Philippine National Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

SEVENTEENTH DIVISION [CA-G.R. SP No. 76488. October 14, 2003.] PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK , petitioner , vs . THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondent . D E C I S I O N VILLARAMA, JR. , J p : This is a petition for review filed under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure , as amended, seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution dated October 10, 2002 rendered by the Court of Tax Appeals which granted respondent's motion to dismiss the appeal from the denial of petitioner's claim for refund/tax credit, as well as the Resolution dated March 20, 2003 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof. The facts leading to the present controversy are as follows: On April 15, 1991, in response to the call of then President Corazon C. Aquino to generate more revenues for national development, herein petitioner Philippine National Bank (PNB) made an advance income tax payment to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for its 1991 operations amounting to P180,000,000,00 under PNB Cashier's Check No. 109435 dated April 12, 1991. 1 For the first and second quarters of 1991, petitioner also paid additional taxes amounting to P6,096,150.00 and P26,854,505.80, respectively, as reflected in its Corporation/Partnership Quarterly Income Tax Return filed on May 30, 1991. 2 In its letters dated April 19, April 29 and May 14, 1991 addressed to respondent, then Commissioner of Internal Revenue Jesus U. Ong, petitioner requested the BIR for the issuance of a corresponding tax credit certificate to cover the said payments. 3 By the end of 1991, petitioner's annual income tax liability supposedly amounted to P144,253,229.78 which when compared with its alleged total credits and payments of P217,552,122.38 resulted to a credit balance of P73,298,892.60. 4 Such credit balance or refundable amount was carried-over from 1992 to 1996 but petitioner alleged this was never applied against its income tax liability due to its negative tax position for the said inclusive years, having incurred losses during the four (4)-year period. 5 On July 28, 1997, petitioner again requested the respondent for the issuance of a credit certificate, which request was forwarded for review and further processing, to the Deputy Commissioner for Legal and Inspection Group, Deputy Commissioner for Operations Group, the BIR's Assessment Division and finally, to the BIR's Large Taxpayer Service. 6 On August 14, 2001, another request was made by petitioner to allow it to apply the amount of P73,298,892.60 against its future gross receipts tax liability. 7 On May 21, 2002, petitioner received a letter from respondent denying its request for the issuance of a tax credit certificate for the following reasons: "1. The amount subject of claim for tax credit certificate is being carried over from your 1991 to 1996 Annual Income Tax Returns. This is clearly shown in your Summary of Tax Liability, Tax Payment and Income Tax Carry Over. To grant your claim would result into granting it twice first for tax carry over as shown in your 1991 amended Income Tax Return and second for granting a tax credit. "2. When you requested for a refund on April 19, 1991, reiterated on April 29, 1991 and again on May 14, 1991 on alleged excess income taxes, the same was considered premature since the determination and computation of your income tax liability can only be ascertained upon filing of your Final or Adjusted Income Tax Return for 1991 on or before April 15, 1992. aSEDHC "3. When you carried over the excess tax payments from 1991 to 1996 Annual Income Tax Return, you had already abandoned your original intention of claiming for a tax credit certificate. Furthermore, the 1991 amended Income Tax Return you filed on April 14, 1994 clearly showed that the amount being claimed has already been applied as tax credit against your 1992 income tax liability. "4. Although there was already a recommendation for the issuance of a tax credit certificate by the Chief, Appellate Division and concurred in by the Assistant Commissioner, Legal Service, the recommendation was for taxable year 1992 and not for the taxable year 1991, which is the taxable year involved in this case. "5. Even if you reiterated your claim for tax credit certificate when you filed your claim on July 28, 1997, the same has already prescribed on the ground that it was filed beyond the two (2) years prescriptive as provided for under Section 204 of NIRC. " 8 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED] Aggrieved by the adverse ruling of respondent on its request for a tax credit certificate, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on June 20, 2002. A Motion to Dismiss was filed by respondent on the ground that the claim for refund was filed beyond the prescriptive period of two (2) years under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and hence the Court of Tax Appeals is without jurisdiction to hear the instant petition. 9 Petitioner filed its Opposition, invoking the Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Philippine American Life Insurance Co . (244 SCRA 446) that "the two year prescriptive period is not jurisdictional and may be suspended for reasons of equity and other special circumstances." 10 In its Resolution 11 dated October 10, 2002, the CTA granted respondent's motion to dismiss holding that "To reiterate, both the claim for refund and the subsequent appeal to this court must be filed within the same two-year period. This is not subject to qualification. The court is bereft of any jurisdiction or authority to hear the instant Petition for Review, considering the fact that the above-stated action for refund was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period as allowed under the Tax Code. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the respondent's Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED. The Petition for Review is accordingly DISMISSED. "SO ORDERED." 12 A motion for reconsideration 13 was filed by petitioner but the same was denied by the CTA in its Resolution 14 dated March 20, 2003, thus: 'While it is true that the two-year period is not jurisdictional as pointed out in the aforementioned case of CIR vs. Philam, supra , nevertheless, there is nothing in the facts of the case to warrant the application of the grounds of 'equity and other special circumstances' for it to be excused from the said requirement. The matter is a simple case of excess payment under Section 229 of the Tax Code. The payment of taxes in advance was made with the understanding that if there would be an excess payment at the end of the taxable year, the excess would either be carried over to the succeeding taxable year or be refunded. The petitioner chose the first alternative and carried it over up to 1992. This decision on the part of the petitioner caused the expiration of the two-year prescriptive period. Hence, petitioner has itself to blame. "Besides, two years is more than sufficient for petitioner to have recovered what was supposedly due it. This negligence would not merit a favorable consideration from this court. Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subeniunt . The law aids those who are vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights ( Felipe Ysmael, Jr. and Co., Inc. vs. The Deputy Executive Secretary , 190 SCRA 673, 1990). "xxx xxx xxx" 15 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED] Copy of the above-cited resolution denying its motion for reconsideration was received by the petitioner on March 28, 2003. The present petition for review was filed within the additional extended period granted by this Court on May 12, 2003. 16 As directed by this Court, respondent filed its Comment to the petition within the period of extension requested. 17 A Supplement to the Petition for Review filed by petitioner's new counsel, as well as respondent's Comment thereto, were both admitted and the case was submitted for decision. 18 The pivotal issue in the present controversy is whether or not the two (2)-year prescriptive period for claiming a refund provided in Sec. 230 of the NIRC is applicable to petitioner's request for tax credit of advance income tax payment made by it in 1991, pursuant to the ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Philippine American Life Insurance Co. 19 that the said prescriptive period is not jurisdictional and may be suspended "for reasons of equity and other special circumstances." We find the petition impressed with merit. Sec. 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 20 (Sec. 230 of the Tax Code) provides: "SEC. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected . No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereinafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected , until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty or sum has been paid under protest or duress. " In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment . Provided, however , That the Commissioner may, even without a written claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid." [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED] The CTA sustained the respondent's denial of petitioner's request for tax credit on the ground of prescription, treating the same as a simple case of excess payment and hence covered by the two (2)-year prescriptive period under Sec. 229. Citing ACCRA Investments Corp. vs. Court of Appeals (204 SCRA 957), the CTA stated that the two (2)-year prescriptive period starts to run from the filing of the Final Adjustment Return, which in the case of petitioner was filed on April 15, 1992, the taxable year involved, and consequently ruled that its right to claim refund expired on April 15, 1994. As to the request for tax credit certificate made by petitioner on April 19 and 29, 1991 and May 14, 1991, such request could not be considered as a claim for refund/issuance of a tax credit within the purview of Sec. 230 while petitioner's request on July 28, 1997 was deemed to be a clear request for the issuance of tax credit certificate of tax erroneously paid . SaDICE We do not agree. The focal point regarding the issue of coverage under Sec. 229 is payment of tax imposed or collected, which contemplates any national revenue tax already due. Considering the special circumstance that the tax credit sought in this case is to be taken or credited not from any such tax erroneously or illegally collected but from advance income tax payment voluntarily made by petitioner responding to the call of then President Aquino to generate more revenues for the government , in no way can be the amount of P180 million advanced in 1991 be considered as an erroneously or illegally paid tax . As pointed out by the petitioner, said amount was neither collected by the BIR pursuant to a tax assessment nor computed by the petitioner taxpayer in the mistaken belief that a tax liability was due. In the ordinary course of business, a taxpayer does not pay taxes in advance and it would be the height of injustice to deny a tax credit from such advance tax payment remitted by the petitioner as a patriotic gesture being