Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of Presidential Decree No. 659, dated February 21, 1975, as Amended

SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION [C.T.A. CASE NO. 7574. April 7, 2010.] TAGANITO MINING CORPORATION , petitioner , vs . COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondent . RESOLUTION UY , J p : For resolution is respondent's "MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION" filed on January 29, 2010, with petitioner's "COMMENT/OPPOSITION ON THE MOTION FOR PARTIAL RECONSIDERATION" filed on February 15, 2010, praying for the partial reconsideration of this Court's Decision promulgated on January 8, 2010, the dispositive portion of which reads: " WHEREFORE , premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED . Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED TO REFUND to petitioner the amount of EIGHT MILLION TWO HUNDRED FORTY NINE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE PESOS AND THIRTY THREE CENTAVOS (P8,249,883.33) , representing its unutilized input taxes attributable to zero-rated sales from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2005. SO ORDERED. " In his Motion, respondent argues that: (1) petitioner has not sufficiently proven its entitlement to a refund; (2) this Court has no jurisdiction to act on the instant Petition for Review; and (3) the denial by inaction was proper in all respects. The instant Motion lacks merit. Petitioner has sufficiently proven its entitlement to the amount of refund granted by this Court. Thus, the denial thereof through inaction by respondent was not proper. Respondent argues that petitioner has not sufficiently proven its entitlement to the refund being claimed. He makes general averments on petitioner's non-compliance with certain requirements, such as those pertaining to the registration of petitioner as a value-added tax (VAT) entity, and that its purchases of goods and services were not properly supported by VAT invoices and/or official receipts, as well as those referring to the invoicing requirements set forth by law. However, said general averments, even when coupled by quoting perfunctorily the words of the pertinent law, cannot be countenanced, simply because they fail to state concrete and specific grounds to warrant the granting of the instant Motion. This holds especially true here, since the Court found that petitioner has established, with sufficient evidence and in accordance with law, that it is entitled to a certain amount of refund, representing the unutilized input VAT for the four taxable quarters of 2005, contrary to respondent's bare assertions in the said Motion. TaIHEA The Court has jurisdiction. Contrary to respondent's stand, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the instant Petition for Review. Sections 112 (D) and 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997 provides as follows: " SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. (A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made, apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund or creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: . . . xxx xxx xxx (D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof. In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may , within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals." (Emphases supplied) " SEC. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected , until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress. In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however , That the Commissioner may, even without the written claim therefore, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid." (Emphases supplied) A cursory reading of the foregoing provisions will reveal that the legislature did not intend that Section 112 should be read in isolation with Section 229, or vice versa . It is a basic principle in statutory construction that force and effect should not be narrowly given to isolated and disjoined clauses of the law but to its spirit, broadly taking all its provisions together in one rational view. 1 Because a statute is enacted as a whole and not in parts or sections, that is, one part is as important as the others, the statute should be construed and given effect as a whole. 2 A provision or section which is unclear by itself may be clarified by reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute. 3 Thus, although Section 112 is specific as to the subject matter of the refund or tax credit certificate, i.e. , "the creditable input tax due or paid" attributable to zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales, such provision should still be harmonized with Section 229. This must be so because the latter provision is not confined to "any national internal revenue tax . . . alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected" , but also encompasses "any sum alleged to have been excessively . . . collected" , which necessarily covers the characteristic of the input VAT attributable to zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sales. SHTEaA This being the case, the mandatory statute of limitations prescribed under Section 229 in seeking judicial recourse should also be made to apply to claims for refund or tax credit certificate under Section 112, both of the NIRC of 1997. This is notwithstanding the fact that second paragraph of Section 112 (D) provides a period within which to file an appeal a decision or the unacted claim with this Court, since the same provision is couched merely in a permissive sense with the employment of the word "may" . Needless to state, the word "may" is generally permissive only and operates to confer discretion. 4 WHEREFORE , premises considered, the instant Motion is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED. (SGD.) ERLINDA P. UY Associate Justice Juanito C. Castaeda, Jr., J., concurs. Olga Palanca-Enriquez, J., is on leave. Footnotes 1. Leynes vs. Commission on Audit , G.R. No. 143596, December 11, 2003. 2. Id. 3. Id. 4. Bersabal vs. Salvador , G.R. No. L-35910, July 21, 1978.