Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. WPP Marketing Communications, Inc.

EN BANC [C.T.A. EB CASE NO. 2289. March 9, 2022.] (C.T.A. Case No. 9704) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , petitioner , vs. WPP MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS, INC. , respondent . DECISION MODESTO-SAN PEDRO , J p : The Case Before the Court En Banc is a PETITION FOR REVIEW ("Petition") , filed on 29 July 2020, 1 with respondents' COMMENT (RE: PETITION FOR REVIEW DATED 29 JULY 2020) ("Comment") , filed on 27 November 2020. 2 The Parties Petitioner COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE ("CIR") is the head of the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR") and empowered to perform the duties of said office, including, among others, the power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees, or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, ("NIRC") or other laws or portions thereof administered by the BIR. He may be served summons, pleadings, and other processes at his office at the BIR National Office Building, BIR Road, Diliman, Quezon City. Respondent WPP MARKETING COMMUNICATIONS, INC. is a duly registered domestic corporation with Company Registration No. 4129. The Facts The following are the undisputed facts: "On August 8, 2006, [respondent] received the Letter Notice (LN) No. 116-AS-04-00-00056 dated June 30, 2006, with attached Details of Taxpayer's Supplier's Records, informing [respondent] of the discrepancy in the information/data provided by third-party sources against its declarations per VAT returns. Thereafter, on October 23, 2007, [respondent] received the Preliminary Assessment Notice dated August 28, 2007 from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). On January 3, 2008, [respondent] received the Formal Letter of Demand (FLD) dated November 20, 2007, together with the Audit Result/Assessment Notice No. LN-116-AS-04-00-00056-000523 from the BIR, demanding payment of alleged deficiency VAT, with interest, in the aggregate amount of P161,801,664.00, for taxable year 2004, broken down as follows: Gross Receipts (per summary list of sales from customers) P1,027,312,152.74 VAT Due (10%) 102,731,215.27 Add: 20% interest from 1/26/05 to 12/11/07 59,070,488.73 TOTAL AMOUNT DUE P161,801,664.00 Thus, on January 14, 2008, [respondent] filed with the BIR the letter dated January 11, 2018, protesting the FLD and seeking the reversal of the imposed deficiency VAT together with its corresponding interest/penalties. On April 3, 2008, [petitioner] Commissioner issued a letter, stating that [respondent] has been delisted from the list of taxpayers under the jurisdiction of Large Taxpayers Service of the BIR, and is now under the jurisdiction of Revenue District Office (RDO) No. 47-East Makati, Revenue Region (RR) No. 8-Makati. On August 20, 2008, [respondent] received the Preliminary Collection Letter (PCL) dated August 18, 2008 from RDO No. 50-South Makati, RR No. 8, seeking to collect the total amount of P161,801,664.00, as alleged deficiency VAT, inclusive of interest. On September 4, 2008, [respondent] received the Final Notice Before Seizure (FNBS) dated September 2, 2008 from RDO No. 50-South Makati, RR No. 8, for the collection of the said deficiency tax. On September 12, 2008, [respondent] filed a letter dated September 15, 2008 with RDO No. 50, requesting that any action to collect the alleged deficiency tax be suspended, and that the subject assessment be reinvestigated. Thereafter, on March 9, 2009, [respondent] received the Collection Letter dated February 24, 2009 from the BIR Large Taxpayers Collection & Enforcement Division, Quezon City. [Respondent] filed with the BIR, on March 20, 2009, a letter requesting for the settlement of the subject tax through a negotiated compromise. On April 17, 2009, [respondent] filed its Application for Compromise Settlement of Internal Revenue Tax Liabilities (BIR Form No. 2107) with the BIR, offering to pay the amount of P3,000,000.00 as a compromise settlement of its deficiency VAT liability for the year 2004 due to doubtful validity of the assessment. Subsequently, on April 23, 2013, [respondent] received the Notice of Denial dated March 19, 2013 signed by Assistant Commissioner, Collection Service, and Head, Technical Working Group on Compromise Elvira R. Vera, denying [respondent]'s application for compromise settlement of its deficiency VAT liability for taxable year 2004 in the total amount of P161,801,664.00. On May 8, 2013, [respondent] filed with the BIR a letter requesting for reconsideration of the denial of [respondent]'s offer of compromise settlement for its alleged VAT liability under LN No. 116-AS-04-00-000556-000523 for taxable year 2004. However, on June 4, 2013, OIC Assistant Commissioner, Large Taxpayers Service Alfredo V. Misajon issued the Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy (WDL), directing the Chief, LT-Collection & Enforcement Division or his duly authorized representative to levy upon the real property and interest in/or rights to real property of [respondent] and to sell and/or forfeit in favor of the Republic of