Feb Investments, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

[C.T.A. CASE NO. 5589. June 16, 2000.] FEB INVESTMENTS, INC. , petitioner , vs . THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondent . D E C I S I O N Before Us for consideration is a Petition for Review filed on March 31, 1998, seeking for a refund of the amount of P2,038,257.46, representing alleged erroneously paid gross receipts tax for taxable year 1996. The facts are simple. Petitioner is a corporation organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines. It is primarily engaged in financing activities. For the four quarters of taxable year 1996, petitioner reported gross receipts in the total amount of P346,027,897.77 for which it allegedly paid P14,973,087.41 as gross receipts tax detailed as follows: LibLex QUARTER EXHIBIT GROSS RECEIPTS GROSS RECEIPTS TAX 1st A/A-1 P64,735,851.80 P3,236,792.59 2nd B/B-1 131,021,901.70 5,642,578.28 3rd C/C-1 89,271,120.46 3,554,016.23 4th D/D-1 60,999,023.81 2,539,700.31 Total P346,027,897.77 P14,973,087.41 ============ ============ Petitioner asseverates that of the total gross receipts of P346,027,897.77, the amount of P40,765,149.04 corresponds to the 20% final tax withheld on passive income and which was further subjected to the 5% gross receipts tax amounting to P2,038,257.46, detailed as follows: SECURITY FINAL TAX GROSS RECEIPTS TAX Long term commercial papers P17,703,717.74 P885,185.89 Fixed rate treasury notes 10,598,196.31 529,909.82 Treasury bills 8,414,760.79 420,738.04 Investment in savings deposit 2,535,236.12 126,761.81 Floating rate treasury notes 899,131.07 44,956.55 Blue fund 595,000.00 29,750.00 Savings deposit 19,107.02 955.35 Total P40,765,149.05 P2,038,257.46 ============ =========== Relying on this Court's ruling in the case of Asian Bank Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 4720, promulgated on January 30, 1996, where this Court ruled that the 20% final tax should be excluded in the computation of the 5% gross receipts tax, petitioner filed its administrative claim for refund with the respondent on September 5, 1997 (Exh. E) and on March 27, 1998 (Exh. F). Failing to obtain relief from the respondent Bureau, petitioner elevated its grievance to this Court on March 31, 1998 to toll the running of the two-year prescriptive period provided under Section 230 of the Tax Code. On May 20, 1998, respondent filed his Answer to the Petition for Review and maintained his stance that petitioner is not entitled to the refund sought there being no basis in fact and in law. In addition thereto, respondent advanced the following Special and Affirmative Defenses to wit: 8. In computing the gross receipts tax (GRT) of financial institutions, such as the petitioner in the above-entitled case, the interest on deposits and yield on deposit substitutes shall be included as part of the tax base upon which the GRT is imposed as provided in Section 8(c) of Revenue Regulations No. 12-80, as amended, which reads: "Sec. 8. Nature and treatment of interest on deposits and yield on deposit substitutes . xxx xxx xxx (c) If the recipient of the above-mentioned items of income are financial institutions, the same shall be included as part of the tax base upon which the gross receipt tax is imposed." 9. The definition of the term "gross receipts" in Section 123(b) of the National Internal Revenue Code is intended "for the purpose of the amusement tax" while the interpretation given by the Supreme Court to the said term in the case of Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Manila Jockey Club, 108 Phil. 821, to mean "all receipts of a taxpayer excluding those which have been especially earmarked by law or regulations for the government or some person other than the taxpayer" is tailor-made for the Manila Jockey Club (MJC) and other companies similarly situated since the money sought to be taxed from the MJC never really belonged to the club but went to the Board of Races, the owner of horses and jockey, thus, the exclusion thereof from its gross receipts is justified unlike in the instant case of the petitioner where the 20% final tax excluded in the computation of the gross receipts tax actually belongs to the petitioner even if not actually received by the petitioner, in the strict sense of the word, since the same is withheld by the payees. 10. The imposition of the gross receipts tax based on all items of income actually received, if interpreted to mean the net of the 20% final withholding tax, will be contrary to law since this will result to an unauthorized reduction of the tax which is fixed by law or regulations or, worst, its effect will result to a subtle amendment of the law or regulations; 11. The petition states no cause of action since it does not alleged (sic) the date/s when the taxes sought to be refunded were actually paid; 12. In an action for tax credit/refund, the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to establish its right to the refund and failure to sustain the burden is fatal to the action for tax refund; 13. Well-settled is the rule that claims for refund are construed in strictissimi juris against the claimants since it partakes of the nature of an