at the time the most profitable corporation in the country which had not been previously applied or carried over in the next succeeding four (4)-year period when business losses unexpectedly befell petitioner, upon the ground that the request for issuance of such tax credit certificate was filed beyond the two (2)-year prescriptive period governing claims for refund of erroneously or illegally paid taxes. The legal significance of the terms erroneously, wrongfully or illegally paid tax is defined or understood, as follows: " Erroneous . Involving error, deviating from the law. This term is not generally used as designating a corrupt or evil act." 21 Erroneous assessment . Refers to an assessment that deviates from the law and is therefore invalid, and is a defect that is jurisdictional in nature, and does not refer to the judgment of the assessing officer in fixing the amount of valuation of the property . [In re Blatt, 41 N.M. 269, P. 2d 293, 301]." 22 " Erroneous or illegal tax . One levied without statutory authority, or upon property not subject to taxation, or by some officer having no authority to levy the tax, or one which in some other similar respect is illegal." 23 " Excessive . Greater than what is usual or proper. A general term for what goes beyond just measure or amount. [ Austin St. Ry. Co. v. Oldham, Tex. Civ. App., 109 S.W. 2d 235, 237]. Tending to or marked by excess, which is the quality or state or exceeding the proper or reasonable limit or measure." 24 " Excessive assessment . A tax assessment grossly disproportionate as compared with other assessments. [ Southern California Telephone Co. v. Los Angeles County , 45 Cal. App. 2d 111, 113 P. 2d 773, 776]." 25 " Illegal . Against or not authorized by law." 26 " Wrongful . Injurious, heedless, unjust, reckless, unfair. Infringement of some right. [ Mathes v. Williams , Tex. Civ. App. 134 S.W. 2d 853, 858.]" 27 "Wrongfully. In a wrong manner; unjustly; in a manner contrary to the moral law, or to justice." 28 Thus, in no sense can the subject amount of advance income tax voluntarily remitted to the BIR by the petitioner, not as a consequence of prior tax assessment or computation by the taxpayer based on business income, be treated as similar to those national revenue taxes erroneously, illegally or wrongfully paid as to be automatically covered by the two (2)-year limitation under Sec. 230 for the right to its recovery. When the P180 million advance income tax payment was tendered by the petitioner, no tax had been assessed or due, or actually imposed and collected by the BIR. Neither can such payment be considered as illegal having been made in response to a call of patriotic duty to help the national government at the time in raising greater revenues. We therefore hold that the tax credit sought by petitioner is not simply a case of excess payment, but rather for the application of the balance of advance income tax payment for subsequent taxable years after failure or impossibility to make such application or carry over to the preceding four (4)-year period when no tax liability was incurred by petitioner due to losses in its operations . It is truly inequitable to strictly impose the two (2)-year prescriptive period as to legally bar any request for such tax credit certificate considering the special circumstances under which the advance income tax payment was made and the unexpected event (four years of business losses) which prevented such application or carry over . Ironically, both the respondent Commissioner and CTA would fault the petitioner for electing to credit or carry over the excess amount of tax payment advanced instead of choosing to refund any such excess amount, holding that such decision on the part of petitioner caused the two (2)-year period to lapse without the petitioner filing such a request for the issuance of a tax credit certificate . They emphasized that the advance tax payment was made with the understanding that any excess amount will be either carried over to the next taxable year or refunded. It appears then that the request for issuance of a tax credit certificate was arbitrarily interpreted by respondent as a simple claim for refund instead of a request for application of the balance (excess amount) to tax liability for the succeeding taxable years, as was the original intention of petitioner when it tendered the advance payment in 1991. The inconsistent, indefinite and contradicting reasons given by respondent Commissioner is evident from his letter denying petitioner's request for tax credit on the remaining balance of its 1991 advance income tax payment. Respondent ruled that petitioner is no longer entitled to claim or request for any further tax credit in 1997 on the remaining balance of P73,298,892.60 after having previously applied as tax credit against petitioner's income tax liability for 1992 . In the same breath, however, respondent declared that having carried over the excess payments from 1991 to 1996 Annual Income Tax Return , petitioner had already abandoned its original intention to claim for a tax credit certificate. Although it is admitted that there was already a recommendation for the issuance of a tax credit certificate, this was for taxable year 1992 and not for the taxable year 1991. And while conceding that petitioner merely reiterated on July 28, 1997 such request for a tax credit certificate, this was already filed beyond the two (2)-year prescriptive period, such right having expired on April 15, 1994. Indeed, it would be absurd under the circumstances to require the petitioner to file another request for tax credit in 1994 when no such tax liability was incurred by it during the period up to 1996 . Since it was only in 1997 when petitioner's business operations became profitable again, it was but natural and expected for it to reiterate such request for tax credit at that year that it was anticipating a tax liability. But respondent Commissioner would later disregard such special circumstances in the case of petitioner's request for tax credit and later denied the same on the ground that it had already prescribed as it should have been made within two (2) years after the filing of petitioner's Final Adjustment Return in 1992 and accordingly petitioner's right to request such tax credit expired on April 15, 1994. Such a rigid posture on the part of respondent conveniently overlooked the fact that it had earlier allowed a tax credit for the taxable year 1992 and the petitioner had consistently maintained that its request for a tax credit certificate for the amount of P180 million advance payment made by it in 1991 will be utilized or applied by it against its future income tax liability . Our Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Philippine American Life Insurance Co. 29 involving a claim for refund of excess income tax payment, held that the prescriptive period of two (2) years should commence to run only from the time that the refund is ascertained, which can only be determined after a final adjustment return is accomplished. Nevertheless, the High Court stressed that even if the two (2)-year period has already lapsed, the same is not jurisdictional, and may be suspended for reasons of equity and other special circumstances . As to what instances may such reasons of "equity and other special circumstances" be properly invoked by the taxpayer whose claim for refund was filed beyond the two (2)-year prescriptive period, authority for this exception is found in the early cases of Panay Electric Co., Inc. vs. Collector of Internal Revenue 30 and Naguiat vs. Araneta . 31 In the first case, there is an agreement between the taxpayer and the Commissioner to wait for the result of a case pending in the Supreme Court involving the same issue, while in the latter case the Commissioner agreed to make the refund and later denied the claim. In this case, the two (2)-year prescriptive period is deemed to have been waived by the BIR when respondent led the petitioner to believe that its request for tax credit had not yet prescribed. This is evident from the correspondence between the parties after petitioner had formally requested for the tax credit in July 1997. Were it the case that petitioner's request for tax credit was already barred by prescription, respondent could have outrightly rejected the same. But what actually transpired is that the BIR undertook to process and in fact referred the request for further processing to the Deputy Commissioner for Legal Inspection Group, Deputy Commissioner for Operations Group, the BIR's Assessment Division and finally, to the BIR's Large Taxpayer's Service only for respondent Commissioner to deny the request for tax credit on the ground that it was filed beyond the two (2)-year prescriptive period for filing a claim for refund. Prior to respondent's letter of May 3, 2002 denying petitioner's request, petitioner's President and Chief Executive Officer Feliciano Miranda, Jr., wrote Deputy Commissioner Atty. Lilian B. Hefti seeking reconsideration of her decision to endorse petitioner's request to the Operations Group for "further processing" since the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division is "limited to claims for tax refund and credit involving erroneous or illegal collection of taxes whenever there are questions of law and/or facts and does not include claims for refund of advance payment, pursuant to Revenue Administrative Order (RAO) No. 7-95 dated October 10, 1995 ." 32 In reply to the aforesaid letter of petitioner, Deputy Commissioner Lilian B. Hefti, sent the following letter dated August 8, 2000 addressed to PNB President/CEO Feliciano L. Miranda, Jr.: "This refers to your letter dated July 26, 2000 requesting for a reconsideration of the decision of this Office to endorse to the Operations Group the docket of your claim for the refund of P73,298,892.60 representing the unutilized balance of your advance income tax payment for the taxable year 1991. HADTEC "It is your position that the Appellate Division of this Bureau which processed the said claim for refund has jurisdiction to do so; that the transfer to the Operations Group from the Legal and Inspection Group, where the processing of said claim is almost complete, is disadvantageous to the taxpayer considering that the processing procedures will start all over again, thus prolonging the granting of the claim for refund. "In reply, please be advised that upon review of the docket of your case, this Office finds that the same presents no legal question for resolution. Rather, what is involved is the verification of factual matters, i.e., existence of material facts to establish your entitlement to refund. Such facts were initially verified through the proper audit of your refund case by the investigating unit under the functional control and supervision of the Deputy Commissioner, Operations Group of this Bureau . It is therefore right and proper for that Operations Group to review, confirm and/or pass judgment upon the findings of the unit under it. "At any rate, sound management practices demand that issues as crucial as refund cases be subjected to complete staff work. There might be a little delay in the transition of cases but we expect the new procedures to be