speculations. These cannot supply the basis for the charge of impropriety in the assessments made.' A pre-trial conference was set. Both parties filed their respective briefs. On March 29, 2012, petitioner filed its "Motion for Summary Judgment," while respondent filed her "Comment (Re: Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment)," on April 13, 2012. Considering that there are genuine issues that need to be resolved, the Court issued a Resolution denying the 'Motion for Summary Judgment.' On September 7, 2012, the parties submitted their Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues. On March 19, 2013, petitioner filed its 'Formal Offer of Exhibits.' While, respondent filed her Formal Offer of Evidence by registered mail on July 29, 2013. On November 14, 2013, the Court resolved to submit the case for decision, taking into consideration the 'Memorandum for Petitioner,' filed on October 17, 2013, and the 'Respondent's Memorandum,' filed on November 12, 2013. Hence, this Decision." 6 In a Decision 7 promulgated on November 4, 2014, the Third Division of this Court affirmed with modification the assessment issued by respondent against petitioner, the fallo of which reads: " WHEREFORE ,premises considered, the assessment issued by respondent against petitioner covering deficiency income tax for the taxable year 2008 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION .The compromise penalty in the amount of Php25,000.00 is hereby CANCELLED .Accordingly, petitioner is ORDERED to PAY respondent the amount of Php1,249,182.75 representing deficiency income tax for the taxable year 2008, plus surcharge of 25% imposed under Section 248 (3) of the NIRC, computed as follows: Basic Deficiency Income Tax 1,249,182.75 Add: 25% Surcharge 312,295.69 Total Amount Due 1,561,478.44 ========== Likewise, petitioner is ORDERED to PAY (a) deficiency interest at the rate of 20% per annum on the basic deficiency income tax of Php1,249,182.75 computed from April 15, 2009 until full payment thereof pursuant to Section 249 (B) of the NIRC; and (b) delinquency interest at the rate of twenty percent 20% per annum on the total amount of Php1,561,478.44 and on the 20% deficiency interest which have accrued as aforestated in (a) computed from September 20, 2011 until full payment thereof pursuant to Section 249 (C) of the NIRC. SO ORDERED. " Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration 8 on November 25, 2014, which was denied by the Court in Division in a Resolution 9 promulgated on April 6, 2015, for lack of merit. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review 10 before the CTA Court En Banc on April 22, 2015, which was granted in a Minute Resolution dated April 27, 2015. In the said Resolution, petitioner was given fifteen days from April 23, 2015, or until May 8, 2015, within which to file its Petition for Review. 11 In compliance therewith, petitioner filed its Petition for Review on May 8, 2015. Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for Review, respondent was ordered by the Court, in a Resolution 12 dated June 24, 2015, to file his Comment, not a Motion to Dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. However, per Records Verification 13 dated August 10, 2015, respondent failed to file the same. Thereafter, the Court En Banc ordered both parties to submit their Memoranda within thirty (30) days from receipt of the Resolution 14 promulgated on August 27, 2015. On December 28, 2015, the case was submitted 15 for decision, taking into consideration petitioner's Memorandum 16 filed on October 7, 2015 and respondent's Memorandum 17 filed on November 16, 2015. Hence, this Decision. In this case, petitioner submits the following grounds for the consideration of the Court: "TAOSI is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution that derives income from, and incurs expenses exclusively for, education-related purposes. The Third Division gravely erred in ordering TAOSI to pay deficiency income tax for the year 2008, plus surcharge and interest. EcTCAD In its tax assessment, the BIR does not find that TAOSI derived any income from, or incurred any expenditure for, any unrelated purpose. Since the BIR admitted that its denial of TAOSI's constitutional tax exemption rested solely on the latter's failure to present a certificate of tax exemption, TAOSI did not, in the proceedings before the Third Division, need to prove anew that the BIR's negative finding is correct. It only needed to show that such certification is not legally required, and since it is not so, there is no basis for the assessment against TAOSI." The foregoing issues boil down to whether the Court in Division erred in affirming with modification the income tax assessment issued by respondent against petitioner for taxable year 2008. The Petition for Review is bereft of merit. Before discussing the merits of this case, we shall first discuss the procedural issue on whether or not matters not raised in the administrative proceedings can be raised for the first time on appeal. The Court in Division may rule on related issues In the case at bench, petitioner insists that it has opened all its books to the BIR examiners and transmitted to the