Alvaro v. Martinez

SPECIAL EIGHTH (8TH) DIVISION [CA-G.R. SP NO. 133735. August 28, 2015.] DIVINA P. ALVARO , petitioner , vs . EFREN P. MARTINEZ , respondent . [CA-G.R. SP NO. 134068. August 28, 2015.] DIVINA P. ALVARO , petitioner , vs . MELCHOR ARTHUR H. CARANDANG, LEILANIE BERNADETTE C. CABRAS, and HON. KIM S. JACINTO-HENARES, EFREN P. MARTINEZ , respondents . [CA-G.R. SP NO. 134238. August 28, 2015.] DIVINA P. ALVARO , petitioner , vs . BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Represented by its Commissioner, HON. KIM S. JACINTO-HENARES, and EFREN P. MARTINEZ , respondents . DECISION SALANDANAN-MANAHAN , J p : Before Us are three (3) consolidated cases which are offshoots of a controversy arising from the administrative case docketed as BIR-PAD Administrative Case No. 3090-13 for Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty filed against herein petitioner Divina P. Alvaro. C.A.-G.R. SP No. 133735 is a Petition for Review 1 filed under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking for a review and reversal of the following issuances, insofar as they dismissed petitioner's administrative complaint against respondent Efren P. Martinez, in OMB Case No. IC-OC-13-1584 before the Office of the Ombudsman, to wit: (1) Resolution 2 dated 22 August 2013 issued by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, and (2) Notice of Dismissal 3 dated 22 November 2013 issued by Assistant Ombudsman Leilanie Bernadette C. Cabras. C.A.-G.R. SP No. 134068 is a Petition [Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure] , 4 seeking to annul and set aside the following issuances, insofar as they dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint against respondent Efren P. Martinez, in OMB Case No. IC-OC-13-1584 before the Office of the Ombudsman, to wit: (1) Resolution 5 dated 22 August 2013 issued by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Melchor Arthur H. Carandang, and (2) Notice of Dismissal 6 dated 22 November 2013 issued by Assistant Ombudsman Leilanie Bernadette C. Cabras. C.A.-G.R. SP No. 134238 is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus , 7 filed under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to nullify or set aside the following issuances of Respondent Efren P. Martinez, Chief of the Personnel Inquiry Division of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR, for brevity), to wit: (1) Order 8 dated 27 May 2013 which, among others, disallowed the inclusion of documentary exhibits in the petitioner's Pre-Trial Conference Brief even before their formal offer; and (2) Order 9 dated 9 September 2013, which denied petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside the Order dated May 27, 2013, Motion for Inhibition of Hearing Officer Efren P. Martinez and Motion to Cancel the Scheduled Hearing on July 22-26, 2013. THE PARTIES 1. Petitioner Divina P. Alvaro (petitioner, for brevity) is the respondent in BIR-PAD Administrative Case No. 3090-13 10 entitled "Bureau of Internal Revenue vs. Divina P. Alvaro" before the Bureau of Internal Revenue and is the complainant in OMB Case No. IC-OC-13-1584 11 entitled "Divina A. Alvaro vs. Efren P. Martinez" before the Office of the Ombudsman, represented herein by her counsel E.L. Gayo & Associates Law Office. CAIHTE 2. Respondent Efren P. Martinez (respondent Martinez, for brevity) is the Chief, Personnel Adjudication Division and Head, Hearing Panel of the respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue who issued the assailed Orders in BIR-PAD Administrative Case No. 3090-13 entitled "Bureau of Internal Revenue vs. Divina P. Alvaro" before the Bureau of Internal Revenue and is the respondent in OMB Case No. IC-OC-13-1584 entitled "Divina A. Alvaro vs. Efren P. Martinez" before the Office of the Ombudsman, represented herein by Atty. Josephine S. Doria and D.G. Macalino & Associates. 3. Respondent Bureau of Internal Revenue (respondent BIR, for brevity) represented by its Commissioner, Hon. Kim S. Jacinto-Henares is the quasi-judicial agency of the government and is the complainant in the BIR-PAD Administrative Case No. 3090-13 entitled "Bureau of Internal Revenue vs. Divina P. Alvaro" before the Bureau of Internal Revenue, represented herein by Atty. Josephine S. Doria. 4. Respondent Melchor Arthur H. Carandang (respondent Carandang, for brevity) is the Overall Deputy Ombudsman who issued the assailed Resolution dated 22 August 2013 in OMB Case No. IC-OC-13-1584 entitled "Divina A. Alvaro vs. Efren P. Martinez" before the Office of the Ombudsman, represented herein by the Office of Legal Affairs, Office of the Ombudsman. 5. Respondent Leilanie Bernadette C. Cabras (respondent Cabras, for brevity) is the Assistant Ombudsman who issued the assailed Notice of Dismissal dated 22 November 2013 in OMB Case No. IC-OC-13-1584 entitled "Divina A. Alvaro vs. Efren P. Martinez" before the Office of the Ombudsman, represented herein by the Office of Legal Affairs, Office of the Ombudsman. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE The factual antecedents of these cases are as follows: On 1 October 2012, petitioner is a Chief Revenue Officer III of Revenue District Office (RDO) La Trinidad, Benguet, Revenue Region (RR) No. 2, Cordillera Administrative Region, who was administratively charged with Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty as per the Formal Charge and Preventive Suspension Order. The Formal Charge 12 reads: "That you, a Revenue Collection Officer III, then assigned in Revenue District Office No. 2, La Trinidad, Benguet, for consideration and without authority, on 27 December 2010 and in prior date, received the amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P168,000.00) from a certain Maribel Mercader-Jones for the payment of the corresponding Capital Gains Tax (CGT) and Documentary Stamp Tax (DST) covering the sale of a parcel of land located at No. 8 Magnolia Street, Monterrazas, Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, covered by TCT No. T-61582, between Ms. Jones and a certain Gina Mercader Coburn on the pretext that you could facilitate the issuance of Certificates Authorizing Registration (CAR); and that you, despite demand and lapse of a considerable length of time, failed to comply with your commitment and continue to fail to return to Ms. Maribel Mercader-Jones the cash and pertinent documents you received from her relative to the above transaction, giving rise to the indubitable presumption that you took advantage of your official position to obtain personal gain and benefit, in violation of Sections 18-1 and 35 A-2 of the Revised Code of Conduct for Revenue Officials and Employees, to the damage and prejudice of revenue service." The Preventive Suspension Order 13 reads as follows: "Pursuant to Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, made effective on November 23, 1989, the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of said Executive Order, as amended by Civil Service Resolution No. 991936 dated August 31, 1999, pertinent Civil Service Laws and the Updated Code of Conduct for Bureau of Internal Revenue Officers and Employees, you are hereby preventively suspended from office for ninety (90) days effective upon receipt hereof, pending final determination of the administrative case against you for Serious Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct. Accordingly, you are hereby required to turn over all government property for which you are accountable and all your unfinished assignments to your immediate superior officer, in accordance with Revenue Memorandum Order No. 58-75 . . ." On 31 January 2013, respondent Martinez transmitted a Memorandum 14 to the Regional Director RR No. 2, which included the Formal Charge and Preventive Suspension Order. The case was docketed as BIR-PAD Administrative Case No. 3090-13 for Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty. Consequently, an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Complaint 15 dated 15 February 2013 was filed by private-complainant Mercader (Mercader, for brevity), through her Attorney-in-Fact, Atty. Arturo Lipata Mercader, seeking to withdraw the letter-complaint dated 21 November 2001, its attachments and all communications related thereto. On the other hand, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order 16 dated 20 February 2013 for lack of legal and factual ground. Petitioner filed her Answer to the Formal Charge 17 on 25 February 2013, together with Annexes. 18 Thereafter, an administrative investigation was conducted with respondent Martinez as Chairman of the BIR's Hearing Panel. On 8 March 2013, respondent Martinez issued an Order 19 denying the Urgent Motions, 20 finding that: ". . . the two motions prayed for cannot be granted and the same should be outrightly denied. . . . This is our final decision on the matter and the preventive suspension order issued against Divina P. Alvaro should (be) upheld and in fact, she is now serving the same." 21 Aggrieved, a Manifestation and Omnibus Motion 22 was filed by Mercader on 15 April 2013 which seeks among others, "to declare her absolute lack of interest to prosecute and pursue all her complaints against Divina P. Alvaro pending before the BIR in general." The same was hereinafter denied by respondent Martinez in its Order 23 dated 7 May 2013, reiterating its previous arguments by stating that ". . . once a complaint has been filed, it cannot anymore be withdrawn especially if the same is done without the concurrence of the prosecutor and absence of legal and valid grounds." 24 DETACa Pre-Trial Conference Briefs 25 were then submitted by petitioner and respondents BIR and Martinez. On 27 May 2013, respondent Martinez issued an Order 26 which, among others, disallowed petitioner's Exhibits "3-a", 27 "6", 28 "7", 29 "9" 30 and Annexes "1" 31 and "2" 32 appended to Exhibit "8" of the Pre-Trial Conference Brief since the Hearing Body has already resolved to deny the said exhibits per its Orders dated 8 March 2013 33 and 7 May 2013. 34 In this wise, the Hearing Body ruled: ". . . In view thereof, said exhibits, together with the documents appended to the aforesaid Motions, are hereby declared not subject to opening anew by indirectly offering the same as Respondent's Exhibits, for all legal intents and purposes, otherwise, there will be no end to litigation." 35 Aggrieved, an Omnibus Motion 36 was filed by petitioner dated 16 July 2013 praying: 1) that the Order dated 27 May 2013 be reconsidered, set aside and withdrawn; 2) that hearing officer Efren P. Martinez totally inhibit himself from the case; 3) and to cancel the scheduled hearing on July 22-26, 2013. The same was denied by respondent Martinez in an Order 37 dated 9 September 2013 reasoning, among others, to wit: ". . . As there appears to be an apparent attempt on the part of the respondent to present and have the documentary evidence be allowed or be admitted in an indirect manner by her insistence to utilize the same as part of her exhibits in her Pre-Trial Conference Brief. Again, we cannot be swayed into allowing their inclusion as respondent's exhibits since what cannot be done directly, as already ordered by this Hearing Body, could not be allowed to be done indirectly. xxx xxx xxx Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Reconsider and/or Set Aside the Order dated May 27, 2013 and the Motion for Inhibition of Hearing Officer Efren P. Martinez, are hereby DENIED, and the Motion to Cancel the Scheduled Hearing on July 22-26, 2013 has been rendered moot and academic." On 5 August 2013, petitioner filed before the Office of the Ombudsman an Affidavit-Complaint against respondent Martinez charging him criminally and administratively of the following: (1) Knowingly Rendering Unjust Judgment (Article 204, Revised Penal Code) or Unjust Interlocutory Order (Article 206, Revised Penal Code); (2) Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, 2 counts; (3) Violation of Section 4 of RA 6713; (4) Serious Misconduct; and (5) Grave abuse of authority. On 22 August 2013, respondent Carandang issued a Resolution 38 which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioner upon finding no merit to the allegations in the complaint which would warrant the Office's exercise of its investigatory or adjudicatory powers. 