well-established in no time. Allow us, however, to allay your concern about delayed processing of your claim. In fact, the undersigned has made representations with the Operations Group about your case and if you would check the status of your case again, you will find that the same has been duly acted upon." 33 [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED] Nowhere in the foregoing communication is the matter of prescription mentioned and neither does it appear that petitioner was advised that its request for issuance of tax credit certificate is subject to the determination of any factual question of whether such claim or request had been filed within the prescribed period. Consequently, petitioner was led to believe that its request for tax credit is already being processed and there is no reason for it even to institute the necessary suit or proceeding before the CTA, as the endorsement to the Operations Group of the BIR further convinced it that the matter was not a simple case of claim for refund under the jurisdiction of the Appellate Division which does not include claims for refund of advance income tax payment . Further considering that petitioner had earlier been granted a tax credit for the taxable year 1992, it was but fair and reasonable for said taxpayer to expect that it can still utilize the credit balance of P73,298,892.60 for the succeeding taxable years even after it failed to apply the same for the period up to 1996 when it incurred a negative income tax liability. Under these circumstances therefore, petitioner cannot be blamed for assuming that its claim or request is not covered by the two (2)-year prescriptive period under Sec. 230 of the Tax Code . It bears stressing that four (4) days after making the advance income tax payment of P180 million, petitioner had stressed that it was requesting for the corresponding tax credit certificate to enable it to utilize said amount against its future tax obligations. 34 The clear and plain implication is that right from the very beginning, petitioner's position with respect to the P180 million advance tax payment, is that it never contemplated a claim for refund under Sec. 230 of the Tax Code but application thereof against its future tax liabilities. And its subsequent representations with the BIR, the latter's officers similarly dealt with petitioner concerning the advance income tax payment and request for tax credit certificate on the basic premise that petitioner's case is not essentially a claim for tax refund, and hence not one (1) covered by Sec. 230. With this factual environment, it is but just and reasonable to conclude that respondent had either actually disregarded or waived the two (2)-year prescriptive period in processing petitioner's request for the issuance of a tax credit certificate, or not considered the period limitation as crucial at all the tax credit being sought as application from the balance of P180 million earlier tendered as "advance income tax payment" in 1991. In an early case, it was held that if a taxpayer is clearly entitled to a refund and his right is not contested by the Commissioner, he may deduct the amount overpaid from his existing tax liability although the Commissioner has not yet approved the claim for refund . 35 In another case, the Supreme Court ruled that an availment of tax credit granted by law, such as the then sales tax on raw materials used to manufacture an article likewise subject to sales tax, not being one for refund, prescribes in ten (10) years under the provisions of Art. 1144 of the Civil Code . The two (2)-year prescriptive period is intended to apply to suits or proceedings for the recovery of taxes, penalties or sums erroneously , excessively, illegally or wrongfully collected ; accordingly, a claim for tax credit, authorized by law, would instead prescribe in ten (10) years, except when otherwise expressed by the Tax Code itself such as in value-added taxes in respect to the claim or application for tax refund or credit. 36 Thus, the foregoing principles should similarly govern cases of advance income tax payment which are not erroneously, excessively, illegally or wrongfully collected and which is clearly not contemplated under Sec. 230 of the Tax Code as to be subjected to the two (2)-year prescriptive period particularly considering the special circumstances of such payment by herein petitioner. Necessarily, therefore, and consistent with justice and equity, petitioner should not be made to suffer losing millions of pesos advanced by it for future tax liabilities as a measure of corporate goodwill and patriotism to help the national government in 1991 raise increased revenues, especially as the reason why petitioner failed to apply such advance tax payment from 1992 to 1996 is the business downturn it experienced on account of which it incurred no tax liability during the said period. This Court is mindful of the basic principle that "taxes are the lifeblood of the nation" and that it is of utmost importance that "the modes adopted to enforce the collection of taxes levied should be summary and interfered with as little as possible." 37 Nonetheless, tax collection should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for government itself. It is therefore necessary to reconcile the conflicting interests of the authorities and the taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxation, which is the promotion of the common good, may be achieved. 