MIGUEL REYES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. REMEDIOS DELGADO, defendant-appellant.

[CA-G.R. No. 56650-R. February 28, 1980.] MIGUEL REYES, ET AL. , plaintiffs-appellees , vs . REMEDIOS DELGADO , defendant-appellant . Camilo P. Esmero for defendant and appellant. Herman B. de Leon for plaintiffs and appellees. SYLLABUS 1. TAX SALES; STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS ARE MANDATORY TO GIVE A CHANGE TO THE OWNER TO REACQUIRE HIS PROPERTY. The law governing tax sales is explicit and clear in its mandatory provisions. The law in setting up the procedure for sale of delinquent properties, intends to avoid any abuse in the deprivation of ownership and to insure an opportunity to an owner to reacquire his property. 2. ID; ACTION TO ANNUL A SALE FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURE IS IMPRESCRIPTIBLE. Non-compliance with the procedure for the sale of delinquent properties being a defect ab initio and permanent, the action to annul the sale does not prescribe (Article 1410, Civil Code). The mere lapse of time, no matter how long, is not and cannot be, of itself, sufficient to give efficacy to a void contract (Tipton vs. Velasco, 6 Phil. 67; Trigal, et al vs. Tobias, et al. 2 SCRA 1154). 3. ID; REASON FOR COMPLETE OBSERVANCE OF REQUIREMENTS. Sales of property for tax delinquency, being in derogation of property rights and due process, the prescribed steps must be followed punctiliously, and that exact and complete adherence to the statutes governing tax sale is imperatively necessary (Cooley, The Law on Taxation , Vol. 3, pp. 2725-22726). 4. ID.; ID.; It is of paramount importance, in keeping with the constitutional provision that protects an individual against deprivation of its rights without due process of law, that the taxpayer should not be deprived of his property confiscated for tax delinquency, except in strict conformity with the law authorizing the same. Courts have "to guard against a great temptation to connive with tax officers and their subordinates, or otherwise resort to dubious means, in order to acquire, at a nominal price, real properties delinquent in the payment of taxes" (Lucido vs. Isias, CA-G.R. No. 575-R, May 27, 1947). 5. ID.; NEITHER LACHES NOR PRESCRIPTION MAY DEFEAT PROPERTY RIGHTS. The Court reiterates the wisdom of the rule that courts should proceed cautiously in depriving a citizen of his property rights due to tax delinquency, taking into account the reasons that can offset such tardiness and neglect in payment. It is preferable to keep inviolate the rule that property cannot be taken except in accordance with due process and that these requirements are to be interpreted strictly against the State or We rue the day when We trifle with and relax the protection over the property rights. Neither laches nor prescription can defeat this great constitutional principle. APPEALS from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte (Ormoc City) Numeriano G. Estenzo, J. D E C I S I O N SISON, P.V. , J p : This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte which nullified the sale by the provincial treasurer at public auction of 233.32 square meters (residential lot) for tax delinquency 43 years ago on legal grounds, the dispositive portion reading: "WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant, declaring the plaintiffs as the owners of the land in question and ordering the defendant or her tenant to vacate the land in question, hereby ordering the Provincial Assessor to cancel the tax declaration of the land in question in the name of the defendant, which tax declaration is hereby declared null and void and of no force and effect, without pronouncement as to costs." (pp. 64-65, Record on Appeal) Defendant appealed with these assigned errors: "I That the trial court erred in not finding that the plaintiffs' cause of action has already been barred by prescription, abandonment or estoppel thru laches, or has become a stale demand. II That the trial court erred in not finding the defendant the absolute owner of the land in question by acquisitive prescription. III That the trial court erred in finding that the tax sale executed by the provincial treasurer dated August 16, 1937, as null and void." (Appellants Brief, pp. A-B) In their complaint for quieting of title and annulment of tax declaration with damages, plaintiffs alleged that they are the heirs of Severino Reyes, who during his lifetime was the owner of two (2) parcels of land both situated in Poblacion, Palompon, Leyte, more particularly described as follows: (1) A residential land containing an area of 233.32 square meters, under Tax Declaration No. 6861 with the Provincial Assessor of Leyte; and (2) A residential land with an area of 120.65 square meters under Tax Declaration No. 6862 likewise with the Provincial Assessor of Leyte; that after the death of Severino Reyes, plaintiffs inherited the above-described parcels of land; that they have been in actual, open and continuous possession of the same in the concept of owners for not less than thirty (30) years; that in 1973, they learned that defendant had surreptitiously transferred to her name the tax declaration of the 233.32 square meter-lot above-mentioned by falsely claiming that she bought the same from Severino Reyes in 1928; that consequently, Tax Declaration No. 5976, was cancelled and another tax declaration issued in appellant's name. Plaintiffs, therefore, prayed that said tax declaration be cancelled and that they be declared the owner of the above parcels of land. For her part, defendant-appellant admitted that she cause to be transferred to her name the Tax Declaration of the property in litigation as now evidence by Tax Declaration No. 16833. However, she denied that the same was fraudulent, the truth being, her action is a valid and legitimate exercise of her right because: a) As early as 1926, the parcels of land in litigation were forfeited in favor of the Provincial Government of Leyte for no-payment of taxes; b) Benigno Delgado, appellant's predecessor-in-interest, applied to the Provincial Treasurer that the same be transferred to him; c) Demands were made to Severino Reyes for the payment of taxes, but he failed to pay the same; d) On August 16, 1937, the Provincial Treasurer of Leyte approved the formal application of Benigno Delgado to repurchase the forfeited property of Severino Reyes; e) Upon the death of Benigno Delgado, defendant Remedios Delgado, as one of his heirs, inherited the parcel of land in dispute and she has been in actual possession of the same since 1937 up to the present. With these issues and after due hearing, the trial court ruled that plaintiffs are the owners of the parcel of land in litigation and defendant-appellant was ordered to vacate the same. Likewise, Tax Declaration No. 16833 covering