39 Attached thereto is the Notice of Dismissal 40 issued by respondent Cabras, addressed to the petitioner informing the latter of the dismissal of the complaint with the following details, to wit: "IC No. : IC-OC-13-1584 Complainant : Divina P. Alvaro Respondent/s : Efren P. Martinez Division Chief, Bureau of Internal Revenue Charge(s) : Violation of RA 6713, Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Articles 204 and 206 of RPC; Serious Misconduct; Grave Abuse of Authority Ground/s for : Lack of merit; Complainant has an Dismissal adequate remedy in another quasi- judicial body No Motion for Reconsideration shall be entertained." At this juncture, petitioner filed the following petitions before this Court, to wit: (1) Petition for Review 41 filed on 30 January 2014, to assail the Resolution dated 22 August 2013 issued by respondent Carandang and the Notice of Dismissal dated 22 November 2013 issued by respondent Cabras in OMB Case No. IC-OC-13-1584 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, insofar as it dismissed petitioner's administrative complaint against respondent Martinez. (2) Petition [Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure] 42 filed on 18 February 2014, to assail the Resolution dated 22 August 2013 issued by respondent Carandang and the Notice of Dismissal dated 22 November 2013 issued by respondent Cabras in OMB Case No. IC-OC-13-1584 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, insofar as it dismissed petitioner's criminal complaint against respondent Martinez. To which respondent Martinez filed its Comment 43 on 15 May 2014 alleging that the dismissal of the petitioner's complaint by the Office of the Ombudsman was valid and that the petitioner has not availed of her remedy in another quasi-judicial body, hence, the petition must be dismissed and the assailed Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman be affirmed. aDSIHc (3) Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus 44 under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure filed on 27 February 2014, anchored on the following grounds: (a) The assailed Orders (27 May 2013 and 9 September 2013) were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction rendering them null and void; (b) The assailed Orders are contrary to law and applicable rules and are, therefore, patently null and void; and (c) The assailed Orders violate the rights of the petitioner to due process of law as respondent in the BIR case. Correspondingly, respondents BIR and Martinez filed their Comment 45 on 3 June 2014, within the extended period prayed for. 46 In the Petition for Certiorari , subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion on respondent Martinez for issuing the assailed Orders which stated, among others, that Exhibits "3-a", "6", "7", "9" and Annexes "1" and "2" appended to Exhibit "8" of the Pre-Trial Conference Brief can not be allowed. Petitioner argues, among others, that: (1) respondent Martinez cannot rule on the issues set forth in the Pre-Trial Conference Brief as the same is premature and a pre-judgment of the case adverse to the petitioner, at that stage of the proceedings; and (2) the acts of respondent Martinez in issuing the assailed Orders caused unwarranted/unjustified benefit and advantage to the BIR in the pending case before it. Petitioner anchored her arguments by citing the case of Gomez vs. Alcantara (579 SCRA 472) and Barbieto vs. CA (604 SCRA 825), which state that, "The right to due process safeguards the opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his claim or defense." 47 In their Comment, respondents Martinez and BIR argued that: (1) the Petition must be dismissed since the assailed Orders have become final and executory on account that petitioner never appealed these Orders before the Civil Service Commission (CSC); (2) the petitioner did not exhaust her administrative remedies as provided by law for not having availed of the remedy of appealing before the CSC the preventive suspension order; and (3) the complainant who filed a case against Divina P. Alvaro before the BIR is not the proper party to move for the withdrawal of the complaint against her. Incidentally, on 2 April 2014, in CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion and Supplemental Petition 48 which reiterated her prayer in her petition for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. In addition, petitioner prays anew for an injunctive writ and for the nullification and setting aside of another Order 49 issued by respondent Martinez that declared the BIR-PAD Administrative Case No. 3090-13 case submitted for decision, upon motion of the prosecutor. The Order reads as follows: ATICcS "The Motion of the Prosecutor to have the case submitted for decision is hereby deemed submitted for resolution. We find the Motion impressed with merit. Records of this case are replete with evidence to show a deliberate intent to unreasonably delay the proceeding in this case brought about by the obstinate refusal of respondent and her counsel to participate and cooperate in the speedy disposition of this case. This contumacious act, despicable as it is, do violence to the speedy administration of justice. Needles (sic) to state, we can not simply close our eyes in tolerance this abominable act, we can not leave into respondent's reckless abandon the determination of the fate and conclusion of this case. WHEREFORE , premises considered, the instant case is now deemed submitted for decision. SO ORDERED." On 18 August 2014, this Court issued a Resolution 50 in CA-G.R. SP No. 134238 that denied the petitioner's urgent application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, to wit: " WHEREFORE , the Court RESOLVES to: (a) DENY the petitioner's application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order; (b) NOTE the Comment dated 16 May 2014 filed via registered mail by respondents Bureau of Internal Revenue and Efren P. Martinez; (c) NOTE the result of the CMIS verification on 15 August 2014 that no reply has been filed; (d) Consider the right of petitioner to filed Reply DEEMED WAIVED ; (e) With only the comment, DEEM the petition SUBMITED FOR RESOLUTION . SO ORDERED ." Aggrieved, petitioner filed on 29 September 2014 a Motion for Reconsideration 51 in CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, which reiterated and reproduced her arguments in support of her prayer for an injunctive writ against the assailed orders in the instant petition. On 1 October 2014, this Court issued a Resolution 52 in CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, which ordered the consolidation of this Petition with other cases pending before this Court, to wit: ETHIDa "WHEREFORE, in accordance with Section 3(a) and (b) (1), Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals (IRCA) and the ruling of the Honorable Supreme Court in A.M. No. CA-13-51-J dated 2 July 2013, let this petition be CONSOLIDATED with CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, and CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, with right of replacement. SO ORDERED." Consequently, on 29 October 2014, this Court issued a Resolution 53 in CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, which denied the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, among others, to wit: "ACORDINGLY, this Court RESOLVES to: (a) DENY the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit; (b) NOTE the Resolution dated 1 October 2014 rendered by the Third Division in the case of CA-G.R. SP No. 134068; and (c) RECALL the 18 August 2014 Resolution insofar as declaring that the case be submitted for decision and REVERT the case of CA-G.R. SP No. 134238 to completion stage pending receipt of all the records of the consolidated cases. Further action is held in abeyance pending the actual consolidation of CA-G.R. SP Nos. 133735, 134068 and 134238. SO ORDERED." On 13 November 2014, this Court issued a Resolution 54 directing the parties to submit their respective consolidated memoranda. Pursuant thereto, petitioner's Consolidated Memorandum 55 was filed on 30 January 2015, respondent Martinez and BIR's Memorandum 56 on 2 February 2015 and respondent Ombudsman's Memorandum 57 on 4 February 2015. Consequently, on 10 March 2015, petitioner filed a Reply Memorandum 58 reiterating thereon the prayer for reliefs in the three (3) separate Petitions as amplified in the Consolidated Memorandum. RELIEFS SOUGHT BY THE PARTIES In CA-G.R. SP No. 133735 , petitioner prays that the assailed Resolution and Notice of Dismissal be reversed and set aside and another one be rendered directing the Office of the Ombudsman to order the investigation of petitioner's complaint against respondent Martinez and to assign an impartial, competent and dedicated Ombudsman personnel to investigate the complaint and render judgment thereon as the facts and the laws may warrant. 59 TIADCc In CA-G.R. SP No. 134068 , petitioner prays, among others, that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered: (a) declaring the said Resolution null and void and setting it aside and declaring the existence of probable cause of the offenses charged against the respondent Martinez; (b) ordering/commanding the respondents Ombudsman to file the appropriate criminal Informations against respondent Martinez in the proper court(s); or ordering the respondents Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation of petitioner's criminal complaint against respondent Martinez and file the appropriate criminal Information in the proper court(s) as may be warranted; and (c) correspondingly declaring the assailed Notice of Dismissal null and void and setting it aside for lack of any bases in law and in fact. 60 In CA-G.R. SP No. 134238 , petitioner prays, among others, that after due proceedings, judgment be rendered: (a) making and declaring as permanent the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order previously issued against respondent Martinez inhibiting/restraining him from sitting or participating in the proceedings in the BIR case; (b) declaring the assailed Orders null and void and setting them aside; and (c) ordering/commanding respondents Martinez or BIR to allow petitioner's Exhibits "3-a", "6", "7", "9", and Annexes "1" and "2" appended to her Exhibit "8" listed in Pre-Trial Conference Brief of Petitioner as respondent in the BIR case. 61 On the other hand, respondents Martinez and BIR pray for the dismissal of the petitions. 62 In like manner, respondents Carandang and Cabras (hereinafter as respondent Ombudsman) prayed that the Petition be dismissed and the 22 August 2013 Resolution and 22 November 2013 Notice of Dismissal in IC-OC-13-1584 of the Office of the Ombudsman be affirmed. 63 THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS In CA-G.R. SP No. 133735 , petitioner's arguments are as follows: 1. The assailed Resolution and Notice of Dismissal are contrary to facts and law and are, therefore, null and void. 64 2. The Overall Deputy Ombudsman Carandang, in dismissing the complaint outright and without conducting the requisite inquiry, knowingly, completely and conveniently disregard (sic) the basic requirement of due process and denied herein petitioner-complainant of the opportunity to be heard of her legitimate grievances against respondent Martinez. 65 3. The Assistant Ombudsman Cabras, in stating in the Notice of Dismissal: "Complainant has an adequate remedy in another quasi-judicial body" and "No Motion for Reconsideration shall be entertained", knowingly and completely disregarded the fact that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officials is not exclusive, but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agency of the government in relation to the offense charged. ( Lacson vs. Executive Secretary , 649 SCRA 142) If she is referring to the procedural remedy of assailing the correctness of the questioned Order of the respondent Martinez in the BIR case against the complainant, this is neither her concern nor of the Ombudsman. 66 4. The assailed Resolution and Notice of Dismissal have not complied with the proscription of the Constitution and the Rules of Court that "No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." (Article VIII, Section 14, Constitution; Rule 36, Section 1, Rules of Court and Rule 120, Section 1, Rules of Court). 67 In CA-G.R. SP No. 134068 , petitioner's arguments are as follows: 1. The respondents Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolution and Notice of Dismissal. 