Philippine National Bank v. Court of Tax Appeals

THIRTEENTH DIVISION [CA-G.R. SP No. 29526. November 23, 1993.] PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK , petitioner , vs . COURT OF TAX APPEALS, TIRSO B. SAVELLANO, ET AL. , respondents . D E C I S I O N HERRERA , J p : This Petition for Review seeks to set aside the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered declaring the COMPROMISE AGREEMENT between the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Oil Company and Philippine National Bank, on the other, as WITHOUT FORCE AND EFFECT; The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is hereby ordered to ENFORCE the ASSESSMENT of January 16, 1991 against Philippine National Bank which has become final and unappealable by collecting from Philippine National Bank the deficiency withholding tax, plus interest totalling P294,958,450.73; Petitioner may be paid, upon collection of the deficiency withholding tax, the balance of his entitlement to informer's reward based on fifteen percent (15%) of the deficiency withholding total tax collected in this case or P44,243,767.00 subject to existing rules and regulations governing payment of reward to informers. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. A Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing judgment was denied, hence, the present Petition for Review. The antecedents of the controversy as well as the issues submitted by the parties for resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals are succinctly narrated in the decision sought to be reviewed as follows: The origin of this case goes back to June 23, 1986, when petitioner informed the Bureau of Internal Revenue (hereinafter referred to as BIR), of the alleged violations by respondent Philippine National Bank (hereinafter referred to as PNB) and the Philippine National Oil Company (hereinafter referred to as PNOC) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1931 of June 11, 1984 which withdrew all exemptions from taxes of government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. In a letter dated August 8, 1986, the BIR had requested PNOC to settle its tax liability for withholding taxes on the interests earned by PNOC's money market placements with the PNB (Exh. "L"; Exh. "3", Exh. "4", PNOC, CTA Rec.). PNOC, in answer to said letter write to the BIR on September 25, 1986, received on October 2, 1986, proposing an amicable settlement of its tax liability which PNOC had estimated at the time to be P4,419,396.83 for the period August 1, 1984 to July 31, 1986. It requested that it be assessed and required to pay only the said amount and that it be permitted to set-off its liability against the tax refund/credit claims of the National Power Corporation. On October 8, 1986, the BIR sent letter of demand to PNB, as withholding agent, for the payment of P376,301,133.33 as final deficiency withholding tax on interest earnings or yield on money placements by PNOC with the PNB covering the period October 15, 1984 to October 15, 1986 (Exh. "B", p. 249, CTA Rec.). On even date, the BIR had also sent a letter to PNOC informing it of the letter of demand sent to PNB (Exh. "B"). PNOC replied on October 14, 1986 by reiterating its proposal to settle the tax liability being demanded from PNB through the offsetting against PNOC's liability of a pending claim for refund/credit of the National Power Corporation. In response to PNOC's letter the BIR noted in its letter dated November 11, 1986 that the proposal for off-setting is at the time premature and so PNOC was requested to settle its tax liability in the amount of P385,961,580.82, made up of P303,343,765.32 as withholding final tax, plus interest computed until November 15, 1986 in the amount of P82,617,815.50. Subsequently tax payments arising out of a compromise agreement were received from PNB by the BIR and petitioner, pursuant to Section 281 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), was paid by the BIR in fourth (4) installments (the last on December 1, 1987), the amount P14,093,321.89 representing informer's reward computed at 15% of P93,955,479.12, broken down as follows: P91,003,129.89 payment made by PNB under June 22, 1987 tax compromise agreement with BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 44 3,952,249.23 advance payment made by PNB P93,955,479.12 total payment made by PNB In a letter dated January 7, 1988, petitioner, through his legal counsel, promptly wrote the BIR demanding payment of the balance of his informer's reward, computed as follows: P385,961,580.82 BIR deficiency withholding tax assessment x .15 statutory % P57,894,237.12 total tax informer's reward due - 14,093,321.89 payment received by petitioner to date P43,800,915.25 outstanding balance =========== (Exh. "V", CTA Rec.) Commissioner Tan, through his letter of March 8, 1988, replied by pointing out that the reward due has been fully paid as he had "accepted the offer of the taxpayer to pay a compromise of 30% of the deficiency basic tax of P303,343,766.29 plus the initial payment of P2,952,349.23 during the tax investigation of the case, or P91,003,129.89". The acceptance of the compromise was said to be "in line with the provisions of Executive Order No. 44, RMO No. 39-86, and RMO No. 4-87". Petitioner sought the reconsideration of this aforesaid action of Commissioner Tan through letter dated March 24, 1988. On April 8, 1988, even as the aforesaid motion for reconsideration was pending in the BIR, petitioner filed a Petition for Review and cautelam with the Court of Tax Appeals in pursuance of his claim that "the Commissioner of Internal Revenue acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or whimsical exercise of jurisdiction" in entering into a compromise agreement resulting in "a gross and unconscionable diminution" of his entitlement to the informer's reward. Petitioner prayed for the enforcement and collection of the tax against liable parties PNB and/or PNOC, and the payment to him by respondent Commissioner of the 15% informer's reward on the total tax liability collected. An Answer with Counterclaim was filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on June 15, 1988 refuting the allegations in the Petition for Review on the main ground that there is no cause of action against him, and that petitioner has been sufficiently if not more than paid for what is due him. The petition was alleged to be baseless and malicious so that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue claimed for exemplary damages against petitioner. Subsequently, a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Petition for Review was filed by petitioner impleading PNB and PNOC, as necessary and indispensable parties, for being part of the compromise agreement. On September 23, 1988 and September 30, 1988, PNB and PNOC, respectively, filed separate motions to dismiss the case on similar allegations of lack of jurisdiction by the Court to decide the case, PNB arguing that the authority of the Commissioner to enter into compromise agreements is purely discretionary and cannot be interfered with by the courts; and PNOC that this case does not fall within the provision of Republic Act No. 1125 outlining the scope of jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. PNB also argued that petitioner cannot assail the legality or validity of the tax compromise. PNOC alleged also that petitioner has no cause of action against it absent the factual showing that it actively participated in, and/or had duly influenced the execution of the compromise agreement. Answer to the Amended Petition for Review was submitted by the Commissioner on November 18, 1988 substantially reiterating his position against the claim of petitioner. Upon the other hand, in reply to the motions of PNB and PNOC to dismiss the case, petitioner invoked the principle against multiplicity of suits and pressed his case against the alleged arbitrary exercise by the Commissioner of his power to compromise. In its Resolution of November 28, 1988 the Court of Tax Appeals resolved