Toledo Power Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION [C.T.A. CASE NOS. 7233 & 7294. December 1, 2010.] TOLEDO POWER COMPANY , petitioner , vs . COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondent . AMENDED DECISION CASANOVA , J p : On December 15, 2009, this Court rendered a Decision partially granting petitioner's claim for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate in the amount of P185,395.11, representing petitioner's unutilized input value-added tax (VAT) from domestic purchases of taxable goods and services, and importation of goods attributable to zero-rated sales for the first and second quarters of taxable year 2003. On January 6, 2010, petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration (With Motion for Leave to Submit Supplemental Evidence) of the said Decision , while respondent filed his Opposition (Re: Motion for Partial Reconsideration) on January 18, 2010. On January 19, 2010, respondent likewise filed his Motion for Partial Reconsideration and petitioner filed its Comment (To Respondent's Motion for Partial Reconsideration dated January 18, 2010) on February 18, 2010. Both parties seek the reconsideration of this Court's Decision promulgated on December 15, 2009, the dispositive portion of which reads: " WHEREFORE , premises considered, the consolidated Petitions for Review are hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED in the reduced amount of P185,395.11. Accordingly, respondent is ORDERED to refund or issue a tax credit certificate in the amount of P185,395.11 in favor of petitioner representing its unutilized input VAT for the 1st and 2nd quarters of taxable year 2003. SO ORDERED. " Petitioner anchors its Motion on the following grounds: "A. PETITIONER HAS SHOWN BY SUFFICIENT AND UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE THAT IT IS A GENERATION COMPANY SUBJECT TO ZERO PERCENT VAT. AaCTcI B. PETITIONER HAS PRESENTED AMPLE AND UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS DULY VERIFIED AND EXAMINED BY THE COURT-COMMISSIONED INDEPENDENT CPA TO PROPERLY SUBSTANTIATE THE CLAIM FOR REFUND OF UNUTILIZED INPUT VAT AMOUNTING TO P6,023,630.94." 1 In support of its argument, petitioner claims that the attachment of the Energy Regulatory Commission's (ERC) Certificate of Compliance (COC) to the Petition for Review disproves this Court's findings that such document was not made of record. Petitioner also contends that this Court should have taken judicial notice of the fact that petitioner is a generation company whose sales of generated power is zero-rated for VAT purposes. Lastly, petitioner states that its alleged failure to present the ERC COC should not be deemed fatal to its claim considering that it was able to present sufficient and uncontested evidence, apart from the said ERC COC, that it is a generation company. In support of its second argument, petitioner contends that the presentation of both the invoices and official receipts supporting the zero-rated sales is not required by the prevailing law in effect at the time the input VAT were incurred. Further, petitioner argues that law and revenue regulations do not provide that failure to reflect or indicate in the invoices or receipts of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) authority to print, as well as the "TIN-V", would result in the outright invalidation of these invoices or receipts. Respondent, in his Opposition , counter-argues that this Court cannot consider the ERC COC since it has been an elementary rule that evidence not formally offered is inadmissible and has no probative value. Furthermore, respondent stresses that in an action for refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to refund, and failure to sustain the burden is fatal to the claim for refund. And finally, respondent reiterates that claims for refund are construed strictly against the claimant. Respondent, on the other hand, anchors his Motion for Partial Reconsideration on the following ground: "THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN PARTIALLY GRANTING PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR REFUND IN THE REDUCED AMOUNT OF P185,395.11 ALLEGEDLY REPRESENTING UNUTILIZED INPUT VAT FOR THE FIRST AND SECOND QUARTERS OF TAXABLE YEAR 2003, BECAUSE PETITIONER HAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY PROVEN ITS ENTITLEMENT TO REFUND AND THAT THE CLAIM WAS NOT FILED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY LAW." In support of his argument, respondent avers that in order to substantiate petitioner's claim for refund, it is imperative for petitioner to prove that it has complied with the registration requirements of a value-added taxpayer in compliance with Section 6 (a) and (b) of Revenue Regulations No. 6-97, in relation to Section 4.107-1 (a) of Revenue Regulations No. 7-95, and Section 236 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997. According to respondent, petitioner failed to show that its purchases of goods and services were made in the course of its trade or