Marababol v. Andrade

[CA No. 35619-R. October 21, 1969.] BELEN P. MARABABOL, ET AL. , plaintiffs and appellees, vs . ALFONSO ANDRADE , defendant and appellant . Anthony E . S . Santos and Pablo P . Magtajas for defendant and appellant. Jose P . Sabio for plaintiffs and appellees. SYLLABUS OWNERSHIP AND POSSESSION; TAX DECLARATIONS AND RECEIPTS; VALUE. While it is true that tax receipts standing alone are not conclusive proof of ownership, it is equally true that the payment of a tax is one of the most persuasive and positive indicia which shows the will of a person to possess, with claim of ownership, the land or property for which such tax is imposed (Tupas vs. Ricamora, 37 O.G. 581). Payment of taxes may be considered as evidence of ownership because it tends to throw light upon the nature of the claim of possession of property. The tax declaration and tax receipts when considered with other evidence on record become an effective proof of possession where claim of ownership could hardly be doubted. D E C I S I O N CONCEPCION , JR ., J p : This is an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land situated at sitio Tagbalitang, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. The plaintiffs, who claim to have been in possession of the land since 1929, also ask the damages for the alleged usurpation of the property by the defendant between 1954 and 1957 and his refusal to restore its possession to them, notwithstanding repeated demands, plus moral damages and attorney's fees. cdta The defendant answered the complaint, denying the allegations of the plaintiffs and set up the defense of ownership of the land since 1956 by purchase from Constancio Villegas, who in turn allegedly bought the same from Zacarias Tupas several years previous. The defendant also filed a counterclaim for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. After trial decision was rendered, the dispositive portion of which is as follows WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the plaintiffs to be the lawful owners of the land in question and ordering the defendant to immediately vacate the premises and restore its possession to said plaintiffs. The defendant is also hereby condemned to pay to the plaintiffs by way of consequential damages to the sum of Three Hundred Fifteen Pesos (P315.00) annually beginning with the year 1957 up to the date of restitution of the property, plus the sum of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00) as attorney's fees and the costs. From the aforesaid judgment, the defendant appealed. He now maintains that the lower court erred 1. In holding that appellees, and not appellant, are the lawful owners of the land in question; 2. In holding that appellees have been in possession of the land in question since 1928 up to 1957; 3. In holding that appellant's vendor Constancio Villegas, had been in possession of the land in question since 1936 up to 1949 or 1956; 4. In ruling that appellant could not have obtained better rights over the land in litigation than his vendor, Constancio Villegas; 5. In not holding that granting but not admitting that defendant's vendor could not have transmitted better rights to defendant over the land in litigation, nevertheless, said appellant acquired the land in question by prescription, tucking his possession over the land to that of his vendor; 6. In making pronouncements or ruling on who was the true possessor of the land in litigation before the institution of the case based solely on tax declaration and tax receipts; 7. In holding that appellant is a possessor in bad faith of the land in litigation, and ordering the forfeiture of the appellant's improvements thereon in favor of appellees; 8. In ordering appellant liable to appellees in damages and attorney's fees; and 9. In not awarding or granting defendant appellant's counterclaims. Plaintiffs' evidence shows that the land in litigation formed part of the hereditary property, left by the deceased spouses Juan Bautista Nicodemus and Dionisia Uyag, which was partitioned by their legitimate children Ciriaco, Isabel, Placido, Juliana and Juanita, all surnamed Nicodemus. As indicated in the sketch Exhibit B which was prepared by the Commissioner appointed by the trial court, Lot C with an area of 7,042.5 square meters was the share of Placido Nicodemus, correspond to the share of Juliana Nicodemus (the land in litigation), Lot B with an area of 7,042.5 square meters was the share of Placido Nicodemus, and Lot D the adjoining parcel on the South with an area of 7,867 square meters pertains to Juanita Nicodemus whose husband is Zacarias Tupas. At the time of the partition which took place long before the last world war, there were no improvements existing on the mother parcel or lot except three matured coconut trees growing on the share of Juanita Nicodemus (Lot D). And that whatever matured coconut trees now existing on Lots A, B, C and D on Exhibit B were introduced or planted by the respective owners thereof. On November 17, 1928, Juliana Nicodemus, married to Doroteo Malubay, sold her share (Lot C on Exhibit "B" together with its improvements consisting of thirty-three coconut trees, as evidenced by Exhibit A. cdll Similarly, years after 1928, Placido Nicodemus also sold his share (Lot D) to the same vendee of Lot C, Juan Padero, husband of appellee Blasita E. Padero and father