Salveron v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

NINTH DIVISION [CA-G.R. SP CASE NO. 45835. November 19, 1999.] ULDARICO C. SALVERON , petitioner , vs . COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ESTATE OF JUAN M. POSADAS III and THE HONORABLE COURT OF TAX APPEALS , respondents . D E C I S I O N ALIO-HORMACHUELOS, P. , J p : Petition for review on certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order of the Resolution (Rollo, pp. 145-147) dated May 15, 1997 of the Court of Tax Appeals [CTA] in C.T.A. Case No. 5038, entitled "Estate of Juan M. Posadas III, represented by Aida M. Posadas, Special Administratrix vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue." The said Resolution denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the Resolution (Rollo, pp. 117-120) dated March 17, 1997 of the CTA denying his motion for leave to intervene in the aforesaid proceeding. The facts are as summarized by the public respondent: "Culled from the records of the case, petitioner on January 3, 1997 filed a "Motion for Leave to Intervene" in CTA Case No. 5038. Said case involves an appeal made by the Estate of Juan M. Posadas against a deficiency estate tax assessment issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue against the said Estate. "In a Resolution, dated March 17, 1997, the Court of Tax Appeals denied the petitioner's motion for leave to intervene for lack of actual, direct and immediate claim or interest of the movant/intervenor and that his claim for alleged unpaid services has no direct bearing with the subject disputed deficiency estate tax assessment. "Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Tax Court in its Resolution, dated May 15, 1997, a copy of which was allegedly received on May 23, 1997. "From the aforesaid Resolution, petitioner on September 5, 1997 filed with this Honorable Court (Seventh Division) a petition for certiorari, Mandamus and prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45187. prcd "This Honorable Court (Seventh Division), in a Resolution dated September 9, 1997, dismissed the aforesaid petition pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion for reconsideration of petitioner against said dismissal was denied by the Court in a Resolution, dated October 10, 1997. "Thus, the instant petition, dated November 3, 1997, under Rule 65, Rules of Court, refiled before this Honorable Court praying, among others, the setting aside of the Resolution, dated May 15, 1997, of the Tax Court in CTA Case No. 5038 for allegedly having been issued with grave abuse of discretion and reiterated his prayer that his Complaint in Intervention be admitted and heard." (Rollo, pp. 214-215). At the outset, it is to be noted that the instant petition is dismissible for having been filed beyond the 60-day reglementary period provided under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner received the assailed Resolution on May 23, 1997 and filed a petition for certiorari on September 5, 1997, which was, as afore-stated, dismissed. The instant petition refiled on November 3, 1997 was clearly filed beyond the reglementary period. Even prior to the implementation of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the period to file a petition for certiorari was held to be three (3) months from notice of the questioned order or decision (Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741). Nonetheless to put the matter to rest, We shall proceed to dispose of the case on its merits. LexLib Stripped of the non-essentials, the main issue in this petition is whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for leave to intervene. We resolve in the negative. Sec. 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: "SECTION 1. Who may intervene . A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding." The permissive tenor of the provision on intervention shows the intention of the Rules to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting or disallowing the same [Garcia, etc., et al. vs. David, et al. 67 Phil 279). The discretion of the court, once exercised, cannot be reviewed by certiorari nor controlled by mandamus save in instances where such discretion has been exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., 184 SCRA 382). cdll In the present case, there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Tax Appeals. It denied petitioner's motion for intervention by reason of its findings that petitioner's claim for alleged unpaid services has no direct bearing with the deficiency estate tax reassessment and that, at any rate, petitioner's rights, if any, may be ventilated in the settlement proceedings of the estate of Juan M. Posadas. Further, it has been brought to this Court's attention that the public respondent Court of Tax Appeals has already rendered a Decision dated December 12, 1997 in the afore-stated CTA Case No. 5038 (per motion for Entry of Judgment, Rollo. p. 238), ordering the cancellation of the subject deficiency tax assessment. Hence, petitioner's alleged right to intervene has also become moot and academic. Where the main action ceases to exists, there is no pending proceeding wherein the intervention may be based (Ordoez vs. Gustilo, etc. et al. 192 SCRA 469). cdlex WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Guerrero and Salazar-Fernando , JJ ., concur.