exemption from taxation. On January 10, 2000, this case was considered submitted for decision sans the memorandum of the respondent. In its Memorandum, petitioner reiterates its stance a quo that it is entitled to the refund sought based on Section 24 (now Section 27), Section 50 (now Section 57), Sections 119 and 120 of the Tax Code, as amended, as implemented by Revenue Regulations No. 12-80, and as interpreted by this Court in the case of Asian Bank Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 4720, promulgated on January 30, 1996. Petitioner claims that it has an overpaid gross receipts tax resulting from its erroneous inclusion of the 20% final withholding tax on interest income derived from its passive investment, such as T-bills investments purchased from different sellers, and interest income from savings account from local banks in its gross receipts. Petitioner asserts that the 20% final withholding tax should have been excluded in its gross receipts since this was not actually received by the petitioner as part of its interest income. Instead, according to the petitioner, what it has received was the net amount of the 20% final withholding tax. The issues are two-fold: 1. Whether or not the 20% final withholding tax should be excluded in the computation of the Gross Receipts Tax; and 2. Whether or not petitioner was able to present relevant documents sufficient enough to establish its entitlement to a refund. Anent the first issue, We held, in a litany of cases, that the 20% final withholding tax should not form part of the gross receipts of the taxpayer for purposes of the 5% gross receipts tax (China Banking Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 5433, October 7, 1998 ; Equitable Banking Corporation vs . Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No . 4720, January 20, 1996) . This is in accord with the thrust of Our decision in the Asian Bank case, supra, where this Court emphatically ruled, thus: "We agree with the petitioner that the 20% final withholding tax on its interest income should not form part of its taxable gross receipts. . . . This conclusion is in accord with the interpretation of the Supreme Court in the case entitled Collector of Internal Revenue vs . Manila Jockey Club, 108 Phil. 821, as quoted by this Court in disposing of a similar issue in the case entitled Compaia Maritima vs . Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue , CTA Case No. 1426 dated November 14, 1966, thus: In the second place, the highest tribunal of the land interpreted the term "gross receipts: to mean all receipts of a taxpayer excluding those which have been especially earmarked by law or regulation for the government or some person other than the taxpayer. Thus, it was held: ". . . The Government could not have meant to tax as gross receipt of the Manila Jockey Club the % which it directs same Club to turn over to the Board of Races. The latter being a Government institution, there would be double taxation, which should be avoided unless the statute admits of no other interpretation. In the same manner, the Government could not have intended to consider as gross receipt the portion of the funds which it directed the Club to give, to winning horses and Jockeys admitted 5%. It is true that the law says that out of the total wager funds 12% shall be set aside as the 'commission' of the track owners but the law itself takes official notice, and virtually approves or directs payment of the portion that goes to owners of horses as prizes and bonuses of jockeys, which portion is admittedly 5% out of the 12% commission. As it did not at that time contemplate the application of 'gross receipts' revenue principle, the law in making a distribution of the total wager funds, took no trouble of separating one item from the other; and for convenience, grouped three items under one common denomination. Needless to say, gross receipts of the proprietor of the amusement place should not include any money which although delivered to the amusement place has been especially earmarked by law or regulation for some person other than the proprietor." (The Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Manila Jockey Club, Inc . , G.R. Nos. L-13890 & L-13887, June 30, 1960) . It is to be noted that, under Section 260 of the Tax Code, a race-track is subject to an amusement tax of 20% of its gross receipts and the term 'gross receipts' embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee, or operator of the amusement place." Notwithstanding the broad and all-embracing definition of the term "gross receipts" found in our amusement tax law, our Supreme Court did not adopt a literal interpretation of the said term in the case of the Manila Jockey Club, Inc . , supra ." Parallel to this, the Court of Appeals, in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Citytrust Investment Philippines, Inc. CA-GR SP. No. 52707, promulgated on August 17, 1999, ruled on the same subject matter in this wise: "Accordingly, the 20% final tax withheld against the Respondent's passive income was already remitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the corresponding year that the same was actually withheld and considered