De Guzman v. Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service

THIRTEENTH DIVISION [CA-G.R. SP NO. 142544. May 3, 2016.] MARINA C. DE GUZMAN , petitioner , vs. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE-REVENUE INTEGRITY PROTECTION SERVICE , respondent . DECISION PIZARRO , J p : Assailed in this petition for review 1 are the Decision 2 and Order 3 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-0095-B finding Marina C. De Guzman administratively liable for Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty and imposing upon her the penalty of dismissal from the service along with its accessory penalties. The Facts : 4 Marina C. De Guzman (Petitioner) is the Officer in Charge-Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Revenue Region I, Calasiao, Pangasinan. She entered the civil service in June 1979 as a Revenue Examiner. On February 16, 2006, a Joint Complaint Affidavit was filed by the Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service (Respondent) before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, R.A. No. 6713, and the Revised Penal Code. In its complaint, the Respondent alleged that for the years 1994 to 2004, the Petitioner's net worth, based on her Sworn Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN), ballooned increasingly from One Million Eight Hundred Twenty-One Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Seven Pesos and Eighteen Centavos (PhP1,821,547.18) to approximately Eleven Million Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Nine Hundred Eight Pesos and Ninety-Nine Centavos (PhP11,445,908.99). Throughout this period, the Respondent noted that the Petitioner's account receivables, jewelries, and cash on hand and in bank substantially increased in value disproportionate to her salary. Furthermore, to conceal her actual net worth, the Respondent maintained that the Petitioner deliberately and intentionally failed to declare a true and detailed statements of her assets as required by law. It claimed that the Petitioner only declared four (4) properties in her SALN when in fact she has four (4) other properties located in Bulacan and did not include her interest in various businesses. On her part, the Petitioner maintained that the accusation of unexplained wealth has no basis since her assets as declared in her SALN came from legitimate sources and most of her properties were either inherited from her parents or were from her other sources of income, e.g. , teaching, garment sub-contractor, part-time concert/show producer. She countered that the discrepancies in her SALN were due to inadvertence not meant to evade the law or suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth. She likewise denied participation or interest in the businesses asserted by the Respondent. AcICHD On February 8, 2014 or almost eight (8) years after the instant complaint was filed, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Gerard A. Mosquera approved the assailed Decision dated September 30, 2013 finding the Petitioner guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty. He found that the Respondent failed to prove its allegation of unexplained wealth as the Petitioner was able to justify and explain with evidence her accumulated wealth over the past years. Thus: WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found GUILTY of Simple Neglect of Duty. Accordingly, she is SUSPENDED for three (3) months without pay. SO ORDERED. 5 The nature of the said judgment being immediately executory, the BIR, as the Petitioner's employer agency, accordingly implemented the Decision and suspended the Petitioner from February 24, 2014 to May 24, 2014. In the meantime, on March 5, 2014, the Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the assailed Decision . However, despite having already served her suspension, as the Office of the Ombudsman had not yet resolved her motion for reconsideration, the Petitioner moved for the immediate resolution of her case. 6 On September 22, 2015 or eighteen (18) months after the Petitioner moved for reconsideration, Overall Deputy Ombudsman Melchor Arthur Carandang approved the assailed Order dated August 7, 2015 modifying the earlier Decision and finding the Petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty, the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE, this Office, through the undersigned, finds respondent Marina C. De Guzman ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE for Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty, and imposes upon her the principal penalty of DISMISSAL from the service along with the accessory penalties of: (a) the cancellation of her civil service eligibility; (b) the forfeiture of her retirement benefits; and (c) her perpetual disqualification from holding public office. SO DECIDED. 