the 232.22-square meter lot issued to appellant Remedios Delgado, on December 12, 1969 (Exh. 7), was declared null and void and of force and effect. It appears from the evidence adduce by the parties that only parcel No. 1, consisting of 233.22 square meters, is involved in this case because it is only this parcel, the tax declaration of which, has been transferred by appellant in her name. The issue is whether the lower court erred in holding that defendant Remedios Delgado did not acquire a valid right over the property in dispute because Benigno Delgado, her predecessor-in-interest, having allegedly acquired the above-mentioned property thru a tax sale, it is incumbent upon appellant to show that proper steps had been taken to safeguard the rights and interests of the property owner, such as notice to him before the actual auction sale. In Our desire to find out whether the assigned errors were really committed by the court a quo , We carefully reviewed the evidence, both testimonial and documentary. We are convinced that there is nothing in the records that would warrant a disturbance of the appealed decision. Appellant anchors her appeal on the grounds that plaintiff's cause of action had prescribed and that she had acquired the property by acquisitive prescription. These grounds are indeed eye-catching, but We cannot give them any credit because, as was found by the trial court, the alleged tax sale held on August 16, 1937, was null and void for lack of compliance with the mandatory provisions of the statute governing tax sales, namely: (1) Advertisement of the sale of at public auction by posting a notice for three (3) consecutive weeks at the main entrance of the provincial building and all municipal buildings of the province, and in a public conspicuous place in the barrio where the property is situated, in English, Spanish, or in the local dialect and in the discretion of the provincial treasurer, by publishing it once a week, for three (3) consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province; (2) Notice shall be sent by registered mail or by messenger to the delinquent taxpayer at his residence. The notice shall set forth amount of taxes and penalties due and the costs of the sale, the date and place of the sale. (Assessment Law, Sec. 35) The records are bereft of any evidence that the above procedure was complied with. The law is explicit and clear in its mandatory provisions, but obviously, the Provincial Treasurer disposed of the property in question unceremoniously. The law, in setting up the procedure for sale of delinquent properties, intends to avoid any abuse in the deprivation of ownership and to insure an opportunity to an owner to reacquire his property. The defect in the transaction, being ab initio and permanent, the action to have it declared null and void, does not prescribed (Article 1410, NCC). The mere lapse of time, no matter how long, is not and cannot be, of itself, sufficiently to give efficacy to a void contract (Tipton vs . Velasco, 6 Phil. 67). In the case of Trigal, et al. vs . Tobias, et al., 2 SCRA, 1154, it was held that a sale at public auction, without notice, is void ab initio and the action to set it aside is imprescriptible. Appellant contends that plaintiffs complaint was for quieting of title and annulment of tax declaration and not for annulment of the tax sale. This, We find without merit, considering that appellant's claim on the property in dispute is premised on the alleged valid acquisition of said residential lot by Benigno Delgado in 1937. We note likewise various inconsistencies in appellant's testimony, which obviously tipped the scales in favor of plaintiffs, such as: (1) In her Answer, she claimed that she became the owner of the residential lot because her predecessor-in-interest, Benigno Delgado, bought the same thru an adoption sale in 1937; (2) In her affidavit executed on Dec. 6, 1968, filed with the Municipal Treasurer of Palompon, Leyte, which became the basis for the cancellation of the Tax Declaration in the name of Severino Reyes for the year 1948, and the subsequent issuance of Tax Declaration No. 16833 in appellant's name on December 12, 1969, she claimed that she bought the same in 1928, when Severino Reyes, was still alive and the document evidencing the sale was lost during the war (Exh. 7-1); (3) Plaintiffs, on the other hand, testified that Severino Reyes died on Nov. 19, 1926, so that in 1928, when the alleged sale took place, h was no longer alive; (4) Despite appellant's claim that she was possessed the disputed property as early as 1937, it was only in 1969 when she caused the tax declaration to be transferred to her name. All this time, the property was in the name of Severino Reyes as evidenced by the tax declaration No. 5976 (Exh. B). It has been held, with great propriety, that "sales of property for tax delinquency, being in derogation of property rights and due process the prescribed steps must be followed punctiliously, and that exact and complete adherence to the statutes governing tax sale is imperatively necessary" (Cooley, The Law on Taxation, Vol. 3, pp. 2725-2726). The case at bar is notorious for absolute non-compliance with these requirements. Moreover, "the real estate tax authorized in the Assessment Law (Commonwealth Act No. 470), constitutes a very small part (from 3/8% to 1%) of the assessed value which is often lower than the market value of the property taxed. It is of paramount importance, in keeping with the constitutional provision that protects an individual against deprivation of its rights without due process of law, that the taxpayer should not be deprived of his property confiscated for tax delinquency, except in strict conformity with the law authorizing the same. We have "to guard against a great temptation to connive with tax officers and their subordinates, or otherwise resort to dubious means, in order to acquire at a nominal price, real properties delinquent in the payment of taxes" (Lucido vs . Isias, CA-G.R. No. 575-R, May 27, 1947). We reiterate the wisdom of the rule that We proceed cautiously in depriving a citizen of his property rights due to tax delinquency, taking into account the reasons that can offset tardiness and neglect in payment. It is preferable to keep inviolate the rule that property cannot be taken except in accordance with due process and that these requirements are to be interpreted strictly against the State, or We rue the day when We trifle with and relax the protection over property rights. Neither laches nor prescription can defeat this great constitutional principle. WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, and no error having been incurred, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. SO ORDERED. San Diego and Asuncion, JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed .