Ty v. Acosta

FIRST DIVISION [CA-G.R. SP No. 42965. June 11, 1997.] ANITA N. TY , petitioner , vs . HON. ERNESTO D. ACOSTA & RAMON G. DE VEYRA, as Judges of the Court of Tax Appeals, HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, ET AL. , respondents . D E C I S I O N VASQUEZ , JR. , J p : For having been filed out of time, the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed CTA Case No. 4965 entitled "Anita N. Ty vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue", in a decision dated July 6, 1996. cdtech Petitioner, Anita N. Ty, is a practising physician. Sometime in December 1988, her books of accounts and other accounting records for 1986 and 1987 were examined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. As a result on October 15, 1992, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a written final decision denying petitioner's protest of her 1987 income tax deficiency assessment. Anita N. Ty admittedly received the decision on January 28, 1993 . So, on March 1, 1993 , petitioner filed her Petition For Review before the Court of Tax Appeals to assail the assessment. The case is docketed as CTA Case No. 4965. After due proceedings, on July 6, 1996, the respondent Court of Tax Appeals handed down its decision dismissing CTA Case No. 4965 for having been filed out of time. The attempt for a reconsideration of the said verdict was likewise denied in a resolution dated October 8, 1996. Later, on October 25, 1996 an Entry of Judgment (Annex I, Petition) was issued declaring the decision in the case final and executory and recorded in the Books of Entries and Judgments of the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the petitioner, Anita N. Ty, imputing grave abuse of discretion against the respondent Court of Tax Appeals in issuing the decision against her on the following grounds: " GROUNDS A. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR REVIEW OF THE PETITIONER FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION FOR FILING SAID PLEADING ON MONDAY, MARCH 1, 1993, WITH THE DUE DATE FOR FILING BEING ON SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 1993. B. THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW MOTU PROPRIO EVEN AFTER IT HAS ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER AND THE PERSONS OF THE PARTIES INVOLVED." (p. 6, Rollo) Pragmatically, at the centerfold of this controversy is the pivotal question: "If the last day to file a petition for review before the Court of Tax Appeals falls on a Saturday, is it automatically extended to the coming Monday if the latter is not a holiday?" It is acknowledged that petitioner received the final assessment (decision) of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on January 28, 1993. Under Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125, as amended, the appeal exclusively belongs to the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. And the appeal period is thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision or ruling as provided for by Section 11 of the said law. Petitioner, therefore, had until February 27, 1993, within which to file the appeal by way of a petition for review. But then, February 27, 1993 fell on a Saturday. LLphil Anyway, petitioner filed her Petition For Review the following Monday, March 1, 1993. The respondent court declared it to be out of time and altogether dismissed the case. Petitioner takes exception. Before the tax court, she reasoned out that under Section 28 of Book I of our 1987 Administrative Code, where the last day for doing an act required or permitted by law falls on a regular holiday, or special holiday, the act may be done in the next succeeding business day. Resultantly, petitioner argues, inasmuch as February 27 is a Saturday when government offices are closed, the filing of the petition could be done the following Monday, March 1, 1993. In the petition at bench, the petitioner buttress her position by citing the very recent case of Azores vs. SEC. 252 SCRA 387 [1996], where the Supreme Court ruled: "Saturdays are not holidays which may be pretermitted in Atlas Cons. Mining & Dev. Corp. v. Factoran the appeal was allowed to be filed the following Monday although the last day for appealing fell the previous Saturday because Saturdays were observed as legal holidays in the Office of the President to which the appeal from the decision of the then Minister of Natural Resources was to be taken. In the case of courts, it was only on January 23, 1993 that the filing of pleadings due on a Saturday was directed to be done the following Monday, if the latter is not a holiday . Hence petitioner's appeal should have been filed on October 17, 1992 as this was the last day for perfecting the appeal. His mere belief in good faith that Saturday was a nonworking day cannot excuse his failure to comply with the rule fixing the period of appeal, which is mandatory. (Emphasis of text supplied)" (p. 7, Rollo) Taking a cue from the ruling in Azores, petitioner concluded that her petition for review filed on March 1, 1993, was still within the reglementary period since February 27, 1993 fell on a Saturday. The argument is untenable. The