DOJ Opinion No. 147, s. 1987
DOJ Opinion No. 147, s. 1987 • Department of Justice Opinions • Opinions • Dec 14, 1987
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DOJ OPINION NO. 147 , s. 1987 December 14, 1987 Hon. Guillermo N. Carague Secretary of Budget & Management Malacaang, Manila Sir : This has reference to your request for opinion on whether or not former RTC Judge Benjamin Famador, Jr. is entitled to the benefits granted under Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. No. 910, as amended. llcd Judge Famador, it appears, retired at the compulsory age of 70 years effective June 2, 1986 after rendering only 3 years, 10 months and 16 days service in the government. In its letter dated July 20, 1987, the GSIS informed the Honorable Chief Justice that Judge Famador is eligible for retirement under R.A. No. 910, as amended, effective June 2, 1986 and requested that the amount of P487,640.00 be remitted to the System to cover payment of his five-year lump-sum gratuity. In a letter of the same date, the Deputy Court Administrator requested your good office to issue the corresponding Notice of Cash Disbursement ceiling in the amount of P509,272.54 to cover the payment of the money value of his terminal leave and retirement gratuity benefits under R.A. No. 910, as amended. You state that Judge Famador cannot enjoy the benefits granted under R.A. No. 910, as amended, since he has not met the minimum requirement of 20 years service in the government. Further, you state although a literal interpretation of Section 2 of R.A. No. 910, as amended, would seem to entitle Judge Famador to a five-year lump-sum, your opinion is that this could not have been the legislative intent "as it is unconscionable to give him five years lump-sum when he rendered only three (3) years, ten (10) months and sixteen (16) days government service". As a matter of official courtesy and propriety, this office has to refrain from rendering opinion on the matter. The determination of whether judges are entitled to the retirement benefits provided under R.A. No. 910, as amended, is a matter that properly pertains to the Supreme Court, as the highest court of the land and as the body exercising administrative supervision over all courts, and to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), as the entity authorized to process, adjudicate and approve applications for retirement under the GSIS Act and to adopt rules and regulations to expedite the settlement of claims under the provisions of said Act. In the case of Judge Famador, the Supreme Court has certified that he compulsorily retired effective June 2, 1986 under R.A. No. 910, as amended (see Certificate of Clearance issued by the Court Administrator and Resolution of the Court En Banc dated May 26, 1987), and the GSIS has found him eligible for retirement under R.A No. 910, as amended (GSIS letter dtd. July 20, 1987). The Office is not competent to dispute or disturb such determinations made by the GSIS and the Supreme Court. prcd We may add some pertinent observations, however, with reference to Section 2 of R.A. No. 910, as amended, which is the basis of the present claim for retirement benefits of Judge Famador. Said provision reads: "SEC. 2. In case a justice of the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals or a judge of the Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court, Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, city or municipal court, or any other court hereafter established, dies while in actual services, his heirs shall receive a lump sum of five years' gratuity computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living and representation allowances received by him as such Justice or Judge, if by reason of his length of service in the Government he was already entitled to the benefits of this Act. The same benefits provided for in this section shall be extended to any incumbent justice of the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, or a judge of the Court of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Court, Agrarian Relations, Tax Appeals, Juvenile and Domestic Relations, or city or municipal court, or any other court hereafter established, as the case may be, who without having attained the case may be, without having attained the length of service required in Section one hereof, shall have to retire upon reaching the age of sixty five years, or upon other causes, such as illness or permanent physical disability, to be certified to by the tribunal to which the justice concerned belongs, or by the Supreme Court in the case of an incumbent judge of the Court of First Instance, and other similar courts or record, or a city or municipal judge, which render him incapacitated to continue in his position". (Emphasis supplied) Pursuant to Section 2, above-quoted, in case a member of the judiciary dies while in actual service, his heirs shall receive a lump sum of five years' gratuity if by reason of his length of service in the Government he was already entitle to the benefits of said Act . The same Section 2 also provides that any incumbent member of the judiciary who, without having attained the length of service required in Section 1 of the said Act shall have to retire at the age of sixty-five [now seventy] years or for other causes to be certified to by the tribunal to which the justice concerned belongs, or by the Supreme Court, in the case of judge of a court of record. prcd Section 2 is couched in clear and unmistakable terms. The five-years lump-sum may be availed of by the heirs of any member of the judiciary who dies in actual service and who at the time of death has already served the government for at least twenty (20) years, which is the minimum number of years in service required for retirement under Section 1 of R.A. No. 910, as amended. The same benefit may also be availed of by an incumben t member of the judiciary who, without having compelled the 20-years service requirement, must retire for having reached the compulsory retirement age of seventy years. In the second situation, there are three requisites for availment of the five-year lump-sum, namely: (1) that the retire is an incumbent justice or judge on the date of his retirement; (2) that he is retiring compulsorily at the age of seventy years; and (3) that he has not completed the 20-year service requirement under Section 1. There is no fixed number of years of government service that the retiree has to satisfy. It is enough that he has served the government and is actually in the government service on the date of his retirement. We see no ambiguity in the phraseology of Section 2. Consequently, recourse to statutory construction is not necessary to determine the legislative intent. It has been held that a statute which within itself is clear should be construed as it reads (Burill National Bank v. Edminister, 119 Me. 367, cited in Crawford, Statutory Construction, p. 278). Since Section 2 does not specify the length of government service which would qualify a retiree to receive the benefits provided therein, there would be no justification to disqualify a retiree from availing of its benefits by reason alone of the fact that his government service is short. Retirement statutes are liberally construed in favor of the retiring officer and it should be in this light that Section 2 should be viewed. It is noted that it is in line with this settled rule of liberal construction of retirement statutes that the applications for compulsory retirement of former Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and former Associate Justices Ramon Fernandez and Roseller Lim were approved by the Supreme Court (see op. Sec. of Justice, No. 81, 1987). prcd Very truly yours, (SGD.) SEDFREY A. ORDOEZ Secretary of Justice
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