Commissioner of Customs v. Court of Tax Appeals

SIXTEENTH DIVISION [CA-G.R. SP No. 78564. May 3, 2006.] COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS , petitioner , vs . COURT OF TAX APPEALS and PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION , respondents . D E C I S I O N DE LOS SANTOS , J p : Assailed before Us on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is the resolution dated January 28, 2003 of public respondent Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), denying herein public petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, which interposed lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a cause of action, the petition for review, docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 6484, filed by herein private respondent with the CTA on May 23, 2002, as well as CTA's resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of its January 28, 2003 order. The petition for certiorari relies on the following grounds, to wit; "I SINCE RESPONDENT SHELL'S PETITION FOR REVIEW WAS FILED WAY BEYOND THE PERIOD ALLOWED BY LAW, THEREBY MAKING THE DEMAND OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS FOR SAID RESPONDENT TO RETURN THE EQUIVALENT AMOUNT OF THE SUBJECT TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATES IT HAD USED TO PAY THE IMPORT DUTIES AND TAXES DUE FROM ITS OIL IMPORTATIONS, ALREADY FINAL AND EXECUTORY, RESPONDENT COURT OF TAX APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE THEREIN ASSAILED JANUARY 28, 2003 AND JUNE 2, 2003 RESOLUTIONS IN C.T.A. CASE NO. 6484. "II SINCE RESPONDENT SHELL'S PETITION FOR REVIEW FAILS TO STATE A VALID CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER, AND INSTEAD, IT IS THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS WHICH HAS A WELL-FOUNDED CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST RESPONDENT SHELL, RESPONDENT COURT OF TAX APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO DISMISS C.T.A. CASE NO. 6484." ( Rollo , p. 17) Respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) is a corporation duly organized under Philippine Law engaged in the importation of petroleum and its by-products into the country. Over the years, it has made importations which were processed and released by the Bureau of Customs upon payment of the corresponding customs duties and taxes. Then Deputy Commissioner Gil A. Valera of the Bureau of Customs ("BOC") filed three (3) complaints or collection against private respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 02-103191, 02-103192, 02-103300. On April 23, 25 and 30, 2002, Shell received the summonses from Branches 19, 49, and 50 of the RTC of Manila, respectively. On May 23, 2002, within 30 days from receipt of the first summons, Shell elevated the collection issue to the CTA by petition for review. HcISTE In the BOC complaints, herein petitioner sought to collect alleged unpaid customs duties and taxes worth about P220,000,000.00 which Shell allegedly settled using Tax Credit Certificates ("TCCs") issued by the One-Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center (the "Center") to duly qualified entities, and transferred to Shell. The BOC asserts that these TCCs were fake and spurious and, for this reason, the subject customs duties and taxes are considered still unpaid. The BOC in its Motion to Dismiss the CTA petition argued that the petition for review was filed out of time. Customs Deputy Commissioner Valera had sent to Shell three (3) letters dated February 15 and 20 and April 12, 2002 (Annexes "J", "K", "N", herein petition), demanding payment of various amounts representing the value of the aforesaid questioned TCCs. In the last sentence of all said three (3) letters, Atty. Valera warned Shell to "Please consider this as our last and final demand," thus informing Shell that it was the final decision of the BOC denying its protests, and in effect that the only step left for Shell to appeal the assessments was to file a petition for review with the CTA. But since the petition for review was filed only on May 23, 2002, the appeal has prescribed for having been filed beyond the thirty (30) day period to appeal by petition for review with the CTA. Thus, the letters demanding settlement by Shell of the equivalent amount of the fake and/or fraudulently secured TCCs, had become final, unappealable, and executory. Consequently, the CTA is denied of jurisdiction to act on the petition. Shell in its opposition to the motion to dismiss insisted that the petition for review was filed on time, maintaining that the 30-day period for filing the appeal to the CTA by way of a petition for review must be counted from the receipt of summons in the civil complaints, citing in the case of Yabes vs. Flojo , 115 SCRA 278, where it was ruled that the filing of the collection suit is the final decision of the Commissioner on the taxpayer's protest. The respondent Court of Tax Appeals denied therein respondent's Motion to Dismiss Shell's petition for review. Hence, the petition for certiorari now before us. Under the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP), a