Equitable Banking Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals

SIXTEENTH DIVISION [CA-G.R. SP No. 52631. November 13, 2000.] EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION , petitioner , vs . HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondents . D E C I S I O N ENRIQUEZ , JR . , J p : This is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed by Equitable Banking Corporation (hereinafter referred to as petitioner bank), the petitioner in this instant recourse to annul and set aside the Resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals (hereafter referred to as respondent Court) promulgated on January 05, 1999 and on March 18, 1999. The first Resolution of respondent Court averred to denies the similar motions of petitioner bank to reopen CTA Cases Nos. 5440, 5460, 5547 and 5575, and to be allowed to present additional evidence in each of these cases; while the second Resolution is a denial of petitioner bank's Motion For Reconsideration on the first Resolution. During the pendency of this instant Petition for Certiorari, petitioner bank has filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 to this Court of the Decision on the merits of the respondent Court in CTA Case No. 5460. By resolution of this court on January 25, 2000, the case and the matter on the issuance of a temporary restraining order are now considered submitted for resolution without the required reply to the comment. The Petition at bench arose from the following factual milieu Petitioner bank a domestic banking corporation with principal address at 262 Juan Luna St., Binondo, Manila filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR, for brevity) its various quarterly percentage tax returns covering those of its Head Office and branches for the period ending December 31, 1994. Petitioner bank also submitted to the BIR its "Transmittal Sheet of Percentage Tax of the Head Office and Branches/Units of Large Taxpayers For the Quarter Ended December 31, 1994" for a total of P28,120,119.44 Gross Receipt Tax (GRT), which amount petitioner bank paid to the BIR. Of this amount of GRT paid by respondent bank, the combined amount of GRT paid by its Head Office, and its Arranque, Magdalena, Ongpin, Reina Regente and Soler Branches pertaining to their percentage tax was P17,072,627.26. These figures were duly reflected in EBC's Quarterly Percentage Tax Return for the quarter ended December 31, 1994 which return was filed also on January 20, 1995 and specifically covers only the said EBC Head Office and specified branches that are all under the jurisdiction of the same revenue district office. The same return specifically states that the aforesaid Head office and Branches accumulated a total gross receipts of P44,573,851.09 for the quarter ended December 21, 1994 and that the total percentage tax EBC paid for said gross receipts covering the Head Office and branches specified for the same quarter was P17,072,627.26. SDATEc On September 26, 1996 on account of the ruling in the case of Asian Bank Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue docketed as CTA Case No. 4720 where it was held that the twenty percent (20%) final withholding tax on banks' passive income should not form part of the bank's taxable gross receipts for the purpose of computing the bank's Gross Receipts Tax, petitioner bank requested the BIR Revenue District Office of Binondo the refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate for, among other sums, the amount of P1,231,671.92 corresponding to the difference between the Gross Receipts Tax paid for the December 31, 1994 quarter pertaining to the EBC Head Office and its Arranque, Magdalena, Ongpin, Reina Regente and Soler Branches and the adjusted Gross Receipt Tax in the amount of P15,840,955.34. The BIR not having acted upon its claim for refund, petitioner bank filed a Petition for Review with the respondent Court to toll the running of the prescriptive period for refund. Issues having been joined with the filing of an answer by the BIR, hearing proceeded before a Commissioner appointed by the respondent Court before whom petitioner bank presented its witness and documentary evidence. Thereupon, petitioner bank filed its "Formal Offer of Petitioner's Evidence" which respondent Court admitted together with the testimony of its witness. The petitioner having rested its case and the counsel for the BIR having manifested that the case was being submitted based on the pleadings the respondent court gave the parties respective periods to file Memorandum. Both Petitioner bank and the BIR filed their memoranda and the respondent Court deemed CTA Case No. 5460 submitted for decision. It was at this stage when petitioner bank filed its "Motion To Reopen Case and Allow EBC to present Additional Evidence." Proceeding parallel to CTA Case No. 5460 were two other cases filed by petitioner bank also praying for refund of alleged erroneously paid withholding tax on interest income derived from loan arrangements for calendar quarter ended June 30, 1994 (CTA Cases No. 5411 and 5146). Both these two cases were dismissed and the respective petitions for refund were denied for failure of the petitioner bank to present evidence of payment by the withholding agent. Anticipating that the CTA cases subject of this petition will have the same fate as CTA Case Nos. 5146 and 5411, the petitioner bank filed a Motion to Reopen Case and allow EBC To Present Additional Evidence in support of its petition for refund. The aforesaid Motion and its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the respondent Court, the petitioner now seeks recourse to this Court through this Petition For Certiorari. A petition for certiorari is a special civil action anchored on the ground of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions (Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). In the instant case, petitioner bank was duly afforded time to present its evidence and it did so. As a matter of record, petitioner bank has already formally offered its evidence and the respondent court has admitted them. In fact, the petition for refund before the court a quo has already been submitted for decision upon manifestation of respondent Commissioner that the case is being submitted based on the pleadings, and the parties having filed their respective memorandum (Rollo, p. 6). This was the factual milieu when petitioner bank filed its Motion to Reopen Case which was denied by the respondent court. After a close scrutiny of the petition, the Court finds it unmeritorious as to grant it. This Court does not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Court in issuing the two (2) resolutions made subject of this petition. In adopting the doctrine enunciated in Delfin vs. Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., (19 SCRA 593) the respondent Court held that "if a case may be reopened from time to time as a party or his lawyer remembers evidence which was overlooked, then litigation will suffer undue delay." This ruling is nothing but an exercise of jurisdiction from which appeal and not certiorari is the proper remedy for correcting any error that might have been committed (Young vs. Sulit, 162 SCRA 659; M & M Management vs. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 227). ITaESD As duly noted by the Court a quo , the petitioner failed to allege substantial facts as to justify its inadvertence or excusable negligence in not presenting the additional documentary evidence for which it substantially sought the reopening of the case. It adverts to nothing but the rulings of the Court in CTA Cases Nos. 5146 and 5411. The presentation of additional evidence is allowed only when such evidence has been omitted through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct evidence previously offered (Alegre vs. Reyes, 161 SCRA 233; Agulto vs. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 80). Finding thus, the inevitable conclusion is that the Court of Tax Appeals rightfully exercised its discretion in denying the petitioner's Motion To Re-Open Case. Inevitably, certiorari will not lie and the instant petition should be as it is hereby denied. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Vasquez, Jr. and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.