BIR all of its receipts, payrolls, cash and check vouchers, and other documents in relation to its revenues and expenses for the year 2008 as shown in its transmittal letters 18 dated August 24 and 25, 2010 and September 9, 2010. Nonetheless, there was no finding in the Final Decision on Disputed Assessment (FDDA) that petitioner's revenues were not derived from education related sources or that it incurred expenses not related to education. Accordingly, the only basis stated therein in denying petitioner's claim of exemption from income tax was the latter's failure to present a certificate of tax exemption. For these reasons, petitioner argues that the CTA Third Division gravely erred and violated its right to due process when, after having rejected the aforesaid sole basis of the BIR in denying petitioner's claim of exemption from income tax, it nonetheless denied said claim on different grounds such as petitioner's failure to prove that its income has been used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes; and, that no part of its income has been derived from activities conducted for profit. On the other hand, respondent, citing the case Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Hantex Trading Co., Inc. , 19 argues that the burden of proof is on the taxpayer contesting the validity or correctness of an assessment to prove not only that the CIR is wrong but the taxpayer is right. Otherwise, the presumption of correctness of tax assessment stands. She also avers that any doubt on whether a tax exemption exists should be resolved against the taxpayer. The Court cannot subscribe to petitioner's view. In this case, while it is true that the issues on whether or not petitioner failed to prove that "its income has been utilized actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes"; and that "no part of its income has been derived from activities conducted for profit" have not been raised by respondent in the assailed FDDA, the Court in Division may still rule on the same, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section 1, Rule 14 of the 2005 Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals, as amended, which provides that "[i]n deciding the case, the Court may not limit itself to the issues stipulated by the parties but may also rule upon related issues necessary to achieve an orderly disposition of the case." Apropos thereto, it is a basic tenet that once a Court acquires jurisdiction over a case, it has wide discretion to look upon matters which, although not raised as an issue, would give life and meaning to the law. 20 Further, no less than the Supreme Court has ruled that the appellate courts have the inherent authority to review unassigned errors (1) which are closely related to an error properly raised, or (2) upon which the determination of the error properly assigned is dependent, or (3) where the Court finds that consideration of them is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. 21 Lastly, We would like to stress that an appeal, once accepted by this Court, throws the entire case open to review, and that this Court has the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned as error by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case. 22 Applying the foregoing, considering that petitioner anchors its claim of exemption from income tax on Section 4 (3), Article XIV of the Constitution and Section 30 (H) of the 1997 NIRC, as amended, it then follows that this Court has jurisdiction to determine if petitioner was able to comply with the established requisites of the said provisions. Thus, We shall now proceed to determine whether petitioner should be classified as a non-stock, non-profit educational institution. The relevant provisions on this matter are Section 4 (3), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution and Section 30 (H) of the 1997 NIRC, as amended, which respectively provides: Section 4 (3), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution " Article XIV Education, Science and Technology, Arts, Culture and Sports Section 4. ... (3) All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit educational institutions used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt from taxes and duties. Upon the dissolution or cessation of the corporate existence of such institutions, their assets shall be disposed of in the manner provided by law. HSAcaE xxx xxx xxx." Section 30 of the 1997 NIRC, as amended " SEC. 30. Exemptions from Tax on Corporations. The following organizations shall not be taxed under this Title in respect to income received by them as such: (A) ... xxx xxx xxx (H) A nonstock and nonprofit educational institution;" On the other hand, the requisites for the said provisions are enumerated by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals , 23 in this wise: (1) the educational institution falls under the classification non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (2) the income it seeks to be exempted from taxation is used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes. Petitioner complied with the first requisite Section 87 of the Corporation Code of the Philippines 24 defined a non-stock corporation in this wise: "Section 87. Definition. For the purposes of this Code, a non-stock corporation is one where no part of its income is distributable as dividends to its members, trustees, or officers, subject to the provisions of this Code on dissolution: Provided, That any profit which a non-stock corporation may obtain as an incident to its operations shall, whenever necessary or proper, be used for the furtherance of the purpose or purposes for which the corporation was organized, subject to the provisions of this Title." On the other hand, non-profit is defined as "no net income or asset accrues to or benefits any member or specific person, with all the net income or asset devoted to the institution's purposes and all its activities conducted not for profit." 