taxpayer has the remedy of appeal to the CTA within thirty (30) days from an adverse decision of the Commissioner of Customs (Sections 301, 2315 and 2402 of the TCCP). The thirty (30) day period to appeal is jurisdictional and and non-extendible ( Pangasinan Transportation vs. Blaquera, 107 Phil. 975 [1960]; Chan Kian vs. Court of Tax Appeals , 105 Phil. 904 [1959]). And only final decisions of the Commissioner of Customs are appealable to this court. There are however cases when although the Commissioner fails to render a decision on the protest filed by a taxpayer, he is nonetheless able to manifest his denial of the protest by some overt acts. Thus, whether there has been a final decision based upon these overt acts will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The BOC argued in its motion to dismiss that the letters sent by Deputy commissioner Valera were its final rulings on the questioned TCCs, and since the petition for review was filed only on May 23, 2002, Shell's appeal has prescribed. There being no timely appeal by shell to the CTA, the demand letters are now executory ( Mambulao Lumber Co. vs. Republic , 132 SCRA 1 [1984]). Since the government's right becomes absolute upon the expiration of the reglementary period to appeal ( Callanta vs. Office of the Ombudsman , 285 SCRA 648 [1998]), Shell is now barred from disputing the correctness of the same ( Republic vs. Court of Appeals , 149 SCRA 351 [1987]). As a result, the CTA is now without jurisdiction to act on Shell's petition. Shell countered that the thirty (30) days allowed by the TCCP to appeal should be counted from receipt of the summons of RTC-Manila, pursuant to Yabes vs. Flojo (115 SCRA 278, July 20, 1982) where the Supreme Court said: "There is no reason for Us to disagree from or reverse the Court of Tax Appeals' conclusion that under the circumstances of this case, what may be considered as final decision or assessment of the Commissioner is the filing of the complaint for collection in the respondent Court of First Instance of Cagayan, the summons of which was served on petitioners on January 20, 1971, and that therefore the appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 2216 was filed on time. The respondent Court of First Instance of Cagayan can only acquire jurisdiction over this case filed against the heirs of the taxpayer if the assessment made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had become final and incontestable. It the contrary is established, as this Court holds it to be, considering the aforementioned conclusion of the Court of Tax Appeals on the finality and incontestability of the assessment made by the Commissioner is correct, then the Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over this case. In the questioned resolution, the CTA also cited the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Union Shipping Corporation and the Court of Tax Appeals , G.R. No. 66160, May 21, 1990, where the Supreme Court ruled that: "Under the circumstances, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, not having clearly signified his final action on the disputed assessment, legally the period to appeal has not commenced to run. Thus, it was only when private respondent received the summons on the civil suit for collection of deficiency income on December 28, 1978 that the period to appeal commenced to run. "The request for reinvestigation and reconsideration was in effect considered denied by petitioner when the latter filed a civil suit for collection of deficiency income. . . ." In ruling that Shell's petition for review was timely filed, the CTA held that Shell correctly employed the date of receipt of the summons as the reckoning date in counting the 30-day period. It found the present case identical to the above-cited cases, although the protests against the demands for payment of the taxes were pending before the CIR instead of the Commissioner of Customs. It applied the doctrine established therein that in the case of a contested assessment made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the filing of a collection case before the court may be considered as the final decision or assessment of the Commissioner. Only thenceforth will the 30-day period to appeal the assessment to the CTA commence to run. caIDSH Citing also Section 7(2) of Republic Act No. 1125, which created the Court of Tax Appeals, the public respondent CTA held that since, here, the Deputy Commissioner and not the Commissioner was the one who filed the complaints before the RTC-Manila for the collection of the subject amount, Shell was justified in not heeding the said demand, considering the pendency of its protests. On the other hand, the collection cases filed with the RTC of Manila, as in the above cited cases, provided a clear and unequivocal decision on the said protests. The pertinent portion of Section 7(2) of Republic Act No. 1125 reads: "Section 7, Jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided xxx xxx xxx (2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention of release