38 Accordingly, for instance, such mere mandatory provisions of Sec. 229 of the NIRC, requiring a claim for refund to be in writing and filed within two (2) years from payment with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, "cannot and should not be a constraint against the application of the doctrine even where that period had already lapsed; precisely, it is an invocation of equity rather than of law." 39 It serves well to underscore the principle that the power to tax must be exercised with caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer. 40 Respondent, however, preferred a narrow and restrictive application of the two (2)-year prescriptive period to defeat petitioner's just and reasonable demand for tax credit, dismissing the claim as a simple case of excess payment under Sec. 230 of the Tax Code which had already prescribed. Said official rejected petitioner's invocation of equity and special circumstances, holding that equity is available only in the absence of law and not its replacement citing jurisprudence to this effect. Indeed, no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing. 41 But here, no such fault or neglect can even be ascribed to petitioner who had unequivocally intended the advance income tax payment made by it in 1991 in response to the call of the national government to raise greater revenues, by immediately requesting for the issuance of a tax credit certificate purposely to enable it to apply such amount so advanced against its future tax liabilities. In his restrictive application of the two (2)-year limitation under Sec. 230 of the Tax Code , respondent Commissioner obviously was unconcerned of the equitable and special circumstances under which petitioner's request for tax credit certificate is being made. Although indeed, equity, which has been described as "justice outside legality," is availed of only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements, 42 jurisprudence had already laid down the rule that the two (2)-year prescriptive period for filing a claim for refund is not jurisdictional and may be suspended or waived for reasons of equity and other special circumstances. Where, as in this case, the request for tax credit is based on the advance income tax payment made by petitioner who was made to believe that such request for tax credit is not covered under the two (2)-year limitation under Sec. 230 as it is not strictly a case of claim for tax refund, and such failure to apply the advance payment was due to negative tax liability for the succeeding taxable years up to 1996, respondent Commissioner seriously erred and abused his discretion in ignoring the attendant circumstances clearly warranting an exceptional treatment. Well-settled is the rule that the findings and conclusions of administrative officers and agencies are generally accorded respect if not finality by the appellate courts. However, the doctrine does not apply when the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion. 43 Under the present Rules , a petition for review of the final orders, judgments, awards or resolutions rendered by quasi-judicial agencies such as the CTA may be given due course whenever they have committed errors of fact or law that would warrant reversal or modification of the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed. 44 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Consequently, the assailed Resolutions dated October 10, 2002 and March 20, 2003 of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 6487 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the respondent Commissioner for issuance with deliberate dispatch of the tax credit certificate after completion of processing of petitioner's claim/request by the concerned BIR officer/s as to the correct amount of tax credit to which petitioner is entitled. EIDATc No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Guaria and Reyes, Jr., JJ . , concur. Footnotes 1. Annexes "D" to "E-1" of Petition, Rollo , p. 70. 2. Annexes "G" to G-2" and "H" to "H-2" of Petition, Rollo , pp. 7678. 3. Annexes "F" to "F-2" of Petition, Rollo , pp. 7375. 4. Annex "I" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 8283. 5. Annexes "J" to "N" of Petition, Rollo , pp. 84-95. 6. Annexes "O" to "R" of Petition, Rollo, pp. 96100. 7. Annex "R" to Petition, Rollo , pp. 101102. 8. Annex "S" of Petition, Rollo , pp. 103104. 9. Annex "T" of Petition, Rollo , pp. 105108. 10. Annex "U" of Petition, Rollo , pp. 109115. 11. Annex "C" of Petition, Rollo , pp. 6369. 12. Ibid ., p. 69. 13. Annex "V" of Petition, Rollo , pp. 116118. 14. Annex "B" of Petition, Rollo , pp. 6162. 15. Ibid . 16. Rollo , p. 124. 17. Rollo , pp. 125141. 18. Rollo , pp. 142177. Per Agendum dated September 22, 2003. 19. Supra . 20. P.D. No. 1158, as amended, up to R.A. No. 8761. 21. Black's Law Dictionary Fifth Edition , p. 486. 22. Ibid . 23. Ibid . 24. Ibid ., p. 504. 25. Ibid . 26. Ibid ., p. 673. 27. Ibid ., p. 1446. 28. Ibid . 29. 244 SCRA 446 30. 103 Phil. 819 31. 104 Phil. 962 32. Rollo , p. 98 33. Rollo , p. 100 34. Rollo , p. 73 35. Commissioner vs. Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. , 28 SCRA 867. 36. Supra , cited in Tax Law and Jurisprudence by Justice Jose C. Vitug, 2000 Edition , p. 307. 37. Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 302 SCRA 241. 38. Commissioner vs. Algue, Inc. , 158 SCRA 9, Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals , 234 SCRA 348. 39. VITUG, supra at p. 45. 40. Roxas vs. Court of Tax Appeals , 23 SCRA 276. 41. Alba Vda. de Raz vs. Court of Appeals , 314 SCRA 36. 42. Smith, Bell & Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals , 267 SCRA 530. 43. Ruby Industrial Corporation vs. Court of Appeals , 284 SCRA 445. 44. Sec. 10, Rule 43, 1997 of Civil Procedure , as amended