business. Moreover, respondent argues that it is the responsibility of a taxpayer seeking refund to comply with Section 2 (c) (1) (2) (4) of Revenue Regulations No. 3-88, which requires the filing of a photocopy of the purchase invoice or receipt evidencing the value-added tax paid together with the application for refund. AaSHED In his Motion , respondent also interposes that this Court had no jurisdiction to act on the Petitions for Review. In support of said argument, respondent cites Section 112 (D) of the NIRC of 1997, which provides that respondent has 120 days within which to process claims for refund of unutilized input tax, to wit: "SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. xxx xxx xxx (D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with Subsections (A) and (B) hereof. In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals." Based on the above-cited provision, respondent asserts that petitioner should give respondent 120 days to process its claim for refund. Petitioner can appeal to this Court within thirty (30) days after the expiration of the 120-day period or from the receipt of the decision of respondent denying its claim for refund. According to respondent, since petitioner did not submit complete documents in support of its administrative claim for refund as stated by Section 112 (D) of the NIRC of 1997, the 120-day period started to run on December 23, 2004, the day when it filed its administrative claim for refund. Hence, the 30-day period within which to file the Petition for Review before this Court commenced on April 23, 2005 and ended on May 22, 2005. Respondent points out that the Petition for Review filed on April 22, 2005 2 was prematurely filed; while the Petition for Review filed on July 22, 2005 3 was belatedly filed. Consequently, this Court had no jurisdiction to act on the said petitions. Petitioner, in its Comment, has the following counter-arguments: (1) petitioner has sufficiently proven its entitlement to a refund of unutilized input VAT amounting to P6,032,630.94, through sufficient and uncontroverted pieces of evidence which comply with the requirements of the Tax Code and existing regulations; and (2) petitioner's claim for refund has been timely filed, in accordance with the provisions of the Tax Code. This Court finds merit in respondent's argument that this Court has no jurisdiction to act on the Petitions for Review filed by petitioner. In computing the two-year prescriptive period for claiming refund or issuance of tax credit certificate, the applicable provision is Section 112 (A) of the NIRC of 1997, which provides: "SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. (A) Zero-rated or Effectively Zero-rated Sales. Any VAT-registered person, whose sales are zero-rated or effectively zero-rated may, within two (2) years after the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made , apply for the issuance of a tax credit certificate or refund of creditable input tax due or paid attributable to such sales, except transitional input tax, to the extent that such input tax has not been applied against output tax: Provided, however, That in the case of zero-rated sales under Section 106(A)(2)(a)(1), (2) and (B) and Section 108 (B)(1) and (2), the acceptable foreign currency exchange proceeds thereof had been duly accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP): Provided, further, That where the taxpayer is engaged in zero-rated or effectively zero-rated sale and also in taxable or exempt sale of goods or properties or services, and the amount of creditable input tax due or paid cannot be directly and entirely attributed to any one of the transactions, it shall be allocated proportionately on the basis of the volume of sales." (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the two-year period should be reckoned from the close of the taxable quarter when the sales were made. EDATSC As held in the assailed Decision , the present claim pertains to unutilized input VAT from domestic purchases of taxable goods and services, and importation of goods attributable to zero-rated sales for the first and second quarters of taxable year 2003. Reckoned from March 31, 2003 and June 30, 2003, the close of each taxable quarter covering the first and second quarters of taxable year 2003, petitioner had until March 31, 2005 and June 30, 2005, respectively, within which to file its administrative claim. Hence, petitioner's administrative claim for refund/tax credit filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on December 23, 2004 was filed on time. However, notwithstanding the timely filing of petitioner's administrative claim, this Court has no jurisdiction over the instant Petitions for Review. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc., 4 Section 112 (D) of the NIRC clearly provides that the Revenue Commissioner has "120 days, from the date of the submission of the complete documents in support of the application [for tax refund/credit]," within which to grant or deny the claim. In case of full or partial denial, the taxpayer's recourse is to file an appeal before the CTA within 30 days from receipt of the decision of the Revenue Commissioner. However, if after the 120-day period respondent fails to act on the application for tax refund/credit, the remedy of the taxpayer is to appeal the inaction of the Revenue Commissioner to the CTA within 30 days. In the instant case, the administrative claim was filed on December 23, 2004, but the judicial claims for refund/tax credit for the first and second quarters of taxable year 2003 were filed by petitioner on April 22, 2005 and July 22, 2005, respectively. Applying the ruling in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. to the instant case, this Court finds that the Petition for Review filed on April 22, 2005 was filed prematurely, while the Petition for Review filed on July 22, 2005 was filed beyond the period provided under Section 112 (D) of the NIRC of 1997. Clearly, this Court has no jurisdiction over the consolidated case. In light of the foregoing considerations, this Court finds legal basis in granting respondent's Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Decision dated December 15, 2009 and in rendering this Amended Decision pursuant to Section 3, Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals. WHEREFORE , respondent's Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED ; while petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. This Court's Decision promulgated on December 15, 2009 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE . Accordingly, petitioner's claim for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate for its unutilized input VAT for the first quarter of taxable year 2003 filed on April 22, 2005 and docketed as CTA Case No. 7233, is hereby DISMISSED for being prematurely filed. Likewise, petitioner's claim for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate for its unutilized input VAT for the second quarter of taxable year 2003 filed on July 22, 2005 and docketed as CTA Case No. 7294 is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed beyond the period provided by law. SO ORDERED. DaAIHC (SGD.) CAESAR A. CASANOVA Associate Justice Ernesto D. Acosta, P.J. , concurs. Lovell R. Bautista, J. , with dissenting opinion. Separate Opinions BAUTISTA , J., dissenting opinion : The Court in resolving the respondent's Motion for Partial Reconsideration disposed of the case as follows: WHEREFORE , respondent's Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED ; while petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. This Court's Decision promulgated on December 15, 2009 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE . Accordingly, petitioner's claim for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate for its unutilized input VAT for the first quarter of taxable year 2003 filed on April 22, 2005 and docketed as CTA Case No. 7233, is hereby DISMISSED for being prematurely filed. Likewise, petitioner's claim for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate for its unutilized input VAT for the second quarter of taxable year 2003 filed on July 22, 2005 and docketed as CTA Case No. 7294 is hereby DISMISSED for having been filed beyond the period provided by law. SO ORDERED. With all due respect to the members of this Court, I must express my dissent from the majority opinion as it now orders the dismissal of the present Petitions for Review. I remain firm in my position that a taxpayer-claimant no longer has to wait for the denial of the claim by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue or even the inaction after the expiration of the 120-day period before it can exercise its right to appeal with this Court, 1 for claims for refund or tax credit, both in the administrative and judicial claims must be filed within the two (2)-year period. 2 Otherwise, no appeal to this Court beyond the 2-year period can be resorted to. 3 The judicial recourse to this Court by a taxpayer-claimant within thirty (30) days, either from the lapse of the one hundred twenty (120)-day period within which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue shall decide on the claim, or after the receipt of the decision denying the same, pursuant to Section 112 (C) 4 of the 1997 National Internal Revenue Code ("NIRC"), as amended, is directory and permissive, and not mandatory nor jurisdictional, as long as it is made within the 2-year prescriptive period prescribed under Sections 112 and 229 of the same Code. 5 The word "may" when used in a statute commonly denotes that it is directory in nature. 6 Further, the same term is generally permissive only and operates to confer discretion. 7 The permissiveness of the action is evident in Section 112 (C) stating: SEC. 112. Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax. . . . (C) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. . . . DEcTCa In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty-day period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals. (Boldfacing supplied) On the other hand, Section 229 of the 1997 NIRC explicitly provides: SEC. 229. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. . . . In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment: . . . (Boldfacing supplied) Section 112 (C) therefore merely provides that the taxpayer affected "may," or has the discretion within 30 days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the 120-day period to exercise his or her right to file a judicial claim with this Court, provided that such judicial claim is filed pursuant to the settled 2-year prescriptive period under Section 229. The Court En Banc had previously ruled on this issue. In the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Toledo Power, Inc. , 8 it was held that: It is true that Section 112(D) [now Section 112(C)] of the abovementioned provision applies to the present case. However, what the petitioner failed to consider is Section 112(A) of the same provision. The respondent is also covered by the two (2) year prescriptive period. We have repeatedly held that the claim for refund with the BIR and the subsequent appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals must be filed within the two-year period. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held in the case of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the two-year prescriptive period for filing a claim for input tax is reckoned from the date of the filing of the quarterly VAT return and payment of the tax due. If the said period is about to expire but the BIR has not yet acted on the application for refund, the taxpayer may interpose a petition for review with this Court within the two year period. In the case of Gibbs vs. Collector, the Supreme Court held that if, however, the Collector (now Commissioner) takes time in deciding the claim, and the period of two years is about to end, the suit or proceeding must be started in the Court of Tax Appeals before the end of the two-year period without awaiting the decision of the Collector. Furthermore, in the case of Commissioner of Customs and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. The Honorable Court of Tax Appeals and Planters Products, Inc. , the Supreme Court held that the taxpayer need not wait indefinitely for a decision or ruling which may or may not be forthcoming and which he has no legal right to expect. It is disheartening enough to a taxpayer to keep him waiting for an indefinite period of time for a ruling or decision of the Collector (now Commissioner) of Internal Revenue on his claim for refund. It would make matters more exasperating for the taxpayer if we were to close the doors of the courts of justice for such a relief until after the Collector (now Commissioner) of Internal Revenue, would have, at his personal convenience, given his go signal. DIESaC This Court ruled in several cases that once the petition is filed, the Court has already acquired jurisdiction over the claims and the Court is not bound to wait indefinitely for no reason for whatever action respondent (herein petitioner) may take. At stake are claims for refund and unlike disputed assessments, no decision of respondent (herein petitioner) is required before one can go to this Court. (Boldfacing supplied) The case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation 9 had also laid emphasis on this issue, to wit: It bears stressing that the use of the word "may" in the afore-quoted provision indicates that judicial recourse within thirty days after the lapse of the 120-day period is directory and permissive and not mandatory nor jurisdictional as long as the said period is within the 2-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC. It is a well-settled doctrine in statutory construction that the word "may" when used in a statute, is permissive and operates to confer discretion; it cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect. Corollary thereto, the Honorable Court of Appeals has ruled that when the 2-year prescriptive period is about to prescribe and the claim for refund with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue has not been acted upon by him, for the protection of the interest of the taxpayer, the latter should file a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals within the said 2-year period; otherwise, if the decision of the Commissioner is adverse to the taxpayer and it was made after the 2-year period, he can no longer appeal the same to the Court of Tax Appeals. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated in this wise: "It appears therefore, that it is not necessary for the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to first act unfavorably on the claim for refund before the Court of Tax Appeals could validly take cognizance of the case . This is so because of the positive mandate of Section 230 of the Tax Code and also by virtue of the doctrine that the delay of the Commissioner in rendering his decision does not extend the reglementary period prescribed by statute. Incidentally, the taxpayer could not be faulted for taking advantage of the full two-year period set by law for filing his claim for refund. Indeed, no provision in the tax code requires that the claim for refund be filed at the earliest instance in order to give the Commissioner an opportunity to rule on it and the court to review the ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on appeal. The law fixed the same period two years for filing a claim for refund with the Commissioner (Sec. 204, par. 3), and for filing of suit in court (Sec. 230), unlike in protests of assessment under Sec. 229 which fixed the period (thirty days from receipt of the decision) before an appeal could be made in court. Indeed, only the latter case presupposes the existence of a prior decision of the Commissioner which could be subjected to review by the court. In fact, the Court of Tax Appeals itself acknowledges that the claim for refund with the Commissioner could be pending simultaneously with a suit for refund filed before the former (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands as Liquidator of Paramount Acceptance Corporation and the Court of Tax Appeals, CA-G.R. SP No. 34102, September 19, 1994)." (Boldfacing supplied) And notably in the case of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 10 the Supreme Court elucidated as follows: Although the taxpayer's refundable or creditable input VAT may not be considered as illegally or erroneously collected, its refund/credit is a privilege extended to qualified and registered taxpayers by the very VAT system adopted by the Legislature. Such input VAT, the same as any illegally or erroneously collected national internal revenue tax, consists of monetary amounts which are currently in the hands of the government but must rightfully be returned to the taxpayer. Therefore, whether claiming refund/credit of illegally or erroneously collected national internal revenue tax, or input VAT, the taxpayer must be given equal opportunity for filing and pursuing its claim. Therefore, the appeal of the petitioner to this Court for the first quarter of taxable year 2003 on April 22, 2005, docketed as CTA Case No. 7233, and also the appeal made for the second quarter of the same taxable year on July 22, 2005, docketed as CTA Case No. 7294, after filing its administrative claim for refund on December 23, 2004, were made well within the prescribed period. aAEIHC Likewise, I uphold that the reckoning of the 2-year prescriptive period provided under Section 112 (A) of the 1997 NIRC within which to file a claim for refund or tax credit must be counted not from the close of the pertinent quarter when the sales were made as pronounced in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (formerly Southern Energy Quezon, Inc.) 11 ("Mirant Case") , but from the date of filing of the relevant return as enunciated in the case of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue 12 ("Atlas Case") . In the case at bench, when petitioner filed its administrative claim for refund on unutilized input VAT attributable to zero-rated sales for the first and second quarters of taxable year 2003 with the BIR on December 3, 2004, and its Petitions for Review before this Court on April 22, 2005 and July 22, 2005, respectively, the well-established ruling then is that embodied in the Atlas Case. In the case of JIDECO Manufacturing Philippines, Inc. v. CIR , 13 the Court En Banc affirmed the matter as follows: As we have already elucidated in our Resolution dated July 20, 1998 in the case of Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 5296, the two-year prescriptive period for the filing of claims for VAT refund should be reckoned from the date of filing of the corresponding quarterly VAT returns in order to harmonize the provisions of Section 112(B) of the NIRC of 1997 with Sections 114(A) and 229 of the same Code. xxx xxx xxx In the cases of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. TMX Sales, Inc. and the Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83736, dated January 15, 1992 and ACCRA Investments Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 204 SCRA 957, the Supreme Court held that the two (2)-year period should be counted from the filing of the final income tax return, because it is only during that date that the exact tax liability or refundability of the tax can be determined. In the same manner, it is only after the filing of the quarterly VAT return that we can determine the VAT liability or refundability of VAT. It should be noted that the basic requirement is that VAT refund can only be granted to the extent that the input taxes have not been applied against output tax. All these matters can only be determined if a return is filed. It is logical therefore, that the two-year period should not immediately be counted from the close of the quarter but from the prescribed date of filing of the VAT return. 14 Taxpayers and litigants relied in good faith on the afore-quoted jurisprudence, and it would be the height of injustice to apply a new doctrine to a pending case involving a party who already invoked a contrary view and who acted in good faith thereon prior to the issuance of the said doctrine. 