of property affected; fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in relation thereto; or other matters arising under Customs Law or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs. xxx xxx xxx" Concerning the question of lack of cause of action, the respondent court held that Shell's cause of action has been sufficiently averred in its Petition for Review, to wit: 1. Before petitioner accepted the transfer of the subject TCCs and their subsequent use as payment for duties and taxes, it was assured by the Government agency concerned that said TCCs are genuine and authentic; 2. That the transfer and utilization of the TCCs by petitioner were duly approved by the said Government agencies; 3. That the questioned TCCs were cancelled without informing petitioner of the specific basis of the cancellation and without opportunity to be heard; 4. The cancellation is in spite of the previous decision of this Court upholding the validity of the transfer and utilization by petitioner of the TCCs, in the case of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation vs. CIR, CTA Case No. 5728, July 23, 1999; and 5. As a result of the said cancellation, the petitioner is now being required to pay the import duties and taxes it previously paid. (Resolution, p. 7) Besides, it stated that "apart from the legal provisions and jurisprudence already discussed above, justice and equity dictate that the issues in the instant case should be resolved in a trial on the merits and after due appreciation of the evidence to be presented since the petitioner's cause of action and its ultimate right can be determined only after such due process has been satisfied." A review of the surrounding facts and circumstances obtaining in the case subject of the petition before us is imperative before we can say that the demand letters of petitioner can be considered as a final decision by the Commissioner of Customs on the liability of respondent Shell upon the spurious TCCs. In 1997 and 1998, respondent Shell was able to secure and purchase tax credit certificates from the following corporations: All-Star Spinning Mills Corporation, Express Colour Industries, Inc., Fiber Corporation, Filstar Textile Industrial Corporation, Jantex Philippines, Inc., Jibbex Industrial Corporation, Mannequin International Corporation, Master Colour System Corporation, Nikko Textile Mills, Inc., Scope Industries, Inc., Spintex International Inc., and Filipino Way Industries, Inc., with an aggregate amount reaching more than Two Hundred Twenty Million Pesos (P220,000,000.00). Upon the belief that said tax credit certificates actually good and valid, the Bureau of Customs allowed respondent Shell to use them to pay and settle the customs duties and taxes due from its petroleum importations, in the aggregate amount of, more or less, Two Hundred Twenty Million Pesos (P220,000.00). However, after an audit investigation conducted by the " One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center " of the Department of Finance, it was discovered that the tax credit certificates utilized by Shell were fraudulently secured by the original grantees thereof, who then transferred the same to respondent Shell. On November 3, 1999, then Finance Secretary Edgardo B. Espiritu wrote respondent Shell informing it of the cancellation of a number of tax credit memos (TCMs) and the related tax credit certificates (TCCs) totaling more than P830,000,000.00, of which P621,421,650.00 was paid to the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and P209,129,141.00 was paid to the Bureau of Customs (Annex "C", Petition). Attached to the letter was a partial list of the canceled TCMs and TCCs. Also on November 3, 1999, Secretary Espiritu wrote then Customs Commissioner Nelson A. Tan, directing him to collect the amount utilized on the subject TCCs, (Annex "D", Petition). On November 4, 1999, respondent Shell wrote Secretary Espiritu requesting him to reconsider, recall and set aside his letter dated November 3, 1999 and to allow it the opportunity for its position to be duly considered or to present its side (Annex "E", Petition). On November 19, 1999, then Customs Commissioner Nelson A. Tan wrote Mr. Oscar Reyes, Country Chairman of respondent Shell, demanding that Shell replace the amount of P209,129,141.00, equivalent to the sum of Tax Debit Memos (TDMs) it utilized which the BOC had subsequently cancelled (Annex "F"). cIECTH On December 9, 1999, respondent Shell wrote Commissioner Tan asking for fifteen (15) days within which to submit its formal response. On December 23, 1999, Shell formally responded to the letter of Customs Commissioner Tan requesting that ". . . your Assessment Letter to [Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell)] dated 19 December 1999, be cancelled and withdrawn." On January 3, 2000, Finance Secretary Espiritu again wrote to Customs Commissioner Tan directing him to collect the amount utilized by respondent on the subject tax credit certificates, including all related penalties, surcharges and interests (Annex "I"). On February 15, 2002, then Deputy