final withholding taxes under Section 50 of the same code. Indubitably to include the same to the Respondent's gross receipts for the year 1994 would be to tax twice the passive income derived by the Respondent for the said year which would constitute double taxation anathema to our Taxation Laws." Having settled the legal issue, We now proceed to the factual basis of petitioner's cause. On the basis of the report of Mr. Ruben Rubio, an independent certified public accountant duly commissioned by this Court to examine petitioner's books of accounts and other pertinent documents, and who testified that petitioner made an overstatement of its final withholding tax in the amount of P 3,203,958.95, this Court was initially inclined to grant petitioner's claim but in a reduced amount. However, despite the certification of the independent certified public accountant, a meticulous examination of the evidence in this case does not sustain the petitioner's position; accordingly, for insufficiency of evidence, the petition must fail. Petitioner alleged that it purchased the treasury bills from lead underwriter as evidenced by confirmation receipts. However, upon this Court's examination of the said documents, We found out that the exhibits supporting such purchases were not confirmation of purchase but rather confirmation of sale, hence, it could be safely inferred that petitioner is the seller and not the purchaser of the securities. While it is true that petitioner has presented, as proof of its purchase, the treasury bills' Certificate of Final Tax Withheld at Source issued by Far East Bank and Trust Co., We find the same insufficient for there is no way by which this Court could ascertain petitioner's interest income and the corresponding 20% final withholding tax. The same holds true with petitioner's documents supporting its withholding tax on floating rate treasury notes since this Court could not decipher with accuracy, petitioner's income from the detailed transaction of sales alone. Instead, petitioner should have offered in evidence the confirmation of purchase receipts aside from the confirmation of sales to prove the interest income and the 20% final withholding tax. In the same breath, We found the Schedule of Interest Income and Trading Gain Certification of the 20% final withholding tax and the manual entries and computation submitted by the petitioner as wanting in probative value for there are no supporting documents for these schedules, hence, violative of Court of Tax Appeals Circular No. 1-95, as amended which provides in part, thus: xxx xxx xxx 1. The party who desires to introduce as evidence such voluminous documents must present: (a) Summary containing the total amount/s of the tax account or tax paid for the period involved and a chronological or numerical list of the numbers, dates and amounts covered by the invoices or receipts; . . . 2. The method of individual presentation of each and every receipt or invoice or other documents for marking, identification and comparison with the originals thereof need not be done before the Court of the Commissioner anymore after the introduction of the summary and CPA certification. It is enough that the receipts, invoices and other documents covering the said accounts or payments must be pre-marked by the party concerned and submitted to the Court in order to be made accessible to the adverse party whenever she/he desires to check and verify the correctness of the summary and CPA certification . . . . (Emphasis Ours) Clearly from the aforequoted provision, petitioner should have presented in evidence, at the very least, its passbook to aid Us in verifying the correctness of the summary. Absence of such document is for a long time considered, in cases bearing the same factual milieu, as fatal to a taxpayer's cause. With regard to petitioner's claim on its investments in long term commercial papers, this Court likewise rule for its denial on the ground that it was petitioner which certified its own final withholding tax, hence, self-serving. Having failed to overcome the burden of proof in substantiating its claim and considering further that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and therefore must be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and in favor of the taxing authorities (Manila Electric Co. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 67 SCRA 351), conformably, We hold that the instant petition must be denied. WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, the Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for insufficiency of evidence. SO ORDERED. (SGD.) ERNESTO D. ACOSTA Presiding Judge I CONCUR: (SGD.) RAMON O. DE VEYRA Associate Judge Separate Opinions The majority opinion denied the claim for refund due to insufficiency of evidence but upheld the ruling that the final withholding tax on certain passive income of a bank should be excluded from its gross receipts for purposes of computing the gross receipts tax. I humbly disagree with the aforementioned ruling primarily because this is based on this Court's decision in the case of Asian Bank Corporation vs.> Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 4720 promulgated on January 30, 1996 . The decision in the Asian Bank case which established a precedent for cases having a similar issue, has as its legal basis Section 4(e) of Revenue Regulations No. 12-80 dated November 7, 1980 which states, thus: "Section 4. . . . (e) Gross receipts tax on banks, non-bank financial intermediaries, financing companies, and other non-bank financial intermediaries not performing quasi-banking activities . The rates of taxes to be imposed on the gross receipts of such financial institutions shall be based on all items of income actually received. Mere accrual shall not be considered, but once payment is received on such accrual or in cases of overpayment then the amount actually received shall be included in the tax base of such financial institutions, as provided hereunder." (Emphasis supplied) Note that in the Asian Bank case, said bank was being assessed for deficiency gross receipts tax of 5% for taxable year 1986 which at that time the aforequoted Section 4(e) of Revenue Regulations No. 12-80 had already been amended, superseded and omitted in the amendatory Revenue Regulations No. 17-84 dated October 12, 1984. In other words, the citation of Section 4(e) of Revenue Regulations No. 12-80 by Petitioner's counsel was erroneous in the sense that it misled this Court to adopt Petitioner's legal basis. The legal basis that should have been cited is Section 8(c) of Revenue Regulations 12-80 which became Section 7(c) of Revenue Regulations No. 17-84 which provides, thus: "Section 4. . . . (c) If the recipient of the above-mentioned items of income are financial institutions, the same shall be included as part of the tax base upon which the gross receipts tax is imposed." Petitioner's counsel purposely did not cite said section because certainly it won't be able to get a refund or tax credit for the alleged overpaid gross receipts tax for obvious reasons. Section 4(e) of Revenue Regulations No. 12-80, as worded, is not a computation which is determinative of the amount to be used as basis of the 5% gross receipts tax. Rather, said Section is reflective of the method of accounting being adopted by the taxpayer, such as the cash receipts and disbursement method or the accrual method of accounting. Said methods of accounting comprise a set of rules for determining when and how to report income and deduction (Consolidated Mines, Inc . vs . Court of Tax Appeals, L-18843, August 29, 1974) . Thus, under the cash receipts and disbursements method, income earned by the taxpayer is not included in gross income until received and expenses are not deducted until paid within the taxable year. And in the case of the accrual method, income is included in gross income when earned, whether received or not, and expenses are allowed as deductions when incurred although not paid (BIR Ruling No. 35-98, April 13, 1998). The 5% gross receipts tax under Section 120 of the Tax Code is collectible from all finance companies doing business in the Philippines from interests, discounts and all other items treated as gross income under the Tax Code. Accordingly, its income derived from investing the excess funds in short-term market placements through commercial banks constitute income, hence, subject to the 5% gross receipts tax under said section. The fact that it has been subjected to the 20% final withholding tax under Section 50(a) is immaterial. Besides, the withholding tax is imposed under Title II of the Tax Code while the finance tax is provided under Title V thereof (BIR Ruling No. 223, November 2, 1989). The fact that the same income is subjected to two (2) different kinds of taxes would not make such payments a case of double taxation. By quoting a superseded revenue regulation, Petitioner in the Asian Bank case, led this Court to believe that indeed the basis of the gross receipts tax is total gross receipts exclusive of the 20% final withholding tax deducted and withheld under Section 50(a) of the Tax Code. Section 7(c) of Revenue Regulations No. 17-84 clearly and categorically provides that the basis of such tax is inclusive of the final withholding tax. Section 2.57 of Revenue Regulations No. 2-98 implementing Republic Act No. 8424 also provides that the bases of the 5% gross receipts tax includes the 20% final withholding income tax deducted at source, to wit: Sec. 2.57. Withholding of Tax at Source (A) Final Withholding Tax . Under the final withholding tax system the amount of income tax withheld by the withholding agent is constituted as a full and final payment of the income tax due from the payee on the said income. The liability for payment of the tax rests primarily on the payor as a withholding agent. Thus, in case of his failure to withhold the tax or in case of under withholding, the deficiency tax shall be collected from the payor/withholding agent. The payee is not required to file an income tax return for the particular income. The finality of the withholding tax is limited only to the payee's income tax liability on the particular income. It does not extend to the payee's other tax liability on said income, such as when the said income is further subject to a percentage tax. For example, if a bank receives income subject to final withholding tax, the same shall be subject to a percentage tax. The High Court's decision in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs . The Manila Jockey Club, Inc . , 108 Phils . 