of the rest of the appellees. Since 1928, Juan Padero and his successor-in-interest, the plaintiff herein executed acts of possession and ownership over the share of Juliana Nicodemus otherwise identified as Lot C in Exhibit B by enjoying the fruits of coconut trees growing thereon, declaring the same for taxation purposes in the name of Juan Padero under Tax Declaration Nos. 3225 and 8281 (Exhs. C & D), paying takes thereon even before the last war, as evidenced by tax receipts (Exhs. E to E-5) until their possession was, sometime in 1956, disturbed when defendant committed illegal acts of dispossession by harvesting the nuts averaging seven hundred nuts or four hundred kilos every three months which was selling at the time at an average price of P48.00 to P50.00 a hundred kilos, and appropriating the proceeds thereof to his own use and benefit, and also planting thereon more than one hundred young coconut plants without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs. These encroachments were discovered by plaintiff Blasita Padero sometime in 1960 when she personally made an investigation after her suspicion was aroused by the considerable decrease in her copra production in several harvests as reported to her by her overseer Pedro Jabinino. Acting immediately, she repaired to the respective houses of defendant Alfonso Andrade and his predecessor-in-interest Constancio Villegas for confrontation. While she asserted her right of ownership over the land above referred to as Lot C in Exhibit B, Blasita Padero, for the purpose of amicable settlement, offered to compensate said defendant for his expenses in the sum of P150.00 in cultivating and planting the more than one hundred young coconut plants on Lot C. For the purpose of referring the matter to his vendor, defendant Andrade volunteered to accompany Blasita Padero to the house of Constancio Villegas located at another Barrio at San Martin, Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. Villegas told Blasita Padero that what he sold to Andrade was that land which he bought from Silvina Tupas, an heir of Juanita Nicodemus and Zacarias Tupas. Andrade promised to consider Blasita's offer, but later impliedly rejected the same. The defendant in turn tried to prove his ownership of the land in question by virtue of a notarized deed of sale executed in his favor by Constancio Villegas and General de Villegas on July 20, 1956 (Exh. 4). He alleged, however, to have been in possession of the land since 1949, because it was mortgaged to him by Constancio Villegas. He admitted that in December 1960, Blasita Padero apprised him of her claim over the property. He accompanied her to the house of Constancio Villegas at Tagoloan to find out why the latter sold the land to him (defendant) and on that occasion, Constancio Villegas informed her that the land was not hers. He also declared that she tried to force him to sell the land to her but he refused, which is the reason why the plaintiffs brought this action against him. Constancio Villegas testified for the defendant and declared that he bought the land in question from the government in 1936 when it was sold at public auction for non-payment of taxes by the previous owner, Juanita Nicodemus; that thereafter, he paid to Silvina Tupas, a surviving daughter of Juanita Nicodemus and Zacarias Tupas, the additional amount of P250.00; that the land was then declared for taxation in the name of Zacarias Tupas, under Tax Declaration No. 18396 (Exh. G). He further stated having paid the land taxes after buying the land from the government (Exhs. 1, 1-A to 1-E and Exhs. 2, 2-A to 2-C). And in 1952, he secured a new tax declaration for the same property in his name (Exh. 3). Dionisia Tupas, one of the surviving children of Zacarias Tupas and Juliana Nicodemus, also testified for the defendant and stated that her mother inherited a piece of land at Tagbalitang which was forfeited by the government for non-payment of taxes and sold at auction to Constancio Villegas. Defendant maintains that the sale involving said Lot C between Juan Padera and Juliana Nicodemus (Exh. A), executed in 1928, appertains to another portion of land, but not Lot C. The contention is untenable, considering that the description as to the boundaries and area of one of the parcels appearing in the document, Exhibit A, tallies with that of Lot C on Exhibit B, and that competent witnesses, who are not shown to be biased or partial have clearly identified the land in litigation. Marcelo Malubay, son of Juliana Nicodemus (deceased), identified Lot C, as the very same parcel of land sold in 1928 by her mother to Juan Padero. He also identified Lot D, the adjoining parcel of Lot C on the south, as the present property of Alfonso Andrade. This is corroborated by the testimony of Placido Nicodemus, the only surviving brother of Juliana Nicodemus, who identified the land in litigation as the share assigned to Juliana Nicodemus in their parent's inheritance. Moreover, the description as to the boundaries of the second parcel appearing on Exhibit A shows that the boundary of the land described therein on the south is Zacarias Tupas, husband of Juanita Nicodemus. The description of the land as appearing on Tax Declaration No. 18396 (Exh. G) in the name of Zacarias Tupas, husband of Juanita Nicodemus shows that its boundary on the North is Doroteo Malubay, husband of Juliana Nicodemus. This circumstance led the trial court to infer therefrom that the two adjoining owners mutually recognized each other's share. Defendant's claim that there was no tradition or delivery of the object of the sale and that the plaintiffs never took possession, physical or actual, of the land in litigation, are unfounded, both in law and in fact. When Juliana Nicodemus executed the documents Exhibit A, she was deemed to have constructively delivered in 1928 the land known as Lot C to Juan Padero. This is in accordance with the provisions of Article 1498 of the Civil Code, which reads When the sale is made through public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot be clearly inferred. In construing the above provisions of law, the Supreme Court in the case of Addison vs . Felix, et al., 38 Phil. 404, held that constructive delivery presupposes actual possession. Aside from the preceding consideration, plaintiffs have as a matter of fact, as borne out by their evidence elsewhere related, exercised acts of dominion over the property in litigation by harvesting the coconuts and enjoying said fruits, declaring the same for taxation purposes in their names, and religiously paying taxes therefor since 1928 up to the present time, except the enjoyment of the fruits which was disturbed by the defendant in 1956. Defendant's claim that plaintiff's possession was not direct or personal, but one done thru their caretaker and overseer, Pedro Jabiniao, whose possession was said to have been defeated by Villegas' pretended adverse possession from 1936 to 1949. This is of no moment. For the evidence does not positively show that Pedro Jabiniao had ever been in possession at any time during the period between 1936 and 1949. On the contrary, Blasita Padero testified that there never was any encargado or overseer employed since the time they bought the land from Juliana Nicodemus until 1960. It was in 1960 that Pedro Jabiniao was made an overseer. It appears further from the testimony of Blasita Padero that after they acquired the land in litigation, her husband Juan Padero used to visit said land from time to time. Assuming for a moment that this caretaker assigned to watch the hired coconut gatherers was Pedro Jabiniao himself, yet considering the nature of the caretaker's duties, and the fact that Juan Padero may have taken an active part in controlling the acts of the hired laborers including the so-called caretaker with respect to the land, which fact may be inferred from his frequent visits, it cannot be rightly said that it was the caretaker who was in possession of the land in dispute. At any rate, Constancio Villegas had never been in possession of Lot C at any time during the period between 1936 and 1949. What Villegas may have taken possession of in 1936 is that property (Lot D of Exh. B) which he bought from the government and for which he allegedly paid an additional sum of P250.00 to Silvina Tupas, eldest daughter of its deceased owner Juanita Nicodemus. This is admitted by Villegas in his direct examination as well as in the cross-examination. And it is even doubtful whether Villegas had actually taken possession of Lot D or the share of Juanita Nicodemus, for when he and Silvina Tupas allegedly went to the land so that the latter may point to the former the boundaries, Villegas stated that they could not enter the land because it was a forest . Lot D may have remained in that condition from 1936 to 1956 for by his conduct with respect to Lot D, Villegas had not manifested any earnest attempt to take actual possession of said land, as could be gleaned from his testimony, thus Q. Now in the direct examination you have stated in answer to a question you made mention that you have gone to the land later, "When did you go there" and you answered, "During election days I actually passed there." Now, will you please tell the Honorable Court during what years or what election when you passed. A. I do not remember it anymore. (p. 23, t.s.n., Montes) It is quite clear that the defendant relies mainly upon the testimony of Constancio Villegas to prove the length of possession required for his defense of prescription. In his attempt to prove that Lot C was included when he allegedly took possession of Lot D, Villegas testified in the cross-examination that the boundary of his property on the North is Placido Nicodemus instead of Doroteo Malubay. But Villegas knew all the time as he was in the position to know who was the adjoining owner of his property on the North, because in that year after he bought Lot D Silvina Tupas delivered to him Tax Declaration No. 18396 (Exh. G) in the name of Zacarias Tupas which shows on its face that the boundary on the North is Doroteo Malubay. For lack of basis, to say the least, the testimony of Villegas is highly incredible. As a matter of fact, the trial court branded the testimony of Villegas like his reference to Placido Nicodemus as neighbor on the North as an apparent fabrication. The Court's observation is not without basis, considering that almost his whole testimony is honeycombed with contradictions or inconsistencies which prompted the court to call his attention to his guesswork in answering question on cross-examination. Defendant furthermore claims that he has been in possession of the land in litigation since 1949 when the land was allegedly