that the question of lack of jurisdiction and/or cause of action which are the bases for respondents PNB and PNOC's motion to dismiss do not appear to be indubitable. Consequently, PNOC filed its Answer on February 14, 1989 and PNB on April 5, 1989. Respondent PNOC substantially contends that: a) Petitioner Savellano has no cause of action against it; b) It has no relation or privity with petitioner, an alleged tax informer; c) The exercise by the Commissioner of its discretion to compromise the tax liability of PNOC at 30% of the deficiency basic tax has legal basis under Executive Order No. 44, and RMO Nos. 39-86 and 4-87; d) It cannot be argued that the compromise was not fair and rational to the Government, since respondent PNOC is a wholly-owned and controlled government corporation and the compromise payment merely involved a transfer of public funds from PNOC to the BIR (citing Millares v. Ortiz, G.R. No. L-49561, June 15, 1979); e) The alleged right of petitioner to the informer's reward does not arise from the annulment of the compromise agreement but rather from the fact of actual payment by the taxpayer; and f) The Court of Tax Appeals has no jurisdiction to settle or resolve the case as against PNOC. For respondent PNB, it substantially contends that: a) The Court has no authority to try and decide the Petition for Review for want of jurisdiction; b) In instances in which the Commissioner is vested with authority to compromise, such power is discretionary and once exercised by him cannot be reviewed or interfered with by the courts; and c) The petition for review should be dismissed on the ground of prescription. Subsequently, PNB and PNOC filed their respective Amended Answer incorporating an opinion of the Commission of Audit that "payment of the herein claim for informer's reward to Mr. Tirso B. Savellano cannot be allowed in audit." Evidence of the parties were ordered to be submitted to be followed by their respective memorandum, after which the case will be deemed submitted for decision (See Minutes of the Session, April 20, 1990, p. 253 Rec.) In the meantime, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion for Suspension of Proceeding adverting to his pending motion for reconsideration with the Commissioner that may soon be resolved, and so the need for the Commissioner to be given time to act on said unresolved motion. Opposition to the Manifestation of petitioner was submitted by PNOC and PNB. On February 22, 1991, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion, moving to withdraw the above-mentioned motion for the suspension of proceeding for the reason that the cause for suspension has become functus oficio with the resolution by the Commissioner of the previously pending motion for reconsideration, and submitting by way of supplemental offer of evidence the a) letter of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated January 16, 1991, demanding from respondent PNB, as withholding agent, the payment of the balance of respondent tax paper PNOC's deficiency tax in the sum of P294,958,450.73; b) the letter dated February 13, 1991, informing petitioner Savellano for the Commissioner's action on the motion for reconsideration. PNB and PNOC filed their respective Opposition, PNOC adopting the position of PNB that the move of petitioner is contrary to Section 35, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner countered that the action of the Commissioner is subject to judicial notice and the submission and marking of the supplementary evidence was made merely to serve the convenience of the Court to speedily dispose of the instant case. The Solicitor General, as counsel for respondent Commissioner, manifested that the Commissioner's stance, as per its letter to the Office of the Solicitor General dated March 11, 1991, considering this recent development, was stated in this wise: "The issue posed before the Tax Court for resolution in the aforesaid case is whether the availment under E.O. No. 44 of the (compromise of the) withholding taxes of P385,961,580.82 assessment on the interest earnings on the money market placement of PNOC with PNB is in accordance with law. This Bureau has arrived at the conclusion that such availment is without legal basis which decision was relayed to PNB in a letter dated January 16, 1991 (Annex "A") demanding for payment of P294,958,450.93 (balance) withholding taxes. As the Omnibus Motion, containing as it does a prayer in accord with the posture of this Bureau, i.e., immediate payment of withholding taxes, we therefore interpose no objection thereto." The Court on May 2, 1991, acting on petitioner's Omnibus Motion, resolved to grant the motion to withdraw the motion for suspension and to admit the supplementary evidence being offered for admission. On May 29, 1991, petitioner Savellano filed a Motion for Prompt Resolution considering that the memoranda of the parties are already with the Court. On June 3, 1991, the Court considered the case submitted for decision as of June 4, 1991 On June 14, 1991, PNB filed Motion to Suspend Proceeding for the reason that it has "elevated the matter of the new assessment dated January 16, 1991, of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue against it in the amount of P294,958,450.73 before the Department of Justice (hereinafter referred to as DOJ) pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 242 prescribing the procedure for the administrative settlement of dispute between government offices, agencies and instrumentalities including government-owned or controlled corporations." Petitioner on June 28, 1991, signified his of position on the motion of PNB to suspend the proceedings citing the principle that jurisdiction once acquired remains with the Court until the case is finally terminated; and noting that PNB's Petition for Review filed with the DOJ amounts to forum-shopping. On July 4, 1991, a Motion for Reconsideration (Re: Order dated June 3, 1991 submitting the case for decision as of June 4, 1991) was filed by PNB praying that the Court hold the decision in this case in view of the Petition for Review it has filed with the DOJ. On July 17, 1991, PNB filed a Motion to Suspend Collection of Tax representing that the respondent Commissioner had sent a letter of demand to it for the amount of P294,958,450.73 representing withholding tax due and collectible; that despite a request for reconsideration, the Commissioner reiterated the demand through letter received May 14, 1991 and noted it as his final decision on the matter; and that the Commissioner is set to issue a warrant of distraint and/or levy against PNB's deposits with the Central Bank; and that the levy and distraint of PNB's deposits unless restrained will cause great and irreparable prejudice not only to the government-controlled PNB, but also to the Government itself. On petitioner's opposition to the motion of PNB to suspend proceedings, PNB replied on July 18, 1991 by citing Secretary of Justice Opinion No. 113 dated June 30, 1990 that even appeals from the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue involving a government-owned or controlled corporation can be taken cognizance of by the DOJ under P.D. No. 242. The principal issue according to PNB involves the determination of the tax due to the Government on the interest income of PNOC but this should be decided only by the DOJ and not this Court as provided by P.D. 242. In the hearing of July 19, 1992, the Court ordered the parties to submit their respective memorandum regarding PNB's Motion to Suspend Proceedings. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue in his memorandum on the question of suspension of proceeding asserts, among others, that the assessment against PNB has already become final and executory such that the assessment can no longer be assailed even at the DOJ. He alleges that the assessment dated January 16, 1991 was received by PNB on February 6, 1991 but no protest was filed or received within the following thirty (30) days that a taxpayer is permitted to do so under the law. A letter dated April 11, 1991, serving as a protest was received only on April 12, 1991, more than 30 days from receipt of assessment and beyond the reglementary period . Petitioner in his Memorandum expressed his belief that this case is not between or among government entities corporations inter se. He notes that fact that the petition for review was initiated by a private litigant as petitioner against three government offices as joint respondents. He argue among others that the Petition for Review filed by PNB with the DOJ presents for adjudication the very same matters/issues which are sub judice before this Court, and PNB would only want to abort the Court's exercise of its tax jurisdiction which had attached upon the filing of the instant petition. Furthermore, since the Court has acquired jurisdiction over the case, it should continue to exercise such jurisdiction until complete remedy is granted. PNB argues in its memorandum that its Petition for Review before the DOJ presents a prejudicial question to the petitioner's claim for informer's reward; and that the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction on the claim for informer's reward but not over the matter of its tax liability. For its part, respondent PNOC essentially maintains that the issuance of the assessment against PNB has given rise to a controversy purely between a government agency and a government owned or controlled corporation. A Rejoinder by petitioner to PNB's Reply of July 18, 1991 was filed and contends that P.D. 242 is not applicable in this case. On September 20, 1991 another Omnibus Motion was filed by petitioner calling attention to the fact that a warrant of garnishment against PNB has been issued by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on August 2, 1991 addressed to the Governor of the Central Bank of the Philippines and received by the same on August 23, 1991; that on the same date August 23, 1991, a debit advice was issued against the demand deposit account of PNB for the amount of P294,958,450.73 and such amount was transferred to demand deposit in trust for the Bureau of Internal Revenue; that the motion to suspend proceedings of PNB has become moot and academic with the enforcement of the final and unappealable assessment through the issuance of a writ of garnishment. Petitioner thus moved for the denial of the said motion to suspend proceedings and for the Bureau of Internal Revenue to be required to deposit with the Court of Tax Appeals the amount of P44,243,767.00, representing the informer's reward still due. On October 9, 1991, PNOC filed a Manifestation which, aside from reiterating its theory that the controversy falls under the jurisdiction of the DOJ, stated that the DOJ has ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to suspend collection of the assailed tax delinquency in the amount of P294,958,450.73 and to file his answer to the Petition within a period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof. Respondent PNB's Comment on petitioner's Omnibus Motion followed on October 10, 1991 arguing that in view of the forequoted DOJ order suspending the collection of the tax, there is no basis for petitioner's motion as the same is premised on the erroneous assumption that the disputed tax has been collected. And, with the denial of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's Motion to Dismiss and requiring him to answer, the DOJ has unequivocably assumed jurisdiction over PNB's Petition; and that this Court must first suspend the proceedings in the instant case to give the DOJ the opportunity to finally decide the validity and propriety of the tax assessment against PNB. We therefore have these issues for determination: 1. Whether the Court of Tax Appeals has jurisdiction over the case, and if so, the extent of its jurisdiction; 2. Whether the validity of the assailed compromise agreement can be sustained; 3. Whether, under the facts of the case, relief may be granted petitioner up to the extent that he will be allowed to collect the outstanding balance on the 15% tax informer's reward. (pp. 40-55, Rollo) The Court of Tax Appeals upheld its jurisdiction and declared the Compromise Agreement between the BIR and the PNB as without force and effect, and as earlier pointed to, decreed that petitioner may be paid, collection of the deficiency withholding tax, the balance of his entitlement to informer's reward based on fifteen percent (15%) of the deficiency withholding total tax collection in its case is P44,243,767.00 subject to existing rules and regulations governing payment of reward to informers. PNB and PNOC filed motions for reconsideration which was denied (p. 87, Rollo). Hence, this petition for review by the PNB. We required respondents to answer. Private respondent, however, filed a manifestation and motion pointing to CA-G.R. SP No. 29583 pending before this court alleging that this petition is a mere rehash of the petition in the other case, and that PNB is not the real party in interest because the amount of P294,958,450.72 which PNB paid to the BIR was debited by PNB from the deposit account of the PNOC. (p. 101, ibid). In its Manifestation and Motion, the Office of the Solicitor General stated that it cannot support the action of respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue in setting aside the compromise agreement entered into by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and Philippine National Bank (PNB) involving PNOC's liability on the interest income on its many market placements with PNB, for reasons set forth in the manifestation and motion more particularly its original stand in defending the validity of the Compromise Agreement when it defended the BIT against the petition for review. The Solicitor General expressed the view that the tax liability of PNOC/PNB squarely qualified for compromise under EO No. 44 as implemented by RMO No. 39-86 expressly providing for a situation "whereby a withholding agent did not withhold the tax either because of neglect, ignorance of law or his belief that he is not required by law to withhold a tax. The OSG therefore asked that it be excused from filing a comment-answer to the petition. We granted the motion and required instead the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue to file its comment, (p. 111, Rollo) which the latter did (p. 125, Ibid). Private respondent likewise filed his answer (p. 147, Ibid). This was followed by a Motion to Dismiss by the private respondent on the basis of the decision of the Supreme Court in CIP No. 101976 and G.R. No. 102258 CA-January 29, 1993 (entitled: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. The commission on Audit and TIRSO B. SAVELLANO vs. The Commission on Audit) setting aside the decision of the COA disallowing in audit the payment of informer's reward given to petitioner Tirso Savellano by the BIR in relation to the same tax payments from PNOC. (pp. 184-185, Rollo). An opposition to the motion to dismiss having been filed. We deemed it more appropriate to consider the motion in relation to the merits of the petition. In coming to this Court, petitioner submits that 1. Respondent court absolutely lacks jurisdiction on disputes and controversies involving government-owned and controlled corporations . 2. The respondent court had no jurisdiction to question the compromise agreement entered into by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue . 3. Commissioner of Internal Revenue cannot annul compromise cases validly entered into . 4. The respondent court erred in not dismissing Savellano's petition which was prematurely filed and without cause of action against respondents . 5. Respondent court failed to consider that respondent Savellano cannot assail the legality of the compromise settlement . 6. The respondent court erred in not ruling that respondent Savellano is not entitled to informer's reward . 