Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Dohle Shipmanagement Philippines, Corp.

EN BANC [C.T.A. EB CASE NO. 1665. July 26, 2018.] (C.T.A. Case No. 8960) COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , petitioner , vs . DOHLE SHIPMANAGEMENT PHILIPPINES, CORP. , respondent . DECISION UY , J p : Before the Court En Banc is a Petition for Review filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on June 29, 2017 against the Dohle Shipmanagement Phils. Corp., 1 seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision dated December 16, 2016 2 and Resolution dated May 22, 2017, 3 both rendered by the Second Division of this Court (Court in Division) in CTA Case No. 8960, entitled "D h le Shipmanagement Phils. Corp., Petitioner, versus Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent," the dispositive portions of which respectively read: Decision dated December 16, 2016 : " WHEREFORE , premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED . Accordingly, respondent is hereby ORDERED TO REFUND or TO ISSUE A TAX CREDIT CERTIFICATE in favor of petitioner in the amount of P7,196,472.58 representing unutilized excess input VAT attributable to petitioner's zero-rated sales/receipts for the four quarters of calendar year 2012. SO ORDERED ." Resolution dated May 22, 2017 : " WHEREFORE , premises considered, respondent's Motion for Partial Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. " THE FACTS Petitioner is the duly appointed Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), empowered to perform the duties of the said office, including, among others, the power to decide, approve, and grant refunds or tax credits of erroneously or excessively paid taxes as provided by law. He holds office at the BIR National Office Building, BIR Road, Diliman, Quezon City. Respondent D hle Shipmanagement Phils. Corp. is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, with office address at No. 30-38 Sen. Gil Puyat, Brgy. San Isidro, Makati City. It is a duly registered VAT taxpayer with Certificate of Registration No. OCN 9R0000306674 dated January 1, 1996 and Tax Identification No. (TIN) 004-500-132-000. As stated in its Articles of Incorporation, its primary purpose is: "To carry on the business of a shipmanager and to act as agents, brokers, ship chandler or representatives of any foreign shipping corporation and individual for the purpose of managing, operating, supervising, administering and developing the operation of vessels belonging to or which are or may be leased or operated by said foreign shipping corporation and individual and, for such purpose, to act as principal in and hire the services of a local manning agent for the overseas employment for seamen and to equip any and all kinds of ships, barges and vessels of every class and description owned by any foreign shipping corporation." On January 1, 2009, respondent and D hle (IOM) Ltd. (DIOM) entered into a Service Agreement, which provides that the former will act as Philippine representative for the latter and all its subsidiaries to carry out tasks which the latter will be requesting from time to time. On August 1, 2010, respondent and DIOM executed Addendum No. 1 to the Service Agreement, which provides for additional services to be rendered by the former in favor of the latter. Respondent electronically filed its Quarterly Value-Added Tax (VAT) Returns for calendar year 2012 on the following dates: Quarterly VAT Returns Filing Date 1st Quarter 2012 April 25, 2012 1st Quarter 2012 (first amended) March 28, 2014 1st Quarter 2012 (second amended) March 31, 2014 2nd Quarter 2012 July 24, 2012 2nd Quarter 2012 (amended) March 31, 2014 3rd Quarter 2012 October 19, 2012 3rd Quarter 2012 (amended) March 31, 2014 4th Quarter 2012 January 24, 2013 4th Quarter 2012 (amended) March 31, 2014 On March 31, 2014, respondent filed an application for refund or tax credit of its unutilized and unapplied input VAT covering the four (4) quarters of calendar year 2012. On July 28, 2014, respondent submitted additional documents in support of its application for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate (TCC). There being no action taken by petitioner on respondent's administrative claim for refund or issuance of TCC, respondent filed a Petition for Review before the Court in Division on December 23, 2014. The case was docketed as CTA Case No. 8960. Petitioner filed his Answer in CTA Case No. 8960 on February 25, 2015, interposing the following special and affirmative defenses, to wit: "3. [He] reiterates and repleads the preceding paragraphs of this answer as part of [his] Special and Affirmative Defenses; 4. Taxes paid and collected are presumed to have been made in accordance with law, hence, not refundable. 5. [Respondent's] claim for refund/tax credit in the amount of Php8,718,593.13 , as alleged unutilized input VAT paid attributable to its zero-rated sales of services for taxable year 2012 were not fully substantiated by proper documents, such [as] sales invoices, official receipts, import documents and other pertinent records. 6. In an action for refund/credit, the burden of proof is upon [respondent] to establish its right to the claimed refund and failure to adduce sufficient proof is fatal to its claim. 