the Philippines so much of [respondent]'s personal/real property, as may be necessary to satisfy in full the sum of P158,801,664.00, plus all increments incident to delinquency. On June 14, 2013, [respondent] filed with the BIR a letter requesting the reconsideration of the denial of [respondent]'s offer of compromise settlement for its alleged VAT liability under LN No. 116-AS-04-00-000556-000523 for taxable year 2004, and requesting the cancellation of the WDL. Thereafter, on March 14, 2014, [respondent] filed with the BIR a letter following up on its request for reconsideration and cancellation of the WDL. On April 12, 2017, [respondent] filed with respondent the letter dated April 11, 2017, requesting for reconsideration of the denial of its request for compromise settlement. On September 26, 2017, [respondent] received the letter dated September 4, 2017 signed by OIC-Assistant Commissioner, Large Taxpayers Service Teresita M. Angeles, stating, among others, that per Memorandum dated January 27, 2017 of Deputy Commissioner Legal Group Jesus Clint O. Aranas, [respondent]'s request for reconsideration was denied due to the following reasons: 1. The issue on prescription was belatedly raised when [respondent] requested for reconsideration of the denial of [respondent]'s offer of compromise settlement through letter dated May 8, 2013, or years after the assessment has become final, executory and demandable. Further, the subject assessment was not appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) within the period required by law. Accordingly, it became final, executory, and demandable, and [respondent] could no longer challenge the validity of the assessment. 2. The denial of the offer for compromise settlement is made on the ground that the offer is below the required minimum payment of at least 40% of the basic tax assessed for cases of "doubtful validity" pursuant to Section 4.2 of Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 30-2002. The basic assessed tax is P102,731,215.27 while the offer for compromise settlement is only P3,000,000.00, which is only 2.92% of the basic assessed tax. While [respondent] may request for compromise lower than 40% of the basic assessed tax, the same is subject to the approval of the National Evaluation Board. In the instant case, the offer was already disapproved by the NEB per Memorandum dated November 27, 2012." On 25 October 2017, respondent filed a Petition for Review before the Court in Division to question the validity of the denial by petitioner of respondent's Request for Reconsideration of the Denied Application for Compromise Settlement. 3 On 29 January 2020, the Court in Division rendered the Assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which provides: 4 " WHEREFORE , in light of the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition for Review is GRANTED . Accordingly, the Denial Letter dated September 4, 2017 issued by [petitioner] Commissioner against [respondent] involving the amount of P158,801,664.00 is hereby ANNULLED, REVERSED , and SET ASIDE . Furthermore, the FLD dated November 20, 2007, assessing petitioner of the deficiency VAT, with interest, in the aggregate amount of P161,801,664.00, for taxable year 2004, and the WDL dated June 4, 2013 issued against petitioner, are CANCELLED and SET ASIDE . SO ORDERED ." On 14 February 2020, petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration on the Assailed Decision, which was denied for lack of merit by the Court in Division in a Resolution, dated 5 June 2020. 5 On 14 July 2020, petitioner filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review, 6 which this Court En Banc granted through a Resolution, dated 20 July 2020. 7 On 29 July 2020, petitioner filed the instant Petition . Afterwards, this Court En Banc issued a Resolution, dated 11 September 2020, requiring petitioner to submit a compliant Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, 8 which was complied with by petitioner through a Compliance, filed on 28 September 2020. 9 In a Resolution, dated 15 October 2020, this Court En Banc noted petitioner's Compliance and required respondent to file a Comment to the Petition within ten (10) days from notice. 10 Thereafter, respondent filed its Comment . On 11 December 2020, this Court En Banc issued a Resolution noting the filing of the Comment and referring the instant case to mediation. 11 However, on 26 February 2021, this Court En Banc received a No Agreement to Mediate from the Philippine Mediation Center Unit. 12 On 19 May 2021, this Court En Banc issued a Resolution submitting the instant case for Decision. 13 Hence, this Decision. The Assigned Errors 14 The Petition did not provide for any specific assigned errors. A perusal of its contents, however, would show that the main issues to be resolved are whether or not the Court in Division appropriately granted respondent's Petition for Review and, in so doing, whether the Court in Division correctly annulled, reversed, and set aside the Denial Letter, dated 4 September 2017, and properly cancelled and set aside the deficiency tax assessment issued against respondent. Arguments of the Parties Petitioner presented the following arguments: 15 1. The Court in Division had no jurisdiction over the case. The assessment has already become final and immutable. The Petition for Review was filed with the Court in Division only after respondent received a denial of its application for compromise settlement. This means that respondent filed its appeal after the assessment had become final and executory. Thus, the validity of the assessment can no longer be questioned. 