Aras-Asan Timber Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

FORMER SPECIAL SEVENTH DIVISION [CA-G.R. SP No. 33062. July 28, 1997.] ARAS-ASAN TIMBER CO., INC. , petitioner , vs . COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE AND THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS , respondent . D E C I S I O N BARCELONA , J p : A petition for review of the December 17, 1993 decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in C.T.A. Case No. 3524. "Aras-Asan Timber Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue", is sought by the petitioner on the following grounds: "I THE RESPONDENT COURT OF TAX APPEALS FAILED TO APPLY THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN INSULAR LUMBER CO. VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS WHICH GRANTED THE CLAIM FOR PARTIAL REFUND OF SPECIFIC TAXES PAID BY THE CLAIMANT, WITHOUT QUALIFICATION OR LIMITATION. II THE RESPONDENT COURT OF TAX APPEALS IGNORED THE INCREASE IN RATES IMPOSED BY SUCCEEDING AMENDATORY LAWS. UNDER WHICH THE PETITIONER PAID THE SPECIFIC TAXES ON MANUFACTURED AND DIESEL FUELS. III IN ITS DECISION, THE RESPONDENT COURT OF TAX APPEALS RULED CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED TENETS OF LAW WHEN IT LENT ITSELF TO INTERPRETING SECTION 5 OF R.A. 1435, WHEN THE CONSTRUCTION OF SAID LAW IS NOT NECESSARY. IV SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF R.A. 1435 ARE NOT THE OPERATIVE PROVISIONS TO BE APPLIED BUT RATHER, SECTIONS 142 AND 145 OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED. V TO RULE THAT THE BASIS FOR COMPUTATION OF THE REFUNDED TAXES SHOULD BE SECTIONS 1 AND 2 OF R.A. 1435 RATHER THAN SECTIONS 153 AND 156 OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE IS UNFAIR, ERRONEOUS, ARBITRARY, INEQUITABLE AND OPPRESSIVE." (pp. 14-15, Rollo) The decretal portion of the decision under review reads: "WHEREFORE, the respondent, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE is hereby ordered to REFUND in favor of petitioner, ARAS-ASAN TIMBER CO., INC., the sum of P2,721.63, without interest, equivalent to 25% partial refund of specific taxes paid on its purchases of regular gasoline, oils and lubricants, diesel and industrial fuels pursuant to the provision of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435, in relation to Section 142 (b) and (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code and Section 145 as prescribed under Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. 1435. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED." (p. 22, Decision; p. 291, Records) On the basis of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 1435 and the case of "Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals" (104 SCRA 710), the petitioner Aras-Asan Timber Co., Inc., a domestic corporation duly licensed to operate a forest concession (Exhibit B. pp. 57-76, Records), filed on September 18, 1982 a claim for a tax refund of P152,794.38 representing 25% of the specific taxes paid on refined and manufactured mineral oils, motor fuels and diesel fuel oil it purchased and actually used in its operations from July 1, 1980 to October 30, 1981 with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (Exhibit A. pp. 6-7, Records). Since the Commissioner's decision on the claim for tax refund was not forthcoming, the petitioner filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for review of its claim on October 8, 1982 in order to stop the running of the two-year prescriptive period within which to file a claim for refund under Section 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code (pp. 1-5, Records). Petitioner's claim for refund, although contested by the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on grounds that: the law relied upon as basis for claim has already been repealed or has expired; the privilege of refund is not available to forest concessionaires absent the payments of additional taxes under a municipal or city ordinance; and prescription (pp. 27-29, 102-115, Records), was granted by the Court of tax Appeals in its decision under review (pp. 8-10, Decision; pp. 277-279, Records). LexLib Pertinent to this petition for review of the Court of Tax Appeals' decision, however, is the determination of the amount of specific taxes to be refunded to the petitioner. In its decision, the Court of Tax Appeals justified its finding for a 25% tax refund on specific taxes deemed paid in accordance with the rates provided in Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. 