7. [Respondent's] sales of goods and services to various alleged clients/affiliates do not qualify as zero-rated[d] VAT under Section 108 (B)(2) of the 1997 Tax Code. 8. The amount subject of the claim for refund/tax credit of [respondent] does not pertain in full to its input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales of services for taxable year 2012. 9. [Respondent] failed to comply with the substantiation requirements under Section 113 and 237 of the 1997 Tax Code in relation to Revenue Regulations No. 16-2005. 10. [Respondent] failed to comply with the conditions/requirements under Section 112(A)(C) (D) of the 1997 Tax Code. 11. Claims for refund are construed strictly against herein [respondent] for the same partakes the nature of exemption from taxation (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Ledesma, 31 SCRA 95) and as such, they are looked upon with disfavor (Western Minolco Corp. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 124 SCRA 1211) ." The Pre-Trial Conference in CTA Case No. 8960 was set on April 16, 2015. Thereafter, the parties filed their Joint Stipulation on May 4, 2015 which was approved by the Court in Division upon issuance of the Pre-Trial Order on May 7, 2015. During trial in said case, respondent presented the following witnesses: James Richard Stevenson, Bethoven S. Saguid, Myra Celeste O. Dabalos and Ronaldo C. Avelino. On July 23, 2015, respondent filed its Formal Offer of Evidence , offering certain exhibits. Petitioner, however, failed to file his comment to respondent's Formal Offer of Evidence . On the hearing held on September 9, 2015, petitioner manifested that he has no evidence to present in CTA Case No. 8960. In the Resolution dated September 9, 2015, the Court in Division admitted some of the exhibits of respondent, and denied the admission of Exhibits "P-36-C", "P-36-L-1" to "P-36-L-78", "P-36-D-010232" to "P-36-D-010278", "P-36-D-020287" to "P-36-D-020332", and "P-36-D-110239" to "P-36-D-110335". On September 24, 2015, respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the said Resolution dated September 9, 2015, praying, among others, for the admission of Exhibits "P-36-C" and "P36-L-1" to "P-36-L-78". Petitioner failed to file his comment to respondent's Motion for Partial Reconsideration . In the Resolution dated December 4, 2015, the Court in Division granted respondent's Motion for Partial Reconsideration , and admitted Exhibits "P-36-C" and "P-36-L-1" to "P-36-L-78". CTA Case No. 8960 was declared submitted for decision on January 18, 2016, considering the filing of petitioner's Memorandum on October 9, 2015 and respondent's Memorandum on January 7, 2016. In the assailed Decision, 4 the Court in Division partially granted respondent's Petition for Review in CTA Case No. 8960, and ordered petitioner to refund or to issue a TCC in favor of respondent in the amount of P7,196,472.58, representing unutilized excess input VAT attributable to petitioner's zero-rated sales/receipts for the four quarters of calendar year 2012. AIDSTE On January 6, 2017, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration , 5 praying for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision. Respondent filed its Comment on the said Motion on February 23, 2017. 6 In the assailed Resolution, 7 the Court in Division denied petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration . On June 8, 2017, petitioner filed its Motion For Extension of Time To File Petition for Review before the Court En Banc, 8 praying for an extension of fifteen (15) days from June 14, 2017 or until June 29, 2017, within which to file his Petition for Review . Thus, the Court En Banc granted petitioner a final and non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days or until June 29, 2017, within which to file its Petition for Review . 9 Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on June 29, 2017, 10 praying that judgment be rendered reversing and setting aside the assailed Decision and Resolution. In the Resolution dated July 14, 2017, 11 the Court En Banc ordered respondent to file its Comment , within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Respondent then filed the said Comment on August 2, 2017. 12 Thereafter, the instant Petition for Review was submitted for decision on August 16, 2017. 13 Hence, this Decision. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR and THE ISSUE Petitioner respectively states the following assignment of error and the issue for the Court En Banc 's resolution, to wit: "THE SECOND DIVISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS PARTIALLY ENTITLED TO ITS CLAIM FOR TAX REFUND/TAX CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF P7,196,472.58, REPRESENTING ITS UNUTILIZED AND EXCESS INPUT VAT ATTRIBUTABLE TO ITS ZERO-RATED SALES/RECEIPTS FOR THE FOUR QUARTERS OF CALENDAR YEAR 2012." 14 "WHETHER OR NOT THE SECOND DIVISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS PARTIALLY ENTITLED TO ITS CLAIM FOR TAX REFUND/TAX CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF P7,196,472.58, REPRESENTING ITS UNUTILIZED AND EXCESS INPUT VAT ATTRIBUTABLE TO ITS ZERO-RATED SALES/RECEIPTS FOR THE FOUR QUARTERS OF CALENDAR YEAR 2012." 