2. Assuming that the Court in Division had jurisdiction over the instant case, it erred in ruling that the case falls under the "other matters" jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals ("CTA"). "Other Matters" do not include cases of denial of compromise. The CTA's "other matters" jurisdiction is limited only to the propriety of the collection process made by petitioner against respondent. It cannot go beyond the validity of the assessment which has already become final and executory. Section 228 of the NIRC is not available to revive the right to contest the validity of an assessment once the same has been irretrievably lost. 3. Assuming the Court in Division had jurisdiction and that the case falls under "other matters," the Court in Division should have only focused on the propriety of respondent's application for compromise settlement. 4. The Court in Division failed to show that respondent's application for compromise was denied without basis. It is only when it is proven that petitioner has abused its discretion that the CTA can take cognizance of issues pertaining to compromise settlements. In the case at bar, petitioner did not commit any abuse of discretion in denying respondent's application for compromise. In its Comment , respondent counter-alleged as follows: 16 1. The Petition should be dismissed outright. Petitioner changed the theory of its case before the Court En Banc , where it is now arguing that the Final Assessment Notice ("FAN") had become immutable. In the proceedings before the Court in Division, it argued that the Preliminary Collection Letter ("PCL") or Final Notice Before Seizure ("FNBS") became immutable. To allow petitioner to change its theory before the Court En Banc would render meaningless the proceedings before the Court in Division. A party is not allowed to change its theory of the case on appeal. Moreover, the FAN has not attained finality considering that respondent timely filed a Protest thereto. 2. The Court in Division correctly assumed jurisdiction. The assessment, being void, cannot attain finality. Thus, any collection effort on a patently void assessment is within the review of the Court in Division. The Court in Division has the jurisdiction to determine whether petitioner's claim is correct and valid based on the assessment conducted. Petitioner's theory that the Court in Division cannot look into the validity of an assessment in an appealed denial of compromise based on doubtful validity is highly objectionable. The doubtful validity of an assessment invariably includes the issue of whether the assessment is valid. Moreover, when petitioner sought affirmative relief instead of dismissal of the case, it is a manifestation of voluntary submission to the Court in Division's jurisdiction. The Ruling of the Court En Banc This Court resolves to DENY the Petition for lack of merit. The Court in Division has jurisdiction over the instant case. Petitioner posits that the Court in Division had no jurisdiction to entertain the Petition for Review filed before it by respondent. In support of this contention, petitioner argues that since the Petition for Review was filed only after respondent received a denial of its offer of compromise, which is long after the assessment became final and executory, respondent can no longer question the validity of such assessment. Further, petitioner argues that the Court in Division has no jurisdiction to entertain questions pertaining to denial of applications for compromise. This Court En Banc is not persuaded. The Court in Division had jurisdiction to rule on the validity of petitioner's denial of respondent's offer of compromise under its "other matters" jurisdiction. The "other matters" jurisdiction is provided in Section 7 (a) (1) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended by Republic Act No. 9282, ("RA 1125") , as follows: "SECTION 7. Jurisdiction. The CTA shall exercise: (a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided: (1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue ;" (Emphasis and underscoring, Ours.) Clearly, therefore, the CTA's appellate jurisdiction is not strictly confined to decisions by the CIR involving disputed assessments or tax refunds but also includes other cases which arise out of the implementation of the NIRC or other tax laws administered by the BIR. 17 As mentioned, what was appealed by respondent before the Court in Division was petitioner's denial of its offer of compromise. The power to compromise tax liabilities is provided to the CIR under Section 204 of the NIRC , to wit: "SEC. 204. Authority of the Commissioner to Compromise, Abate and Refund or Credit