Marine Fuels Phils., Inc. v. Secretary of Finance

SECOND DIVISION [C.T.A. CASE NO. 8330. August 8, 2014.] MARINE FUELS PHILIPPINES, INC. , petitioner , vs . SECRETARY OF FINANCE, representing the DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, and the COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS representing the BUREAU OF CUSTOMS , respondents . [C.T.A. CASE NO. 8332. August 8, 2014.] CHELSEA SHIPPING CORPORATION , petitioner , vs . THE HON. SECRETARY OF FINANCE, representing the DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, and the COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS representing the BUREAU OF CUSTOMS , respondents . RESOLUTION CASANOVA , J p : For this Court's resolution are the following: 1. Petitioner Marine Fuels Philippines, Inc.'s (MFPI) Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution , filed on May 13, 2014, with respondent's Comment (On Petitioner MFPI's Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution) filed on June 5, 2014; 2. Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration , filed through registered mail on May 15, 2014, with petitioner MFPI's Opposition (Re: Motion for Reconsideration dated 15 May 2014) filed on June 6, 2014. On August 1, 2014, respondents filed a Manifestation dated July 30, 2014, stating that by virtue of a shifting order issued by the Philippine Ports Authority MT Chelsea Enterprise has been shifted from Ship 9 to Ship 15, Isla Putting Bato wharft, North Harbor. Respondents' Manifestation dated July 30, 2014 is hereby NOTED . The Court shall first resolve petitioner MFPI's Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution which was adopted by petitioner Chelsea Shipping Corporation (CSC) in its Manifestation 1 filed on May 21, 2014. DTIcSH Petitioner MPFI, in its Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution , claims that the instant case is an action for injunction, alleging that the Petition for Review , granted in the Decision promulgated on April 29, 2014 prayed for a permanent injunction against the further detention and forfeiture of the subject cargo and M/T Chelsea Enterprise. According to petitioner MFPI, such grant of the Petition in the Decision , being an action for injunction, is immediately executory pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner MFPI adds that the immediately executory nature of a decision granting an injunction, especially a permanent one issued as part of the judgment, was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Converse Rubber Corporation vs. Jacinto Rubber & Plastics, Co., Inc. , 97 SCRA 158 (Converse case) wherein the High Court held that the enforcement of either final or preliminary-made-final injunctions in decision of trial courts are immediately executory. Petitioner MFPI likewise finds instructive the ruling in PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc., vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc., 485 SCRA 632 (PAL case) wherein the Supreme Court ruled that the actions involved in the questioned decision therein were indeed for injunction considering that on the basis of the title end the allegations contained in the complaint filed by the plaintiffs therein, the latter sought the enjoinment of the implementation of a certain cap on salary deductions. In view of the foregoing, petitioner MFPI, joined by petitioner CSC, pray that, as a matter of right and invoking the ministerial duty of the Court, a Writ of Execution must be issued for the immediate release of the subject cargo and M/T Chelsea Enterprise. Finally, petitioner MFPI argues that it is not disputed and it is a matter previously made known in writing to the Court that the continued detention of the subject vessel and its volatile cargo of 220 MT of Industrial Diesel Oil (IDO) for over three (3) years now since its seizure has caused the severe depreciation of the subject vessel rendering the same unsafe. According to petitioner MFPI, the current condition of the subject vessel which is laden with 220 MT of IDO, a corrosive and volatile cargo, docked in the busy Port of Manila allegedly poses a grave risk and imminent danger to public safety. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that petitioner MFPI's motion must be denied on the ground that the Petition is not a case for injunction which may be immediately executed pending appeal. According to the respondents, the prayer in the Petition filed by petitioner MFPI centers primarily on the reversal and nullification of the 2nd Indorsement dated July 28, 2011 and 3rd Indorsement dated July 30, 2011 of respondent Secretary of Finance, and the consequent release of M/T Chelsea Enterprise and its oil cargo. Clearly, the supposed injunction upon respondents takes place only after the positive act of releasing the vessel. CAHTIS Moreover, respondents allege that the cases cited by petitioner MFPI are not on all fours with the case at bar. Unlike in this case, the Converse and PAL cases allegedly involve the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction by the respective courts in said cases. Respondents point out that in this case, no preliminary injunctive relief was issued by the Court that can be considered immediately executory and simply made final after hearing on the merits as contemplated in the Converse case. Respondents further contend that the actions pertaining to the respondents are not proper for injunction inasmuch as the same had already been accomplished prior to the filing of the petition. Otherwise stated, there are no impending or continuing acts on the part of respondents that can be restrained by an injunctive writ. Indeed, during the entire proceedings of this case, the subject vessel and its cargo remain forfeited in favor of the government and no motion to release the same had been granted by the Court. At the outset, Section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides as follows: SEC. 4. Judgments