7 Simply put, despite having served her suspension per Decision dated September 30, 2013, the Petitioner was meted out with the more severe penalty of dismissal. Hence, the instant petition. The Issues : The Petitioner comes before this Court presenting the following as issues: I WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS HAS BEEN VIOLATED WITH THE IMPOSITION OF A SUBSEQUENT AND HARSHER PENALTY AFTER THE ORIGINAL PENALTY HAS ALREADY BEEN SERVED AND COMPLETED. II WHETHER OR NOT THE OMB [UDSMAN] COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WITH THE IMPOSITION OF A SUBSEQUENT AND HARSHER PENALTY AFTER THE ORIGINAL PENALTY HAS ALREADY BEEN SERVED AND COMPLETED. III WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL WAS VIOLATED IN VIEW OF THE DELAY IN RESOLVING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IV WHETHER OR NOT THE FINDING OF GRAVE MISCONDUCT AND SERIOUS DISHONESTY, AND THE IMPOSITION UPON THE PETITIONER OF THE PRINCIPAL PENALTY OF DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE ALONG WITH ITS ACCESSORY PENALTIES IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 8 This Court's Ruling : Recognizing the truism that justice delayed is justice denied, Our present Constitution guarantees that all persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. 9 The impact of this constitutional right was first given vitality in the case of Tatad v. Sandiganbayan 10 when the High Court ruled that three (3) years of inordinate delay cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable, ergo , is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights to the speedy disposition of his case. Through the years, the more extensive scope of this right as enveloped in the present Constitution had been given much emphasis, thus in Dansal v. Fernandez , 11 the Supreme Court ruled: Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice. It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case"; includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords broader protection than Section 14(2), which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after the submission of the case. The present constitutional provision applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases. TAIaHE Applying this constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court, in various occasions, had dismissed administrative and criminal complaints for not being resolved expeditiously. In the Tatad case, the Court found three (3) years of delay as a transgression on the constitutional right to a speedy disposition of the cases against him. In Roque v. Office of the Ombudsman , 12 the failure of the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve a complaint that has been pending for six (6) years was held clearly violative of the rights of petitioners to due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against them. Similarly, in Angchangco, Jr. v. Ombudsman , 13 a delay of six (6) years was found unwarranted. In Coscolluela v. Sandiganbayan , 14 the Supreme Court likewise sided with the petitioner because the proceedings against him was terminated only after almost eight (8) years from the filing of the complaint. Withal, it is likewise indubitable that speedy disposition of cases is a relative term and has been used by the courts as a flexible concept. In the determination of whether or not the right to a speedy trial has been violated, certain factors may be considered and balanced against each other. The Supreme Court, in various cases, has laid down the following guidelines: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reasons for such delay; 3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and 4) the prejudice caused by the delay. 15 Gleaned from the foregoing benchmark, We find that the Petitioner's right to a speedy disposition of her case has been violated. First , the acts of the Petitioner that the Respondent investigated had supposedly occurred in the period covering 1994 to 2004. Yet, the complaint came to be initiated only on February 16, 2006. Subsequently, the Petitioner was able to file her counter-affidavit and never asked for any extension or postponement from the Office of the Ombudsman. To harp on her desire to have her case resolved in the earliest possible opportunity, she filed several motions to reiterate her plea. Ultimately, the Decision finding the Petitioner guilty of Simple Neglect of Duty was only approved by the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon on February 8, 2014 or a lapse of almost eight (8) years from the filing of the complaint. Meanwhile, the Order resolving the Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was only approved by the Overall Deputy Ombudsman on September 22, 2015 or eighteen (18) months from the filing of the motion for reconsideration and after the Petitioner had already served her suspension. From the foregoing unfolding of events, it is quite clear that it took nine (9) years and six (6) months from the filing of the complaint by the Respondent for the Office of the Ombudsman to decide the Petitioner's case. Under such circumstances, the Petitioner cannot be faulted for invoking her right to speedy trial. To Our mind, such long period, when tested with the jurisprudential yardstick, cannot be considered a simple delay but constitutes inordinate and oppressive delay in the disposition of her case a complete and utter disregard of the Petitioner's constitutional right. ICHDca Second , the Office of the Ombudsman, in its Decision and Order , failed to offer any reasonable justification for the delay in resolving the Petitioner's case. The Respondent claims