mortgaged to him by Villegas. He further claims that a private document evidencing said contract of mortgage was destroyed by him after Villegas executed in 1956 the deed of sale exhibit 4 in his favor. If the transaction of mortgage and sale mentioned in the next preceding paragraph did really take place, then certainly the subject matter thereof does not include Lot C or the land in litigation, considering the following testimony of Andrade who declared, thus Q. So that the land which was sold to you by Villegas was the land which he acquired from the heir of Nicodemus who inherited the same from her parents, is that correct. A. Yes, sir. Even if we accept, for the purpose of argument, the probability that there was mortgage and that the land in litigation was included, yet there is evidence on record from which an inference may be made that the said transaction, if any, took place in 1952 and not in 1949. According to Villegas himself that sometime after the last war, he caused the Tax Declaration of the land he bought from Tupas to be transferred in his name immediately after having it surveyed by an assessor. His testimony is corroborated by defendant when the latter declared that as soon as the alleged mortgage was executed, he and Villegas went around the land and had it surveyed. Considering that Tax Declaration No. 9132 (Exh. 3) in the name of Constancio Villegas, prepared with the assistance of defendant Andrade who conveniently furnished the statement "declared as new" and the statement of the area (14725 hectares), was issued and to take effect in 1952, there is reasonable ground to conclude that the transaction of mortgage took place in that year and not in 1949. So that appellant's actual possession of the land in litigation commenced in 1956, or shortly before that year, when he started planting coconuts thereon, as shown in his testimony Q. Now you said that you planted 200 coconut trees in the land in question, when did you start planting, what year if you remember? A. In 1956. (t.s.n. 42, Montes). Even granting, without admitting that defendant's actual possession of the land in litigation was done in good faith and with just title, yet his continuous possession of about five years from 1956 up to the filing of the present action on February 6, 1961, is not sufficient to vest title upon him by prescription both under the provisions of Section 41 of Act No. 190 or under Art. 1134 of the Civil Code. Ownership and other real rights over immovables are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten (10) years. The Court gives no credence to the testimony of Constancio Villegas that he had been in possession of the land in litigation because said testimony is apparently pure fabrication like his reference to Placido Nicodemus as his neighbor on the north. Consequently, the defendant Andrade, who is only a vendor of Constancio Villegas in 1956, could not obtain better rights than the latter and his (Andrade's) subsequent occupation of the land in controversy was a clear invasion of plaintiff's right which makes him a possessor in bad faith who losses all that he had planted and introduced in the land in accordance with Art. 441 of the Civil Code. But while it is true that the tax receipts standing alone are not conclusive proof of ownership, it is equally true that the payment of a tax is one of the most persuasive and positive indicia which shows the will of a person to possess, with claim of ownership, of the land or property for which such tax is imposed (Tupas vs . Ricamora, 37 O.G. 581). The value and efficacy of tax receipts is also recognized by the Supreme Court in the case of Dimayuya and Coronel vs . Buck and Norman, Unpub. Dec., 63 Phil. 1065, wherein it was ruled that payment of taxes may be considered as evidence of ownership because it tends to throw light upon the nature of the claim of possession of property. The tax declaration and tax receipts when considered with other evidence on record become an effective proof of possession when claim of ownership can hardly be doubted. Defendant also claims to have acquired in good faith the land in litigation by purchase and for value from Constancio Villegas, and for this reason demands for the protection of his right. Assuming that there was good faith, yet considering the flaw of Villegas' title was established by evidence, defendant acquired as better title to the land in question than the seller had. Granting for the sake of argument that defendant was a possessor in good faith at the beginning, but from the moment on December 1, 1960, when he rejected the offer of Blasita Padero to pay the sum of P150.00 as reimbursement for the former's expenses in planting about more than one hundred young plants on the land in litigation, his good faith was converted into bad faith. The rejection is without cause. Good faith may be converted to bad faith according to Art. 828 of the Civil Code. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose that character until the occurrence of something showing that the possession is not ignorant of the weakness of his title. Similarly, the trial court did not err in awarding the plaintiffs damages and attorney's fees (Arts. 549 & 2208, new Civil Code). WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, at appellant's costs. aisadc IT IS SO ORDERED. Villamor and Reyes, JJ ., concur.