1435, as follows: "Petitioner claims that it is entitled to the 25% partial refund of specific taxes paid from its purchases of refined and manufactured fuel oils, diesel fuel oils and lubricating oils from July 1, 1980 to October 31, 1981 in the total amount of P152,794.38. However, in its Memorandum, petitioner included in its claim for refund purchases of fuels from November 1981 to January 1982. A Table showing purchases of Diesel. Regular Gasoline and Industrial Fuel from July 1980 to January 1982 was presented by petitioner. It was alleged that it paid a total of P545,063.38 specific taxes on said purchases. The amount now being claimed as 25% refund on specific taxes paid is P136,265.84 instead of the original P152,794.38. It appears also that petitioner did not include in the Table its purchases of lubricating oils as the sales invoices, covering these purchases, indicated drums instead of liters. However, petitioner offered in evidence its working paper marked as Exhibits OO, OO-1, OO-2, OO-3 and OO-4 showing its Cash Receipts or Disbursement Vouchers with the oils and lubricants already converted into liters. A drum of oil is equivalent to 208,175 liters based on the working paper presented by petitioner. [See Exhs. OO, OO-1 to OO-4, inclusive]. Respondent did not oppose petitioner's offer of evidence. Respondent argued that specific taxes paid prior to October 8, 1980 had already prescribed the petition having been filed only on October 8, 1982. The Tax Code provides for the judicial remedy of filing a claim for refund within a period of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax pursuant to the provision of Section 230 (formerly Section 292). Section 135 of the Tax Code insofar as pertinent provides 'that specific taxes on locally manufactured petroleum products levied under Sections 153, 155 and 156 of this title, except lubricating oil and grease , shall be paid within fifteen (15) days from the date of removal thereof from the place of production.' It is therefore evident that the manufacturer of petroleum products has up to 15 days from the date of its removal within which to pay the specific taxes on locally manufactured petroleum products. As an exception, manufacturers of lubricating oils and grease have to pay the specific tax collected from the purchaser on the date of its removal from the place of production. Petitioner purchased both manufactured petroleum products and lubricating oils and grease. Thus, with respect to its purchases of lubricating oils, the specific taxes paid thereon are deemed paid at the date of its removal. The claim for refund of the 25% specific taxes paid on oils and lubricants purchased and delivered prior to October 8, 1980 had indeed prescribed. Hence, the corresponding 25% partial refund of specific tax paid on 2,914.45 liters of oils [Exh. J-1] purchased from Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., in September 4, 1980. Invoice No. 27221 F, had prescribed. [See also Exh. OO, p. 83, CTA record.] All claims not included in the claim for refund filed in the administrative level (BIR) cannot be the subject of the present appeal. Thus, purchases of petroleum products and lubricants made after October 31, 1981, not being included in the claim for refund filed with the respondent's office, cannot be considered by this Court for the same was not included to form part of its claim for refund with the BIR nor of this petition for review. The petition calls for the refund of 25% of the specific taxes paid on petitioner's purchases of manufactured oils and fuels from July 1, 1980 to October 31, 1981 and not purchases of fuels from July 1, 1980 to January 31, 1982, as prayed for in the Memorandum. Following the provision of Section 135 of the Tax Code, the specific taxes paid on the rest of petroleum products purchased by petitioner falls due on the 15th day following the date of its removal . Therefore, all shipments of petroleum products, except oils and lubricants, paid by petitioner 15 days prior to October 8, 1980 or on September 23 , 1980 are deemed paid on October 8, 1980 which is well within the two-year prescriptive period as prescribed under Section 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code. The specific taxes collected from petitioner on its purchases of petroleum products other than oils on September 23, 1980 shall be paid within 15 days from the date of its removal or on October 8, 1980. It follows that on October 8, 1980, all purchases of locally manufactured petroleum products, except oils, on September 23, 1980 are deemed paid. Thus, all purchases of fuels prior to September 23, 1980 have prescribed. It should be noted that in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation and Court of Tax Appeals, supra, the Supreme Court's Third Division granted Rio Tuba's Motion for Reconsideration of its decision dated September 30, 1991. The Supreme Court in its Resolution, dated March 25, 1992, arrived at the following conclusion, to wit: 'Since the private respondent's claim for refund covers specific taxes paid from 1980 to