Coverage of a "Well-defined Group" under R.A. 8367 (Revised Non-Stock Savings and Loan Association Act of 1997)

DOJ OPINION NO. 065, s. 2015 September 17, 2015 Mr. Elmard A. So President & General Manager Multi Savings and Loan Association, Inc. 7/F Pryce Center Building 1179 Chino Roces Avenue corner Bagtikan Street Makati City Dear Mr. So : This has reference to your request for opinion regarding the coverage of a "well-defined group" under R.A. 8367, otherwise known as the Revised Non-Stock Savings and Loan Association Act of 1997. You state that Multi Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (MULTISLAI) was incorporated by the Securities and Exchange Commission on 18 April 1985, and was licensed accordingly by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) on 28 May 1985. You also state that MULTISLAI was incorporated primarily to provide lower loan rates and promote savings to help Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) members and their families with basic financial needs; and that MULTISLAI does not allow membership from the public in general. You further state that on 07 July 2015, BSP Integrated Supervision Department I reiterated an opinion rendered by the Office of the General Counsel and Legal Services (OGCLS) as to the issue of the coverage of MULTISLAI's well-defined group. In this particular instance, OGCLS opined that the OFWs employed by Global Petroprojects Services AG (GPSA) of Zurich, Switzerland do not fall within the "well-defined group" under R.A. 8367 for lack or non-existence of employer-employee relationship between the mother companies, SMS and MRA, identified in the By-Laws of MULTISLAI vi-a-vis the aforesaid OFWs. You finally state that in this regard, the OFWs are ineligible members of MULTISLAI and is directed, among others, to stop accepting members outside the well-defined group as provided in its By-Laws. Hence, this request. With regret, we have to decline the opinion requested as the query involves the substantive rights of a private party, specifically the OFWs, and since the opinion of the Secretary of Justice is merely advisory in nature, such opinion would not be binding upon said private parties who, if adversely affected by such opinion, may take issue therewith and contest it before the courts. As a matter of policy, therefore, the Secretary of Justice has consistently refrained from rendering opinion on questions which are justiciable in nature or those which may be the subject of judicial litigation. 1 Second, pursuant to settled policy and precedents, the Secretary of Justice refrains from expressing his views on matters that fall within the primary jurisdiction of another office or agency, e.g., the BSP, over which he exercises no revisory authority, unless requested by the office or agency concerned. This time-honored policy is dictated not only by practical considerations but also out of due respect and deference for the competence and expertise of the office or agency having primary jurisdiction to resolve the matters and for its familiarity with the policy repercussions of the issues, not to mention the logical recognition of the lawful exercise of an authority conferred by law. 2 Nonetheless, we would like to state some relevant comments and observations, solely for your information and guidance. We refer you to Section 4, paragraph 3 of R.A. 8367, to wit: The Association shall confine its membership to well-defined group of persons and shall not transact business with the general public. A "well-defined-group" shall be defined by the Monetary Board, and shall consist of, but shall not be limited to, any of the following: 1) employees, officers, and directors of one company , including member-retirees; 2) government employees belonging to the same department/branch/office, including member-retirees; and 3) immediate members of the families (up to second degree of consanguinity or affinity) of those falling under paragraphs 1 and 2 above. (Emphasis supplied) AScHCD Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning without attempted interpretation ( Ramos vs. Court of Appeals, 108 SCRA 728, 733). Known as the plain meaning rule, or verbal legis, this rule, which was derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude a different construction (see also, PNB vs. Garcia, 388 SCRA 485, 491). The rationale is because the legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used the words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute (Secretary of Justice Opinion No. 15, s. 2011, citing Opinion No. 39, s. 2010). Further, it is an elementary rule of statutory construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says ( San Juan de Dios Hospital Employees Association-AFW vs. NLRC, 282 SCRA 316). The clear, unambiguous and unequivocal language of a statute leaves no room for construction but only application ( Republic Flour Mills, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Customs, 39 SCRA 269). Please be guided accordingly. Very truly yours, (SGD.) LEILA M. DE LIMA Secretary Footnotes 1. Secretary of Justice Opinion Nos. 5 and 15, s. 2013; Nos. 56 and 57, s. 2011. 2. Secretary of Justice Opinion No. 94, s. 2004, citing Opinion Nos. 81, 64, 62 and 4, s. 2004.