Taxes. The Commissioner may (A) Compromise the payment of any internal revenue tax, when: (1) A reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer exists; or (2) The financial position of the taxpayer demonstrates a clear inability to pay the assessed tax. The compromise settlement of any tax liability shall be subject to the following minimum amounts: For cases of financial incapacity, a minimum compromise rate equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the basic assessed tax; and For other cases, a minimum compromise rate equivalent to forty percent (40%) of the basic assessed tax. Where the basic tax involved exceeds One million pesos (P1,000,000) or where the settlement offered is less than the prescribed minimum rates, the compromise shall be subject to the approval of the Evaluation Board which shall be composed of the Commissioner and the four (4) Deputy Commissioners. xxx xxx xxx The Commissioner shall submit to the Chairmen of the Committee on Ways and Means of both the Senate and House of Representatives, every six (6) months, a report on the exercise of his powers under this Section, stating therein the following facts and information, among others: names and addresses of taxpayers whose cases have been the subject of abatement or compromise; amount involved; amount compromised or abated; and reasons for the exercise of power: Provided, That the said report shall be presented to the Oversight Committee in Congress that shall be constituted to determine that said powers are reasonably exercised and that the Government is not unduly deprived of revenues." Following this, the CTA has jurisdiction over issues involving compromise of tax liabilities because it is a power expressly provided by the NIRC in favor of the CIR. As such, the exercise of this authority is an "other matter" arising from the implementation of the NIRC . Providing the CTA exclusive power to review decisions made by the CIR in relation to this authority serves a purpose, which is to avoid and correct any grave abuse by the CIR of his discretion to compromise tax liabilities. That the CTA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the exercise of the CIR's power to compromise tax liabilities has been thoroughly discussed in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Oriental Assurance Corporation , 18 to wit: "The Court in Division properly assumed and exercised jurisdiction over the case Petitioner submits that the Second Division had no jurisdiction over the original Petition. To support his contention, he enumerates three (3) reasons. First, Petitioner's refusal to enter into a compromise agreement is not covered by the phrase "other matters arising under this Code" as stated in Section 7 (a)(1) of Republic Act ("RA") No. 1125, as amended by RA No. 9282. Second, Respondent had no cause of action as there is no wrong or right in entering or refusing to enter into a compromise contract. Lastly, a Warrant of Garnishment is not a decision that is appealable to the CTA. The Court En Banc is not persuaded. Jurisdiction is conferred by law and is the capacity of a court to 'entertain, hear, and determine controversies.' The CTA, as a court of special jurisdiction, only takes cognizance of matters clearly within its jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the CTA, in particular those falling under the 'other matters' clause has been ruled to include, but not limited to: prescription of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ('CIR')'s right to collect taxes, determination of the validity of a warrant of distraint and levy issued by the CIR and the validity of a waiver of the statute of limitations. In the landmark case of Philippine National Oil Company v. Court of Appeals , the Supreme Court expanded the previous enumeration and considered the validity of a compromise agreement as 'other matters arising from the NIRC: and other laws being administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue' and thus, appealable to the CTA under Section 7(1)(a) of RA No. 1125, as amended by RA No. 9282. Notably, the Supreme Court pointed out in the said decision that the CIR's discretionary authority to enter into a compromise agreement is not absolute and that this Court may inquire into allegations of abuse thereof. In fact, the CTA has the authority and power to set aside a compromise agreement entered into by the CIR and a taxpayer that is contrary to law and public policy, to wit: 'It is generally true that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the courts; but when the exercise of such functions by the administrative officer is tainted by a failure to abide by the command of the law, then it is incumbent on the courts to set matters right, with this Court having the last say on the matter. The manner by which BIR Commissioner Tan exercised his discretionary power to enter into a compromise was brought under the scrutiny of the CTA amidst allegations of 'grave abuse of discretion and/or whimsical exercise of jurisdiction.' The discretionary power of the BIR Commissioner to enter into compromises cannot be superior over the power of judicial