7. The claim of respondent Savellano, if allowed, would potentially create a fertile ground for graft and corruption. (p. 119, Rollo) Petitioner maintains that respondent court is without jurisdiction to resolve the dispute between the petitioner and the BIR regarding the latter's assessment citing Presidential Decree No. 242 (1973) which was incorporated as chapter 14 of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) being solely between BIR and PNB, and therefore, shall be administratively settled and adjudicative by the Secretary of Justice, which had already taken cognizance of the controversy and upheld its jurisdiction of the controversy as follows: Anent the issue of jurisdiction of this Office to take cognizance of the issue raised in the Petition, suffice it to say that in the Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 609, the Supreme Court sustained the ruling of the Court of Appeals that: . . . it was grave error for the Court of Tax Appeals to have taken cognizance of the case in view of the explicit provisions of Presidential Decree No. 242, pertinently providing that: SECTION 1. Provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding, all disputes, claims and controversies solely between or among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations but excluding constitutional offices or agencies, arising from the interpretation and application of statutes, contracts, or agreements, shall henceforth be administratively settled or adjudicated as provided hereinafter: Provided, That this shall not apply to cases already pending in court at the time of the effectivity of this decree. The Appellate Tribunal thus held that the controversy between the DBP and the Commissioner of Customs was not within the jurisdiction of the CTA and should have been decided in accordance with the mode of settlement and adjudication set forth in Sections 2 and 3 of P.D. No. 242, viz: SEC. 2. In all cases involving only questions of law, the same shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by the Secretary of Justice, as Attorney General and ex-officio legal adviser of all government-owned or controlled corporations and entities, in consonance with section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code. His ruling or determination of the question in each case shall be conclusive and binding upon all the parties concerned. SEC. 3. Cases involving mixed questions of law and of fact or only factual issues shall be submitted to and settled or adjudicated by: (a) The Solicitor General, with respect to disputes or claims or controversies between or among the departments, bureaus, offices and other agencies of the National Government; (b) The Government Corporate Counsel, with respect to disputes or claims or controversies between or among the government-owned or controlled corporations or entities being served by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel; and (c) The Secretary of Justice, with respect to all other disputes or claims or controversies which do not fall under the categories mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b) The Appellate Court ruled that Section 7 (2) of Republic Act No. 1125 pursuant to which the Court of Tax appeals had therefore been exercising exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in case involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, inter alia had been superseded by said P.D. No. 242, it being a settled rule of statutory construction that where there is irreconcilable repugnancy between two statutes anent the same subject matter as there is between P.D. No. 242 and Sec. manner of settlement of disputes involving customs duties, etc. between government offices, agencies and corporations the one of late enactment, being the latest expression of the legislative will, should prevail over the other which is of earlier enactment." supra, pp. 612-614) Traversing along the same line of reasoning, the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue under Section 7 (1) of R.A. No. 1125, i.e., involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue" squarely falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of this Office, not with the court of Tax Appeals. The thirty (30)-day reglementary period argument relied upon cannot likewise thus be sustained, the same being applicable only to cases appealable to the CTA (see also Sec. 229, National Internal Revenue Code), not to cases similar to the case at bar which, as unequivocably explained in the aforesaid case of DBP vs. CA, supra, not only falls beyond the jurisdiction of the CTA but is determinable under and in accordance with the mode of settlement and adjudication set forth in P.D. No. 242 Relative to the Motion to Suspend Collection of Tax, justice and fair play compel us to grant the same. Moreover, to deny the motion would not only render the resolution of the case at bar moot and academic; it would also be unquestionably prejudicial to the petitioner bank a ground recognized even by R.A. No. 1125 as an exception to the rule on non-suspendability of tax collection in case of appeal to CTA. (pp. 24-26, Rollo) The foregoing ruling does not seem to square with the facts and the law on the matter in controversy. It bears stressing that the present controversy is not solely between the BIR or CIR and the petitioner but involves private respondent Savellano who, initiated the petition in this case after he disputed the Compromise entered into by Commissioner Tan with the petitioner by filing a motion for reconsideration through a letter dated March 24, 1988. On April 8, 1988, even as his aforesaid motion for reconsideration was pending in the BIR, respondent Savellano filed with respondent Court a Petition for Review later on amended to include PNB and PNOC, on the ground that respondent CIR acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or whimsical exercise of jurisdiction in entering into a compromise agreement resulting in a gross and unconscionable diminution of his entitlement to the informer's reward. Petitioner prayed for the enforcement and collection of the tax agreement against PNB and/or PNOC, and the payment to him by respondent Commissioner of the 15% informer's reward or the total tax liability collected. This is the dispute that was brought before respondent court for decision. There was then no dispute between petitioner PNB and the CIR. The dispute between the CIR and the PNB was brought about by the resolution of the CIR revoking its compromise agreement with the PNB/PNOC on Motion For Reconsideration of Savellano. Otherwise stated, the dispute brought to the Secretary of Justice was not a dispute solely between the CIR and PNB/PNOC but arose from the dispute between Savellano on one hand and the CIR and PNB/PNOC on the other which may not be resolved without affecting the right of Savellano. This was also the basic dispute that was brought by respondent Savellano before the Court of Tax Appeals, which clearly is not a dispute solely between or among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the national government, which falls under the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 242. The initial challenge to the jurisdiction of the respondent CTA by petitioner was not because the matter should be resolved by the Secretary of Justice under PD 242 but as argued by PNB the authority of the Commissioner to enter into compromise agreement is purely discretionary and cannot be interfered with by the Courts, and as submitted by PNOC, this case does not fall within the provision of RA No. 1125 outlining the scope of the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. The fact that later events supervened which were related to the subject of the petition, viz, the resolution by the Commissioner of the previously pending motion for reconsideration in favor of Savellano did not convert the dispute before the CTA as solely between the CIR and the PNOC nor did it divest respondent Court of Tax Appeals of its acquired jurisdiction. The dispute still involved the petitioner Savellano the basic question being whether or not he is entitled to collect the outstanding balance on the 15% tax informer's reward. Clearly, the dispute before the Court of Tax Appeals is not solely between the government agencies that falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of Justice. As set forth in Section 1, P.D. 242, the matters required to be administratively settled by the Secretary of Justice are disputes, claims and controversies solely between or among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the national government, including government owned or controlled corporations, like the dispute between the Development Bank of the Philippines and the Customs Commissioner in the case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals 180 SCRA 609 which was held to fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance, however, in this case by petitioner is misplaced, because the present controversy before the Court of Tax Appeals is not a dispute, claim or controversy solely between or among the departments, bureaus, offices, agencies, and instrumentalities of the national government, but involves a private person over whom the Secretary of Justice is clearly without jurisdiction. As pointedly observed by the Court of Tax Appeals: This case has evolved from one originally between an informer, who is a private person, and a government bureau and government-owned or controlled corporations as respondents, to a case between the same private litigant as plaintiff and PNB and PNOC as those remaining on the defense. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 242 meant to subject to adjudication by a proper government body only those disputes or controversies solely among or between government offices, agencies and instrumentalities . This is not one such case. We do not think that the case of Development Bank of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals (180 SCRA 609 (1989) has application here. This is a case initiated by a private litigant and up to its submission for complete resolution continued to involve the interest of the private litigant since one of the reliefs prayed for from the very start is for respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue to enforce and collect and respondents PNB and PNOC to pay the total tax liability estimated at P387,987,785.73. Distinctively, the Development Bank of the Phils. case started as one solely between a government agency and a government corporation . Here, even if the BIR subsequently arrived at the conclusion that the availment of E.O. No. 44 by the PNOC was without legal basis and it has to change its original stance, the same will merely form part of the incidents of this case and may not deprive this Court of jurisdiction if one has legally been acquired in the first place. This is but compatible with the principle against multiplicity of suits which looks to a final determination in a single action of the whole controversy (Section 6 and 7, Rule 3, Section 14, Rule 6, in relation to Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court). Respondents PNB and PNOC do not deny that this Court has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the persons of PNB and PNOC. In their memoranda, after the case has been deemed submitted for decision on June 4, 1991, it appears that PNB and PNOC has bowed to the jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the question in this petition. In their oral arguments counsels for PNB and PNOC also maintained that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition filed by Savellano, (pp. 23-25 Decision pp. 62-64, Rollo) The question of jurisdiction settled, we also believe that the Department of Justice cannot intervene in this case and deprive this Court of Jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the court once acquired, is exclusive, and continues until the end of te litigation or until the case is finally terminated. (Lat v. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, Inc., 67 SCRA 425, 434 (1975) citing cases; Evangelista v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 109 Phil. 957, (1960). As earlier pronounced by the Supreme Court in a case: "Jurisdiction over remedies of the same nature arising from the same cause of action is indivisible. It is the policy of the courts to determine the entire controversy between litigants. Accordingly, jurisdiction carries with it the power to hear and determine every issue or question properly arising in the case, to do any and all things with reference thereto authorized by law, and to grant full and complete relief (Iburan v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234, 238 (1950) citing 21 C.J.S., 135, 136), (p. 23 Decision, p. 62, Rollo) Moreover, as pointed out by the Court of Tax Appeals in its Resolution on petitioner's Motion For Reconsideration to which we fully agree: 1. Under Section 24(c) of the National Internal Revenue Code, all corporations, agencies or instrumentalities owned or controlled by the Government like the PNOC and PNB which are performing proprietory functions are similarly subject to income tax as that imposed upon all corporate taxpayers. Hence, they should stand on equal footing with private taxpayers which are similarly engaged in the same business as PNOC or PNB. They should be governed by the same rate of tax, rules and regulations imposed in relation to the enforcement of our tax laws. This will include the remedies provided for by our tax laws. Under Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code the remedy provided by law to taxpayers adversely affected by the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals and the law does not distinguish whether the party appealing to the Court of Tax Appeals is a government corporation or not. If a different remedy is intended for government corporation this should have been provided for expressly in the law or other laws. 2. Furthermore, it has never been the intention of P.D. No. 242 to include taxes and duties among items which can be the subject of administrative adjudication by the Department of Justice because when the President issued said P.D. he is presumed to know that government owned or controlled corporations are subject to the same kind of tax like other private corporate taxpayers. We cannot interpret to apply the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code peacemeal so that one provision will be applicable while others will not unless there is an express provision in other laws which expressly states otherwise. 3. We also find that PNOC and PNB fails to consider the fact that P.D. No. 242 is a general law which deals in general with administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes, claims and controversies between or among government offices, agencies and instrumentalities including government owned or controlled corporations, while the National Internal Revenue Code and Republic Act No. 1125 are both special law which deal specifically with taxes and remedies of the taxpayers adversely affected by the decision or ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. We cannot conclude therefore that P.D. 242 amended or repeal the provisions of the NIRC and the Charter of the Court of Tax Appeals without the said P.D. specifically saying so. It is a settled jurisprudence that special laws may not be repealed or amended by a general law by mere implication. And so, in that parallel case of National Power Corporation vs. Hon. Presiding Judge, RTC Br. XXV (supra.). which involved conflict in the provisions on jurisdiction over cases regarding the enforcement and collection of real property taxes, the controversy was resolved in this wise: It is indeed desirable and beneficial to the Judiciary's on going program of decongesting court dockets that intra-governmental disputes such as this be settled administratively. Unfortunately, our consideration of the legal provisions involved leads us to a different conclusion. In reconciling these two conflicting provisions of P.D. 242 and P.D. 464 on the matter of jurisdiction we are guided by the basic rules on statutory construction. An examination of these two decrees shows that P.D. 242 is a general law which deals with administrative settlement or adjudication of disputes, claims and controversies between or among government offices, agencies and instrumentalities, including government owned or controlled corporations. The coverage is broad and sweeping, encompassing all disputes, claims and controversies. P.D. 464 on the other hand, governs the appraisal and assessment of real property for purposes of taxation by provinces, cities and municipalities, as well as the levy, collection and administration of real property tax. It is a special law which deals specifically with real property taxes. It is a basic tenet in statutory construction that between a general law and a special law, the special law prevails. GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT." (Underscoring supplied.) While the aforecited case involved the enforcement and collection of real property taxes, the principle enunciated therein is deemed applicable analogously to the case at bar involving as it does the collection of Internal Revenue tax and the repugnancy between a special and general law, that is, between the National Internal Revenue Code and Republic Act No. 1125 on the one hand and P.D. No. 242 on the other hand. 4. Moreover, it is to be noted that the case at bar was initiated by petitioner herein, against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and later on, PNOC and PNB were made correspondents. Admittedly, respondents then, submitted to or recognize the jurisdiction of this Court. They may not repudiate it later on especially if the relief they were praying for could not be granted by the Court. This issue was well discussed in the original decision of this court. (pp. 90-94, Rollo). Petitioner maintained that respondent court has not jurisdiction to question the compromise agreement entered into by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. These are relative to violations of the National Internal Revenue Code falling exclusively within the provision of the CIR and the Taxpayer concerned which cannot be interfered with by the court of Tax Appeals citing Monserrat et al. vs CIR (RTA Case No. 11) and Koppel, Phil. v. Collector of Internal Revenue 87 Phil. 351, holding that in instances in which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is vested with authority to compromise, such power is discretionary and once exercised by him cannot be reversed or interfered with by the court. We are unable to accept petitioner's submissions. Its formulation of the issues on CIR and CTA's lack of jurisdiction to disturb a compromise agreement presupposes a compromise agreement validly entered into by the CIR and not, when as in this case, it was indubitably shown that the supposed compromise agreement is without legal support. In case of arbitrary or capricious exercise by the Commissioner or if the proceedings were fatally defective, the compromise can be attacked and reversed through the judicial process (Meralco Securities Corporation v. Savellano, 117 SCRA 805, 812, p. 812 (1982); Sarah E. Ramsay et. al. v. U.S. 21 Ct. C1 443, aff'd 120 U.S. 214, 30 L. Ed. 582; Tyson v. U.S. 39 F. Supp. 135 cited in page 18 of decision). It thus becomes a disputed assessment which falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. As pointed out by respondent CTA: In a case (Meralco Securities Corp. v. Savellano, supra) with resembling circumstances as the case on hand, an informant had given confidential denunciations in the hope of being rewarded on the tax collected. The Commissioner failed to determine any assessable tax against the object of the denunciations and the informant did not agree with this ruling. He sought the issuance of an assessment and collection of the tax against the party involved but erroneously went to the then Court of First Instance for relief. Under these conditions, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over the case and also found occasion to elucidate on the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals, analyzing that: "The question whether or not to impose a deficiency tax assessment on Meralco Securities Corp. undoubtedly comes within the purview of the words "disputed assessments" or of "other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code." Of course, the cited case does not involve a compromise agreement. But it may not also be incorrect to say, drawing a parallel from the inference of the Supreme Court in said case, that the question on the validity of a compromise agreement entered into by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is within the context of "disputed assessments" or of a "other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code." For if in reviewing a compromise agreement, such agreement is found to be characterized with abuse of discretion, it follows that the Court will also have to make a determination of the propriety and legality of imposing a deficiency tax assessment . As well in the Meralco Securities Corp. Case, the Supreme Court had perceived of the possibility that informer's rights may be the subject of adjudication by this Court. The Supreme Court, speaking through then Justice Claudio Teehankee opined: "Thus even assuming arguendo that the right granted the taxpayers affected to question and appeal disputed assessments, under Section 7 of R.A. 1125, may be availed of by strangers or informers like the late Maniago, the most that he could have done was to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue within thirty days from receipt pursuant to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125. In Section 11 of R.A. 1125, therefore, reference to any person, adversely affected by a decision or ruling of the Commissioner who may file an appeal to this Court may be interpreted to include an informer adversely affected by a decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Our belief that it is this Court that has jurisdiction over this case has been reinforced by the finding that the resolution of the validity or illegality of the compromise agreement necessitates the application of tax principles, this case being pervaded with tax connotations. It is not too much to say that with the recognized expertise of this Court in tax cases, it is most competent to adjudicate these issues. This Court holds that it exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the case at bar, to the exclusion of the DOJ such jurisdiction extends not only to a determination of the validity of the compromise agreement in question, but also up to the priority and legality of the issuance of an assessment against the concerned taxpayer/s. (pp. 18-22 Decision, pp. 57-61, Rollo) Under section 7 RA 1125 the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals is broad enough to include other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue. This indubitably includes Savellano's claim for informer's reward under Section, 316 (now Sec. 281) of the Tax Code (Meralco Securities Corporation vs. Savellano 117 SCRA 807 Mojica v. Vera G. R. No. 43742-R, Oct. 9, 1972 cited in the arms of the CIR (pp. 129-132, Rollo) Upon the other hand, the authority of CIR to revoke the Compromise Agreement entered into under E.O. 44 by his predecessor in office if he is satisfied, as in this case, that the same is not in conformity with law is not without factual and legal basis. The CIR is not bound by illegal acts of his predecessor (Hilado v. Coll. of Int. Reve., G.R. No. L-9403, Oct. 31, 1956, 100 Phil. 288; The Col. of Int. Rev., et al., G.R. No. L-2304 July 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 1119). Thus: In the instant case, then BIR Commissioner Bienvenido A. Tan exceeded his authority in agreeing to the compromise settlement since the letter of demand against the petitioner was sent only on October 8, 1986 while the letter to the PNOC informing of its tax liability was only on October 14, 1986. In short the tax assessments against petitioner and PNOC were not yet in existence as of December 31, 1985. E.O. 44 allows compromise of tax