Commissioner Gil A. Valera of the Bureau of Customs wrote respondent Shell that, after an investigation conducted, it cancelled P20,409,765.00 worth of TCCs acquired by it from Filipino Way Industries which it utilized to pay the BOC (Annex "J"). The letter demanded payment of the said amount within five (5) days from receipt thereof, and carried an admonition that "Failure on your part to settle your obligation would constrain the Bureau of Customs to initiate the legal action in the regular court." It also urged Shell to "Please consider this as our last and final demand." On February 20, Deputy Commissioner Valera again wrote respondent Shell demanding payment within five (5) days from receipt of the letter, of P139,122,941.00 representing the TCCs it acquired from the All Star Spinning Mills, and which it utilized to pay the BOC (Annex "K"). The letter stated that after an investigation conducted, it cancelled the TCCs, with an admonition that "Failure on your part to settle your obligation would constrain the Bureau of Customs to initiate the legal action in the regular court." It also bore the same caution to "Please consider this as out last and final demand." On February 27, 2002, Shell wrote Customs Deputy Commissioner Gil A. Valera requesting that the Bureau of Customs' demand for payment be withdrawn and that the status quo be maintained and to hold in abeyance any action pending the outcome of certain cases (Annex "L"). On March 4, 2002, respondent Shell again wrote Customs Deputy Commissioner Valera requesting that the Bureau of Customs demand for payment be withdrawn and that the status quo be maintained insofar as certain TCCs and TCMs were concerned, and to hold in abeyance any action pending the outcome of certain cases (Annex "L"). On April 12, 2002, Customs Deputy Commissioner Gil A. Valera for the third time wrote respondent Shell demanding payment, within five (5) days from receipt of the letter, of P196,999,938.00 equivalent to the TCCs it utilized to settle its obligations with the BOC, which TCCs it acquired from the following companies: All Star Spinning Mills, Inc., Express Colour Industries Incorporated, Fiber Technology, FLB Int'l. Fiber Corporation, Filstar Textile Industrial Corporation, Janitex Philippines Inc., Jibtex Industrial Corporation, Mannequin International Corporation, Master Colour System Corporation, Nikko Textile Mills Inc., Scope Industries, Inc., and Spintex International, Inc. Valera stated that the cancellation was the result of investigation conducted by the Bureau which showed that the TCCs were found to be fraudulent. IcHEaA Because of respondent Shell's refusal to heed the demand of the Secretary of Finance and the Bureau of Customs, the latter filed the three (3) subject complaints for collection of a sum of money against respondent Shell before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. 02-103191, 02-103192 and 02-103300. On April 23, 25 and 30, 2002, respondent Shell received the summonses from the Regional Trial Court of Manila, through Branches 19, 49 and 50 thereof, for the aforementioned three (3) collection cases. On May 23, 2002, Shell filed the subject petition for review with respondent Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), docketed as CTA Case No. 6484, against the Commissioner of Customs, praying: "WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully prays that: 1. The cancellation of the subject TCCs, TCC transfers and related TDMs be declared invalid, illegal and unjust; 2. The 1999 Collection Letter, and the action of the Deputy Commissioner in attempting to enforce collection of the amounts corresponding to the aforesaid TCCs and TDMs, on the assumption that it had been duly authorized by Respondent and hence legally considered as Respondent's denial of Petitioner's protest of the 1999 Collection Letter, be declared devoid of basis, and that Respondent and his agents be ordered to withdraw the same; and 3. Respondent and his agents be enjoined permanently from any and all attempts to collect from Petitioner the above-stated amounts. Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for. ( Rollo , p. 130) On July 26, 2002, petitioner BOC moved for the dismissal of said petition for review. The motion was opposed by respondent Shell. On January 28, 2003, respondent CTA promulgated its now assailed Resolution (Annex "A") denying petitioner's motion to dismiss for lack of merit. On February 14, 2003, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of said January 28, 2003 Resolution, which motion was also opposed by respondent Shell. On June 2, 2003, respondent CTA denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit (Annex "B"). Hence, the petition for certiorari. We find merit in the petition. Sections 301, 2315 and 2402 of The Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP) provide that a taxpayer has the remedy of appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from an adverse decision of the Commissioner of Customs. This 30-day period to appeal is jurisdictional ( Pangasinan Transportation vs. Blaquera , 107 