review by the courts. The discretionary authority to compromise granted to the BIR Commissioner is never meant to be absolute, uncontrolled and unrestrained. No such unlimited power may be validly granted to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of national emergency. In this case, the BIR Commissioner's authority to compromise, whether under E.O. No. 44 or Section 246 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended, can only be exercised under certain circumstances specifically identified in said statutes. The BIR Commissioner would have to exercise his discretion within the parameters set by the law, and in case he abuses his discretion, the CTA may correct such abuse if the matter is appealed to them. Petitioners PNOC and PNB both contend that BIR Commissioner Tan merely exercised his authority to enter into a compromise specially granted by E.O. No. 44. Since this Court has already made a determination that the compromise agreement did not qualify under E.O. No. 44, BIR Commissioner Tan's decision to agree to the compromise should have been reviewed in the light of the general authority granted to the BIR Commissioner to compromise taxes under Section 246 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended. Then again, petitioners PNOC and PNB failed to allege, much less present evidence, that BIR Commissioner Tan acted in accordance with Section 246 of the NIRC of 1977, as amended, when he entered into the compromise agreement with PNOC. xxx xxx xxx The Court of Appeals, in upholding the jurisdiction of the CTA to set aside the compromise agreement, ruled that: We are unable to accept petitioner's submissions. Its formulation of the issues on CIR and CTNs lack of jurisdiction to disturb a compromise agreement presupposes a compromise agreement validly entered into by the CIR and not, when as in this case, it was indubitably shown that the supposed compromise agreement is without legal support. In case of arbitrary or capricious exercise by the Commissioner or if the proceedings were fatally defective, the compromise can be attacked and reversed through the judicial process ( Meralco Securities Corporation v. Savellano , 117 SCRA 805, 812 [1982]; Sarah E. Ramsay, et al. v. U.S. 21 Ct. Cl 443, affd 120 U.S. 214, 30 L. Ed. 582; Tyson v. U.S. , 39 F. Supp. 135 cited in page 18 of decision) . . . Although the general rule is that compromises are to be favored, and that compromises entered into in good faith cannot be set aside, this rule is not without qualification. A court may still reject a compromise or settlement when it is repugnant to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. The compromise agreement between the BIR and PNOC was contrary to law having been entered into by BIR Commissioner Tan in excess or in abuse of the authority granted to him by legislation. E.O. No. 44 and the NIRC of 1977, as amended, had identified the situations wherein the BIR Commissioner may compromise tax liabilities, and none of these situations existed in this case. The compromise, moreover, was contrary to public policy. The primary duty of the BIR is to collect taxes, since taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and their prompt and certain availability are imperious needs. In the present case, however, BIR Commissioner Tan, by entering into the compromise agreement that was bereft of any legal basis, would have caused the Government to lose almost [Php]300 million in tax revenues and would have deprived the Government of much needed monetary resources. Allegations of good faith and previous execution of the terms of the compromise agreement on the part of PNOC would not be enough for this Court to disregard the demands of law and public policy. Compromise may be the favored method to settle disputes, but when it involves taxes, it may be subject to closer scrutiny by the courts. A compromise agreement involving taxes would affect not just the taxpayer and the BIR, but also the whole nation, the ultimate beneficiary of the tax revenues collected. In the same way that this Court can review the discretionary power of the CIR to enter into compromise agreements, it can also review the CIR's refusal to do so." With such exhaustive explanation, it can no longer be denied that the CTA has absolute and unbridled appellate jurisdiction over actions involving compromise of tax liabilities. Examining the validity of the assessment is necessary to determine whether the tax claim is of doubtful validity. Petitioner claims that if the Court in Division had jurisdiction over the instant case, the Court in Division should have only focused on the propriety of respondent's application for compromise settlement and should not have touched on the validity of the assessment. This is terribly misplaced. Section 204 of the NIRC provides two (2) grounds for the CIR to exercise its power to compromise tax liabilities: a) if reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against the taxpayer exists; or b) if the financial position of the taxpayer demonstrates a clear inability to pay the assessed tax. The Application for Compromise Settlement of Internal Revenue Tax Liabilities (BIR Form No. 2107) filed by respondent clearly provides that its ground for seeking a compromise of its tax liabilities is the doubtful validity of the tax claim. 