Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals

TWELFTH DIVISION [CA-G.R. SP No. 35996. September 13, 1995.] (C.T.A. Case No 4438) METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY , petitioner , vs .HON. COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondents . D E C I S I O N TAYAO-JAGUROS , J p : Before this Court is a petition for review filed by Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company from the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 4438, dismissing said bank's petition assailing the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in holding said bank liable for the amount of P925,619.06 representing deficiency documentary stamp tax on foreign exchange transaction for the year 1986 and denying its protest on the ground that it was filed beyond the thirty-day reglementary period under Section 170 of the 1986 Tax Code. These are the facts: On October 21, 1988, petitioner Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company received from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue a demand letter assessing it deficiency documentary stamp tax on foreign exchange transaction in the total amount of P925,619.06. At the bottom of said demand letter is a reminder which reads: "IMPORTANT: If you disagree with the above assessment, please file with the Collection Office, Room 509, Main BIR Building, Diliman, Quezon City, your protest in writing indicating your reasons therefor in accordance with the requirements of Revenue Regulations No. 12-85 within thirty (30) days from receipts hereof; otherwise, the same becomes final and unappealable, pursuant to the provisions of Section 270 of the Tax Code." It appears that despite receipts of said demand letter, petitioner bank only filed its corresponding protest on August 1, 1989, or after a period of almost a year. Consequently, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue rendered a decision dying the protest for having been filed beyond the reglementary period as provided by law. Sustaining the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the respondent Court of Tax Appeals rendered the appealed decision dismissing the bank's petition. Hence, the instant petition for review by the bank. We find no merit in this petition. Basically, petitioner bank raises before this Court the same issues and arguments it has raised before the respondent court. Foremost is its argument that it failed in filing its protest within the reglementary period of thirty days from notice against the assessment of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue due to the alleged negligence of its counsel. We believe that the respondent court had already squarely ruled on the matter, to wit: "It is the duty of a party litigant to make inquiries do counsel on matters concerning his case. (Florendo v. Florendo, L-24982, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 432.) He is duty bound to contact his lawyer from time to time in order that he may be informed of the progress of his case. Thus, a party is bound by the mistake and may suffer for the negligence of his lawyer. (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 46). Moreover, it is a settled rule that the negligence of counsel is binding on the client just as the latter is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. (Paramount Vinyl Products Corporation vs. NLRC. 190 SCRA 525; Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Lincoln Gerald, Inc., vs. NLRC, 1987, SCRA 70; Gutierrez vs. Zulueta, 187 SCRA 607; Manila Electric Co., vs. Court of Appeals 187 SCRA 200; Eden vs. Ministry of Labor & Employment, 182 SCRA 840; Blaza vs. Court of Appeals, supra; Negros Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Court of First Instance of Batangas, Branch 1, 160 SCRA 352; Escudero vs. Dulay, 158S SCRA 69; and Villa Rhecar Bus vs. De la Cruz, 157 SCRA 13.)" (pp. 5-6, C.T.A. Dec.;pp. 26-27, Rollo) Indeed, in Tesoro v. C.A.,54, SCRA 296, the Supreme Court emphasized that: "It has been repeatedly enunciated that 'a client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result might have been different had he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening case, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could not allege and show that prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned." Moreover. We observe that the petitioner's delay in filing its protest against the said assessment of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is so gross to consider the same as just simple negligence given the almost a year period before petitioner was heard in protest. Section 270 of the 1986 National Internal Revenue Code expressly provides: "Sec. 270. Protesting of assessment . When the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative finds that proper taxes should be assessed, he shall first notify the taxpayer of his findings. Within a period to be prescribed by implementing regulations, the taxpayer shall be required to respond to said notice. If the taxpayer fails to respond, the Commissioner shall issue an assessment based on his findings. Such assessment may be protested administratively by filing a request for reconsideration or reinvestigation in such form and manner as may be prescribed by implementing regulations within thirty (30) days from receipt of the assessment; otherwise, the assessment shall become final and unappealable . If the protest is denied in whole or in part, the individual, association or corporation adversely affected by the decision on the protest may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipts of the said decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final, executory and demandable." [As inserted by PD 1773] [Emphasis supplied] From the above provision of law, petitioner has only thirty days from notice to file its protest. The assessment becomes final and unappealable after the lapse of the thirty-day period without filing such protest. In the instant case, petitioner only filed its protest after the lapse of almost three hundred (300) days from notice of assessment. We have not known similar act of gross negligence in filing delayed protest to an assessment of the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue. For all of petitioner's imputation of negligence of its counsel, it should also re-examine itself, specifically its management of affairs as to how such gross negligence had escaped its attention for almost a year. As for the other issue of new trial, petitioner has yet to advance to this Court its legal basis warranting a new trial of this case under Rule 37 of the Revised Rules of Court. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED by this Court for lack of merit. The appealed decision of the respondent court in C.T.A. Case No. 4438 is affirmed. Cost against petitioner. IT IS SO ORDERED. Elbinias and Adefuin-Dela Cruz, JJ .,concur.