15 This is in conformity with the Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Albino S. Co v. Court of Appeals , 16 wherein it ruled that when a doctrine is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. Thus, in the case of Team Energy Corporation (Formerly Mirant Pagbilao Corporation and Southern Energy Quezon, Inc.) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 17 the First Division of this Court made the following pronouncement: Although there is a recent case entitled Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Mirant Pagbilao Corporation (Formerly SOUTHERN ENERGY QUEZON, INC.) , wherein the Supreme Court held that the reckoning of the two-year prescriptive period for the filing of a claim for input VAT refund starts from the close of the taxable quarter when the relevant sales were made, this Court finds it proper to apply said ruling to cases filed after the promulgation date of the Mirant Case . To apply said ruling in the present case will in effect be giving the new doctrine retroactive application thereby impairing vested rights. (Boldfacing supplied) And in the case of Mindanao II Geothermal Partnership v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue , 18 the following disquisition was made: The CTA has been consistent with the foregoing rule that even after petitioner filed its Petitions for Review with the Court in Division in 2005, the CTA has continued to invoke the rule that the reckoning of the two-year prescriptive period for the filing of claims for VAT refund/tax credit certificate starts from the date of filing of the corresponding quarterly VAT returns, in similar cases such as Takenaka Corp. Phil. Branch v. CIR, CTA Case No. 6762, March 20, 2006, Mirant (Navotas 11) Corporation v. CIR, CTA Case Nos. 7234 & 7295, October 2, 2008, CE Luzon Geothermal Power Co. v. CIR, CTA Case Nos. 6792 & 6837, November 25, 2008. AcHEaS Moreover, even after the promulgation of the Mirant SC Case , the CTA has continued to apply the rule that the reckoning of the two-year prescriptive period for the filing of claims for VAT refund/tax credit certificate starts from the date of filing of the corresponding quarterly VAT returns, citing as basis the ruling of the Supreme Court in the Atlas SC case. Thus, the rule that the reckoning of the 2-year period is the date of filing of the quarterly VAT return has become a well-established doctrine and adopted in numerous decisions of the CTA, the Court of Appeals and even the Supreme Court until the Supreme Court rendered its decision in the Mirant SC Case on September 12, 2008. Consequently, taxpayers and litigants relied in good faith on such prevailing CTA jurisprudence. In light of the foregoing, the ruling in the Mirant Case that the reckoning of the 2-year prescriptive period is from the close of the taxable quarter should be applied prospectively, i.e. , to administrative and judicial claims filed after September 12, 2008. Therefore, it is my considered view that the present claim is outside the application of the Mirant Case. Accordingly, I vote for the DENIAL of respondent's Motion for Partial Consideration. Footnotes 1. Should be P6,032,630.94. 2. Docketed as CTA Case No. 7233. 3. Docketed as CTA Case No. 7294. 4. G.R. No. 184823, October 6, 2010. BAUTISTA, J., dissenting opinion: 1. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. CE Cebu Geothermal Power Company, Inc. , CTA EB No. 426, May 29, 2009. 2. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victorias Milling Co., Inc. , No. L-24108, January 3, 1968, 22 SCRA 12. 3. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Accenture, Inc. , CTA EB No. 410 (CTA Case No. 7387), March 18, 2009. 4. As amended by Republic Act No. 9337. 5. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Aichi Forging Company of Asia, Inc. , CTA EB No. 416, February 4, 2009. 6. De Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice , G.R. No. 147932, January 25, 2006, 480 SCRA 71. 7. Supra, citing Agpalo, Ruben E., Statutory Construction, Second Edition 1990, p. 239 citing Bersabel v. Salvador, G.R. No. 35910, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 176. 8. CTA EB No. 321 (CTA Case Nos. 6805 & 6851), May 7, 2008. 9. CTA EB No. 408 (CTA Case No. 6647), March 25, 2009. 10. G.R. Nos. 141104 & 148763, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 73. 11. G.R. No. 172129, September 12, 2008, 565 SCRA 154. 12. G.R. Nos. 141104 & 148763, June 8, 2007, 524 SCRA 73. 13. CTA Case No. 6552, September 16, 2004. 14. CTA EB No. 53, June 7, 2005. 15. Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon , G.R. No. 143275, March 20, 2003, 399 SCRA 376. 16. G.R. No. 100776, October 28,1993, 277 SCRA 444. 17. CTA Case Nos. 7229 and 7298, October 5, 2009. 18. CTA EB No. 513 (CTA Case Nos. 7227, 7287 and 7317), March 10, 2010, Concurring and Dissenting Opinion penned by Associate Justice Lovell R. Bautista, with Associate Justice Caesar A. Casanova, concurring.