Phil. 975 ([1960]) and moreover, it is non-extendible ( Chan Kian vs. Court of Tax Appeals , 105 Phil. 904 [1959]). But as we have seen, there are cases where the Commissioner will not render a decision on the protest filed by a taxpayer but will manifest his denial by some overt acts. What constitutes a final decision from these overt acts will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. For instance, in the case of St. Stephen's Association vs. Collector of Internal Revenue , 104 Phil. 314 [1958], in response to the request of the taxpayer that the assessment be cancelled and withdrawn, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in his letter of denial stated that "(t)his decision becomes final thirty days after your receipt hereof unless an appeal is taken to the CTA within the same period, in accordance with RA 1125." The letter was held to be a final decision appealable to respondent CTA. Then, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Ayala Securities Corporatio n, 70 SCRA 204 [1976], a letter from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue reminding a taxpayer of his obligation to pay taxes, which reiterates a previous demand for the settlement of an assessment, was held to be in effect a decision on a disputed assessment, appealable to respondent CTA. In Morales vs. Collector of Internal Revenue , 17 SCRA 1018 (1966), the Supreme Court held that a letter requiring a taxpayer to pay the tax not later than or before a certain date assumes the tenor of finality, and clearly indicates a denial of the plea for cancellation of assessment, and thereby constitutes an appealable decision. In the instant petition, Customs Deputy Commissioner Valera sent to respondent Shell three (3) letters dated February 15 and 20, 2002 and April 12, 2002 demanding payment of various amounts representing the value of the TCCs it utilized but which were subsequently cancelled by the Department of Finance for having been procured fraudulently by the original grantees. In all said three (3) letters, it was mentioned that respondent Shell "Please consider this as our last and final demand," thereby informing Shell that it was the final decision of the Bureau of Customs on the matter. We find the tenor of all three letters written by the Customs Deputy Commissioner to Shell unmistakably indicative of its final rulings on the assessments concerning the spurious TCC's and TCM's, which were then already appealable to respondent CTA. Each letter carries a clear demand to pay within five (5) days from receipt, and each also carries a warning that "this [is] our last and final demand." Indeed, the communications issued by then Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu indubitably show that an investigation has led to a final determination that the cancelled TCCs had been fraudulently procured by the original grantees, and that Shell's utilization thereof as transferee did not have the effect of settling the duties and taxes due on its importations, thus the demand by BOC to pay the equivalent amounts. Yet, the subject petition for review (CTA Case No. 6484) was filed only on May 23, 2002, or more than three (2) months after the first two letters, and forty-one days after the third letter. Clearly, all three assessments have become final, unappealable and executory, and respondent Shell is barred from disputing the correctness of the same ( Republic vs. Court of Appeals , 149 SCRA 351 [1987]). It is now said to have waived or lost its right to contest the assessments, particularly the right to appeal to respondent CTA ( Dayrit vs. Cruz , 165 SCRA 571, [1988]). The government's right to collect has become absolute upon the expiration of the reglementary period to appeal ( Callanta vs. Office of the Ombudsman , 285 SCRA 648 [1998]). There can then no longer be any inquiry allowed on the merits of the original case ( Mambulao Co. vs. Republic, supra ). Concerning the issue of the authority of Customs Deputy Commissioner Gil A. Valera, head of the Revenue Collection & Monitoring Group, petitioner has pointed out that then Customs Commissioner Titus Villanueva issued on September 24, 2001 Customs Memorandum Circular No. 27-2001, which reads: ITADaE "All Deputy Commissioners All District Collectors All Service/Division Chiefs All Others Concerned Subject : OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER Revenue Collection & Monitoring Group In the interest of the service and in order to normalize the operations, it is hereby directed: 1. All papers and documents, emanating from the Legal Service, Financial Service and Collection Service, that require the signature/approval of the Commissioner of Customs shall be coursed through the Office of Atty. GIL VALERA, Deputy Commissioner for Revenue Collection Monitoring Group, for appropriate action or indorsement, with his recommendations, to the Commissioner of Customs. 