15 Petitioner's arguments: Petitioner argues that respondent's invoices and official receipts in support of its claimed input VAT failed to comply with the mandatory invoicing requirements under Section 113 (A) (B) of the 1997 Tax Code in relation to Section 237 of the same Code, and as implemented under Sections 4.110-8 and 4.113-1 of Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 16-05 and Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 42-2003. Moreover, according to petitioner, respondent's documentary exhibits ( i.e. , Invoices; Official Receipts; Certifications of Inward Remittances issued by the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company; SEC Certificate of Non-Registration of Company), which are presented in court as evidence to support its judicial claim for input VAT refund are all "hearsay evidence," hence, these documents have no probative value. Furthermore, petitioner avers that respondent's claim for refund is strictly construed against it for the same partakes the nature of tax exemption. Respondent's counter-arguments: Respondent counter-argues that petitioner did not point to any specific findings by the Court a quo but merely made a general and sweeping allegation that respondent's invoices and official receipts failed to comply with the invoicing requirements under the law and the regulations. According to respondent, the review and validation conducted by the court-appointed Independent Certified Public Accountant (ICPA), Ms. Myra O. Dabalos, likewise showed that respondent's input tax payments for the period of claim are duly substantiated and supported by official receipts and/or invoices which are in full compliance with the invoicing requirements under Section 113 of the Tax Code, as implemented by RR No. 16-2005 and other issuances. Respondent likewise submits that, apart from being a mere afterthought, as so judiciously observed by the Court a quo , petitioner's allegation of hearsay evidence also lacks basis. Moreover, respondent avers that as appropriately ruled by the Court a quo , respondent's sales invoices and official receipts are recognized commercial documents and should not be considered bereft of probative value. It is also the contention of respondent that its voluminous documentary evidence was duly presented under Rule 13 of the rules of this Court on the appointment of an ICPA and her examination of documents; and that the report of the ICPA was then duly presented to and considered by the Court a quo . THE COURT EN BANC 'S RULING The instant Petition for Review lacks merit. Petitioner fails to rebut the factual findings of the Court in Division. Petitioner invites the Court En Banc 's attention to review, re-evaluate and take a second hard look on the documentary evidence ( i.e. , VAT Invoices and Official Receipts), marked as Exhibits "P-36-D-010001 to P-36-D-010231", "P-36-D-20001 to P-36-D-020286", "P-36-D-030001 to P-36-D-030369", "P-36-D-040001 to P-36-D-040251", "P-36-D-050001 to P-36-D-050252", "P-36-D-060001 to P-36-D-060331", "P-36-D-070001 to P-36-D-070320", "P-36-D-080001 to P-36-D-080304", "P-36-D-090001 to P-36-D-090292", "P-36-D-100001 to P-36-D-100268", "P-36-D-110001 to P-36-D-110238", and "P-36-D-120001 to P-36-D-120284", presented by respondent in support of the partially granted input VAT refund, representing its unutilized excess input VAT attributable to its zero-rated sales/receipts for the four quarters of calendar year 2012, since these invoices and official receipts do not indicate in full the required information. Specifically, petitioner points out the following information which were not clearly indicated in the said invoices and official receipts, viz. : (i) the term "zero-rated sale" were not clearly written or printed prominently on the said invoices or official receipts; (ii) the said invoices or official receipts do not clearly indicate the break-down of the sale price between its taxable and zero-rated components; (iii) the name, business style, address and TIN of its purchaser, customer or client , in blatant violation of the mandatory invoicing requirements under Section 113 (A) (B) in relation to Section 237 of the Tax Code, and as implemented under Section 4.110-8 of RR No. 16-2005. We disagree with petitioner. The Court in Division has already scrutinized and examined respondent's supporting documents, such invoices and official receipts. This is clearly apparent in the assailed Decision, the pertinent portions of which read: "After careful scrutiny of the Independent CPA Report and [respondent]'s supporting documents, the Court finds that out of the P1,021,342.21 input VAT claim on domestic purchases of goods other than capital goods and P10,140,132.96 input VAT claim on domestic purchases of services totaling P11,161,475.17, the amount of P1,094,126.24 should be disallowed for not being properly substantiated by VAT invoices or receipts as prescribed under Sections 110(A) and 113(A) and (B) of the 1997 NIRC, in relation to Sections 4.110-1, 4.110-8, and 4.113-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 16-05, as amended. Below is the breakdown of the disallowed input VAT of P1,094,126.24: xxx xxx xxx With regard to the claimed P433,997.79 amortization of input VAT on purchases of capital goods exceeding P1Million, [respondent]'s Schedule