July 1983 then we find that the private respondent is entitled to a refund. It should be made clear, however, that Rio Tuba is not entitled to the whole amount it claims as refund. The specific taxes on oils which Rio Tuba paid for the aforesaid period were no longer based on the rates specified by Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. No. 1435 but on the increased rates mandated under Sections 153 and 156 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. We note, however, that the latter law does not specifically provide for a refund to these mining and lumber companies of specific taxes paid on manufactured and diesel fuel oils. In Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, (104 SCRA 710 [1981]), the Court held that the authorized partial refund under section 5 of R.A. No. 1435 partakes of the nature of a tax exemption and therefore cannot be allowed unless granted in the most explicit and categorical language. Since the grant of refund privilege must be strictly construed against the taxpayer, the basis for the refund shall be amounts deemed paid under Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. No. 1435. ACCORDINGLY, the decision in G.R. Nos. 83583-84 is hereby MODIFIED. The private respondent's CLAIM for refund is GRANTED, computed on the basis of the amounts deemed paid under Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. No. 1435, without interest. SO ORDERED.' The aforesaid ruling was further discussed by the High Court in response to Rio Tuba's Motion for Clarification which is actually a second Motion for Reconsideration. In its Resolution dated June 15, 1992, the following comments were elucidated: 'Rio Tuba's contention that the refund should be based on the rates effective at the time the specific tax was paid is without merit. Section 1 of RA 1435 amended Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code providing for increased rates on specific taxes. Section 142 of the NIRC incorporated the refund privilege on specific taxes paid on manufactured oils which are used in agriculture and aviation . Section 5 of RA 1435 provided for a refund privilege on specific taxes on manufactured oils paid by miners or forest concessionaires . There is a difference in the refund privileges of those engaged in agriculture and aviation on one hand, and miners or forest concessionaires on the other. Since the refund privilege of the former is incorporated in Section 142, then upon any amendment of Section 142 increasing the tax rates, the basis for the refund will accordingly be adjusted. Significantly the refund privilege granted to miners or forest concessionaires is not incorporated in Section 142 but is found in Section 5 of RA 1435. There is thus an intent on the part of the legislature to use the specific tax rates provided in Section 1 as the sole basis for refund, notwithstanding future rate increases. All the sections of RA 1435 must be read as a whole. In the absence of any express provision of law, the refund privilege granted to miners and forest concessionaires in Section 5 must be construed as based on the specific tax rates provided in Section 1. Regarding the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's (CIR's) contention in his motion for reconsideration that RA 1435 had become an anachronism way back in 1973 when the legislature provided for increased specific tax rates on manufactured oils, said position that a partial refund would be inconsistent with the purpose of the subsequent laws increasing specific tax rates is without merit. The refund privilege is not inconsistent with the increase in specific tax rates since the refund is based only on the original rates provided in Section 1 of RA 1435. These subsequent laws did not, therefore, expressly or impliedly, repeal the refund privilege. xxx xxx xxx.' The Court, after examining the Invoices offered by petitioner as evidence, arrived at the following computation on the refundable 25% specific taxes paid on Diesel, Regular Gasoline, Industrial Fuels from September 23, 1980 to October 31, 1981, and Oils and Lubricants from October 8, 1980 to October 31, 1981, as follows: xxx xxx xxx The Resolution of the Supreme Court dated March 25, 1992 in the Rio Tuba case (supra.) stated that the claim for refund of specific taxes should be computed on the basis of the amounts deemed paid under Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. No. 1435, without interest. prLL Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. 1435 insofar as pertinent provides: 'SEC. 1. Section one hundred and forty-two of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, is further amended to read as follows: 'SEC. 143. Specific Tax on manufactured oils and other fuels . On refined and manufactured mineral oils and motor fuels, there shall be collected the following taxes: (a) . . . (b) Lubricating oils, per liter of volume capacity, seven centavos; (c) Naphtha, gasoline, and all other similar products of distillation, per liter of volume capacity, eight centavos; and (d) . . .' 