25 A perusal of petitioner's Amended Articles of Incorporation 26 reveals that it is essentially a non-stock, non-profit educational institution, formed to operate a school, specifically for the following levels: Pre-school, Elementary, and High-School in different parts of the Philippines. The same, likewise, provides that "no part of the income which the association may obtain as an incident to its operation shall be distributed as dividends to its members, trustees or officers subject to the provisions of the Corporation Code on dissolution. That in case of dissolution, assets of the Corporation shall belong to similar institutions or to the government. . . . Any profit obtained by association as a result of its operation, whenever necessary or proper, shall be used for furtherance of the purposes as enumerated in Article II, subject to the provision of Title XI of the Corporation Code of the Philippines." AScHCD Based therefrom, there is no doubt that petitioner was able to comply with the first requisite. Petitioner failed to comply with the second requisite Settled is the rule that statutes in derogation of sovereignty, such as those containing exemption from taxation, should be strictly construed in favor of the State. 27 The burden of proof rests upon the party claiming exemption to prove that it is, in fact, covered by the exemption so claimed. 28 Moreover, under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1125, 29 the CTA is categorically described as a court of record. As cases filed before it are litigated de novo ,party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases. Thus, between petitioner and the BIR, the former should prove its case. In the case at bench, We find petitioner's Audited Financial Statements for the year 2008, 30 which comprise the Balance Sheet, 31 Statement of Activities, 32 Statement of Changes in Fund Balance 33 and Statement of Cash Flows 34 insufficient to prove that all its income and revenues were actually, directly and exclusively used for educational purposes. Petitioner should have provided the Court with copies of its books of account ( i.e. ,general ledger, subsidiary ledger, cash receipts and disbursement books and general journal) and source documents ( i.e. ,official receipts, invoices, and disbursement vouchers),upon which the figures shown in the said Audited Financial Statements were based. It also bears noting that even prior to the initial presentation of the witness for petitioner 35 (scheduled on October 8, 2012),the Court in Division has already emphasized, in the Resolution 36 dated June 25, 2012, the need for further proceedings and presentation of evidence by both parties, in a regular trial on the merits, to resolve the following genuine issues: "(1) whether or not the income derived by petitioner from its school related activities is exempt from income tax, despite petitioner not having previously secured a ruling/certificate of exemption from the BIR confirming its status as a tax exempt non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and, (2) whether the income of petitioner was used actually, directly and exclusively for educational purposes." Thus, petitioner cannot now insist that it need not prove anew, in the proceedings before this Court that its income was derived from education-related sources, and none of its expenditures were unrelated to education. However, notwithstanding the aforesaid Resolution, as well as the considerable length of time given to petitioner to substantiate its claim of exemption from income tax, the latter still opted to prove only the non-necessity of submitting a certificate of tax exemption. Being a court of record, the CTA is not expected to dig into the records of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to supply the insufficient evidence presented by petitioner. Further, petitioner cannot justify the non-presentation of the aforesaid lacking documents on the sole ground that the originals thereof have already been forwarded with the BIR during the administrative investigation of its case. After all, petitioner ought to have copies of the same since it is required to keep a copy of its business transactions. Nonetheless, assuming that petitioner has no more copies of the said documents, it could have simply requested the Court to issue a subpoena duces tecum to compel the BIR to submit the documents needed by it. But, as pointed out earlier, petitioner opted not to do