of Input VAT Deferred shows that said amount arose from calendar years 2008 to 2012 purchases, as follows: xxx xxx xxx However, [respondent] failed to submit before this Court VAT invoices/official receipts in support of its claimed amortization of input tax from previous years in the amount of P395,966.70. In addition, the sales invoice supporting the purchase of 'Furniture Cliff, BSS & CMCP' during the CY 2012 reflects an input VAT of only P49,807.77, which is lower than the claimed amount of P99,615.54. Consequently, only the properly supported amount of P178,379.20 represents [respondent]'s valid input tax on purchases of capital goods exceeding P1Million and on the amount of P29,729.87 is creditable for CY 2012, computed as follows: xxx xxx xxx." Parenthetically, even upon a cursory examination by the Court En Banc of the Exhibits being questioned by petitioner, it shows that the same are composed not only of VAT Invoices and Official Receipts, but also of other documents, such as Check, Accounts Payable, and Journal Vouchers of respondent. Nevertheless, We are likewise convinced that the corresponding VAT Invoices and Official Receipts representing respondent's pertinent transactions, as found by the Court in Division, show compliance with the invoicing requirements of the law. Considering that the Court in Division made the above-stated specific findings after scrutiny of the ICPA Report and respondent's supporting documents which lead to the partial grant of respondent's Petition for Review in the case a quo , it behooves petitioner to specifically pinpoint which of the remaining VAT invoices or receipts of respondent failed to comply with the invoicing and accounting requirements under the law, and which of the required information on such VAT invoices or receipts is or are lacking. In other words, petitioner cannot merely issue a sweeping and unsubstantiated statement that certain invoices and official receipts of respondent are not compliant with the invoicing requirements of the law. The general averment of petitioner that respondent failed to comply with the said requirements cannot constitute a reversible error on the part of the Court in Division for being unsubstantiated, too vague, highly speculative, and uncertain. As between the above-stated findings of the Court in Division and the general averment of petitioner, the former must perforce prevail. Petitioner has already waived his right to object to respondent's evidence. To reiterate, according to petitioner, respondent's documentary exhibits ( i.e. , Invoices; Official Receipts; Certifications of Inward Remittances issued by the Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation and Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company; SEC Certificate of Non-Registration of Company), which are presented in court as evidence to support its judicial claim for input VAT refund are all "hearsay evidence," hence, these documents have no probative value. Petitioner is certainly mistaken. It is basic in the rule of evidence that objection to evidence must be made after the evidence is formally offered. In case of documentary evidence, offer is made after all the witnesses of the party making the offer have testified, specifying the purpose for which the evidence is being offered. It is only at this time, and not at any other, that objection to the documentary evidence may be made. 16 In Blas vs. Angeles-Hutalla , 17 the Supreme Court held: "The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as waived . In Tison v. Court of Appeals , the Supreme Court set out the applicable principle in the following terms: [F]or while the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners do not strictly conform to the rules on their admissibility, we are, however, of the considered opinion that the same may be admitted by reason of private respondents failure to interpose any timely objection thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence, otherwise, the objection shall be treated as waived , since the right to object is merely a privilege which the party may waive. As explained in Abrenica vs. Gonda, et al. , it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, otherwise, it will be deemed to have been waived . The proper time is when from the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from the presentation of the proof, the inadmissibility of the evidence is, or may be inferred. Thus, a failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform with the statute is a waiver of the provisions of the law. x x x ." (Emphases and underscoring supplied) In this case, it is noteworthy that petitioner failed to file any comment on, or object to any of the evidence offered in, respondent's Formal Offer of Evidence in CTA Case No. 8960. 