not stayed by appeal. Judgments in actions for injunction , receivership, accounting and support, and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall be enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken therefrom , unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in its discretion may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting the injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support. (Emphasis supplied.) From the foregoing, a judgment on an action for injunction is immediately executory and not stayed by appeal. The question how is whether or not the instant case can be considered as a main action for injunction which is enforceable after their rendition. The grant of a final injunction finds basis in Section 9 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court which provides as follows: SEC. 9. When final injunction granted. If upon the trial of the action it appears that the plaintiff is entitled to have the act complained of permanently enjoined, the court shall grant a final injunction perpetually restraining the defendant from the commission or continuance of the act or confirming the preliminary mandatory injunction. An action for injunction, therefore, is as it has always been, a recognized remedy in this country. It is, as above intimated, a suit which has for its purpose the enjoinment of the defendant, perpetually or for a particular time, from the commission or continuance of a specific act, or his compulsion to continue performance of a particular act. It has an independent existence. It is similar to the special, civil action of prohibition under Rule 65, except that the latter, in common with other special civil actions, deals with special matters requiring a special procedure, i.e. , it is concerned with public officers or entities performing public duties: tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons exercising functions judicial or ministerial, whereas the former, an ordinary suit, generally involves acts and transactions of private individuals. 2 In this case, the consolidated Petitions for Review were filed by petitioners MFPI and CSC praying for this Court: 1. to reverse and nullify the 2nd Indorsement dated July 28, 2011 issued by the Secretary of Finance and the 3rd Indorsement dated July 30, 2011 of the Commissioner of Customs; and EcTaSC 2. to reinstate the Decision dated June 30, 2011 of the Commissioner of Customs finding that the subject cargo allegedly composed of 220 Metric Tons (MT) of Industrial Diesel Oil (IDO), more or less, and Marine Tugboat (M/T) Chelsea Enterprise, should be released; thereby, permanently enjoining respondents Secretary of Finance and Bureau of Customs (BOC), their subordinates, personnel and agents, or any other person from further detaining and forfeiting the subject cargo and M/T Chelsea Enterprise in favor of the government. It is clear from the foregoing that the prayer to permanently enjoin respondents from further detaining and forfeiting the subject cargo and M/T Chelsea Enterprise in favor of the government is merely anchored on petitioners MFPI and CSC's appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Finance. Notably, the Court, in rendering the Decision , exercised its jurisdiction over appeals from the Decision of the Secretary of Finance under Section 7 (a) (6) of Republic Act (RA) No. 1125 as amended by RA No. 9282 which does not include the jurisdiction to rule on actions for injunction. Section 7 (a) (6) of RA No. 1125, as amended by RA No. 9282 reads: SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. The CTA shall exercise: (a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided: xxx xxx xxx (6) Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review, from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs which are adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code; Thus, it cannot be said that the Decision promulgated on April 29, 2014 granting the appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Finance is a decision on an action for injunction. Furthermore, let it be clarified that the Court granted the Petitions for Review filed by petitioners MFPI and CSC by ordering the release of the subject cargo and M/T Chelsea Enterprise as mentioned in the Decision . After finality of the said Decision , its execution will, as a matter of course, enjoin respondents from further detaining and forfeiting the subject cargo and M/T Chelsea Enterprise in favor of the government. Clearly, in granting the appeal filed by petitioners MFPI and CSC in its Decision , the Court addressed and passed upon the prayer to enjoin respondents from further detaining the subject cargo and M/T Chelsea Enterprise without treating the instant case as an action for injunction. Considering that the Decision dated April 29, 2014 is a decision on the appeal from the ruling of the Secretary of Finance, which is not one of those judgments enforceable after their rendition as provided under Section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, petitioner MFPI's prayer for the immediate execution of the said Decision must be denied for lack of merit. As to respondents' Motion for Reconsideration , respondents assail the Decision promulgated by this Court on April 29, 2014, alleging that M/T Chelsea Enterprise and its oil cargo remain liable for seizure and forfeiture under the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCCP). Respondents allege that there is still no proof of actual purchase of any IDO from Petron intended for delivery to M/T China Venture. Respondents also aver that petitioner MFPI's explanation that it only encountered certain delivery constraints while in transit, which compelled petitioner MFPI to simply divert 220 MT of petroleum products to M/T China Venture instead of delivering the same to the four (4) different foreign vessels originally supposed to receive the same is insufficient to overcome the