so. Consequently, petitioner has no one to blame but itself for its failure to substantiate it claim of exemption from income tax, pursuant to Section 4 (3), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution and Section 30 (H) of the 1997 NIRC, as amended. Similarly, We cannot lend credence on the testimonies of petitioner's witnesses, Mr. Gideon A. De Leon (expert witness in the field of Accountancy) and Ms. Eve Sherlyn P. Dychauco (Chief Accountant of Petitioner) which, as correctly pointed out by the Court in Division, were "self-serving" considering that there are no other supporting evidence substantial enough for the Court to verify whether the income was utilized actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes or its income has been derived from non-profit activities." Based therefrom, it is evident that petitioner failed to discharge its burden of proving that the income it seeks to be exempted from income tax was used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes. However, petitioner remains a proprietary educational institution under Section 27 (B) of the 1997 NIRC, as amended. Thus, respondent correctly subjected petitioner's income to ten percent (10%) tax prescribed in the said section, to wit: "SEC. 27. Rates of Income Tax on Domestic Corporations. xxx xxx xxx (B) Proprietary Educational Institutions and Hospitals. Proprietary educational institutions and hospitals which are non-profit shall pay a tax of ten percent (10%) on their taxable income except those covered by Subsection (D) hereof: Provided, That if the gross income from unrelated trade, business or other activity exceeds fifty percent (50%) of the total gross income derived by such educational institutions or hospitals from all sources, the tax prescribed in Subsection (A) hereof shall be imposed on the entire taxable income. For purposes of this Subsection, the term 'unrelated trade, business or other activity' means any trade, business or other activity, the conduct of which is not substantially related to the exercise or performance by such educational institution or hospital of its primary purpose or function. A 'proprietary educational institution' is any private school maintained and administered by private individuals or groups with an issued permit to operate from the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS),or the Commission on Higher Education (CHED),or the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA),as the case may be, in accordance with existing laws and regulations." AcICHD Finding no reversible error, the Court En Banc affirms the Assailed Decision dated November 4, 2014 and the Assailed Resolution dated April 6, 2015, both rendered by the CTA Third Division. WHEREFORE ,premises considered, the present Petition for Review is hereby DENIED ,for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. (SGD.) CAESAR A. CASANOVA Associate Justice Roman G. del Rosario, P.J.,Juanito C. Castaeda, Jr.,Lovell R. Bautista, Erlinda P. Uy, Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino, Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla and Ma. Belen M. Ringpis-Liban, JJ. ,concur. Footnotes 1. En Banc Rollo (Vol. I),pp. 12-49. 2. Annex "A" to the Petition for Review, Ibid. ,pp. 51-69. 3. Annex "B" to the Petition for Review, Id. ,pp. 71-76. 4. Par. 1, The Parties, Decision dated November 4, 2014, Annex "A" to the Petition for Review, Id. ,p. 52. 5. Par. 2, The Parties, Decision dated November 4, 2014, Annex "A" to the Petition for Review, Ibid. 6. The Facts, Decision dated November 4, 2015, Annex "A" to the Petition for Review, En Banc Rollo (Vol. I),pp. 52-59. 7. Supra note 2. 8. Annex "Q" to the Petition for Review, En Banc Rollo (Vol. I),pp. 460-480. 9. Supra Note 3. 10. Id. ,pp. 1-6. 11. Supra Note 2. 12. En Banc Rollo (Vol. I),pp. 483-484. 13. Ibid. ,p. 485. 14. Id. ,pp. 488-489. 15. Resolution dated December 28, 2015, En Banc Rollo (Vol. II),pp. 545-546. 16. Id. ,pp. 490-525. 17. Id. ,pp. 535-543. 18. Exhibits "N","O","P". 19. G.R. No. 136975, March 31, 2005. 20. Comilang v. Burcena ,G.R. No. 146853, February 13, 2006. 21. Sesbreo vs. Central Board of Assessment Appeals , G.R. No. 106588, March 24, 1997; Adelfa Demafelis vs. Court of Appeals and Fernando Condez ,G.R. No. 152164, November 23, 2007. 22. Edilberto L. Barcelona vs. Dan Joel Lim and Richard Tan ,G.R. No. 189171, June 3, 2014, citing Sociedad Europa de Financiacion, S.A. v. Court of Appeals ,G.R. No. 75787, January 21, 1991. 23. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 124042, October 14, 1998. 24. Batas Pambansa Bilang 68. 25. CIR vs. St. Luke's Medical Center, Inc. , G.R. Nos. 195909 and 195960, September 26, 2012. 26. Exhibit "A". 27. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc. vs. City of Davao, et al. ,G.R. No. 143867, March 25, 2003. 28. National Power Corporation vs. Province of Isabela ,G.R. No. 165827, June 16, 2006. 29. AN ACT CREATING THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS. 30. Exhibit "B". 31. En Banc Rollo (Vol. I),p. 378. 32. Ibid. ,p. 379. 33. Id. ,p. 380. 34. Id. ,p. 381. 35. Per Minutes of the Hearing dated October 8, 2012, Division Docket (Vol. I),p. 305. 36. Division Docket (Vol. I),pp. 217-221.