18 Needless to state, after such formal offer, the inadmissibility of any of the evidence offered is or may already be inferred. Thus, for petitioner's failure to object to the admissibility of respondent's documentary evidence, he has effectively waived his right to object to do so. Such being the case, petitioner cannot now question the admissibility of the subject evidence for being hearsay. WHEREFORE , in light of the foregoing considerations, the Petition for Review is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated December 16, 2016 and the Resolution dated May 22, 2017, both rendered by the Court in Division in CTA Case No. 8960 are AFFIRMED . AaCTcI SO ORDERED. (SGD.) ERLINDA P. UY Associate Justice Juanito C. Castaeda, Jr., Lovell R. Bautista, Caesar A. Casanova and Catherine T. Manahan, JJ., concur. Roman G. del Rosario, P.J. , See Dissenting Opinion. Esperanza R. Fabon-Victorino and Cielito N. Mindaro-Grulla, JJ. , join Presiding Justice del Rosario's Dissenting Opinion. Ma. Belen M. Ringpis-Liban, J. , Inhibited. Separate Opinions DEL ROSARIO , P.J., dissenting opinion : With utmost respect, I am constrained to withhold my assent to the ponencia , denying for lack of merit, the Petition for Review filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR). I humbly submit that the Petition for Review filed by respondent before the Court in Division was belatedly filed, thus, depriving the Court in Division of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same. In refund cases, a taxpayer must prove not only his entitlement to a refund but also his compliance with the procedural due process as non-observance of the prescriptive periods within which to file the administrative and the judicial claims would result in the denial of the claim. 1 The procedure for value-added tax (VAT) refund claims is outlined in Section 112 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, as amended. Section 112 relevantly provides: "SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. xxx xxx xxx (C) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) hereof. In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals." (Boldfacing supplied) Pursuant to the afore-quoted provision, the CIR has 120 days from the submission of supporting documents to decide the claim for refund. In case of full or partial denial, or inaction of the CIR, the taxpayer may file an appeal with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) within thirty (30) days from receipt of the decision or from the lapse of the 120-day period. Compliance with both periods is jurisdictional. The period of 120 days is a prerequisite for the commencement of the 30-day period to appeal. 2 In Pilipinas Total Gas, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 3 the Supreme Court En Banc summarized the procedure for VAT refund claims filed prior to June 11, 2014, as in this case, viz .: "To summarize, for the just disposition of the subject controversy, the rule is that from the date an administrative claim for excess unutilized VAT is filed, a taxpayer has thirty (30) days within which to submit the documentary requirements sufficient to support his claim, unless given further extension by the CIR. Then, upon filing by the taxpayer of his complete documents to support his application, or expiration of the period given , the CIR has 120 days within which to decide the claim for tax credit or refund. Should the taxpayer, on the date of his filing, manifest that he no longer wishes to submit any other addition[al] documents to complete his administrative claim, the 120[-]day period allowed to the CIR begins to run from the date of filing. In all cases, whatever documents a taxpayer intends to file to support his claim must be completed within the two-year period under Section 112(A) of the NIRC. The 30-day period from denial of the claim or from the expiration of the 120-day period within which to appeal the denial or inaction of the CIR to the CTA must also be respected. It bears mentioning at this point that the foregoing summation of the rules should only be made applicable to those claims for tax credit or refund filed prior to June 11, 2014 , such as the claim at bench." (Boldfacing supplied) Elsewise stated, the 120-day period may be reckoned from any of the following dates, whichever may be applicable: 1. Date of filing of the administrative claim in cases where submission of complete documents was made upon such filing, or when the taxpayer plainly manifests that he no longer wishes to submit any other additional documents to complete his administrative claim; or 2. Date of submission of documents, which may be made within 30 days from the date of filing of the taxpayer's administrative claim, unless given further extension by the CIR; or 3. Date of expiration of 30 days from filing of the administrative claim, when complete documents did not accompany the administrative claim. The facts, as narrated in the ponencia , disclose that respondent's application for refund was filed on March 31, 2014 . Respondent submitted additional documents in support of its claim on July 28, 2014 [or way beyond thirty (30) days from date of filing of application for refund]. On December 23, 2014 , respondent filed its Petition for Review before the Court in Division on n There is nothing on record which would show that respondent's submission of supporting documents on July 28, 2014 was a result of BIR's prior request, or that such submission was made within the extended time allowed by the CIR. Applying Pilipinas Total Gas , respondent should have filed the additional supporting documents within thirty (30) days from March 31, 2014 (date of filing of the administrative claim) or until April 30, 2014. The CIR had until August 28, 2014 to act on the application for refund of respondent, and the latter, in turn, had thirty (30) days, or until September 27, 2014 to elevate the "deemed denial decision" of the CIR with the CTA by way of filing a Petition for Review. The filing of its Petition for Review only on December 23, 2014 with the CTA Division is clearly out of time thereby resulting in the finality of the "deemed denial decision" of the CIR on respondent's claim for refund. 