burden of proof established under Section 2535 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines. HCITAS Likewise, respondents point out that the absence of any document showing the actual source of the subject oil cargo, as well as the details of shipment, at the time of seizure contradicts the claim of petitioner MFPI that while M/T Chelsea Enterprise was on its way to deliver specific quantities of petroleum products to four (4) foreign vessels, it had to divert said products instead to M/T China Venture due to operation constraints. According to respondents, the belated presentation of such documents only during the forfeiture proceedings raises questions on the truthfulness of petitioner MFPI's explanation. Respondents also argue that the alleged urgency caused by petitioner MFPI's operational constraints is rendered doubtful by the bunkering permit. In addition, respondents allege that there was actually no "operational constraints" caused by the purported late arrival of M/V Nashwan on January 16, 2011 considering that its estimated date of arrival is up to January 18, 2011 while the estimated date of loading in the Petron purchase order is January 16, 2011. In view thereof, respondents believe that the alleged "operational constraints" is simply an afterthought designed to justify the suspicious transfer of unidentified oil cargo to M/T China Venture. Respondents furthermore posit that there is still no purchase document issued by Petron referring to IDO's intended for delivery to M/T China Venture since the delivery notes, invoices, certifications and correspondence presented allegedly refer to the vessels M/V Eastern Sky, M/V Golden Venus, M/V Nashwan, and M/V Amber Halo, and do not mention anything about the local bound vessel M/T China Venture. Respondents argue that if these documents prove that the oil cargo physically on board M/T Chelsea at the time of seizure are the same petroleum products indicated in the said documents, it should have been readily available at the time M/T Chelsea Enterprise was transporting the subject oil cargo to MT China Venture, which is a locally bound vessel. Lastly, respondents contend that the purported results of the laboratory tests presented by petitioner MFPI do not show categorical identity in all the characteristics of Petron's IDO and the oil cargo loaded on M/T Chelsea Enterprise. Petitioner MFPI opposes the Motion for Reconsideration , interposing the following arguments: 1. The Motion for Reconsideration is utterly pro forma , a mere scrap of paper that did not toll the reglementary period of appeal. Thus, the Decision dated April 29, 2014 ("Decision") of the Honorable Court is now final and immediately executory. A. The Motion for Reconsideration is a mere reiteration of the same arguments previously raised by respondents which the Honorable Court has already considered, weighed and exhaustively passed upon. B. The Motion for Reconsideration further failed to specifically point out the findings or conclusions in the Decision which are allegedly not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law. Indeed, the Honorable Court correctly appreciated the uncontroverted evidence of petitioner MFPI by ruling in favor of the latter. 2. Even assuming that the Motion for Reconsideration may be considered, the same must nevertheless be denied for failing to present any cogent reason to warrant a reversal of the Decision . A. The Honorable Court properly appreciated the uncontroverted evidence presented by petitioner MFPI which proved that there was no importation of the 220 Metric Tons of IDO from M/T Chelsea Enterprise to M/T China Venture. Hence, petitioner MFPI did not violate Section 2530 (A), (B), (F), (K), (L) and subparagraphs (3), (4) and (5) in relation to Section 3602 of the TCCP. IEcDCa 1. Respondents do not even refute the Honorable Court's finding that petitioner MFPI is not engaged in the importation of petroleum. In fact, various government certifications confirm that M/T Chelsea Enterprise never left Philippine territory during the dates material to the instant case. 2. Contrary to the argument of respondents that there is supposedly no proof of actual purchase of any IDO from Petron Corporation ("Petron") intended for delivery to M/T China Venture, the Honorable Court properly found that the evidence show that the subject cargo was locally obtained by petitioner MFPI from Petron. B. The Honorable Court properly ruled that the delivery by M/T Chelsea Enterprise of the subject cargo to M/T China Venture is a domestic sale, a finding which respondents do not assail in their Motion for Reconsideration . 3. Significantly, respondents do not even refute the Honorable Court's finding that there was no illegal importation of the crude oil used in the manufacture of the subject cargo, which effectively affirmed the ruling of respondent Bureau of Customs ("BOC") that the government was not deprived of any lawful revenue from the subject transaction. Petitioner MPFI's opposition was likewise adopted by petitioner CSC as per its Manifestation filed on June 16, 2014. 