that the delay was justified because the case before the Office of the Ombudsman involved voluminous documentary exhibits in addition to the various pleadings filed by the parties. The Respondent's justification does not impress Us. Its excuse for the delay the voluminous nature of the exhibits and the amount of legwork and coordination undertaken cannot stand against the aforecited strong-hold pronouncements of the Supreme Court against undue delay. Conceding that the present case may have involved voluminous records, We find it unreasonable, if not preposterous, that it should take a deciding body a lengthy period of eight (8) years, from the filing of the complaint up until the initial Decision was approved, to go through the pieces of evidence submitted before it. Even the period of one (1) year and six (6) months which took the Office of the Ombudsman to resolve the motion for reconsideration does not add to its cause. Further, We emphasize that the Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are especially mandated to act promptly on complaints filed before them, as inscribed in R.A. No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989. 16 As highlighted by the Supreme Court: [The Office of the Ombudsman] was constitutionally created to be the "protector of the people," with the expressed mandate that it "shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the people." To attain its mandate, Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989) bestowed upon [the Office of the Ombudsman] broad and tremendous powers and functions generally categorized as follows: investigatory power, prosecutory power, disciplinary power, contempt power, public assistance functions, authority to inquire and obtain information, and function to adopt, institute and implement preventive measures, . . . These powers, functions and duties are aimed to enable [the Office of the Ombudsman] to be "a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office." . . . When the Constitution enjoins [the Office of the Ombudsman] to "act promptly" on any complaint against any public officer or employee, it has the concomitant duty to speedily resolve the same. . . . . . . Clearly , [the Office of the Ombudsman] 's inaction does not only violate petitioner's right to speedy disposition of their cases guaranteed by the Constitution, but is also opposed to its role as the vanguard in the promotion of efficient service by the government to the people and in ensuring accountability in public office. Considering that [the Office of the Ombudsman] is tasked to "determine the causes of inefficiency . . . in the Government, and make recommendations for (its) elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency," its prolonged delay is manifestly a violation of due process. These are only some of the cases showing [the Office of the Ombudsman] 's disregard of the person's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. Sadly, the list of cases is growing. This is alarming. Here, [the Office of the Ombudsman], the very protector of the people, became the perpetrator of the dictum that "justice delayed is justice denied." Indeed, the said dictum is not a meaningless concept that can be taken for granted by those who are tasked with the dispensation of justice. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases was intended to stem the tide of disenchantment among the people in the administration of justice by our judicial and quasi-judicial tribunals. The adjudication of cases must not only be done in an orderly manner that is in accord with the established rules of procedure, but must also be promptly decided to better serve the ends of justice. Excessive delay in the disposition of cases renders the rights of the people guaranteed by the Constitution and by various legislations inutile. The people's respect and confidence in the Office of the Ombudsman are measured not only by its impartiality, fairness, and correctness of its acts, but also by its capacity to resolve cases speedily. 17 Third , the Petitioner had assertively and assiduously invoked upon the Office of the Ombudsman her right to the speedy disposition of her case. Her motions to resolve, both on the original complaint and her motion for reconsideration, show that she never slept on her rights and actually asserted that the instant complaint be immediately acted upon by the Office of the Ombudsman. Fourth , We recognize the prejudice caused to the Petitioner by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against her. While the Office of the Ombudsman was playing the delay game, the Petitioner was made to suffer the anxiety of unduly delayed proceedings and the expense of court litigation. The suspension ordered by the initial Decision had become fait accompli after the Petitioner had fully served her suspension. She returned to work immediately thereafter only to be meted out with a graver penalty. The Petitioner had been in the government service for forty-two (42) years. We could not fathom the anxiety and humiliation she had suffered for more than nine (9) years as a result of the delayed proceedings. To Our mind, such long time it took the Office of the Ombudsman to settle the present case is unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive. The long wait suffered by the Petitioner without valid cause or justifiable motive had unnecessarily trampled upon her constitutional right to a speedy disposition of her case. These inordinate delay grossly violated the Petitioner's rights as the Office of the Ombudsman had been given more than ample opportunity to investigate and decide the Petitioner's case, yet it took eight (8) years for the complaint to be resolved and another eighteen (18) months before the motion for reconsideration was attended to. This Court cannot be the one to tolerate such an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice. Thus, We find the delay unwarranted, one that Our fundamental law loathes. As it stands with present case law, a finding of violation of the right to the speedy disposition of case warrants the dismissal of the case. In the above-cited cases of Tatad, Roque, Angchangco , and Coscolluela , the Supreme Court, after a determination of violation of the petitioners' right to a speedy disposition of their cases, accordingly dismissed the cases filed before them. In the same vein, the cases of People v. Sandiganbayan , 18 Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan , 19 Licaros v. Sandiganbayan , 20 and Abardo v. Sandiganbayan 21 also made clear the imposition of the radical relief of dismissal of the cases against petitioners for having been unduly delayed and unresolved. In a case involving a present presidential candidate, the Supreme Court likewise dismissed a criminal case after finding that it took the Office of the Ombudsman four (4) years before the preliminary investigation was terminated. 22 Said otherwise, the concomitant repercussion of a finding that a person's constitutional right to a speedy disposition of case has been violated and transgressed, such as in the case in consideration, is the outright dismissal of the complaint, whether administrative or criminal. Having reached the foregoing conclusion, We deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by the Petitioner. In the end, what this Court seeks to protect is the right of the Filipino people from unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive delays which render their rights nugatory. By recognizing the prejudice caused to the Petitioner by the lengthy delay in the proceedings against her, We are not only aspiring towards the end of hastening the administration of justice but, more importantly, discouraging the practice of promoting oppression of our citizens by holding a prosecution or litigation suspended for an indefinite time. Simply put, this decision seeks not only to protect the Petitioner's rights, but to protect the public's interest in a speedy disposition of cases. Absolutely, this case is about the right of the Petitioner to be reinstated and restored to her previous position in light of the patent violation of her constitutional right to the speedy disposition of her case committed by the Office of the Ombudsman. As a court granted with the jurisdiction to review cases from the Office of the Ombudsman and grant ancillary remedies and reliefs, and considering the circumstances surrounding the Petitioner's tedious odyssey towards achieving a just resolution of her case, it is paramount for this Court to provide such injunctive relief to protect the Petitioner from unjust invasion of her right to a decent career in the government service and restore to her what had been rightfully hers from the very beginning. ASEcHI All told, it would be too much toll on the basic tenets of fair play, good dealing, and equity if after having served her full suspension, the Petitioner would still be dismissed on an unduly and excessively delayed proceeding. WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED . The assailed Decision dated September 30, 2013 and Order dated August 7, 2015 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE . The Petitioner is hereby REINSTATED to her previous position IMMEDIATELY . No Costs. SO ORDERED . Gaerlan and Quijano-Padilla, JJ. , concur. Footnotes 1. Filed under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure on October 9, 2015; See Rollo , pp. 3-23. 2. Dated September 30, 2013; Id. , pp. 26-49. 3. Dated August 7, 2015; Id. , pp. 50-56. 4. As culled from the rollo . 5. Supra , note 2, p. 48. 6. See Motion to Resolve dated August 28, 2014; Rollo , pp. 81-84. 7. Supra , note 3, pp. 55-56. 8. Supra , note 1, p. 9. Bracketed insertion added. 9. Article III, Section 16. 10. G.R. Nos. 72335-39, March 21, 1988. 11. G.R. No. 126814, March 2, 2000. 12. G.R. No. 129978, May 12, 1999. 13. G.R. No. 122728, February 13, 1997. 14. G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013. 15. See Ombudsman v. Jurado , G.R. No. 154155, August 6, 2008, citing Dela Pea v. Sandiganbayan , G.R. No. 144542, June 29, 2001. 16. See Section 13 of R.A. No. 6770. 17. See Enriquez v. Office of the Ombudsman , G.R. Nos. 174902-06, February 15, 2008. Bracketed insertions added and emphasis supplied. 18. G.R. No. 188165, December 11, 2013. 19. G.R. No. 108595, May 18, 1999. 20. G.R. No. 145851, November 22, 2001. 21. G.R. Nos. 139571-72, March 28, 2001. 22. See Duterte v. Sandiganbayan , G.R. No. 130191, April 27, 1998.