4 While the issue of the reckoning point of the 120-day period was not raised before the CTA En Banc , the same cannot operate to vest the CTA with jurisdiction to act on respondent's judicial claim. In the language of Team Sual Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue/Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Team Sual Corporation: 5 "In any case, even if the CIR failed to raise the issue of TSC's noncompliance with the 120-day waiting period at the first instance, such failure would not operate to vest the CTA with jurisdiction over TSC's judicial claims for refund. The Court has already settled that a judicial claim for refund which does not comply with the 120-day mandatory waiting period renders the same void. As such, no right can be claimed or acquired from it, notwithstanding the failure of a party to raise it as a ground for dismissal . In San Roque , the Court expounded on such point, to wit : San Roque's failure to comply with the 120-day mandatory period renders its petition for review with the CTA void. Article 5 of the Civil Code provides, "Acts executed against provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity." San Roque's void petition for review cannot be legitimized by the CTA or this Court because Article 5 of the Civil Code states that such void petition cannot be legitimized "except when the law itself authorizes [its] validity." There is no law authorizing the petition's validity. It is hornbook doctrine that a person committing a void act contrary to a mandatory provision of law cannot claim or acquire any right from his void act. A right cannot spring in favor of a person from his own void or illegal act. This doctrine is repeated in Article 2254 of the Civil Code, which states, "No vested or acquired right can arise from acts or omissions which are against the law or which infringe upon the rights of others." For violating a mandatory provision of law in filing its petition with the CTA, San Roque cannot claim any right arising from such void petition. Thus, San Roque's petition with the CTA is a mere scrap of paper. (Emphasis supplied)" (Boldfacing supplied) The right to appeal is a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Fort Bonifacio Development Corporation , 6 so emphasizes: "The right to appeal is not a natural right. It is not part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. The failure to timely perfect an appeal cannot simply be dismissed as a mere technicality, for it is jurisdictional . . . . xxx xxx xxx It has been ruled that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional . The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right to appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. At the risk of being repetitious, We declare that the right to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the law." (Boldfacing supplied) As respondent's Petition for Review before the Court in Division was filed beyond the 120+30 day period, the CTA did not acquire jurisdiction over its judicial claim for VAT refund. All told, I vote to GRANT the Petition for Review of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and to REVERSE AND SET ASIDE the Decision dated December 16, 2016 and Resolution dated May 22, 2017 of the Court in Division in CTA Case No. 8960. Footnotes 1. EB Docket, pp. 5 to 18. 2. Penned by Associate Justice Juanito C. Castaeda, Jr., and concurred by Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova; EB Docket, pp. 21 to 49. 3. Supra ; EB Docket, pp. 51 to 60. 4. EB Docket, pp. 21 to 49; Division Docket Vol. II (CTA Case No. 8960), pp. 811 to 839. 5. Division Docket Vol. II (CTA Case No. 8960), pp. 842 to 852. 6. Division Docket Vol. II (CTA Case No. 8960), pp. 862 to 867. 7. EB Docket, pp. 51 to 60; Division Docket Vol. II (CTA Case No. 8960), pp. 870 to 879. 8. EB Docket, pp. 1 to 3. 9. Minute Resolution dated June 14, 2017, EB Docket, p. 4. 10. EB Docket, pp. 5 to 18. 11. EB Docket, pp. 62 to 63. 12. EB Docket, pp. 69 to 77. 13. Resolution dated August 16, 2017, EB Docket, pp. 128 to 129. 14. EB Docket, p. 8. 15. Ibid . 16. Westmont Investment Corporation vs. Francia, Jr., et al. , G.R. No. 194128, December 7, 2011. 17. G.R. No. 155594, September 27, 2004. 18. Division Docket Vol. II (CTA Case No. 8960), p. 624. DEL ROSARIO, P.J., dissenting opinion: 1. Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. , G.R. No. 184823, October 6, 2010. 2. Hedcor, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , G.R. No. 207575, July 15, 2015. 3. G.R. No. 207112, December 8, 2015. 4. CIR vs. Dash Engineering Philippines, Inc. , G.R. No. 184145, December 11, 2013. 5. G.R. Nos. 201225-26 and G.R. No. 201132, April 18, 2018. 6. G.R. No. 167606, August 11, 2010. n Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy.