DOJ Opinion No. 038, s. 1999

DOJ OPINION NO. 038 , s. 1999 May 10, 1999 2nd Indorsement Respectfully returned to the Officer-in-Charge, Bureau of Local Government Finance, Department of Finance, Manila, the within 1st Indorsement of that Office, together with its attachments, requesting opinion on the legality of Section 21 of Ordinance No. 7794, as amended, (the Revenue Code of Manila) relative to the letter dated July 21, 1998 of the City Treasurer of Manila requesting advice and/or further instructions on the Notices of Charges issued by the City Auditor of Manila threatening enforced settlement against the revenue collection clerks/officers who implemented the Bureau of Local Government Finance's cease and desist order. It is stated among others that the Order was made in view of the imposition of business taxes under Section 21 of the said Ordinance on businesses already subject to the business taxes under Section 8 and 14 to 20 of the same Ordinance; that the Bureau has consistently expressed the view that the said imposition under Section 21 will constitute double taxation as the same kind of tax is being imposed twice on the same business; and that the City Auditor of Manila, on the other hand, contends that laws or statutes are presumed valid unless its legality or constitutionality is challenged in the proper court and Ordinance No. 7794 enjoys the same presumption of legality and thus, the City Treasurer's Office should continue to perform its mandated function as regards collection of taxes. prcd With regret, this Office is constrained to decline rendition of opinion on the matter for the following reasons: Firstly, pursuant to law and established precedents, the Secretary of Justice, as Attorney General, renders opinion or gives legal advice only on specific questions of law formulated or submitted by the heads of Departments or the chiefs of bureaus and offices called upon to decide or act on cases, controversies or matters actually arising from their respective offices. Accordingly, he has in practice, consistently declined to render opinion or give legal advice at the instance of subordinate officials who, on problems confronting them in the exercise of their official duties, should, as a matter of official courtesy and said administrative practice, first consult their respective chief or head of office who may competently resolve the resolve the issue without seeking assistance from another office (Secretary of Justice Opn. Nos. 92 and 130, s. 1989). Secondly, the resolution of the issue raised would inevitably involve an interpretation and/or examination of the Local Government Code of 1991. The interpretation and application of the Local Government Code of 1991, however, properly fall within the jurisdiction of the Oversight Committee mandated by law (Sec. 533, R.A. No. 7160) to promulgate the rules and regulations necessary for the implementation of the said Code and of the Department of the Interior and Local Government as the lead agency designated by the President in the implementation of the said Code. (Administrative Order No. 269, dated February 21, 1992). Pursuant to settled policy and precedents, the Secretary of Justice does not rule on issues which fall within the primary jurisdiction of another office or agency in this case, the Oversight Committee and DILG over which rulings or actuations this Department exercises no revisory authority, unless the request comes from such office or agency (Secretary of Justice Ops. Nos. 47 and 159, s. 1993). And finally, in line with established precedents, the Secretary of Justice does not pass upon the validity of duly enacted legislative acts of local government units which are presumed valid and enforceable unless declared otherwise by the competent court or superseded or repealed by the lawmaking authority (Secretary of Justice Op. No. 152, s. 1984; No. 302, s. 1956). Although the Secretary of Justice has, pursuant to the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, the authority to decide any question involving the Constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures , we could no longer act on the matter considering that the period to appeal the same to the Secretary of Justice had already expired. In connection therewith, attention is invited to the provisions of Section 187 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which reads: "SECTION 187. Procedure for Approval And Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings . The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: . . . Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal; Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein : Provided finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction." (Emphasis supplied) (SGD.) JUSTICE SERAFIN R. CUEVAS Secretary