'SEC. 2. Section one hundred and forty-five of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, is further amended to read as follows: 'SEC. 145 Specific Tax on Diesel fuel oil . On fuel oil, commercially known as diesel fuel oil, and on all similar fuel oils, having more or less the same generating power, there shall be collected, per metric ton, one peso.' With respect to the amount refundable on purchases of diesel and industrial fuel, both parties agreed and arrived at a formula, in converting liters of diesel and industrial fuel to metric tons. The base for computing the amount refundable for specific taxes paid on diesel and industrial fuel should be that as prescribed in Section 2 of Republic Act No. 1435. The formula to convert liters to metric tons of diesel and industrial fuel as agreed upon by the parties is: No. of liters x Specific Gravity = Metric Ton 1,000 It was further agreed that the specific gravity of diesel is 0 . 8429 . While the specific gravity of industrial fuel is 0 . 9493 . Thus, the total number of liters of diesel subject to refund is 613,700 equivalent to 517.28773 metric tons, computed as follows: 613,700 lts. of diesel x 0.8429 = 517.28773 Metric tons of diesel ======= 1,000 and the total number of liters of industrial fuel subject to refund is 280,800 equivalent to 266.56344 metric tons, computed as follows: 280,800 lts, of industrial fuel x 0.9493 = 266.56344 ======== 1,000 Metric tons of Ind. Fuel After having converted the liters of diesel and industrial fuel into metric tons, the Court can now compute the amount to which petitioner is entitled to be refunded on the specific taxes paid from the use of petroleum products purchased for the period covering September 23, 1980 to October 31, 1981. Petitioner is entitled to the amount of P2,721.63 computed by the Court, as follows: Refundable Amount of 25% Specific Taxes Paid on Regular Gasoline, Oils & Lubricant, Diesel and Industrial Fuel Oil Purchased from Sept. 23, 1980 to Oct. 31, 1981 Per Court ' s Computation based on Secs . 1 and 2 of RA 1435 Specific Tax Rate Amount Paid Regular Gasoline 72,000 lts. x P0.80/lt. [Sec. 142(c)] P5,760.00 Oils and Lubricants 62.036 lts. x P0.07/lt [Sec. 142(b)] 4,342.52 Diesel 517 mt. x P1.00/mt. [Sec. 145] 517.00 Industrial Fuel 267 mt. x P1.00/mt. [Sec. 145] 267.00 Total P10,886.52 Percentage refundable under Sec. 5 of R.A. 1435 x 25% AMOUNT REFUNDABLE P2,721.63 ========= As regards the 20% interest per annum being claimed by petitioner, the rule is that no interest on refund of tax can be awarded unless authorized by law or the collection of the tax was attended by arbitrariness. [Collector v. Prieto, 112 Phil. 907; Commissioner v. Asturias Sugar Central, 2 SCRA 1140; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. American Rubber Co., 18 SCRA 842: Atlas Fertilizer Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 100 SCRA 556; Shell Philippines, Inc. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 162 SCRA 628.] An action is not arbitrary when exercised honestly and upon due consideration where there is room for two opinions, however much it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion was reached. [F.B. Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary (3rd ed.) p. 69, citing Imperial Development Corporation v. Aover, 08473-AP, August 23, 1979.] Arbitrariness presupposes inexcusable or obstinate disregard of legal provisions. [Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, et al., 19 SCRA 430]. None of the exceptions are presented in the case at bar. Respondent's decision denying petitioner's claim for refund was based on an honest interpretation of law. We, therefore, see no reason why petitioner should be entitled to the payment of interest. Moreover, the Supreme Court held in the Rio Tuba case that no interest shall be charged in computing the 25% refund on specific taxes paid. [See Supreme Court Resolution dated March 25, 1992.] In the same manner, petitioner's prayer for cost of suit cannot be awarded. It is an elementary rule that the government shall not be liable for costs of suits unless otherwise provided by law. [Section 1, Rule 142, Revised Rules of Court; Collector of Internal Revenue v. Convention of Philippine Baptist Churches and the Court of Tax Appeals, 2 SCRA 10.]" (pp. 10-22, Decision; pp. 279-291, Records) The petitioner argues in its petition that since it paid specific taxes on manufactured oils, diesel fuel oil and other fuels based on Sections 153 and 156 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended, it should be given a 25% tax refund on this amount paid in accordance with Section 5 of R.A. 1435, which provides: ". . . Provided, however, that whenever any oils mentioned above are used by miners or forest concessionaires in their operations, twenty-five per centum of the specific tax paid thereon shall be refunded by the Collector of Internal Revenue upon submission and proof of actual use of oils and under similar conditions enumerated in sub-paragraphs one and two of section one thereof, amending section one hundred forty-two of the Internal Revenue Code . . ." (pp. 33-34, Rollo). Hence, its claim for a refund of P136,265.38 representing 25% of the specific taxes paid based on the increased rates provided for in Sections 153 and 156 of the National Internal Revenue Code (pp. 2-3, Records; p. 34, Rollo). In their comment to the petition for review filed on March 22, 1994, the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Court of Tax Appeals through the Office of the Solicitor General argue that: 1. "The decision of Respondent Tax Court was based on law and Jurisprudence on the Matter" (p. 86, Rollo), which were Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. 1435 in accordance with the doctrine in 'Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Rio Tuba Nickel Mining Corporation and Court of Tax Appeals' (pp. 87-88, Rollo). 2. The (i)nstant case submitted was for decision on the basis of the ruling in Rio Tuba case and by agreement of the parties as to the refundable amount' (p. 93, Rollo), the agreement referred to being the 'Compliance' submitted by the petitioner to the Court of Tax Appeals containing the computations of specific taxes based on Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. 1435 (p. 94, Rollo). 3. The 'Insular Lumber case not in all (sic) fours with the Rio Tuba case'" (p. 95, Rollo). In reply to the respondents' comment to the petitioner, the petitioner avers that: 1. "Contrary To The Conclusion Of The Respondents. The Parties Have Not Agreed On the Refundable Amount Of Specific Taxes' (p. 131, Rollo) since during the April 20, 1994 hearing, the petitioner, through counsel, manifested its reservation with respect to using Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. 1435 as basis for the computation of specific taxes deemed paid" (pp. 131-134, Rollo). 2. "The Petitioner Was Denied The Equal Protection Of The Law When The Respondent Court Computed The Refundable Amount, Not On The Basis Of The Specific Taxes Actually Paid, But On the Amounts Deemed Paid Under Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. No. 1435, As Amended" (p. 134, Rollo). In compliance with the Court's May 3, 1994 resolution, the respondents filed their answer to the petition for review on June 2, 1994 substantially reiterating the arguments in the comment previously filed (pp. 158-164, Rollo). In its claim for a 25% refund on specific taxes paid on manufactured oils, diesel fuels and other fuels, the petitioner would like the Court to apply the increased rates provided for by subsequent laws amending Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. 1435, applying therefore the rule in statutory construction that statutes and their amendments are read together and harmonized (Agpalo, "Statutory Construction", pp. 189-190). The foregoing rule, however, admits exception to the rule that: "(S)tatutes granting tax exemptions are construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority" (Ibid., p. 219). The case at bar falls under this exception. "Exceptions contained in tax statutes must be strictly construed against those claiming the exception. Accordingly, he who claims an exemption from his share of the common burden of taxation must justify his claim by showing that the legislature intended to exempt him by worked too plain to be mistaken. For exemptions from taxation are not favored in law, nor are they presumed. They must be expressed in the clearest and most unambiguous language and not left to mere implications. It has been held that 'exemptions are never presumed, the burden is on the claimant to establish clearly his right to exemptions and an alleged grant of exemption will be strictly construed and cannot be made out by inference or implications but must be beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, since taxation is the rule and exemption the exception, the intention to make an exemption ought to be expressed in clear and unambiguous terms'" (Ibid.). The Rio Tuba cases cited by the respondent Court of Tax Appeals as basis of its grant of a refund of 25% on specific taxes deemed paid , that is, based on the rates prescribed in Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. 