DOJ Opinion No. 024, s. 1994

DOJ OPINION NO. 024 , s. 1994 February 24, 1994 Secretary Rizalino S. Navarro Department of Trade and Industry 361 Sen. Gil J. Puyat Avenue Makati, Metro Manila Sir : This has reference to your queries regarding the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations (the "Uruguay Round"). LLpr You state that the Philippines in an active participant in the Uruguay Round which was conducted under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and concluded on December 15, 1993; that the Philippines is committed to implement the results of the Uruguay Round which are contained in the Final Act; that in the case of Agriculture, the Final Act provides for the conversion of non-tariff measures on agricultural products into tariffs; and that such provisions conflict with R.A. No. 7606 (The Magna Carta of Small Farmers), particularly Section 23 (10) thereof, which reads: "SEC. 23. Incentives . xxx xxx xxx (10) Importation shall not be allowed on agricultural products that are produced locally in sufficient quantity. Importation policies should include the protection of new and developing crops such as soybean, ramie, sorghum and wheat. Importation policies shall be reviewed periodically by the government in consultation with farmers' organizations". (Emphasis supplied) You now inquire as follows: "1. Whether the provision of the Uruguay Round to convert quantitative restrictions on agricultural products into tariffs amend the Magna Carta specifically Section 23, paragraph 10"; and "2. Whether non-implementation by the President or the Secretary of Agriculture of the trade provision of the Magna Carta hold them liable for action by interest groups". With respect to the first query, we believe that the abovequoted provision of R.A. 7606 cannot be amended or repealed by the Final Act of the Uruguay Round. While the Philippines adopts "the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land" (Sec. 2, Art. II, Philippine Constitution), it has been said that a municipal law which is in conflict with a rule of international law will often be given effect in municipal courts, the reason being that such courts are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances and that the fact of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere (Salonga and Yap, Public International Law, 5th Ed., p. 13). As another author puts it, in case of conflict between international law and the municipal law of the tribunal deciding the case, the municipal law shall prevail (Paras, International Law, 1980 Ed., pp. 21-22). We find it pertinent to add, however, that if the Final Act is subjected to the ratification process in the Senate pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution, our reply to this particular query might be different if we are to consider and apply the American jurisprudential rule that a treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress in the same manner that an act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty (see Thomas vs. Gray, 169 US 264; 42 Law Ed 740). As regards the second query, it suffices to say that under the Constitution, the main function of the executive is to enforce laws enacted by Congress (Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230). Thus, for as long as Section 23[10] of R.A. 7606 remains in the statute books, government officials tasked with its implementation are bound to comply therewith; otherwise, their actions can be subject to judicial review, which is possible under the principle of separation of powers well-entrenched in our system of government. Thus, in Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals, 101 Phil. 490, cited with approval in Medallas vs. Sayo, 103 SCRA 594, the Supreme Court held: "The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three co-equal departments, the executive, the legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is not be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision in a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the courts as govern the judicial review of all administrative acts of all administrative officers." Please be guided accordingly. Very truly yours, (SGD.) FRANKLIN M. DRILON Secretary