821, June 30, 1960 , which was reaffirmed by the said Court in the case of Visayan-Cebu Terminal Co . , Inc . vs . Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA 357, February 27, 1965 cannot be considered as precedent cases, hence, inapplicable to the two cases decided by this Honorable Court in the cases of Compaia Maritima vs . Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No . 1426 dated November 14, 1966 and Asian Bank Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 4720 dated January 30, 1996, for the following reasons: In the Manila Jockey Club, Inc. case, the Club was authorized to operate horse races in which betting was made through the sale of tickets to the public. The total amount of bets called "wager fund" were distributed pursuant to Executive Order No. 320 and Republic Act No. 309, as follows: 87% as dividends to holders of winning tickets 12 as "commissions" of the Manila Jockey Club, of which % was assigned to the Board on Races and 5% was distributed as prizes for owners of winning horses and authorized bonus for jockeys. According to the above-mentioned distribution of the "wager fund", the then Collector of Internal Revenue assessed the Club on the whole amount of its "commission" of 12. But since the Club had already paid the amusement tax based on its 7% share of the "commission", the amount assessable pertains only to the 5% for the period from November 1946 to October 1950. On various instances, the Club protested the proposed assessments and was sustained by the opinions of the Secretary of Justice rendered on three different occasions (Opinion No. 345, series of 1941; Opinion No. 249, series of 1952 and Opinion No. 340, series of 1955). Notwithstanding the opinions of the Secretary of Justice to the effect that the amount corresponding to the 5% was held only by the Club in trust for the owners of winning horses and authorized bonuses of jockeys, the then Collector of Internal Revenue demanded payment of amusement taxes for the period November 1946 to October 1950. Said demand letter was timely appealed to the Court of Appeals wherein a unanimous judgment was obtained reversing the Collector's stand on the matter. In the High Court, the position of the Secretary of Justice was sustained thereby upholding the Court of Tax Appeals' decision. Accordingly, gross receipts of the proprietor of the amusement place should not include any money which, although delivered to the amusement place was "especially earmarked " by law or legal rule and regulations for some persons other than the proprietor. Undeniably, they are money received by the racing club but they are money earmarked by law or regulations for winning horse owners and jockeys and never for a minute become the property of the race track. The same is true in the case of the % which the law directs the club to deliver to the Board on Races. The High Court therefore agrees with the stand of the Court of Tax Appeals that such funds representing 5% of the 12% "commissions" of the race track do not form part of the gross receipts, hence not subject to the amusement tax of 20%. The above-mentioned decision of the High Court was also applied in the case of Visayan Cebu Terminal Co . , Inc . vs . Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA 357, Nos . L-19530 and L-19444, February 27, 1965 . The legal issue involved in this case is the interpretation of the management contract entered into by and between the Bureau of Customs and Visayan Cebu Terminal Co., Inc. whereby the latter as contractor was appointed the sole manager of the Arrastre Service at the Port of Cebu City. In the said Management Contract, it was further agreed and understood that in consideration of the rights and privileges granted the Contractor for the management of the Arrastre Service, the Bureau of Customs shall receive twenty eight (28%) percent of the total monthly gross income derived from whatever source in connection with the operations of the Arrastre Service, payable within ten (10) days of the succeeding month. The main legal issue involved in this case is whether or not the gross receipts corresponding to the 28% of the total gross income of the Service Contractor delivered to the Bureau of Customs within ten (10) days of the following month should form part of the gross receipts subject to 3% contractor's tax under Section 191 of the Tax Code. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled in favor of the petitioner, holding the view that the said 28% payment by the Arrastre Contractor based on its monthly gross income should not form part of the gross receipts subject to 3% contractors tax and that paragraph 23 of the said Management Contract can legally be construed as a " regulation ". As the learned trial court has aptly observed: ". . . the government could not have intended to consider as gross receipts the 28% that went to one of its institutions, the Bureau of Customs, and thereby collect percentage tax on it from petitioner. To hold petitioner liable for the payment of percentage tax is unquestionably unjust and not contemplated by Section 191 of the Tax Code." All the above-mentioned decisions of the High Court made specific reference to gross receipts which are especially " earmarked by law or legal rule or regulation " as not forming part of the taxable gross receipts for purposes of the gross receipts tax under the Tax Code. For this purpose, it is pertinent to define the word "earmark" as a mark put upon a thing to distinguish it from another. Originally and literally, a mark upon the ear, a mode of marking sheep and other animals. Property is said to be earmarked when it can be identified or distinguished from other property of the same nature. To set apart from others (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, p. 508). In the case of the Manila Jockey Club, Inc. Executive Order No. 320 and Republic Act No. 309 made the specific "earmarking" for distribution of the total wager fund to different persons other than the proprietor. The same is true in the case of Visayan Cebu Terminal Co., Inc. where the specific earmarking of the 28% of the total monthly gross income to be delivered to the Bureau of Customs by the Contractor was provided in paragraph 23 of the Management Contract. Such specific earmarking of the twenty percent (20%) final income tax as not includible in the gross receipts for purposes of the gross receipts tax was not provided by any law or legal rule or regulation, hence the non-applicability of the above-cited High Court decisions to the Asian Bank Corporation case. This legal observation is also in point in the case of Compaia Maritima case where the non-inclusion of the 10% reserve from the total cash collection to avoid claim for refund on freight and passengers tickets not taken is not provided by any law or legal rule or regulation. In the Asian Bank Corporation case, petitioner bank alleges that subjecting the gross receipts to the 20% final withholding income tax and later to the 5% gross receipts tax is not only oppressive and obnoxious but even a confiscatory form of double taxation. Double taxation has been defined "as the taxing of the same item or piece of property twice to the same person, or taxing it as the property of one person and again as the property of another, but this does not include the imposition of different taxes concurrently on the same property or income (e.g. federal and state income taxes), nor the taxation of the same piece of property to different persons when they hold different interests in it or when it represents different values in their hands, as when both the mortgagor and mortgagee of property are taxed in respect to their interests in it, or when a tax is laid upon the profits of the corporation and also upon the dividends paid to its stockholders" (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, p. 491). This acceptable form of double taxation is reflected in BIR Ruling No. 223 dated November 2, 1989, thus: "The 5% gross receipts tax under Section 120 of the Tax Code is collectible on all finance companies doing business in the Philippines from interests, discounts, and all other items treated as gross income under the Tax Code. Accordingly, your income derived from investing the excess funds in short-term market placements through commercial banks constitutes income hence, subject to the 5% gross receipts tax under said Section. The fact that it has been subjected to the 20% final withholding income tax under Section 50(a) is immaterial. Besides, the withholding tax is imposed under Title II of the Tax Code while the finance tax is provided under Title V thereof." (BIR Ruling No. 223, November 2, 1989) For as long as the basis for the claim for refund or tax credit certificate is based on the non-inclusion of the amount representing the final withholding income tax under Section 50(a) as part of the gross income subject to gross receipts tax, this dissenting opinion will stand. For purposes of the amusement tax under Section 260 of the Tax Code, the term 'gross receipts' embraces 'all the receipts' of the proprietor, lessee, or operator of the amusement place. The words 'all the receipts' refer to the total amount of cash received which becomes part of the funds of the taxpayer and does not include any money which has been specially earmarked by any law or legal rule or regulation for some other person other than the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. Receipts means actually received (Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co . vs . Collector of Internal Revenue, G . R . No . L-3222, January 21, 1952) for itself and not for others, for otherwise they would not be receipts (Manila Jockey Club, Inc . vs . Collector of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No . 205, April 15, 1958 ; Jai Alai Corporation of the Philippines vs . Araneta, CTA Case No . 108, July 31, 1956 [Annotated, NIRC by Commissioner Jose Araas, 1988 Edition, p . 687) . WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, I hereby register my dissent to the majority opinion and vote for the denial of the claim for refund for lack of legal basis. (SGD.) AMANCIO Q. SAGA Associate Judge