1435, explains: "Since the private respondent's claim for refund covers specific taxes paid from 1980 to July 1983 then we find that the private respondent is entitled to a refund. It should be made clear, however, that Rio Tuba is not entitled to the whole amount it claims as refund. The specific taxes on oils which Rio Tuba paid for the aforesaid period were no longer based on the rates specified by Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. No. 1435 but on the increased rates mandated under Sections 153 and 156 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. We note, however, that the latter law does not specifically provide for a refund to these mining and lumber companies of specific taxes paid on manufactured and diesel fuel oils. In Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Tax Appeals, (104 SCRA 710 [1981]), the Court held that the authorized partial refund under Section 5 of R.A. No. 1435 partakes of the nature of a tax exemption and therefore cannot be allowed unless granted in the most explicit and categorical language. Since the grant of refund privileges must be strictly construed against the taxpayer, the basis for the refund shall be the amounts deemed paid under Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. No. 1435." (pp. 552-553, 207 SCRA 549) This is further amplified by the Supreme Court's Resolution dated June 15, 1992 in response to Rio Tuba's Motion for Clarification: "Rio Tuba's contention that the refund should be based on the rates effective at the time the specific tax was paid is without merit. Section 1 of RA 1435 amended Section 142 of the National Internal Revenue Code providing for increased rates on specific taxes. Section 142 of the NIRC incorporated the refund privilege on specific taxes paid on manufactured oils which are used in agriculture and aviation . Section 5 of RA 1435 provided for a refund privilege on specific taxes on manufactured oils paid by miners or forest concessionaires . There is a difference in the refund privileges of those engaged in agriculture and aviation on one hand, and miners or forest concessionaires on the other. Since the refund privilege of the former is incorporated in Section 142, then upon any amendment of Section 142 increasing the tax rates, the basis for the refund will accordingly be adjusted. Significantly, the refund privilege granted to mines or forest concessionaires is not incorporated in Section 142 but is found in Section 5 of RA 1435. There is thus an intent on the part of the legislature to use the specific tax rates provided in Section 1 as the sole basis of refund, notwithstanding future rate increase. All the sections of RA 1435 must be read as a whole. In the absence of any express provision of law, the refund privilege granted to miners and forest concessionaires in Section 5 must be construed as based on the specific tax rates provided in Section 1. cdll Regarding the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's (CIR's) contention in his motion for reconsideration that RA 1435 had become an anachronism way back in 1973 when the legislature provided for increased specific tax rates on manufactured oils, said position that a partial refund would be inconsistent with the purpose of the subsequent laws increasing specific tax rates is without merit. The refund privilege is not inconsistent with the increase in specific tax rates since the refund is based only on the original rates provided in Section 1 of RA 1435. These subsequent laws did not, therefore, expressly or impliedly, repeal the refund privilege. xxx xxx xxx" (pp. 14-15, Decision; pp. 283-284, Records) The petition must therefore be denied. The Court cannot indulge in an expansive construction and write into the law an exemption that was not set forth therein (supra). The 25% refund granted to miners and forest concessionaires on specific taxes they paid provided in Section 5 of R.A. 1435 explicitly refers to specific taxes paid in accordance with the rates prescribed in Sections 1 and 2 of the same law. The subsequent laws which increased the rates prescribed in Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. 1435 did not expressly provide for a refund of 25% to miners and forest concessionaires on specific taxes they paid in accordance with the increased rates. The petitioner, therefore, is entitled only to a 25% refund on the specific taxes deemed paid in accordance with the rates prescribed in Sections 1 and 2 of R.A. 1435. Since the respondent Court of Tax Appeals' computation of the amount of refund the petitioner is entitled to, is in accord with the guidelines provided for in the Rio Tuba case, the same must therefore be affirmed. WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit and the respondent Court of Tax Appeals' decision dated December 17, 1993 is AFFIRMED, in toto . llcd SO ORDERED. Montoya and Asuncion, JJ . , concur. Celia Lipana-Reyes, J . , is on leave.