2. The following authorities are delegated by the Commissioner of Customs to Deputy Commissioner GIL VALERA: a. All claims for refund b. Tax Credit c. Transfer of Tax Credit d. Administrative Cases, provided that in decisions ordering the dismissal of the respondent from the service or exonerating him from the charges, the same shall be cleared by the Commissioner of Customs. (Annex "U", Petition, Rollo, p. 178) Clearly, to Customs Deputy Commissioner Valera has been delegated all authority respecting tax credits and transfers of tax credits. Besides, on November 22, 2001, Customs Commissioner Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order No. 40-2001 expressly delegating to Deputy Commissioner Valera the authority to sign, file and prosecute the civil complaints of the Bureau of Customs for collection of monies. Said Memorandum Order reads: "ALL DEPUTY COMMISSIONERS ALL DISTRICT COLLECTORS ALL SERVICE/DIVISION CHIEFS ALL OTHER CONCERNED Subject : OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER Revenue Collection & Monitoring Group In the interest of the service and in order to promote the efficiency of its collection efforts, Paragraph 2 of Customs Memorandum Order No. 27-2001 be amended by adding: "2. e. To sign, file and prosecute civil complaints of the Bureau of Customs for collection of monies against importers, insurance companies, and other concerned parties." This Order shall take effect immediately." (Annex "V", Petition, Rollo , p. 180) The assailed CTA resolution held that the case at bar is identical to the cases of Yabes vs. Flojo , 115 SCRA 278 [1982] and CIR vs. Union Shipping Corporation, et al ., 185 SCRA 547 [1990], with the difference that it involves the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and not the Commissioner of Customs. But it should be noted that in Yabes , there was yet no final decision on the protest of taxpayer Doroteo Yabes to the assessment. Instead, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue even wrote Yabes that the resolution on his protest was being held in abeyance. Obviously, though there was no resolution of the protest, the filing of the civil case in court for collection may be considered as the final decision on the protest. Also, in CIR vs. Union Shipping Corporation, et al., supra ., the Commissioner of Internal Revenue did not categorically rule on the taxpayer corporation's protest or motion for reconsideration of its assessment for deficiency income taxes, and instead it quite arbitrarily issued a Warrant of Distraint and Levy. The tax payer again asked for reinvestigation and for reconsideration of the Warrant of Distraint and Levy, but the CIR did not act on the request, and instead, it filed a collection suit against the taxpayer. It was held that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue must state whether his action on the questioned assessment is final, and this cannot be implied from the mere issuance of a Warrant of Distraint and Levy. The filing of the civil suit should therefore be considered as his final denial of the request for reconsideration of the tax assessment. In the case before Us, we hold that the letters of Customs Deputy Commissioner Gil A. Valera are petitioner's final rulings on respondent's Shell's protests, and since the subject petitioner for review was filed way beyond the period allowed by law from receipts of the said letters, the demand of the Bureau of Customs for respondent Shell to replace/return the equivalent amount of the fraudulently secured tax credit certificates which the latter had used to pay for the import duties and taxes of its subject oil importations, is already final and executory. In consequence thereof, respondent CTA is without jurisdiction to act on C.T.A. Case No. 6484. In ruling otherwise, therefore, it acted with grave abuse of discretion. It must be clarified that the government through petitioner does not ask for a review of its demand for payment on respondent Shell, much less does it appeal form its assessment. What it seeks is to collect the duties and taxes due it from Shell, and clearly, the Regional Trial Court, a court of general jurisdiction, has jurisdiction over petitioner's complaint. IDESTH Incidentally, this Court earlier in CA-G.R. SP No. 71756, involving a petition for certiorari filed by herein respondent which charged Judge Concepcion S. Vergara of RTC-Manila with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for denying its motion to dismiss the complaint in Civil Case No. 02-103191, one of the three subject complaints filed by the petitioner, has upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC thereover and ruled that Yabes is not applicable to Shell's protest. It was also held that Deputy Commissioner Gil A. Valera has authority to commence and prosecute the subject collection suit in the name of the Government as the real party in interest, since he has been so authorized by Commissioner of Customs Antonio M. Bernardo. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of Public Respondent Court of Tax Appeals dated January 28, 2003 and June 2, 2003 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and C.T.A. No. 6484 pending before it is Ordered DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Reyes, Jr., and Tayag, JJ., concur.