68 2. The said Resolution and Notice of Dismissal are patently null and void and violated the rights of the petitioner to due process of law. 69 3. The assailed Resolution and Notice of Dismissal have not complied with the proscription of the Constitution and the Rules of Court that "No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based." (Article VIII, Section 14, Constitution; Rule 36, Section 1, Rules of Court and Rule 120, Section 1, Rules of Court). No facts and law were stated as bases thereof. 70 In CA-G.R. SP No. 134238 , petitioner's arguments are as follows: 1. The assailed Orders were issued by respondent Martinez and consequently, by the respondent BIR, with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction rendering them null and void. 71 2. The assailed Orders are contrary to law and applicable rules and are, therefore, patently null and void. 72 3. The assailed Orders violate the rights of the petitioner to due process of law as respondent in the BIR case. 73 In their Memorandum , respondent Martinez and BIR's argued as follows: 1. The questioned Orders dated May 27, 2013 and September 9, 2013 became final and executory. The petitioner never appealed or questioned these Orders before the CSC. 74 2. The petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies available to her 75 Petitioner did not appeal to the CSC to question the Orders subject of the petition for certiorari and mandamus. This is a fatal omission which justifies the dismissal of her petition. 76 3. The Office of the Ombudsman did not commit any reversible error and did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed Alvaro's complaint. 77 4. The complainant is guilty of forum-shopping. The complainant never alleged in her Verification against non-forum shopping that she failed to elevate or challenge the questioned Orders to the Civil Service as administratively mandated by law. What she failed to get as a remedy from the CSC, because her failure to elevate to that office the questioned Orders, she is now trying to secure from the Court of Appeals. This constitutes "forum shopping". 78 AIDSTE In the same vein, respondent Ombudsman's arguments in their Memorandum are as follows: 1. Grave abuse of discretion cannot be ascribed on the Office of the Ombudsman for dismissing petitioner Divina P. Alvaro's complaint against respondent Efren Martinez, considering that the right of petitioner to due process was not violated. 79 2. The assailed Resolution and Notice of Dismissal complied with the proscription of the Constitution and the Rules of Court that "No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." 80 ISSUES A careful reading of the records in these three (3) consolidated cases would reveal that the petitioner essentially presents the following issues for the consideration of this Court, to wit: 1. Whether or not the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in CA-G.R. SP No. 134238 is the proper remedy to assail the Orders issued by the respondents in the course of the administrative proceedings? 2. Whether or not respondent Martinez acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders dated 27 May 2013 and 9 September 2013 in BIR-PAD Administrative Case No. 3090-13? 3. Whether the respondent Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed petitioner's complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB Case No. IC-OC-13-1584? RULING As to the first issue, We hold in the negative. The Petition for Certiorari is dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, a Petition for Certiorari may be availed of by an aggrieved party when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 81 SDAaTC In CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, petitioner avers that a direct resort to this Court is made because respondent Martinez' assailed orders will deprive petitioner of the right to present evidence in support of the defenses in the BIR case and will deny petitioner of a fair trial before an impartial magistrate. 82 Petitioner bolsters this argument on the theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action. On the other hand, respondent Martinez argued that petitioner did not exhaust administrative remedies available. Petitioner did not appeal to the CSC to question the Orders subject of petition for certiorari and mandamus. Thus, this is a fatal omission which justifies the dismissal of the petition. 83 Applicable to the case at bar is the 2011 BIR Revised Rules of Procedure in the Investigation/Hearing of Administrative Cases (BIR Rules of Procedure) which provides for remedies in the conduct of administrative proceedings before the BIR, as adopted from the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, to wit: " Section 1, Rule VII. Filing of motion for reconsideration. A party adversely affected by the decision may file a motion for reconsideration with the CIR within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be entertained." " Section 4, Rule VII. Filing of appeal. The decision of the CIR imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days' salary, may be appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC), within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. . . ." " Section 8, Rule VII. Petition for review with the Court of Appeals. A party may elevate a decision of the CSC before the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court." Likewise, the 2011 Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) provide for remedies of an aggrieved party in disciplinary cases, to wit: " Section 56, Rule 11. Motion for Reconsideration in Disciplinary Cases Filing The party adversely affected by the decision may file a motion for reconsideration with the disciplining authority who rendered the same within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. A motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration is not allowed." " Section 61, Rule 12. Appeal in Disciplinary Cases Filing Subject to Section 45 of this Rules, decisions of heads of departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days salary, may be appealed to the Commission within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. . . ." " Section 70, Rule 13. Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals. A party may elevate a decision of the Commission before the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court." Relative to the Preventive Suspension Order, Section 28, Rule 13 of the RRACCS provide for the remedy of appealing the Order of Preventive Suspension to the CSC, to wit: " Section 28. Remedies from the Order of Preventive Suspension. The respondent may file an appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. Pending appeal, the same shall be executory. A motion for reconsideration from the order of preventive suspension shall not be allowed." From the foregoing, it is clear that the petitioner had a plain, speedy and adequate remedy before she may file the petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The recourse open to the petitioner was to appeal the decision of the BIR to the CSC, and should their appeal be denied, to assail the denial in this Court through the remedy warranted under the law. Well settled is the rule that before a party may seek the intervention of the courts, he should first avail of all the means afforded by administrative processes. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery is still available, with a procedure prescribed pursuant to law for an administrative officer to decide the controversy, a party should first exhaust such remedy before resorting to the courts. 84 In the same vein, where an appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for certiorari will not be entertained. The remedies of appeal and certiorari being mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Thus, where an appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion. 85 In the case of Delos Reyes, et al. vs. Flores, et al. , 86 the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the petition because of the petitioner's failure to exhaust administrative remedies available from the dismissal of her petition for relief. In applying the foregoing, the respondent was correct in declaring that, since petitioner did not appeal to the CSC to question the orders, the petition for certiorari should be dismissed. acEHCD Accordingly, We resolve to dismiss the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 134238 for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Administrative proceedings are conducted without strict recourse to technical rules of procedure and evidence. In its 7 May 2013 Order , 87 respondent Martinez reiterated that as a requirement of the hearing body, the parties were urged to be fair and honest in their dealings, by limiting, to the extent possible, issues being raised on the ground of technicality because the hearing body is not strictly bound by the technical rules of procedure. 88 The procedure in administrative cases is governed by CSC Resolution No. 99-1936 89 and specifically Section 4, Rule IV 90 of the BIR Rules of Procedure which provides that Hearing officers shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence where the Rules of Court are being applied only in suppletory character. Having settled the procedural issues, we resolve the primordial issue of whether or not respondent Martinez acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders dated 27 May 2013 and 9 September 2013 which addressed the following issues: (a) whether or not the preventive suspension order against petitioner is legal; and (b) whether or not the disallowance of petitioner's exhibits in the Pre-Trial Conference Brief was contrary to law and rules. We hold in the negative. The issuance of the preventive suspension order was proper for being in accordance with Section 2, Rule IV of the BIR Rules of Procedure. In response to the issue raised by petitioner regarding the legality of her preventive suspension, respondent Martinez reiterated its 27 May (2013) Order when it resolved not to grant the prayer of petitioner that her preventive suspension be lifted, reasoning in this wise: " . . . In the said Order, we pointed out that the disciplining authority may preventively suspend a subordinate officer or employee if the charge against such officer and employee involves, among others, Grave Misconduct or Serious Dishonesty ." 91 In this case, petitioner was charged with Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty. Section 2, Rule IV 92 of the BIR Rules of Procedure provides for the power of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to preventively suspend the respondent pending an investigation. Thus, the order of preventive suspension issued against petitioner was proper for the same is authorized by the BIR Rules of Procedure and RRACCS. The proper remedy to lift the preventive suspension order is to appeal before the CSC. On the issue of the illegality of the preventive suspension order, petitioner averred that since the preventive suspension has already been served, the issue of the validity of the same shall be litigated in the main case for purposes of payment of back wages and other benefits. 93 Respondent Martinez cited Section 25, Rule 7 94 of the RRACCS when it reasoned that " it is not enough that an employee is exonerated of the charges against him, but it should be proven that his suspension must be unjustified, hence, we find no cogent reason that the matter should be litigated in the main case ." 95 Furthermore, respondent Martinez was correct in ruling that the proper forum to question the validity of the preventive suspension order is lodged with the CSC. Section 28, Rule 7 96 of the RRACCS provides that the remedy to lift the preventive suspension order is to perfect an appeal to the CSC within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. No grave abuse of discretion can be imputed to respondent Martinez when he ruled on the disallowance of petitioner's exhibits. Respondent Martinez disallowed the marking of Exhibits "3-a", "6", "7", "9" and Annexes "1" and "2" appended to Exhibit "8" 97 during the Pre-Trial Conference for the reason that the complaint can not be withdrawn based on the whims and caprices of the complainants. Petitioner avers that these exhibits were simply listed in her Pre-Trial Conference Brief for proper marking and for the purpose of pre-trial conference. Thus, the aforestated ruling is premature and is a pre-judgment of the case adverse to petitioner, clearly showing bias of respondent Martinez in favor of complainant BIR and a malicious denial of petitioner's rights to due process of law. 98 SDHTEC Respondent, on the other hand, anchors its disallowance of petitioner's exhibits citing thereon Section 13, Rule 3 99 of the RRACCS. It argued that the denial of the exhibits was justified since it is only the Prosecutor who could cause the withdrawal/dismissal of the complaint. Respondent cited the case of Florendo vs. Enrile (239 SCRA 22) which stated that, " proceedings against a public officer or employee for his misconduct, malfeasance or misfeasance cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the complainants and should not depend on their whims and caprices since the complainants are, in real sense only witnesses therein ." 