Whether the NTC Can Authorize MediaScape, Inc. to Use the Existing Fiber Optic Network of PLDT

DOJ OPINION NO. 007, s. 2013 January 17, 2013 Undersecretary Lourdes M. Trasmonte Sugar Tripartite Council Chairperson-Designate Department of Labor and Employment Intramuros, Manila Dear Undersecretary Trasmonte : This refers to your request for opinion on the query stated therein relating to the interpretation and implementation of Section 9 of Republic Act No. 809, otherwise known as "The Sugar Act of 1952." Specifically, you want to be advised on the validity of the following grounds raised by the Universal Robina Corporation-Southern Negros Development Corporation (URC-SONEDCO) for its non-compliance with the abovementioned legal provision, to wit: "1. They have not recovered from their business losses brought about by the frequent breakdown of equipment and machineries despite the expansion and upgrade of facilities, and the transfer of canes by planters in the other sugar mills that are not covered by RA 809 also contributed to low sugar production; "2. URC is a different entity from SONEDCO and the latter's liabilities and obligations should not be treated as the former's in the absence of bad faith in the purchase of SONEDCO's assets; "3. The planters and the millers agreed the reversion of the sharing ratio from 70%-30% back to 60%-40% in the crop years (2009-2010, 2010-2011 and 2011-2012), thus there is no more increase in milling participation granted to planters and therefore they are not covered by RA 809." The provision adverted to reads: "Section 9. In addition to the benefits granted by the Minimum Wage Law, the proceeds of any increase in the participation granted the planters under this Act and above their present share shall be divided between the planter and his laborer in the plantation in the following proportion: " Sixty per centum of the increased participation for the laborers and forty per centum for the planters. The distribution of the share corresponding to the laborers shall be made under the supervision of the Department of Labor. "The benefits granted to laborers in sugar plantations under this Act and in the Minimum Wage Law shall not in any way be diminished by such labor contracts known as "by the piece," "by the volume," "by the area," or by any other system of "pakyaw," the Secretary of Labor being hereby authorized to issue the necessary orders for the enforcement of this provision." 1 You state that prior to 1988, the production sharing agreement in the SONEDCO mill district was 60-40, with 60% of raw sugar produced for the planters and 40% for the mill (SONEDCO); that in crop year 1988-1989, by virtue of the above provision, a three percent (3%) field workers' production share became operative in the SONEDCO mill district when a 65%-35% production sharing agreement was implemented; and that this three percent (3%) field workers' production share is automatically converted to quedan in the name of the Secretary of Labor and Employment who holds the workers' share in trust. You also state that in September 1988, the Gokongweis purchased the SONEDCO sugar mill and placed it under the management of the Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (URSUMCO); that with the implementation of R.A. No. 6982 2 effective crop year 1991-1992, and pending the issuance of a definite ruling from higher authority on the substitution of benefits as provided for under Section 12 vis--vis Section 14, both of R.A. No. 6982, DOLE issued Department Order No. 2, s. 1992, providing for the continued implementation of R.A. No. 809 in the mill districts of Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Company (BISCOM), SONEDCO and San Carlos; 3 and that in the case of Planters Association of Southern Negros, Inc. vs. Ponferrada , 4 the Supreme Court upheld the 1993 ruling of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental in Bacolod City, Branch 42, that "the benefits under RA 6982 do not and cannot supersede or substitute the benefits under RA 809 in the milling districts where the latter law was already in implementation at the time of the effectivity of RA 6982." 