3 Perusal of respondents' Motion for Reconsideration reveals that the arguments contained therein are mere reiteration of the allegations interposed in their Memorandum filed on September 19, 2013 which the Court has already addressed and passed upon in the assailed Decision . Accordingly, a detailed discussion addressing the arguments in the Motion for Reconsideration is not necessary. The Motion for Reconsideration primarily assails this Court's appreciation of the evidence presented by petitioners MFPI and CSC, alleging that the evidence failed to overturn the burden of proof established under Section 2535 of the TCCP. However, to reiterate the ruling in the assailed Decision , while the Court shares the observations made by respondents regarding the inconsistencies on some of the evidence presented by petitioners, the rest of the evidence, however, were found sufficient to prove that there was no importation of the subject cargo from M/T Chelsea Enterprise to M/T China Ventures. In finding, for the petitioners, the Court made a thorough examination of the evidence presented and found what actually transpired before the seizure of the subject vessel which supported the Court's conclusion that there was actually no importation of the subject IDO in this case. Thus, the Court is correct in ordering the release of the subject IDO and M/T Chelsea Enterprise. In view of respondents' failure to raise matters which would warrant the reversal of this Court's ruling in the assailed Decision , the Court has no other recourse but to deny respondents' Motion for Reconsideration for being unmeritorious. On the other hand, the Court cannot sustain petitioner MFPI's allegation that the Motion for Reconsideration is utterly pro forma , and that it did not toll the reglementary period of appeal, thus, making the Decision dated April 29, 2014 of the Court final and immediately executory. ECDaAc A motion for reconsideration shall point out specifically the findings and conclusions of the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings and conclusions. 4 In the case of Marikina Valley Development Corporation, et al. vs. Flojo , 5 the supreme Court held that a motion for reconsideration, when sufficient in form and substance that is, when it satisfies the requirements of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court interrupts the running of the period to perfect an appeal. A motion for reconsideration that does not comply with those requirements will, upon the other hand, be treated as pro forma intended merely to delay the proceedings and as such, the motion will not stay or suspend the reglementary period. The net result will be dismissal of the appeal for having been unseasonably filed. In this case, while the Court agrees with petitioner MFPI that respondents' Motion for Reconsideration contains allegation similar to the arguments interposed in their Memorandum which were already passed upon in the assailed Decision , such finding, however, does not automatically make the Motion pro forma . In the same case of Marikina Valley Development Corporation , the High Court explained that a motion for reconsideration which concerns with issues already resolved by the trial court does not necessarily mean that the motion is pro forma and that the movant is often confined to the amplification or further discussion of the same issues already passed upon by the trial court. The pertinent portion of the said case reads: It should, however, be noted that the circumstance that a motion for reconsideration deals with the same issues and arguments posed and resolved by the trial court in its decision does not necessarily mean that the motion must be characterized as merely pro forma . The Supreme Court further mentioned that more than two (2) decades ago, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes had occasion, in Guerra Enterprises Company, Inc. v. Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur , to point out that a pleader preparing a motion for reconsideration must of necessity address the arguments made or accepted by the trial court in its decision : ". . . . Among the ends to which a motion for reconsideration is addressed, one is precisely to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to the law or the evidence (Rule 37, Section 1, subsection [c]); and in doing so, the movant has to dwell of necessity upon the issues passed upon by the court. If a motion for reconsideration may not discuss these issues, the consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial. We find in the Rules of Court no warrant for ruling to that effect, a ruling that would, in effect eliminate subsection (c) of Section 1 of Rule 37." ( Emphases supplied ) The movant is very often confined to the amplification or further discussion of the same issues already passed upon by the trial court. Otherwise, his remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision, but a new trial or some other remedy. 6 HEIcDT Moreover, contrary to petitioner MFPI's allegation that the Motion for Reconsideration failed to specifically point out the findings or conclusions in the Decision which are allegedly not supported by the evidence or which are contrary to law, an examination of the Motion shows that it specifically discussed and assailed the findings of facts in the Court's Decision from which the reversal of the ruling of the Secretary of Finance was primarily based. As can be gleaned from the previously cited arguments in respondents' Motion for Reconsideration , respondents have sufficiently raised the issues which they wanted to be reconsidered, interposing their own appreciation of the evidence presented by petitioners in this case. Considering that the Motion for Reconsideration is not merely a pro forma motion, petitioner MFPI's allegation that the filing of the said Motion did not toll the running of the reglementary period of appeal, and thus, making the Decision promulgated on April 29, 2014 of the Court final and immediately executory is clearly bereft of merit. WHEREFORE , premises considered, petitioners' Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution , filed on May 13, 2014, and respondents' Motion for Reconsideration , filed through registered mail on May 15, 2014, are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED . (SGD.) CAESAR A. CASANOVA Associate Justice Juanito C. Castaeda, Jr. and Amelia R. Cotangco-Manalastas, JJ., concur. Footnotes 1. Docket, vol. VII, pp. 3648-3649. 2. Manila Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al. , G.R. No. L-45961, July 3, 1990. 3. Docket, vol. VII, pp. 3738-3741. 4. Section 2 of Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. 5. G.R. No. 110801, December 8, 1995. 6. Marikina Valley Development Corporation, et al. vs. Hon. Napoleon R. Flojo, supra note 5.