100 This Court finds the disallowance of exhibits proper, as mandated by Section 1, Rule 6 of the BIR Rules of Procedure, to wit: "Sec. 1. Nature of proceedings; Hearing Officer(s). The formal investigation shall be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the truth without necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings. The Hearing Officer(s) shall personally conduct the hearing. He/they shall take full control of the proceedings. He/they may examine the parties and witnesses freely with respect to the matters at issue, but shall limit the questions on points of facts and law involved in the case. He/they shall also limit the presentation of evidence by the parties only on matters relevant and material to the issues and necessary for a just, expeditious, and inexpensive disposition of the case . . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Accordingly, Section 5 Rule 6 101 of the BIR Rules of Procedure reinforces the power of the Hearing Officer to issue orders during the hearing of the case. Thus, respondent correctly followed procedure in denying the allowance of the exhibits which he deemed as not material or relevant to the administrative case against petitioner. No grave abuse of discretion can, therefore, be imputed to respondent who acted in accordance with the law and rules. The Urgent Motion to Withdraw Complaint and the Special Power of Attorney filed by Mercader are defective in form and substance, thus they cannot be admitted. In its 8 March 2013 Order , 102 respondent Martinez ruled on the Urgent Motion to Withdraw Complaint and All Its Attachments, in this wise: HSAcaE "Upon our painstaking scrutiny, we found that said motion did not satisfy the required form and substance to make the same legally and validly acceptable to this hearing body . . ." . 103 In the said Order, respondent Martinez found the Special Power of Attorney 104 (SPA) executed by Mercader to be defective, to wit: "The hearing body finds that there is nothing in the said SPA a reference about the authority of the agent or in this case, Atty. Mercader, the specific power to withdraw the subject complaint." 105 A perusal of the SPA would reveal that under paragraph 3 thereof, the power of Atty. Mercader to initiate action, legal or otherwise, does not comprehend that he is vested with authority to withdraw the case. The same was confirmed by Atty. Mercader himself when he was asked by the Hearing Body to confirm that the power to withdraw complaint does not form part of paragraphs 3 and 5 of the SPA. 106 Furthermore, paragraph 4 of the Urgent Motion to Withdraw Complaint , filed by Atty. Mercader, states the reason for the withdrawal of Mercader, to wit: ". . . the instant complaint was made in haste and was the result of an honest mistake and misapprehension of facts." 107 Respondent Martinez found the statement to be in such a clear language that the same is coming from the complainant Maribel herself. Therefore, it is subject to the Hearsay Rule. In the aforementioned order, respondent Martinez ruled in this wise: ". . . this hearing body observed that it is subject to the Hearsay Rule on Evidence, which Atty. Mercader likewise confirmed when asked by this representation. Until and unless Maribel is presented personally before us so that we could be given the opportunity to validate this claim, we cannot accept the same for being hearsay, which is violative of the Hearsay Rule on Evidence." 108 Settled is the rule that while rules of procedure do not strictly apply to administrative cases as long as defendant's right to due process is not violated, its liberal application in administrative cases does not allow admission of hearsay evidence, i.e. , affidavits not identified by affiants, as this would violate the constitutional right of petitioner to due process and his substantive right not to be adjudged guilty on the basis of hearsay evidence. 109 In the instant case, the Urgent Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed by Atty. Mercader was in a clear language that it was in fact made to appear that Maribel Mercader was the one who drafted the same. Thus, the same is inadmissible under the hearsay rule. More importantly, the Supreme Court in Glanie Flores, et al. vs. Myrna S. Lofranco , 110 declared that affidavits are classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants statements, which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by (t)he one writing them. For this reason, the Court added, that affidavits are generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiant themselves are placed on the witness stand to testify the(r)eon. AScHCD On another mater, in its 7 May 2013 Order , respondent Martinez reiterated that the Urgent Motion to Withdraw Complaint and Omnibus Motion filed by Mercader can be considered as a veiled form of pressure. The same was found to be suspicious in character since she stated in her motion that she is presently staying in Spain, with no specific address given. She did not even bother to attach a photocopy of the portion of her passport to show that she was indeed in the Philippines or in Baguio for a visit. 111 Accordingly, with reference to the Manifestation and Omnibus Motion filed by petitioner, it appears that she was presently staying in Spain at the time of its execution. As a rule, documents that are executed, signed or issued within the jurisdiction of another state and intended to be used or presented in the Philippines must bear a consular notarization or authentication 112 in order for such documents to be accorded legal effect in the Philippines. Each document acknowledged or authenticated 113 should bear the seal of the Embassy and the signature of the authenticating officer. It is stated in the Manifestation and Omnibus Motion filed by Mercader on 18 April 2013 that Mercader is presently staying in Spain, 114 a fact which was not supported by any other proof. In view of that, this Court finds that respondent Martinez was correct in noting that the motions filed by Mercader entertains doubt as to whether the said document were in fact signed by her and that she attests to the truth and veracity of the contents thereof. The non-compliance with the aforestated rule regarding authentication of documents made abroad and the absence of any other proof to validate that she participated in the act of its execution would lead to a conclusion that the documents may appear to be fabricated. It is vital that the documents subject of any legal proceedings be authenticated or at least certified to be true and correct, otherwise, they should not be considered. Further, it was revealed that during the time of the execution of the said motion, the prosecutor denied having given Mercader the authority to file said Motion on her own. In fact, respondent Martinez found that the act of Mercader in declaring her absolute lack of interest to prosecute and pursue all complaints against petitioner is tantamount to suppressing the truth and pieces of evidence. Such is an act of withholding knowledge or information involving a particular offense or violation which should not be countenanced. Hence, we agree with respondent Martinez when he did not accept the Omnibus Motion, and ruled in this wise: "Justice demands that once a complaint has been filed, it cannot anymore be withdrawn especially if the same is done without the concurrence of the prosecutor and absence of legal and valid grounds. In view of the said defects, we cannot uphold the legality and validity of the Omnibus Motion filed by Ms. Mercader. . . . " 115 Withdrawal of the complaint would not result in outright dismissal or absolve the person complained of from administrative liability. In relation to her administrative liability, petitioner argued that there is grave abuse of discretion in disallowing the exhibits presented by her as evidence. Averring that the same may warrant a dismissal of the administrative charge against her. Petitioner further adds that upon the sworn declaration of Mercader, through her attorney-in-fact and counsel, there has been no factual and legal basis from the beginning to warrant the filing of the complaint. Thus, the complaint and all its attachments should be declared withdrawn and the formal charge should be outrightly dismissed. 116 We do not agree with the petitioner. It was not the letter-complaint filed by Mercader that commenced the administrative proceedings against petitioner. Instead, it was the formal charge filed by Commissioner of Internal Revenue by the Deputy Commissioner of the Legal and Inspection Group. The letter-complaint merely triggered the BIR's fact-finding investigation. In its 7 May 2013 Order , 117 respondent Martinez reiterated the fact that a prima facie case was established against the petitioner as a result of the conduct of investigation or inquiry by the investigating body. 118 Thereafter, a Formal Charge was filed against the Respondent. Considering that the complaint was initiated by the proper disciplining authority, then the latter should be the one who has the authority to withdraw the complaint against the petitioner. In fact, in the Comment 119 filed by respondent, it averred that, "Prosecutor Rominito David had opposed the withdrawal of the complaint arguing that it is the responsibility of the state to institute disciplinary actions whether criminally or administratively against revenue officials and employees who violate(s) the penal or administrative laws of the state." 120 The Supreme Court held in the case of Carlito C. Encinas vs. PO1 Alfredo P. Agustin, Jr. and PO1 Joel S. Caubang 121 that "a complaint for malfeasance or misfeasance against a public servant of whatever rank cannot be withdrawn at any time for whatever reason by a complainant, as a withdrawal would be 'anathema to the preservation of the faith and confidence of the citizenry in their government, its agencies and instrumentalities'. Administrative proceedings 'should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices of complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein.'" 122 Evidently, in the Orders issued by respondent Martinez, the basis for the disallowance of the exhibits was founded on the appreciation of the facts and law attendant to the case. First , in its 8 March 2013 Order , 123 it ruled that: "The ultimate complainant in the case before us is the BIR and not Maribel after it was established that a prima facie case exist against respondent Divina P. Alvaro. . . . Hence, it is only the BIR that can withdraw the formal charge filed against respondent." 124 Second , in its 7 May 2013 Order , 125 it ruled that: ". . . during the time of the execution of the said motion, the prosecutor denied having given Ms. Mercader the authority to file said Motion on her own. . . . Justice demands that once a complaint has been filed, it cannot anymore be withdrawn especially if the same is done without the concurrence of the prosecutor and absence of legal and valid grounds." 126 Third , in its 27 May 2013 Order , 127 it stated that: "Section 13, Rule 3 of the RRACCS explicitly provides that the withdrawal of the complaint does not result in its outright dismissal nor discharge the person complained of from any administrative liability. Where there is obvious truth or merit to the allegation in the complaint or where there is documentary evidence that would tend to prove the guilt of the person/s complained of, the same should be given due course." 128 Moreover, withdrawal of the complaint will not free petitioner from administrative liability, particularly because administrative proceedings are imbued with public interest, public office being a public trust. As was held in the case of Celfred P. Flores vs. Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia , 129 "[t]he withdrawal of the complaint does not free the respondent from liability as the purpose of an administrative proceeding is to protect the public service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office i[s] a public trust. The withdrawal of the complaint or the execution of an affidavit of desistance does not automatically result in the dismissal of the administrative case" . The foregoing dicta was reiterated in Johnny Gomez and Mar Guidote for Sabino S. Ramos vs. Rodolfo A. Concepcion , 130 where the Court added that, "[t]he apparent lack of interest of herein complainant to pursue the matter will not be enough to warrant the dismissal of the case since the records on hand could amply show the culpability of respondent for which he should be held administratively liable" . Applying the same to the case at bench, petitioner cannot argue that the withdrawal of the complaint is more than sufficient to cause the dismissal of the BIR case against her. In fact, in its 8 March 2013 Order , respondent Martinez reiterated that even if the SPA of Maribel and the Urgent Motion filed by Atty. Mercader were to be accepted, the success or failure of the case is not dependent solely on the testimony of or evidence to be given by or extracted from Maribel. 131 In the same vein, stated in its 9 September 2013 Order, petitioner was entitled to present her evidence and witnesses to prove her innocence and not merely on the exhibits offered by Mercader. 132 Therefore, We find that the withdrawal of the complaint by Mercader in this case would not result in the outright dismissal or absolve the petitioner from administrative liability. Petitioner was afforded her right to due process. Petitioner imputes bias on the part of respondent Martinez when it ruled on the disallowance of the exhibits for being premature and a prejudgment of the case. Petitioner cites the case of Gomez vs. Alcantara (579 SCRA 472) and Barbieto vs. CA (604 SCRA 825), wherein the right to due process was consistently upheld as a safeguard of one's opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his claim or defense. We do not agree with petitioner that she was denied of her right to due process. Records would reveal that the petitioner was given an opportunity to vent her side, to wit: First , the hearing body conducted a fact-finding investigation prior to the issuance of a Formal Charge. In the respondent's Comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, it was confirmed that the BIR acted upon the complaint of Mercader by conducting a preliminary investigation or a fact-finding investigation to determine whether or not a prima facie case exist to warrant the filing of a formal charge against the Petitioner. Thereafter, Special Investigator Eden M. Robrigado forwarded his findings and recommendations to the Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Legal and Inspection Group for evaluation. 133 Second , petitioner was given an opportunity to know the charges and evidence presented against her during the hearing. The hearing body received and conducted hearings on the motions and pleadings filed by the petitioner and Mercader, namely: Urgent Motion to Withdraw Complaint, Urgent Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order, Answer to the Formal Charge, Petitioner's Pre-Trial Conference Brief, and Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration/Inhibition/Cancellation of Hearing. TAIaHE Third , respondent acted upon the motions and pleadings filed by its Orders dated 8 March 2013, 134 7 May 2013, 135 27 May 2013, 136 and 9 September 2013. 137 In its 8 March 2013 Order, it was stated, to wit: ". . . After hearing all the respective arguments of the parties and the pleadings submitted, we shall now resolve the same . . . ." 138 Further, respondent assured that the formal hearing was held to allow petitioner to present her case and for the hearing body to decide on the same judiciously, stating that: ". . . if respondent has a good case and I encourage her to submit herself to a formal hearing and present her evidence accordingly, she shall be given her day in court and we shall uphold her right to an impartial hearing as part of due process." 139 Fourth , in its assailed 9 September 2013 Order, respondent Martinez gave the petitioner sufficient time to rely on the strength of her own pieces of evidence, thus: ". . . it is urged that the parties submit their position paper/memorandum and submit the case for resolution without further hearings, pursuant to Section 31, Rule 8 140 of the RRACCS . . ." 141 It can be gleaned from the foregoing that respondent Martinez afforded due process to petitioner. Respondent Martinez correctly followed the BIR Rules of Procedure in conducting a fact-finding investigation, issuing a formal charge, as well as conducting hearings on the motion and pleadings filed by the parties. Thus, it is evident that petitioner was afforded the chance to be heard on basis of the hearings which the respondent was conducting in the course of the administrative proceedings against petitioner. It cannot be denied that petitioner's argument on lack of due process was anchored mainly on the denial of the documents she seeks to be admitted as a cause for the dismissal of the complaint against her. However, respondent ruled on the said documents per its Orders and reasoned against its allowance in accordance with law and jurisprudence. Basic is the rule that in administrative proceedings, the essence of ample opportunity to be heard is the chance to explain one's side. Ample opportunity to be heard means any meaningful opportunity, verbal or written, given to the employee to answer the charges against him and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing or conference or some other fair, just and reasonable way. 142 In this case, petitioner was evidently afforded every opportunity to be heard, thus, she cannot claim that she was denied her right of due process. It is legal and valid for respondent Martinez to declare the BIR case submitted for decision despite the pendency of the petition. In its Motion for Reconsideration 143 in CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, petitioner argued that the Order of respondent Martinez declaring that the BIR case was deemed submitted for decision, was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and must be declared null and void together with the questioned Orders assailed in her petition. 144 ICHDca Petitioner alleges that respondent Martinez deprived petitioner's right to due process when he proceeded with the hearing scheduled on February 18-21, 2014 despite the improper service of the Notice of Hearing 145 to her counsel and the justifying reasons stated in her Manifestation and Motion 146 dated 10 February 2014. We do not agree with the petitioner. First , petitioner assails the service of the Notice of Hearing and the continuance of the scheduled 19 February 2014 hearing despite her filing of a Manifestation and Motion stating the unavailability of petitioner and her counsel on the scheduled hearing date. Records show that in the 9 September 2013 Order of respondent Martinez, hearings were scheduled on February 18-21, 2014. 147 The said Order was admitted to be received by the petitioner on 27 January 2014 as stated in her Petition 148 and in her Urgent Motion. 149 Thus, it is clear that as early as 27 January 2014 at the time of receipt of the Order, petitioner was notified of the hearing set on February 18-21, 2014. But, instead, waited until 10 February 2014 to file the Manifestation and Motion, that moved for the cancellation of the hearing, albeit, for the second time. Second , it is to be noted that petitioner has already moved for the cancellation of the hearing dated 22 July 2013 before the respondent Martinez. 150 Consequently, in its Order dated 9 September 2013, respondent Martinez declared that "the scheduled hearing was previously cancelled since the petitioner made an assumption that her motion would be granted and thus she opted not to appear during the July 22, 2013 hearing. In view thereof, the succeeding hearings were cancelled." 151 In the Manifestation and Motion of the petitioner, it is apparent that she is moving for the cancellation of the scheduled hearing on February 18-21, 2014 for the second time. Under the BIR Rules of Procedure, in administrative disciplinary cases, schedule of hearings previously set shall be strictly followed without further notice. The pertinent provisions of the rules are as follows: "Rule VI. Section 7. Continuous hearing until terminated; Postponement. Hearings shall be conducted on the hearing dates set by the Hearing Officer or as agreed upon during the pre-hearing conference. The parties, their counsels and witnesses, if any, shall be given notice of at least five (5) days before the first scheduled hearing specifying the time, date and place of the said hearing and subsequent hearings. Thereafter, the schedule of hearings previously set shall be strictly followed without further notice. A party may be granted only two (2) postponements upon oral or written requests. No further postponement shall be allowed. . . ." cDHAES Petitioner further avers that it is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for respondent Martinez to declare, by its Order, the BIR case submitted for decision because the said case is still at the pre-trial stage and there is yet no pre-trial order duly and validly issued. 152 Petitioner contends that the issue on the validity of this order is one purely of law, whether or not it is legal and valid for him to declare the BIR case submitted for decision despite the pendency of the petition filed on 18 February 2014. 153 We are not convinced. Petitioner cannot argue that this petition will be rendered moot, academic and ineffectual by the continuation of the administrative proceedings before respondent Martinez. It is settled that rules of procedure are, as a matter of course, construed liberally in proceedings before administrative bodies. 154 Administrative bodies are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in the courts of law. 155 Rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as rules of procedure are used only to help secure and not to override substantial justice. 156 Furthermore, the law is categorical with regard to the continuation of the principal case despite the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Under Section 7 of Rule 65, it is provided that, ". . . The petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case, unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued, enjoining the public respondent from further proceeding with the case." Applying the same, We find that no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the imputed acts of respondent Martinez. The Office of the Ombudsman was correct in dismissing petitioner's complaint. Petitioner avers that the same petition for certiorari lies in this case because the respondents Ombudsman summarily dismissed the criminal complaint of petitioner without conducting preliminary investigation and despite clear existence of probable cause that the offense charged have been committed and that respondent Martinez is probably guilty thereof. 157 We do not find merit in petitioner's arguments. A careful reading of the Resolution dated 22 August 2013 issued by respondent Ombudsman would reveal that the Office of the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the complaint filed by petitioner. First , the respondent Ombudsman was correct when it found that the complaint filed by the petitioner was solely anchored on respondent Martinez' issuance of alleged unjust and unimpartial BIR-PAD Orders, and, in essence, merely seeks the review thereof, albeit, in the guise of filing the administrative and criminal charges. 158 In the case at bench, a perusal of the issues submitted reveals that the crux of the controversy revolves around the alleged acts respondent Martinez in BIR-PAD Administrative Case No. 3090-13 in issuing Orders during the course of the proceedings in the administrative case before it. Petitioner alleges that respondent Martinez committed legal errors in arriving at his findings and conclusions in his Orders. Hence, petitioner posits that there was no basis for the respondent Ombudsman to dismiss its complaint, since it is clear that respondent Martinez denied petitioner's motions as an "obvious premeditated design to dismiss her from service." 159 We concur with the observation of the respondent Ombudsman that the BIR-PAD proceedings are far from its conclusion as the same is only in its formal investigation stage. As it is, it would only be proper to let the BIR proceed with its administrative hearings unimpeded by outside interference. 160 Hence, in applying by analogy the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party may seek the intervention of the court, she should first avail of all the means afforded her by administrative processes. The same doctrine likewise gives the administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of the case. Significantly, in disposing of the complaint filed by the petitioner, the Office of the Ombudsman noted that the BIR should be allowed to proceed in hearing the case against petitioner without outside interference which exactly what the Office of the Ombudsman did in the instant case considering the availability of remedies to petitioner other than the filing with the Office of the Ombudsman of a complaint against the hearing officer. 161 By reason of the foregoing, it is clear that petitioner has to exhaust first her administrative remedies before she seeks the intervention of the courts. Second , the allegations of petitioner that the BIR-PAD Orders issued by respondent Martinez were adverse to her was correctly found by the respondent Ombudsman to be insufficient, in itself, to support the allegations of "undue injury", "serious misconduct", "serious dishonesty" and "violation of RA 6713". 162 A careful evaluation of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 134068 filed against respondent Ombudsman warrants the conclusion that it presents another instance which calls for application of the general rule of non-interference. Petitioners cannot fault the Ombudsman for finding that, ". . . by merely alluding to the fact that the BIR-PAD Orders issued by the hearing panel were adverse to her is insufficient, in itself, to support her allegations . . . . 163 We sustain respondent Ombudsman's pronouncement that the mere fact that petitioner's motions were not granted on several occasions, does not necessarily point to an unimpartial hearing panel. 164 ASEcHI The petitioner's arguments are merely conjectures bereft of any proof. There was no showing that there is any irregularity in the proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman. It has been said that, ". . . great respect must be accorded to the OMB's exercise of its constitutionally mandated functions. Unless clearly shown to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion, these judgments are not interfered with." 165 Manifestly, the complaint was not dismissed not because the charges were unfounded, but because of prevailing doctrines, the law and existing jurisprudence which justify the dismissal of her complaint. Third , the respondent Ombudsman correctly observed that respondent Martinez is not covered by Articles 204 and 206 of the Revised Penal Code because he is not a judge of a regular court. Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized under Article 204 166 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established in this jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. 167 The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said judgment is unjust. 168 Clearly, therefore, in order to hold a judge liable, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment remains the law. 169 In the case at bench, the assailed Orders dated 27 May 2013 and 9 September 2013 issued by respondent Martinez as Head of the BIR Hearing Panel, was made during the conduct of the Formal Hearing/Investigation in BIR-PAD Administrative Case No. 3090-13. Section 1, Rule VI 170 of the BIR Rules of Procedure provides for the nature of proceedings before the Hearing Panel of the BIR. Hence, since the assailed Orders were issued in pursuance to the conduct of a formal investigation, the same proceeding not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence 171 as prescribed by the Rules of Court. There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. It was held in Alforte v. Santos 172 that even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an accused, she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint. Fourth , We agree with the pronouncement of the Office of the Ombudsman that it may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes the complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body. It is provided under Section 20 (1) of RA 6770, 173 to wit: "Section 20. Exceptions. The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that: (1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body; (2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman; (3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith; (4) The complaint has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or (5) The complaint was filed after one (1) year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of." (Emphasis supplied.) In the same vein, as a matter of procedure, Section 4, Rule III 174 of Administrative Order No. 07, 175 series of 1990, provides as follows: "Section 4. Evaluation. Upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall be evaluated to determine whether the same may be: a) dismissed outright for any of the grounds stated under Section 20 of RA 6770, provided, however, that the dismissal thereof is not mandatory and shall be discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman concerned; b) treated as a grievance/request for assistance which may be referred to the Public Assistance Bureau, this Office, for appropriate action under Section 2, Rule IV of this Rules; c) referred to other disciplinary authorities under paragraph 2, Section 23, RA 6770 for the taking of the appropriate administrative proceedings; d) referred to the appropriate office/agency or official for the conduct of further fact-finding investigation; or e) docketed as an administrative case for the purpose of administrative adjudication by the Office of the Ombudsman." (Emphasis supplied.) Correspondingly, Section 5 (b), Rule III of the same Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides, that "if the hearing officer finds no sufficient cause to warrant further proceedings on the basis of the affidavits and other evidence submitted by the parties, the complaint may be dismissed. . . ." In the case at bench, We find merit in respondent Carandang's finding that, "applying by analogy the doctrine of administrative remedies, before a party may seek the intervention of the court, she should first avail of all the means afforded her by administrative processes . . . As it is, it would only be proper to let the BIR proceed with its administrative hearings unimpeded by outside interference." 176 Manifestly, the respondent Ombudsman was correct in dismissing the complaint after finding that the petitioner has to exhaust first her administrative remedies before she seeks the intervention of the court. It has been consistently held that the Court's policy is to maintain non-interference in the determination of the Ombudsman of the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the exercise of such discretion. As enunciated in the case of Manuel C. Roxas and Ahmed S. Nacpil vs. Hon. Conrado M. Vasquez , 177 to wit: "This observed policy is based not only on respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of this Court will be seriously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped with cases if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant." Furthermore, it is well-settled that the Court will not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of whether or not probable cause exists except when it commits grave abuse of discretion. 178 Grave abuse of discretion exists where a power is exercised in an arbitrary, capricious whimsical or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by, or in contemplation of law. 179 This policy being based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. The Constitution and RA 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989) grants the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers that is virtually free from executive, legislative or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. 180 Conformably then with Section 2, Rule II 181 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, the Investigating Officer may recommend the outright dismissal of a complaint if he finds the same devoid of merit. 182 That is exactly what happened in this case. Thus, no abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse, may be attributed to the respondent Ombudsman. cSaATC In view of the foregoing, there is indeed nothing from the assailed Resolution dated 22 August 2013 that would show any taint of abuse of discretion by the Office of the Ombudsman. WHEREFORE , premises considered, this Court RESOLVES as follows: (1) The Petition for Review under Rule 43 in CA-G.R. SP No. 133735 is DISMISSED . The Resolution dated 22 August 2013 issued by respondent Overall Deputy Ombudsman Melchor Arthur H. Carandang and the Notice of Dismissal dated 22 November 2013 issued by respondent Assistant Ombudsman Leilanie Bernadette C. Cabras are AFFIRMED . (2) The Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 in CA-G.R. SP No. 134068 is DISMISSED . The Resolution dated 22 August 2013 issued by respondent Overall Deputy Ombudsman Melchor Arthur H. Carandang and the Notice of Dismissal dated 22 November 2013 issued by respondent Assistant Ombudsman Leilanie Bernadette C. Cabras are AFFIRMED . (3) The Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus under Rule 65 in CA-G.R. SP No. 134238 is DISMISSED . The Order dated 27 May 2013 and Order dated 9 September 2013 issued by respondent Efren P. Martinez are AFFIRMED . With treble costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. Dimaampao and Quijano-Padilla, * JJ., concur. Footnotes * Vice Justice Franchito N. Diamante per Raffle dated 27 August 2015. 1. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 8-25. The Petition for Review dated 24 January 2014 was filed through registered mail on 30 January 2014. 2. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 74-75; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 72-73. 3. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 76; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 74. 4. CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 3-22. The Petition [Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure] dated 10 February 2014 was filed through registered mail on 18 February 2014. 5. Supra note 2. 6. Supra note 3. 7. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 3-15. The Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus [With Urgent Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order] dated 18 February 2014, was filed through registered mail on 27 February 2014. 8. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 34-37; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 32-34; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 53-56. 9. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 63-67. 10. For Grave Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty. 11. For: (1) Unknowingly rendering Unjust Judgment (Article 204, Revised Penal Code) or Unjust Interlocutory Order (Article 206, Revised Penal Code); (2) Violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 3 (e) of R.A. 3019, 2 counts; (3) Violation of Section 4 of R.A. 6713; (4) Serious Misconduct; and (5) Grave abuse of authority. 12. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 20-21. 13. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 22. 14. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 18-19. 15. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 52-53, 68-69; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 50-51, 66-67; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 28-29, 123-124. 16. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 60-67; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 58-65; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 33-40. 17. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 23-27. 18. Annex "1" Urgent Motion to Withdraw Complaint and Annex "2" Urgent Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order. 19. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 46-51; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 44-49; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 69-73. 20. Supra note 15 and note 16. 21. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 51; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 49; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 73. 22. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 72-73; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 70-71; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 95-96. "Manifestation and Omnibus Motion, Confirmation and Ratification of Authority of Atty. Arturo L. Mercader and the Urgent Motion to Withdraw Complaint and All Its Attachments filed by him, and Grant of Authority to Atty. Arturo Mercader to do and Perform all Acts Relative to the Above-Entitled Case, and Revocation of All Authorities of Atty. George Florendo and Withdrawal of All Pleadings and Papers Filed by Him." 23. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 54-57; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 52-55; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 91-93. 24. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 55; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 53; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 92. 25. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 42-45 for petitioner's Pre-Trial Conference Brief, and Rollo , pp. 38-41 for respondent's Pre-Trial Conference Brief; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 40-43 for petitioner's Pre-Trial Conference Brief and Rollo , pp. 36-39 for respondent's Pre-Trial Conference Brief; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 49-52 for petitioner's Pre-Trial Conference Brief dated 7 May 2013, and Rollo , pp. 45-48 for respondent's Pre-Trial Conference Brief dated 21 May 2013. 26. Supra note 8. 27. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 58-59, 70-71; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 56-57, 68-69; CA-G.R. SP No 134238, Rollo , pp. 30-31. "Special Power of Authority with Revocation of Previous Authority" by Mercader dated 4 February 2012. 28. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 52-53, 68-69; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 50-51, 66-67; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 28-29, 123-124. "Urgent Motion to Withdraw Complaint and All Its Attachments" by Atty-in-Fact of Maribel Mercader, Atty. Lipata Mercader, dated 20 February 2013. 29. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 60-67; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 58-65; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 33-40. "Urgent Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order" by petitioner dated 20 February 2013. 30. Supra note 22. 31. Supra note 28. 32. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 32. "1st Indorsement" of the respondent submitting the Urgent Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order dated 20 February 2013. 33. Supra note 19. 34. Supra note 23. 35. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 35; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 33; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 54. 36. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 77-82; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 75-80; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 57-60. 37. Supra note 9. 38. Supra note 2. 39. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 74; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 72. 40. Supra note 3. 41. Supra note 1, CA-G.R. SP No. 133735. 42. Supra note 4, CA-G.R. SP No. 134068. 43. CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 93-98. 44. Supra note 7, CA-G.R. SP No. 134238. 45. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 159-165. Comment dated 16 May 2014 was filed via registered mail. 46. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 154-155. "Motion for Additional Time to Comment" dated 24 April 2014. 47. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 13. 48. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 176-182, 198-205. The "Urgent Motion Reiterating the Urgent Motion for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order in the Petition Filed on February 18, 2014 and Supplemental Petition [With Urgent Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction]" dated 24 March 2014 was filed through registered mail. 49. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 194-195, 217-218. The Order received by the petitioner on 21 March 2014 which deemed the BIR-PAD Administrative Case No. 3090-13 submitted for decision. 50. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 171-174. Resolution dated 18 August 2014 by Court of Appeals Twelfth (12th) Division with Hon. Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, Hon. Justice Elihu A. Ybaez, and Hon. Justice Carmelita S. Manahan as members. 51. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 220-238. The Motion for Reconsideration [Re: Resolution dated August 18, 2014] dated 19 September 2014 was filed through registered mail. 52. CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 108-109. Resolution dated 29 October 2014 by Court of Appeals Third (3rd) Division with Hon. Justice Ricardo R. Rosario, Hon. Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Hon. Justice Leoncia Real-Dimagiba as members. 53. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 243-245. Resolution dated 29 October 2014 by Court of Appeals Twelfth (12th) Division with Hon. Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, Hon. Justice Elihu A. Ybaez, and Hon. Justice Carmelita S. Manahan as members. 54. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 97. Resolution dated 13 November 2014 by Court of Appeals Special Twelfth (12th) Division with Hon. Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, Hon. Justice Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela, and Hon. Justice Carmelita S. Manahan as members. 55. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 118-180. The Consolidated Memorandum of the petitioner dated 7 January 2014 was filed through registered mail on 30 January 2015. 56. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 182-189. The Memorandum of respondent's Martinez and BIR dated 18 January 2014 was filed on 2 February 2015. 57. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 191-201. The Memorandum of respondents Ombudsman dated 21 January 2014 was filed through registered mail on 4 February 2015. 58. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 206-214. The Reply Memorandum of the petitioner dated 26 February 2014 was filed through registered mail on 10 March 2015. 59. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 421. 60. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 164. 61. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 177-178. 62. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 189. 63. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 199. 64. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 128. 65. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 140. 66. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 141. 67. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 142. 68. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 149. 69. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 150. 70. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 164. 71. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 170. 72. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 170. 73. Ibid. 74. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 187. 75. Ibid. 76. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 188. 77. Ibid. 78. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 188-189. 79. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 194. 80. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 198. 81. Section 1, Rule 65. Petition for Certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (Revised Rules of Court) . 82. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 6. 83. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 164. 84. National Power Corporation, Pablo V. Malixi and Members of the Board of Inquiry and Discipline vs. Court of Appeals, Ramon Arel, Lee Licup and Romy L. Fuentes , G.R. No. 137034, February 23, 2004 citing Bangus Fry Fisherfolk, et al. vs. Hon. Enrico Lanzanas, et al. , G.R. No. 131442, July 10, 2003. 85. Madrigal Transport, Inc. vs. Lapanday Holdings Corporation, et al. , G.R. No. 156067, August 11, 2004. 86. G.R. No. 168726, March 5, 2010. 87. Supra note 23. 88. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 55; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 53; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 92. 89. The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. 90. Section 4, Rule IV. Technical rules not applicable. The Hearing Officer and the Panel of Hearing Officers shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all administrative cases, disputes or controversies in the most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity. (a) Where there is no sufficient applicable provision under these rules, the procedural law as provided for in the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service shall be applied. (b) The Hearing Officer/Panel may adopt procedural law and jurisprudence generally applicable to administrative cases or any appropriate measure or procedure in any given situation or matter not covered by these rules. (c) The provisions of the Rules of Court shall apply in suppletory character." 91. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 34-35; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 32-33; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 53-54. 92. Sec. 2, Rule IV. Preventive Suspension Order (PSO). The CIR may preventively suspend the respondent pending an investigation for a period of not more than ninety (90) days if the charge against the respondent involves dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the charge against the respondent would warrant his removal from office. An order of preventive suspension may be issued to temporarily remove the respondent from the scene of his misfeasance or malfeasance and to preclude the possibility of exerting undue influence or pressure on the witnesses against him or tampering of documentary evidence on file with his office. In lieu of preventive suspension, for the same purpose, the CIR may re-assign the respondent to other units of the Bureau during the formal hearings/investigation. 93. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 63. 94. Section 25, Rule 7. Preventive Suspension, nature. Preventive suspension is not a penalty. It is designed merely as a measure of precaution so that the official or employee charged may be removed from the scene of his/her alleged misfeasance/malfeasance/nonfeasance while the same is being investigated. (RRACCS) 95. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 63-64. 96. Section 28. Remedies from the Order of Preventive Suspension. The respondent may file an appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. Pending appeal, the same shall be executory. A motion for reconsideration from the order of preventive suspension shall not be allowed. (RRACCS) 97. Rollo , p. 54. "With respect to Exhibits "3-a", "6", "7", "9" and Annexes "1" and "2" appended to Exhibit "8" of Respondent, they cannot be allowed as Respondent's exhibits since the Hearing Body already resolved to deny the Urgent Motion to Withdraw Complaint and All its Attachment, and Urgent Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order . . . per its Orders dated March 8, 2013 and May 7, 2013. In view thereof, said exhibits, together with the documents appended to the aforesaid Motions, are hereby declared not subject to opening anew by indirectly offering the same as Respondent's Exhibits, for all legal intents and purposes, otherwise, there will be no end to litigation." 98. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 11. 99. Section 13, Rule 3. "The withdrawal of the complaint does not result in its outright dismissal nor discharge the person complained of from any administrative liability. Where there is obvious truth or merit to the allegation in the complaint or where there is documentary evidence that would tend to prove the guilt of the person/s complained of, the same should be given due course." (Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 EO 292) 100. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 162. 101. Sec. 5, Rule VI. Orders or resolutions during the hearing of the case. The orders or resolutions of the Hearing Officer on any issue, question, matter, or incident raised before him during the hearing of the case shall be valid and effective. 102. Supra note 19. 103. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 46; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 44; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 69. 104. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 58-59, 70-71; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 56-57, 68-69; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 30-31. "Special Power of Authority with Revocation of Previous Authority" by Mercader dated 4 February 2012. 105. Supra note 102. 106. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 47; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 45; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 70. 107. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 52, 68; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 50, 66; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 28, 123. 108. Supra note 105. 109. Honorable Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo vs. Leopoldo F. Bungubung and Hon. Court of Appeals , G.R. No. 175201, 23 April 2008. 110. Glanie Flores, Sylvia Flores, Richard Flores, Timoteo Flores, Leonardo Flores, Virgilio Flores and Danny Flores vs. Myrna S. Lofranco, Clerk III, RTC, Br. 20, Digos City, Davao Sur , A.M. No. P-04-1914, 30 April 2008. 111. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 54-55; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 52-53; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 91-92. 112. www.philembassymadrid.com/authentication , 22 June 2015, 11:31 a.m. "The requirements for the authentication of documents in Spain are likewise provided for under the website of the Embassy of the Philippines, Madrid, Spain, to wit: (a) Original and photocopy of document duly legalized by the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and (b) Cash payment for processing fee of each document ." 113. http://www.philembassy.no/consular-services/authentication-notarials-and-legalization , 22 June 2015, 11:40 a.m. If an affidavit is made by a Filipino before a foreign Notary Public and the affidavit shall be used in the Philippines, the affidavit must be authenticated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the country where the affidavit was notarized. The affidavit shall in turn be authenticated by Philippine consular officials. 114. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 72; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 70; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 70. 115. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 55; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 53; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 92. 116. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 25. Petitioner's Answer to the Formal Charge. 117. Supra note 23. 118. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 54; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 52; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 91. 119. Supra note 45. 120. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 163. 121. G.R. No. 187317, April 11, 2013. 122. Supra , citing Guro vs. Doronio , 444 Phil. 827 (2003). 123. Supra note 19. 124. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 46, 47; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , pp. 44, 45; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 70, 71. 125. Supra note 23. 126. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 55; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 53; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 92. 127. Supra note 8. 128. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 36; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 34; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 55. 129. A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499, 6 October 2008. 130. A.M. No. P-98-1283, 9 May 2000. 131. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 47; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 45; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 70. 132. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 65. 133. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 160. 134. Supra note 19. Order of Respondent Martinez re: Urgent Motion to Withdraw Complaint filed by Mercader and Urgent Motion to Lift Preventive Suspension Order filed by petitioner. 135. Supra note 23. Order of Respondent Martinez re: Omnibus Motion of Mercader. 136. Supra note 8. Order of respondent Martinez re: Pre-Trial Conference Brief of herein petitioner Alvaro and herein respondent BIR. 137. Supra note 9. Order of respondent Martinez re: Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for Inhibition/and Motion for Cancellation of Hearing filed by petitioner. 138. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 46; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 44; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 69. 139. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 49; CA-G.R. SP No. 134068, Rollo , p. 47; CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 72. 140. Section 31. Submission of Position Paper/Memorandum. At any stage of the proceedings, the parties may, based on their mutual consent, submit position paper/memorandum and submit the case for resolution without any need for further hearings. 141. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 65. 142. Flordeliza Maria Reyes-Rayel vs. Philippine Luen Thai Holdings Corp./L & T International Group Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 174893, July 11, 2012, citing Perez vs. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company , G.R. No. 152048, April 7, 2009. 143. Supra note 51. 144. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 235-236. 145. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 200. 146. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 212-213. 147. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 66. 148. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 8. 149. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , pp. 177, 200. 150. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 211. 151. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 66. 152. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 203. 153. CA-G.R. SP No. 134238, Rollo , p. 204. 154. Leoncio A. Amadore vs. Alberto G. Romulo, Manuel B. Gaite and Presidential Anti-Graft Commission , G.R. No. 161608, 9 August 2005 citing Realty Exchange Venture Corporation vs. Sendino , G.R. No. 109703, 5 July 1994, 233 SCRA 665, 671; Police Commission vs. Lood , G.R. No. L-34637, 24 February 1984, 127 SCRA 757, 761. 155. Supra , citing Bantolino v. Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. , G.R. No. 153660, 10 June 2003, 403 SCRA 699, 704. 156. Supra , citing Department of Environment and Natural Resources vs. DENR Region 12 Employees , G.R. No. 149724, 19 August 2003, 409 SCRA 359, 365. 157. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 147. 158. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , pp. 72-73. 159. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 196. 160. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 73. 161. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 196. 162. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 73. 163. Ibid. 164. Ibid. 165. Emmanuel T. Pontejos vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Restituto Aquino , G.R. Nos. 158613-14, 22 February 2006. 166. Revised Penal Code, Art. 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification. 167. Atty. Manuel T. Ubarra vs. Judge Luzviminda Mapalad , A.M. No. MTJ-91-622, 22 March 1993, 220 SCRA 224, 234 citing Sta. Maria vs. Ubay , 87 SCRA 179 (1978); Rodrigo vs. Quijano , 79 SCRA 10 (1977); Pabalan vs. Guevarra , 74 SCRA 53 (1976); In re: Rafael C. Climaco , 55 SCRA 107, 119 (1974); and Evangelista vs. Baes , 61 SCRA 475 (1974). 168. Louis Vuitton S.A. vs. Judge Francisco Diaz Villanueva , A.M. No. MTJ-92-643, 27 November 1992, 216 SCRA 121, 127. 169. Id. , at pp. 127-128 & 133. 170. Section 1. Nature of Proceedings; Hearing Officer(s). The formal investigation shall be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the truth without necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings. The Hearing Officer(s) shall personally conduct the hearing. He/they shall take full control of the proceedings. He/they may examine the parties and witnesses freely with respect to the matters at issue, but shall limit the questions on points of facts and law involved in the case. He/they shall also limit the presentation of evidence by the parties only on matters relevant and material to the issues and necessary for a just, expensive, and inexpensive disposition of the case. The Hearing Officer shall administer oaths and take testimonies of the concerned parties. The Assistance Commissioner of the Inspection Service (ACIR-IS) is empowered to summon witnesses and to issue subpoena duces tecum or ad testificandum. 171. Rule VI, Section 4. Technical rules not applicable. The Hearing Officer and the Panel of Hearing Officers shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence as prescribed in the Rules of Court, but shall proceed to hear and decide all administrative cases, disputes or controversies in the most expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in accordance with justice and equity. 172. 243 SCRA 514, 518 (1995). 173. Republic Act No. 6770, "An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the Ombudsman, and for Other Purposes" , 17 November 1989. 174. As amended by Administrative Order No. 17, dated 7 September 2003. 175. Administrative Order No. 07, "The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman" , dated 10 April 1990. 176. CA-G.R. SP No. 133735, Rollo , p. 73. 177. G.R. No. 114944, 19 June 2001, citing Tirol vs. Commission on Audit , G.R. No. 133954, 3 August 2000. 178. Antonio Prospero Esquivel and Mark Anthony Esquivel vs. The Hon. Ombudsman, The Sandiganbayan (Third Division), The People of the Philippines and Herminigildo Eduardo , G.R. No. 137237, 17 September 2002, 389 SCRA 143, 151. 179. Dr. Honorata Baylon vs. Office of the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan , G.R. No. 142738, 14 December 2001, 372 SCRA 437, 449. 180. Amado G. Perez (Deceased) represented by his widow Guillerma T. Perez, Mario S. Francisco, Rafael P. Argame, Mirasol V. Mendoza, Gloria S. Gonzalvo and Maria Fe V. Bombase vs. Office of the Ombudsman, Mayor Ignacio R. Bunye, Carlos G. Dominguez, Rogelio P. Madriaga, Recto Coronado, Teodora A. Diang, Tomas M. Osias, Reynaldo Camilon and Benjamin Bulos , 429 SCRA 357, 363, 27 May 2004; Alba vs. Nitorreda , 254 SCRA 753, 13 March 1996. 181. Section 2. Rule II. Evaluation. Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall recommend whether it may be: a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit; b) referred to respondent for comment; c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has jurisdiction over the case; d) forwarded to the appropriate office or official for fact-finding investigation; e) referred for administrative adjudication; or f) subjected to a preliminary investigation. 182. Rene Knecht and Cristina De Knecht v. Hon. Aniano A. Desierto, as Ombudsman; Hon. Jejomar Binay, as Mayor of Makati City; Hon. Pablo Cuneta, as Mayor of Pasay City; Hon. Manuel James Raterta, as Solicitor, Office of the Solicitor General; Engr. Jesus Reyna, as City Engineer of Pasay City; Atty. Pepito Abad, as Chief of Civil Security Unit, Pasay City; Ronaldo E. Lampitoc, Jr., as Deputy Sheriff of MTC, Branch 46, Pasay City; Luis Lasa, as Deputy Sheriff of RTC, Branch 111, Pasay City; and Mariano Nocom , G.R. No. 121916, 26 June 1998, 353 Phil. 494, 502.