Philippine Allied Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals

SPECIAL FOURTEENTH DIVISION [CA-G.R. SP No. 28560. September 14, 1993.] (C.T.A. Case No. 4634) PHILIPPINE ALLIED ENTERPRISE CORPORATION, ARMSTRONG ENTERPRISES, REMAL ENTERPRISES, TYREMART INCORPORATED and ALPCO INDUSTRIAL COMPANY , petitioners , vs . COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS , respondents . D E C I S I O N GARCIA , J p : Sought to be set aside in this petition for review is the Resolution dated July 7, 1992 of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 4634, dismissing for having been filled out of time, the petition for review thereat filed by the petitioners from an adverse decision of the Commissioner of Customs The facts are as follows: In separate protest cases filed with the District Collector of Customs for the Port for Manila, herein petitioners, namely, Philippine Allied Enterprises Corporation, Armstrong Enterprises, Remal Enterprises, Tyremart Incorporated and Alpco Industrial Company, challenged as excessive the duties and taxes levied on their tire importations. Consolidated, the case were decided by the District Collector in favor of the petitioners. However, on automatic review by the Commissioner of Customs, the latter, in a decision dated June 18, 1991, reversed the ruling of the District Collector and accordingly denied the petitioners' protests. On June 20, 1991, a copy of the aforementioned decision of the Commissioner of Customs was received by Atty. Nilda Torrevillas. In acknowledging her receipt of said copy, Atty. Torrevillas handwrote the following entries in the Record Book of the Commission: "Received. Copy June 28, 1991 Remal Ent. Phil. allied Armstrong Tyremart Alpco By: (Atty. Nilda A Torrevillas' signature)". On July 24, 1991, or more than thirty (30) days from her receipt of the aforesaid copy, Atty. Torrevillas, acting for and in behalf of the herein petitioners, filed with the Court of Tax Appeals a petition for review of the same decision of the Commissioner of Customs. Reacting thereto, the respondent Commissioner moved to dismiss the petition on the ground that the same was filed beyond the 30-day prescriptive period fixed therefor under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 1125. In its challenged Resolution of July 7, 1992, the respondent Court of Tax Appeals granted the Commissioner's motion and accordingly dismissed the petition for review. Hence, petitioners' present recourse grounded on their lone submission that- ". . . THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS SHOULD HAVE DECLARED THAT THE 30-DAY REGLEMENTARY (sic) PERIOD OF APPEAL HAS NOT YET STARTED TO RUN WHEN PETITIONER FILED THEIR PETITION FOR REVIEW BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO VALID SERVICE OF NOTICE UPON THE COUNSEL OF RECORD OF THE PETITIONERS" The petition must fall. It is urged by the petitioners that in both the proceedings before the District Collector of Customs and the Commissioner of Customs. They were represented by their counsel of record, a certain Atty. Manuel M. Hechanova and that, in said proceedings, Atty. Nilda Torrevillas never entered her appearance as additional or collaborating counsel. Presiding therefrom petitioners argue that Atty. Torrevillas receipt of a copy of the Commissioners' decision on June 20, 1991 cannot prejudice them since she was never their counsel but Atty. Hechanova who was never served or furnished with a copy of the same decision. Petitioners' disavowal of Atty. Torrevillas as being their counsel when the latter received a copy of the Commissioner' decision on June 20, 1991 cannot hold water. For sure, a number of circumstances betrays petitioners' posture. To begin with, there is the entry in the Commissioner's Record Book in the very handwriting of Atty. Torrevillas herself wherein she made it clear that in receiving a copy of the Commissioner's decision, she was receiving it for and in behalf of all the five (5) petitioners herein whose individual names were even specified by her. If, as claimed by the petitioners, Atty. Torrevillas was merely requested by the sister of the manager of Remal Enterprises to secured a copy of the same division for Remal, it puzzles us why Atty. Torrevillas should receive the copy not merely for Remal Enterprises but also for the rest of the petitioners. Then, too, there is the unrefined fact that Atty. Torrevillas surreptitiously tampered with the Commissioner's Record Book by making it appear that she received a copy of the Commissioner's decision on June 28, 1991 when in truth and in fact she actually received the same on June 20, 1991. If Atty. Torrevillas was not then engaged as petitioners' counsel, her receipt of a copy of the decision, whether on June 20 or June, 28, would make no difference. Evidently, the lady attorney tampered with the Record Book because she was than already engaged as counsel by the petitioners and therefore she had to tamper the date by making it as June 28, 1991 in order to beat the statutory 30-day period for filing a petition for review with the respondent Court of Tax Appeals. Indeed, were we to reckon the said period from the tampered date, the petition for review she filed on July 24, 1991 in behalf of the petitioners would have been very much on time. Finally, it could not have been a mere coincidence that it was Atty. Torrevillas herself who eventually filed the petition for review in CTA Case No. 4634. Doubtless, Atty. Torrevillas' subsequent filing of said petition for and in behalf of the herein petitioners cannot but indicated petitioners' prior engagement of the services of Atty. Torrevillas as their counsel. So it is that on June 20, 1991, Atty. Torrevillas went to the office of the respondent Commissioner precisely to secure a copy of the latter's decision for purposes of the petition for review she subsequently filed with the respondent Court of Tax Appeals in behalf of the herein petitioners. Independent of the foregoing, awareness must be made of the fact that protest cases are primarily governed by the Tariff and Customs Code and that the provisions of the Rules of Court relative to notices have only a suppletory application, In this connection, Section 2314 of said Code specifically provides that notice of the decision of the Commissioner of Customs "shall be given to the party by whom the case was brought for review. Here, even assuming that Atty. Torrevillas was not petitioners' "counsel of record" in the sense that she had not entered her appearance in the case, she could, however, be considered, at the very least, as representative of the petitioners when she secured and acknowledged receipt of a copy of the Commissioner's decision on June 20, 1991. Hence, service to her is as much a service to the herein petitioners. In closing, we cannot help but express our misgivings on the posture taken by the petitioners. Basically, petitioners would want us to ignore Atty. Torrevillas receipt of the Commissioner's decision on June 20, 1991. Were we to go by the petitioners, it is obvious that there can never be in this case any starting date from whence to reckon the statutory 30-day prescriptive period within which the same decision may be challenged in the respondent court. The resulting absurdity is that any challenge to that decision, in whatever date the petitioners may wish to file it, will always be timely filed. In short, prescription will never run against the petitioners. This, we cannot countenance. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED Galvez and Verzola JJ., concur.