pronouncement in Azores that in the case of courts effective January 23, 1993, there will be no office on Saturdays, so that pleadings falling due on that day may be filed the following Monday, if the latter is not a holiday, takes its origin from a Supreme Court Memorandum to its Docket and Cashier Divisions. It was basically intended to revoke the Saturday overtime services earlier granted the said offices under an authority dated January 6, 1993 which was thereby cancelled and revoked. Plainly, having been addressed to two (2) of its own divisions, the Memorandum can only be effective insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned. Our considered opinion is that the directive is only internal and not intended to cover the other courts. Besides, it is of judicial knowledge that lower courts are open on Saturdays, especially the Office of the Clerks of Courts, precisely to receive pleadings, inter alia. The Saturday duties are mandated under Supreme Court Memorandum Order Revised Schedule and Working Hours, dated 19 November 1993 and lately re-emphasized in Circular No. 95-96 of the Office of the Court Administrator, Supreme Court of the Philippines. Appropriately, in BA vs. Gerochi, Jr., 230 SCRA 9 (1994) it was declared: "Unfortunately for the petitioner, the Saturday of 28 December 1985 was a business day for the courts. The prevailing rule even then was that if the last day to appeal fell on a Saturday, the act was still due on that day and not on the next succeeding business day (SM Agri and General Machineries vs. NLRC, 169 SCRA 20). Hence when the petitioner finally filed its appeal on 02 January 1986, it was late by five (5) days. The petition itself, significantly was dated and verified on the same day of 02 January 1986 . Parenthetically, the Docket & Receiving Section and the Cashier Section of this Court were open on 28 December 1985, and it was only on 20 January 1993 when this Court's offices were ordered closed on Saturdays . (Emphasis supplied) In the meantime, the Court of Tax Appeals had promulgated and adopted its own rules on procedure pursuant to Section 8 of Republic Act No. 1125. Ironically for the petitioner, Section 3 of the said rules provides: LLjur Sec. 3. The office of the Clerk of Court of the Court of Tax Appeals shall be open for the purpose of receiving petitions, pleadings, motions, and the like during the hours of eight to twelve A.M. and one to four P.M. on Mondays to Fridays and from eight A . M . to one P . M . on Saturday , except on such days as may be designated by law or executive proclamation as being official holidays." (emphasis supplied) In the final analysis, We find the respondent Court of Tax Appeals to have committed no reversible error or abuse of discretion in ruling that the CTA Case No. 4965 was indeed, filed out of time. While ordinarily the Rules of Court calls for a liberal construction (Section 2, Rules of Court), the reglementary periods therein prescribed are to be strictly observed for they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and an ordinary discharge of judicial business (Mangali vs. CA, 99 SCRA 236 [1980]). Strict compliance with such periods has more than once been held to be imperative (FJR Garments vs. CA, 130 SCRA 216 [1984]), particularly and more significantly in respect to the perfection of appeal (Gutierrez vs. CA, 26 SCRA 32 [1970], BA vs. Gerochi, Jr., 230 SCRA 10, 11 [1994]). Of late, in Azores vs. SEC, supra, the Supreme Court also ruled: "The failure of a party to perfect his appeal in the manner and within the period fixed by law renders the decision sought to be appealed final with the result that no court can exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision. For it is more important that a case be settled than that it be settled right. It is only in exceptional cases when we have allowed a relaxation of the rules governing the periods of appeals." Appeal is a mere statutory privilege. Corollarily, its requirements must be strictly complied with. Perfection of an appeal within the statutory reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional (Refugia vs. CA, 258 SCRA 347 [1996]) and failure to do so renders the questioned decision final and executory and deprives the appellate court or body of jurisdiction to alter the final judgment much less to entertain the appeal. Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights (Pedrosa vs. Hill, 257 SCRA 373 [1996]). The timeliness of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even the Supreme Court can trifle with (BA vs. Gerochi, Jr. 230 SCRA 9 [1994]) One last point to consider, it is basic and well-entrenched that the issue on jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the proceedings even on appeal (Caro vs. CA, 158 SCRA 270 [1988]; Estoesta vs. CA 179 SCRA 203 [1989]). Even if, not raised as a defense, a case could be dismissed ex mero motu, if it appears that the appeal was filed out of time (Ker vs. Co. Ltd. vs. CTA. 4 SCRA 160 [1962]). LLpr IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and is ordered DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. De Pano, Jr . and Ynares Santiago, JJ . , concur.