5 Further, you state that claiming continued business losses, the URC-SONEDCO filed, sometime in 2008, a Petition with the DOLE, through the STC, for the suspension of the 3% production sharing benefit for workers in the SONEDCO milling district for at least two (2) years; that in 2009, URC-SONEDCO and the planters entered into an agreement on the said suspension without the participation of the workers who, thru the Democratic Association of Labor Organizations (DALO), therefore, opposed the agreement; and that the said workers group, however, later withdrew its opposition to the agreement and, in its Board Resolution No. 004-11, dated February 12, 2011, approved the withholding of the 3% workers share provided that it will last only for a period of two (2) years. Considering that the period of suspension agreed upon by the workers was only for two crop years (2009-2010 and 2010-2011), it is your position that URC-SONEDCO should have resumed compliance with the aforesaid DOLE-issued D.O. No. 2. Since, as you claim, URC-SONEDCO refuses to comply with the Department Order and the law, you now elevate the matter to us for resolution. It is basic in statutory interpretation that when the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 6 The reason is because when the law is clear, interpretation does not apply only application. 7 The language of the subject provision on the participation of the laborers vis--vis that of the planters in the sugar plantation is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. As such, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This doctrine is based on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude a different construction. 8 As we have previously opined: As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, while that which is within the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not within the statute; but where the law is clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit (82 C.J.S. Statutes 325). 9 Besides, a reading of the other provisions of R.A. No. 809 does not show any iota of proof that non-compliance of mandate of the law or the waiver of the benefit granted therein is allowed. Neither are we prepared to sustain the same: ut res magis valeat quam pereat or, that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute. The intent of the legislature, it must be stressed, is to be determined from a consideration of the whole of the statute and not from a reading of only a particular or an isolated part thereof. 10 Our position finds support in Letter of Instructions No. 854, 11 issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos under his martial law powers, hence, remains operative. 12 Said Presidential issuance, which was issued after the constitutionality and enforceability of R.A. No. 809 was upheld in the case of Asociacion de Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., 13 provides that, among other things, " (A)s a matter of public policy, any contract, device or quitclaim of any sort tending to exempt the planter, in whole or in part, from the liability under the Act shall be null and void. " 14 To sustain the claims of URC-SONEDCO would be clearly violative of the afore-quoted provision of LOI No. 854 which, having been issued to implement a law, has the effect of a law. 15 Anent the claim that URC has an identity separate from SONEDCO, suffice it to say that the facts stated in your letter tends to belie the said claim. Moreover, any such claim must be supported by competent documentary evidence. Absent such competent evidence, we are not prepared to support URC's claim. We find no reason to discuss the ruling in the Planters Association of Southern Negros, Inc. case for the simple reason that R.A. No. 809, not R.A. No. 6982, is the applicable law, the latter not having amended and/or repealed the former but, as the Court ruled in the Planters Association of Southern Negros, Inc. case, merely complements the same. 16 Please be advised accordingly. Very truly yours, (SGD.) LEILA M. DE LIMA Secretary Footnotes 1. Stress added. 2. Entitled, "An Act Strengthening the Social Amelioration Program in the Sugar Industry, Providing the Mechanics for its Implementation, and for Other Purposes". 3. San Carlos ceased operations in 1999. 4. 317 SCRA 463. 5. Ibid., at p. 469. 6. See, Baranda vs. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757, 770, citing cases. 7. See also, Pascual vs. Pascual-Bautista , 207 SCRA 561, 568; Sec. of Justice Op. Nos. 45 & 40, s. 2012; Nos. 51, 31 & 23, s. 2011. 8. Sec. of Justice Op. No. 23, s. 2010; Nos. 57 & 10, s. 2008; Nos. 48, 45 & 44, s. 2007. 9. Ibid., No. 48, s. 2008; underscoring added. 10. Philippine Global Communications, Inc. vs. Relova, 145 SCRA 385; Aisporna vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 459. 11. Entitled, "On the Implementation of Republic Act No. 809, Otherwise Known as the Sugar Act of 1952". 12. Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution. 13. 88 SCRA 294. 14. 5th Measure mandated to be undertaken and implemented pursuant to LOI No. 854. 15. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Solidbank Corporation, 416 SCRA 436, 448; Yazaki Torres Manufacturing, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 493 SCRA 86, 97; Sec. of Justice Op. Nos. 51, 46, s. 2011. 16. See, Op cit., p. 472.