DOJ Opinion No. 113, s. 1999

DOJ OPINION NO. 113 , s. 1999 December 7, 1999 Atty. Alexander B. Arcilla Director, Bureau of Import Services 3rd Floor, Oppen Building 349 Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue Makati City Sir : The opinion of this Department is requested on the issue relating to the interpretation of the provision of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8752, otherwise known as the "Anti-Dumping Act of 1999". The provision of law adverted to pertinently provide, to wit: "SECTION 3. Section 301, Part 2, Title II, Book I of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows: 'PART 2. SPECIAL DUTIES 'SECTION 301. Anti-Dumping Duty . xxx xxx xxx '(b) Initiation of Action . . . . 'The application shall be filed with the Secretary of Trade and Industry in the case of non-agricultural product, commodity or article, or with the Secretary of Agriculture in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article. The Secretary shall require the petitioner to post a surety bond in such reasonable amount as to answer for any and all damages which the importer may sustain by reason of the filing of a frivolous petition. . . ." (emphasis supplied) Specifically, opinion and assistance is sought on "how to determine a reasonable amount of 'surety bond' which will not be contrary to the principle of due process." It may be stated, at the outset, that there exists no rule of thumb in defining reasonableness. The term "reasonable" is a relative term, and the facts of the particular issue or controversy must be considered in the determination of what is reasonable (see 36 Words and Phrases 406, citing In re: Nice and Schreiber, 123 F. 987, 988). Thus, it has been held, in one case, that a "reasonable amount" meant an amount commensurate with the services, estimated from past experience and present conditions (Ibid., p. 420, citing Butler County vs. Gardner, 96 S.W. 582). prcd Likewise, under the Rules of Court, it is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed (Sec. 5[m], Rule 131). Absent any proof to the contrary, the presumption prevails. There is also a legal presumption that the rates are reasonable and it must be conceded that the fixing of rates by the government, through its authorized agent, involves the exercise of reasonable discretion which, absent any abuse thereof, will not be interfered with (RCPI vs. NTC, 184 SCRA 517, 524, citing cases). Premised on these presumptions and the earlier cited meaning of "reasonable amount", the following court pronouncements in Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, 153 SCRA 622, become material in the fixing or determination of the reasonable amount of surety bonds imposable without running afoul of the principle of due process, to wit: "The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice or hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates. When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character (at pp. 627-628, citing Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, 10 SCRA 46) Hence, considering the aforesaid presumptions on regularity of performance of official duty and reasonableness of rates, not to mention the facts and circumstances pertinent to the determination of said reasonableness, it is evident that apart from the requisite of publication which is a must in administrative issuances, among others, if their purpose is, as in this case, to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation (Taada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446; Pesigan vs. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174), in the determination or fixing of the rates of surety bonds imposable by both the DTI and the Agriculture Secretaries against applicants for anti-dumping investigations, if applicable to all persons, natural or juridical, prior notice or hearing are not essential to their validity nor a requirement of due process. However, if said rates apply exclusively to a particular person, based upon a finding of fact, prior notice and hearing became essential to their validity and the observance of due process (see PCFI vs. Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, supra, p. 628). Your query is, thus, answered accordingly. Very truly yours, (SGD.) JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS Secretary