Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fort Bonifacio Development Corp.

TWELFTH DIVISION [CA-G.R. SP No. UDK-4443. January 27, 2003.] COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER, REVENUE DISTRICT NO. 44, TAGUIG AND PATEROS, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE , petitioner , vs . FORT BONIFACIO DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION , respondent . R E S O L U T I O N REYES, B. , J p : For Our consideration are the petitioners' Manifestation with attached Amended Petition for Review and the respondent's Counter-manifestation which raised the issue of whether or not to admit the petitioners' Amended Petition for Review. On 13 December 2001, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue received a copy of the decision dated 07 December 2001 of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 5962 ( Rollo , pp. 3159) granting the petition for review filed by herein respondent Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation. The decision ordered the refund or issuance of tax credit certificate in the total amount of P15,036,891.27 in favor of Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al., as herein petitioners, sought to appeal the said decision and in the meantime filed on 28 December 2001 by registered mail a motion for extension of time praying for an extension of fifteen (15) days from 28 December 2001, the last day of filing the petition for review, or until 12 January 2002 within which to file the petition. On 21 January 2002, the Court received the petitioners' Motion for Re-Extension of Time to File Petition for Review dated 14 January 2002, praying for another extension of fifteen (15) days or until 27 January 2002. HTIEaS On 29 January 2002, this Court, acting on the first motion for extension, issued a Resolution dismissing instead the petition for non-payment of docket and other legal fees pursuant to Section 1(c) Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure ( Rollo , p. 5) considering that it was Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation, and not the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al. that was designated as petitioner in the latter's Motion for Extension of Time to file petition for review. In its Manifestation dated 07 February 2002 ( Rollo , pp. 711), respondent Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation pointed out the defect in the title of the petition as the petitioner should be the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and that the petition was not accompanied by certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein; that it did not state the specific material dates; and that it was not accompanied by proof of service of a copy of the petition on the Court of Tax Appeals. Moreover, respondent noted that when the petitioners filed their motion for second extension, dated 14 January 2002, the first extension prayed for had already expired, and the second motion for extension did not show that there was a "most compelling reason" for the extension as required by the provisions of Section 4, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Appeals (RIRCA) and Section 4, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On 17 May 2002, petitioners filed a Manifestation acknowledging their inadvertence in failing to correct the title of the petition where Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation was designated as petitioner and thus attaching an amended Petition for Review but adopting the original verification in the original Petition for Review and the annexes attached thereto ( Rollo , pp. 7578). Respondent Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation hence filed its Counter-Manifestation ( Rollo , pp. 96100) insisting for the denial of the admission of petitioners' Amended Petition on the same grounds stated in its previous Manifestation dated 07 February 2002. Also, it argued that the Petition for Review earlier filed may no longer be amended as the same was filed out of time, having been filed only on 31 January 2002, or after 27 January 2002, the date of expiration of the extension of time prayed for by the petitioners in their "Motion for Re-extension of Time to File Petition for Review". Moreover, the Resolution of this Court dated 29 January 2002, denying the first "Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review" and dismissing the petition, had already become final and executory for failure to file a motion for reconsideration. We rule to reiterate the dismissal of the instant petition for review and thus deny the admission of the Amended Petition but not on the basis of Our first Resolution dismissing the petition for non-payment of docket and other legal fees as there was clearly an error in the designation of Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation as petitioner in the initial motion for extension of time filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al.. The petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue is indeed exempted from payment of docket and other legal fees, as a government official representing the Bureau of Internal Revenue. The dismissal of the petition for review and denial of the amended petition are premised rather on: 1) the late filing of the original petition for review earlier filed by the Commissioner, et al.; 2) the absence of a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 07 January 2002; and 3) lack of authority of Atty. Alberto R. Bomediano, Jr., legal officer of the BIR Region 8, Makati City, to pursue the case on behalf of the petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue. It should be noted that the first extension to file petition for review prayed for a period of fifteen (15) days from 28 December 2001 or until 12 January 2002. The second motion for extension prayed for an extension of another fifteen (15) days from 12 January 2002 or until 27 January 2002. This second motion was dated 14 January 2002 and was received by the Court on 21 January 2002. Definitely, the second motion for extension dated 14 January 2002 was filed after the expiration of the first extension on 12 January 2002, hence, there was no more period to extend. There was thus no reason for the petitioners to assume that the motion for re-extension of time would be granted. Likewise, there was no showing that there existed a "most compelling reason" for the second extension as required by the provision of Sec. 4, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, thus: ". . . Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. (n) Precisely, the last day of filing of the petition for review was on 12 January 2002. The filing of the petition for review on 31 January 2002 was definitely beyond the extension prayed for. "The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory, but jurisdictional , and the failure to perfect that appeal renders the judgment of the court final and executor . . . The case at bench, given its own settings, cannot come close to those extraordinary circumstance that have indeed justified a deviation from an otherwise stringent rule. Let it not be overlooked that the timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even this Court can trifle with." ( Demata vs. Court of Appeals, 303 SCRA 690-696, citing Bank of America, NT & SA v. Gerochi, Jr., 230 SCRA 9; Mangali v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 236 ). Moreover, when the petitioners received the Resolution dated 29 January 2002 dismissing the petition for review on 04 February 2002 ( Rollo , p. 73), they did not file a motion for reconsideration of said resolution. Said resolution had already become final and executory. As to whether the legal officer of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) could institute judicial action on behalf of the government, the case in point is Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory (G.R. No. 144942, June 28, 2001) . The Court, through Honorable Justice Jose C. Vitug denied the appeal in a Resolution dated 15 November 2000 on the ground, among others, that it was not pursued by the Solicitor General. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed a motion which sought an explanation on the "supposed discrepancy" between the pronouncement of the Court that requires the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General and the provision of Section 220 of the Tax Reform Act of 1997 (R.A. 8424, effective 01 January 1998) that allows the legal officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to institute judicial action on behalf of the government. Said Section 220 provides: "SECTION 220. Form and Mode of Proceeding in Actions under this Code. Civil and criminal actions and proceedings instituted in behalf of the Government under the authority of this Code or other law enforced by the Bureau of Internal Revenue shall be brought in the name of the Government of the Philippines and shall be conducted by legal officers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue but not civil or criminal action for the recovery of taxes or the enforcement of any fine, penalty or forfeiture under this Code shall be filed in court without the approval of the Commissioner." The Court elucidated, thus: "The power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, is a province inherent upon the Supreme Court and recognized as such in the 1987 Constitution which mandates the tribunal to adopt a general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure. The Solicitor General, being the principal law officer and legal defender of the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, is aptly the office that can bring a case on appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. The rule also finds justification in Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, of the Philippine Administrative Code which outlines the parameters of the functions of the Office of the Solicitor General, including, but not limited to, its duty to (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a private party. xxx xxx xxx." Emphatically, the proper officer that could pursue the instant case is clearly the Solicitor General. WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the prayer to admit the amended petition for review is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition for review is reiterated. SO ORDERED. Brawner and * Pine, JJ . , concur. Footnotes * Acting Jr. Member.