liabilities outstanding as of December 31, 1985. Moreover E.O. 44 envisions disputed assessment or delinquent accounts. Withholding tax, in reality on the part of the withholding agent, is a penalty for failure of the withholding agent to withhold and remit the tax. (National Development Corp., vs. Commissioner, 151 SCRA 472, 480 1987) Ergo, penalties cannot be a proper subject of compromise. The Law holds the withholding agent personally liable for the payment or remittance to the BIR of withholding tax (Phil. Guaranty Co. Comm. of Int. Rev., SCRA 1, 4, (1965). It is not amiss to state here further that E.O. 44 was enacted purposely to assist taxpayers in settling their delinquent/disputed tax assessments. Petitioner in the instant case is not a taxpayer, but acting in the capacity as agent of the government mandated by law (Sec. 51 Tax Code) to withhold the taxes and hold the same as special fund in trust for the government until paid to the collecting officers. (pp. 136-139, Rollo) The CIR pointed to section 51, 251 and 271 of the National Internal Revenue Code to show that withholding taxes are penalties and cannot possibly be within the scope of E.O. No. 44 which deals with delinquent accounts and/or disputed assessment. Respondent CTA was of a similar view, and held that what is unsanctionable with the act of the previous Commissioner of Internal Revenue Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr. is that PNOC could not and should not have been allowed to avail of E.O. No. 44 and RMO No. 39-86 since the case against PNOC and PNB involved withholding tax assessment which is actually not a tax but a penalty (National Development Corp. v. Commissioner, 151 SCRA 472, 480 (1987). E.O. No. 44 contemplates the acceptance of compromise payments on delinquent accounts and disputed assessments in reference to taxes due as strictly distinguished from penalty. Penalties could not therefore be the subject of compromise agreement based on E.O. No. 44. And concluded: In fine, the compromise agreement entered into by the parties is not only permeated with mistake on the substantive aspects of the contract but, more importantly, lack of authority from the basic law characterizing the actions of the previous Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Enough reasons exist therefore to justify the invalidation of the compromise agreement. It is the rule that the Government is not estopped from correcting the mistakes and errors of its agents (British Trader's Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA, 719, 726 citing Hilado v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 52 O.G. 2481 and other cases). So is the Commissioner not bound by the erroneous ruling of his predecessor as he has the power to rectify the error (Phil). Guaranty Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra). (p. 78, Rollo) Significantly, petitioner has not taken issue with the substantive basis of the CIR and respondent court in finding, for the reasons aforestated, that the compromise agreement is invalid and lack legal support, but has confined itself to respondent's lack of authority to disturb much less nullify the compromise agreement which as pointed to above is no well-taken. Petitioner submits that the petition filed before respondent court was pre-mature as respondent Savellano's Motion For Reconsideration before the CIR was still pending. There is thus no resolution or decision on the Motion For Reconsideration rendered by the CIR that calls for a review by respondent Court of Tax Appeals. Similarly, Savellano has no cause of action yet against PNB and PNOC considering that informer's rewards are based on actual revenue collection of BIR from delinquent taxpayer. In this case, the basis for Savellano's claims for additional informer's reward is still pending reconsideration with the CIR and subsequently with the Department of Justice and Office of the President. The submission is not meritorious. The Petition For Review by respondent Savellano with the Court of Tax Appeals even as his Motion for Reconsideration was still pending with the CIR was filed ex-abundanti cautelem to toll the start of the running of the thirty (30) days period for filing the Petition For Review. Respondent joined issue therewith filing and serving their respective answers. Accordingly, the case proceeded to trial with parties presenting and offering documentary and testimonial evidence after which they filed their respective memoranda and submitted the case for decision. In the meantime the BIR resolved the pending Motion For Reconsideration against herein petitioner and issued a formal letter of assessment against herein petitioner and issued a formal letter of assessment against PNB (Exhibit "Y" "Z" and "AA") for payment of the outstanding balance on the deficiency withholding tax, plus interest form which the PNB filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice even as it filed a Motion to suspend proceedings before the CTA pending the DOJ resolution of its pending Petition For Review. Petitioner has never raised before respondent CTA the issue of prematurity on the ground that there was still appending Motion for Reconsideration by Savellano with the CIR. It was respondent Savellano or petitioner who filed a Manifestation and Motion and asked for the suspension of the proceedings adverting to his pending Motion For Reconsideration with the Commissioner that may soon be resolved, and so the need for the commissioner to be given time to act on said unresolved motion. Opposition to the Manifestation of petitioner was submitted by PNOC and PNB (Vide Decision page 8 of Decision p. 47, Rollo). It was only on June 14, 1991 after receiving the adverse resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals that petitioner filed a motion to suspend proceedings for the reason that is has elevated the matter of the new assessment dated January 16, 1991 of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue against it to the Department of Justice pursuant to PD No. 242 (pp. 10-11, Decision pp. 49-50. Prematurity not having been raised in the Court below, petitioner cannot raise such issue now. Settled is the rule that issues to raised in the court below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. (Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Wonder Philippines and Court of Tax Appeals 160 SCRA 573). Petitioner likewise questions the right of respondent Savellano to assail the legality of the compromise settlement who, as informer is considered as an agent of the CIR and, therefore, under the principle of agency is bound by the Compromise entered between the former and PNOC/PNB pursuant to Article 1311 of the Civil Code on privity of contracts. Pursuing this line, petitioner claims that Savellano is estopped from questioning the compromise settlement, for he himself has consented and accepted his informer's reward. And that finally, Savellano failed to file his protest against the CIR's compromise settlement within the reglementary period of thirty (30) days as his request for reconsideration was filed only after nine (9) months and after having completely received his reward. We find petitioner's stance not to be well-taken. We fail to see the light of petitioner's theory for agency. At bottom, what Savellano is seeking in his petition with the CTA is the enforcement of the collection of his just reward granted to him by law as an Informer of which he claims to have been unjustly deprived by the unwarranted act of the CIR in entering into what he claims is an unlawful compromise agreement. Moreover, he was to a party to this Compromise agreement and does not appear to have been formally notified thereof. On 7 January 1988 respondent Savellano wrote the BIR demanding payment of P43,800,915.25 representing the outstanding balance as the 15% tax informer's reward. On 8 March 1988 the BIR by letter-decision received 11 March 1988 denied outright private respondent's claims for payment upon the ground that the receipt by respondent of P14,093,321.89 constituted full payment of the informer's reward under Section 281 paragraph 1 of the Tax Code, as amended on March 25, 1988 respondent Savellano filed a Motion For Reconsideration with the BIR. On 8 April, in order to reserve his statutory right to appeal, respondent Savellano filed his petition for review with the CTA well within the thirty (30) day period from receipt of the letter-decision denying his claim for payment of the outstanding balance of his informer's reward, which belies petitioner's belated stance of prescription. On the contrary, it is the PNB's protest against the assessment that, according to the respondent CTA, had already prescribed: The record shows that letter of demand dated January 16, 1991 for the amount of P294,958,450.73 was received by PNB on February 6, 1991. The Commissioner alleges that no protest from PNB was filed or received within the following thirty (30) days that a taxpayer is permitted to do so under the law. A letter dated April 11, 1991 serving as a protest was received only on April 12, 1991, more than thirty (30) days from receipt of assessment and beyond the reglementary period. The Commissioner thus concludes that the assessment has already become final and executory. Against this, PNB could only argue that the tax notice was improperly sent, allegedly having been received by the Bank's general mailing services instead of its financial Management Department. Nonetheless, PNB would also depend on its theory that since it is the DOJ which has jurisdiction over this case, there is not thirty (30) day period to be reckoned with as P.D. 842 has no such rule. (p. 79, Rollo) Petitioner likewise claims that respondent court erred in not ruling that respondent Savellano is not entitled to informer's reward as entitlement thereto only accrues when there is actual recovery or collection of revenue by the government. Since the taxpayers when alleged delinquency in the payment of taxes was discovered and reported are government-owned corporation, there is actually no revenue that could be said to have been collected or derived by the government from the information supplied by informer (petitioner) citing Millares vs. Ortiz G.R. No. L-49561 June 15, 1989) and the COA ruling in COA case No. 746 disallowing the payment to respondent Savellano for Informer's reward in the sum of P2,397,924.75 from NCA's deficiency taxes no such revenue or income having been actually realized or recovered by the government nor has any benefit accrued to the public on the basis of the information furnished by the claimant and upon which the informer's reward is claimed. The issue has been laid at rest in the en banc decision of the Supreme Court in The Commissioner of Internal Revenue versus The Commission on Audit G.R. No. 101976 and Tirso B. Savellano versus The Commission on Audit G.R. No. 102258 promulgated on January 29, 1993 as follows: One of the reasons for respondent COA's disallowance of the informer's reward under consideration is that there was actually no revenue realized or recovered as two (2) government agencies were involved. This view is simplistic and merits no concurrence. It overlooks the fact that the two (2) government agencies involved, NCA and PNOC, possess legal personalities separate and distinct from the Philippine government. Although both are government-owned and controlled corporations, NCA and PNOC perform proprietary functions. Their revenues do not automatically devolve to the general coffers of the government. Unless the general coffers of the government. Unless transferred to the Philippine government through the vehicle of taxation, no part of their revenues is available for appropriation by the Legislature for expenditure in government projects; such revenues remain said agencies' in their entirety, to be applied to and expended for their own exclusive purpose. Clearly, then, when said revenues are subjected to tax, the portion thereof corresponding to such tax becomes, in its own, revenue for the government accruing to the General Fund. That the informer's reward was sought and given in relation to tax delinquencies of government agencies provides no reason for disallowance. The law on the matter makes no distinction whatsoever between delinquent taxpayers in this regard, whether private persons or corporations, or public or quasi public agencies, it being sufficient for its operation that the person or entity concerned is subject to , and violated, revenue laws, and the informer's report thereof resulted in the recovery of revenues. It is elementary that where the law does not distinguish, none must be made. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distingere debemos. In fact, the Treasurer of the Republic of the Philippines, upon request of the BIR, issued a journal voucher crediting the amount of P294,958,450.73 to the account of the BIR designated as Fund 104 (Answer of Savellano par. 28 p. 155, Rollo). Finally, petitioner posits that the claim of respondent Savellano, if allowed, would potentially create a fertile ground for graft and corruption, and raises the question on why it should be the informer and not the BIR who had to discover the infirmity in the compromise settlement, and why the CIR despite the COA ruling disallowing the payment of informer's reward still proceeded to justify the payment of the P43,800,915.25 on top of the P14,093,321.81 which he had already received. To begin with, it is not the infirmity in the compromise settlement that entitles Savellano to the reward but the collection of the deficiency tax in the amount of P294,958,450.73 which was found to be due and actually collected by the Government on the basis of information given by Savellano. Section 281 of the Tax Code expressly allows the payment of the informer's reward on the actual deficiency tax collected. The mere possibility of collusion or graft is not sufficient ground for disallowance. We again advert to the aforecited Savellano case. The Solicitor General correctly dismisses the mere possibility of collusion to obtain the informer's reward as sufficient ground for disallowance. Collusion cannot be presumed. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. In the case at bar, there is no showing of collusion between petitioner Savellano as informer and any official or employee of the BIR or the Department of Finance. Neither is there any evidence to overcome the presumption of regularity enjoyed by the official acts of the BIR and the Department of Finance in approving the claim of petitioner Savellano for informer's reward. Respondent COA considers the payment of informer's reward in this case as placing a premium upon violations committed by government agencies and therefore, improper. At first blush, it would appear that by paying the informer's reward, the government punishes itself for violations committed by its own agencies. This, however, is more apparent than real. The delinquencies of these agencies are not condoned, much less rewarded. It is the person whose information led to the discovery of their transgressions who is being rewarded. Although this results in a reduction in the amount of revenues actually received, the net effect is that the government still gains from the remaining amount paid, which otherwise would have been lost to it. (p. 192, Rollo). We end as we do in accordance with the long standing policy and practice of the Supreme Court in the disposition of appeals to respect the conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies and, with more reason, those of a Court such as the Court of Tax Appeals, which, by the nature of its functions, is dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject, unless there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of its authority." (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 86785, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 182). We find none in this case. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Decision sought to be reversed is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Santiago and Somera, JJ., concur.