Temprosa, Jr. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

FOURTH DIVISION [CA-G.R. SP No. 38731. January 12, 1996.] TOMAS B. TEMPROSA, JR. , petitioner , vs . THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondent . D E C I S I O N VASQUEZ , JR . , J p : Appeal by way of Petition for Review under Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 (now Circular No. 1-95) of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals dated March 3, 1995 dismissing the case for lack jurisdiction. Relevant facts of the case reveal that petitioner, Tomas Temprosa, Jr., a lawyer by profession, imported from the United States a 1985 Dodge Caravan donated to him by his daughter and son-in-law who are residents of New Jersey, U.S.A.. As a result of the importation, petitioner was assessed fifty (50%) percent ad valorem tax in the amount of P123,929.00 and value added tax. In order to effect release of the vehicle, petitioner paid the taxes imposed on the vehicle under protest. Subsequently, on July 3, 1991, he filed a claim for refund of the 50% ad valorem tax and the amount of P12,485.00 which he claims to be an over payment of the value added tax. On June 15, 1992 (Exh. K), the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) denied the request for refund. Not convinced, petitioner instituted the present action before the Court of Tax Appeals on October 7, 1992 wherein the issue on whether the tax court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition surfaced. Specifically, the jurisdictional issue rests upon the timeliness of the appeal undertaken. Anyway, on March 3, 1995, the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction which decision was duly received by the petitioner on April 3, 1995. On April 7, 1995 petitioner submitted a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the tax court on July 7, 1995. Petitioner acknowledged to have received this order on July 24, 1995. On the same day, July 24, 1995, petitioner posted his Second Motion For Reconsideration (Annex I) and an Omnibus Motion on October 7, 1995. On October 14, 1995, petitioner received the denial of the second motion for reconsideration and the Omnibus Motion basically on the ground that pursuant to Administrative Circular No. 1-95 or 1-91, only one motion for reconsideration is allowed. On October 16, 1995 the instant petition was filed before this court for the reversal of the decision of March 3, 1995 and Orders dated July 7 and September 18, 1995 issued by the Court of Tax Appeals. The petition is insufficient in form and in substance. It is deeply-rooted in this jurisdiction that judgments or decisions of judicial or quasi-judicial agencies must become final at a certain definite time, otherwise, the court litigations will be an unending affair. As a consequence of this basic principle, the law prescribes the procedure for the perfection of an appeal by unsatisfied litigant from an adverse decision rendered against him. Conformably, the period fixed must strictly be followed considering that the right to appeal is merely statutory privilege and should be exercised in the manner and in accordance with provisions of law. (PCIB vs. CA, 229 SCRA 360 [1994]). Parenthetically, finality of a judgment or order becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected (Amarante vs. CA, 232 SCRA 104 [1994]), and a party is barred from assailing the correctness of a judgment not appealed by him and he may only make a counter-statement of errors to sustain the judgment on other grounds but not to adduce arguments which would modify or reverse the same (Heirs of Juan Oclarit vs. CA, 233 SCRA 239 [1994] ). As a corollary, under Supreme Court Revised Circular No. 1-95, or from its forerunner Circular No. 1-91, appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, the Court of Tax Appeals including, shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of award or of the denial of petitioner's Motion For New Trial or Reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo . The same circular proscribes the filing of a second motion for reconsideration . In the present case, petitioner received the assailed March 3, 1995 decision on April 3, 1995 thereby giving him until April 18, 1995 within which to perfect an appeal. When the timely motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner was denied on July 7, 1995 which he received on July 24, 1995, at the very least, petitioner had only up to August 8, 1995 to file the petition for review to this court. Eventually, when this petition for review was submitted on October 16, 1995, the same was way beyond the period of appeal. As the second motion for reconsideration, being a prohibited pleading, did not stop the running of the period of appeal. Fittingly, this petition having been filed beyond the reglementary period, which is not only mandatory but likewise jurisdictional, rendered final and executory the contested order of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and deprives this court of jurisdiction to entertain this appeal (Ceniza vs. CA, 218 SCRA 390 [1993] ). It must likewise be attested, that Court of Tax Appeals, whose decision and order are being assailed herein is not impleaded as a respondent further justifying the dismissal of this petition. IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this petition is ordered DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED. Paras and Gutierrez , JJ ., concur.