19 Thus, in order to determine whether petitioner's denial of said application for compromise was proper, there is a need to evaluate if the tax claim against respondent is indeed not of doubtful validity. This includes examining whether the subject tax assessment is valid. If it is found that the tax assessment is void due to substantial and/or procedural reasons, then the compromise of tax liabilities requested by a taxpayer should be allowed as the tax claim is not only of doubtful validity but is actually void. As duly found by the Court in Division and as painstakingly verified by this Court En Banc , the tax assessment issued against respondent was void since no Letter of Authority ("LOA") was issued in favor of the revenue officers who audited respondent's books of accounts. This is a factual finding uncontroverted by petitioner. Hence, petitioner is deemed to have admitted that the tax assessments issued against respondent are void due to lack of a valid LOA. Elementary is the rule that a valid deficiency tax assessment must be preceded by the issuance of a valid LOA in favor of the revenue officers who would audit a taxpayer's books of accounts and other accounting records since without such LOA, the assessment resulting from the examination conducted by the said revenue officers is undoubtedly void. 20 Consequently, the tax claim against respondent is not only of doubtful validity but is in fact void from the start. Petitioner, then, should have granted respondent's application for compromise. This Court En Banc thus agrees with the discussions of the Court in Division in the Assailed Decision which provide, as follows: "According to [respondent], the assessment did not become final, demandable, and executory; and the VAT assessment is void, not just of doubtful validity. On the other hand, [petitioner] Commissioner is of the view that the same assessment has become final, executory and demandable, and hence, there is no reason for [respondent] not to pay the said assessment. We agree with [respondent]. The subject VAT assessment is void, since there was no LOA issued which authorizes the examination of [respondent] by the BIR for taxable year 2004. xxx xxx xxx Correspondingly, since the subject VAT tax assessment was issued without a prior LOA, the same is void. As such, the said assessment bears no valid fruit, and could not have attained finality. Relative thereto, it is a hornbook doctrine that a person committing a void act contrary to a mandatory provision of law cannot claim or acquire any right from his void act. A right cannot spring in favor of a person from his own void or illegal act. Consequently, [petitioner] Commissioner may no longer collect the balance of the same VAT assessment." As petitioner failed to issue a valid LOA in favor of the revenue officers who audited respondent's books of accounts and other accounting records, the resulting deficiency tax assessment against respondent is void. Being a void assessment, no valid fruit can be derived therefrom. 21 Accordingly, the assessment could not have attained finality, nor can any tax collection be pursued by petitioner pursuant to such assessment. Respondent's application for compromise based on doubtful validity of the tax claim was thus well-founded, and, as such, petitioner committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the same. WHEREFORE , the instant Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision, dated 29 January 2020, and Resolution, dated 5 June 2020, promulgated by the Court in Division are hereby AFFIRMED . SO ORDERED. (SGD.) MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO Associate Justice Roman G. del Rosario, P.J., Juanito C. Castaeda, Jr., Erlinda P. Uy, Ma. Belen M. Ringpis-Liban, Catherine T. Manahan, Jean Marie A. Bacorro-Villena, Marian Ivy F. Reyes-Fajardo and Lanee S. Cui-David, JJ. , concur. Footnotes 1. Records, pp. 7-62. 2. Id. , pp. 75-81. 3. Decision, dated 29 January 2020, Annex "A", Petition, id. , p. 49. 4. Id. , pp. 56-57. 5. Resolution, dated 5 June 2020, Annex "B", Petition, Records, pp. 59-62. 6. Records, pp. 1-5. 7. Id. , p. 6. 8. Id. , pp. 63-65. 9. Id. , pp. 66-71. 10. Id. , pp. 72-74. 11. Id. , pp. 82-84. 12. Id. , p. 85. 13. Id. , pp. 86-88. 14. Id. , p. 13. 15. Id. , pp. 13-24. 16. Id. , pp. 75-80. 17. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Hambrecht & Quist Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 169225, November 17, 2010. 18. Citing Philippine National Oil Company v. Court of Appeals , G.R. Nos. 109976 and 112800, 26 April 2005, CTA EB Case No. 1716 (CTA Case No. 8817), 6 August 2019. 19. Exhibit "P-18", Division Docket Vol. I, p. 288; Exhibit "R-13", BIR Records, p. 139. 20. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. McDonald's Philippines Realty Corp. , G.R. No. 242670, 10 May 2021. 21. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Liquigaz Philippines Corporation, et al. , G.R. Nos. 215534 and 215557, 18 April 2016.