Citytrust Finance Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

[C.T.A. CASE NO. 5518. July 18, 2000.] CITYTRUST FINANCE CORPORATION , petitioner , vs . COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondent . D E C I S I O N This case involves a claim for refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate in the amount of P543,469.85 allegedly representing overpaid gross receipts tax for the calendar year ended December 31, 1995. The facts of the case are simple. Petitioner, Citytrust Finance Corporation, is a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines with principal office located at 1071 Philippine Stock Exchange Road, corner Pearl Drive, Ortigas Center, Pasig City. aTcESI For the calendar year 1995, Petitioner seasonably filed its Quarterly Percentage Tax Returns reflecting gross receipts in the total amount of P205,893,400.63 with corresponding gross receipts tax payment in the sum of P82,271,704.93, broken down as follows: Period Covered Exh. Gross Receipts Gross Receipts Tax January to March 1995 A P52,676,548.55 P2,368,199.24 April to June 1995 B 64,160,425.73 2,925,458.59 July to September 1995 C 40,913,155.18 1,819,457.54 October to December 1995 D 48,143,271.17 2,129,279.42 Total P205,893,400.63 P9,242,394.79 ============= =========== Petitioner alleges that the gross receipts in the amount of P205,893,400.63 included the sum of P51,255,326.69 representing gross receipts derived from passive income which was already subjected to 20% final withholding tax in the amount of P10,869,397.04. On January 30, 1996, this Court rendered a decision in C.T.A. Case No. 4720 entitled Asian Bank Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue wherein it was held that the 20% final withholding tax on bank's interest income should not form part of its taxable gross receipts for purposes of computing the gross receipts tax. On April 17, 1997, on the strength of the aforementioned decision, Petitioner filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue a letter-request for the refund or issuance of tax credit certificate in the aggregate amount of P543,469.85 representing allegedly overpaid gross receipts tax for the year 1995, computed as follows: (Exhs. F and F-1). Total Income Subject to Final Withholding Tax P51,255,326.69 Less Total Final Taxes Paid 10,869,397.04 Income Net of Final Withholding Tax 40,385,929.65 =========== 5% GRT Should Be P2,019,296.48 Less GRT Paid 2,562,766.33 GRT Overpayment P543,469.85 =========== Without waiting for action from the Respondent, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review the next day, i.e., April 18, 1997, in order to toll the running of the two year prescriptive period to judicially claim for the refund of overpaid internal revenue tax pursuant to Section 230 of the Tax Code, as amended. By way of special and affirmative defenses, Respondent avers that Petitioner's claim for refund is still undergoing administrative routinary investigation, the claim of Petitioner that it made an erroneous and excessive payment of gross receipt tax does not ipso facto warrant a tax refund or tax credit; Petitioner must prove that the exclusion being claimed from its gross receipts are allowed under the Tax Code and its implementing regulations; the claim for refund must be supported by evidence and are construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer; and Petitioner must prove that it has complied with the provisions of Section 230 of the Tax Code, as amended. In order to support its claim for refund, Petitioner presented the following evidence: AEIDTc 1. The Quarterly Percentage Tax Returns for the year 1995 (Exhs. A to D, inclusive of submarkings); 2. Summary of gross receipts/income subjected to percentage tax (Exhs. E and E-1); 3. The administrative claim for refund with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (Exhs. F and F-1); 4. Certifications from SGV and Co signed by Mr. Renato Galve, the commissioned independent CPA, who conducted the examination of the Petitioner's documents relative to the instant claim for refund (Exhs. H, H-1 to H-4, I, and I-3-a); 5. Audited financial statements and income tax return of Petitioner for the year 1995 (Exhs. J, J 9-a, and K); 6. Certifications from the Treasury Department and Government Securities Department of Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas with respect to final taxes withheld on treasury bills and remittances to the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the years 1994, 1995 and 1996 (Exhs. L, and N to N-5); and 7. Schedule of treasury bills purchased by Petitioner in 1995 from secondary markets with various outright purchase documents (Exhs. M, M-1 and M-3 to M-36). Respondent, on the other hand, elected not to submit controverting evidence. Eventually, this case was submitted for decision after both parties presented their respective memorandums. The Court is now confronted with the following issues: a. Whether or not the 20% final withholding tax on the bank's interest income should form part of the taxable receipts for purposes of computing the gross receipts tax; and b. Whether or not Petitioner has proven its claim with sufficient evidence. ESHcTD As regards the first issue, this Court finds Petitioner's cause to be meritorious. The final taxes derived by Petitioner on its passive income should no longer form part of the gross receipts for purposes of computing the gross receipts tax, as We have already ruled on this matter in the case of Asian Bank Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 4720, dated January 30, 1996 , pertinent portions of which read as follows: " We agree with the petitioner that the 20% final withholding tax on its interest income should not form part of its taxable gross receipts . xxx xxx xxx This conclusion is in accord with the interpretation of the Supreme Court in the case entitled Collector of Internal Revenue vs. Manila Jockey Club, 108 Phil. 821, as quoted by this Court in disposing of a similar issue in the case entitled Compaia Maritima vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 1426 dated November 14, 1996, thus: In the second place, the highest tribunal of the land interpreted the term: "gross receipts" to mean all receipts of a taxpayer excluding those which have been especially earmarked by law or regulation for the government or some person other than the taxpayer. Thus, it was held: ". . . . The Government could not have meant to tax as gross receipt of the Manila Jockey Club the % which it directs same Club to turn over to the Board of Races. The latter being a Government institution, there would be double taxation, which should be avoided unless the statute admits of no other interpretation. In the same manner, the Government could not have intended to consider as gross receipt the portion of the funds which it directed the Club to give, or know the Club would give, to winning horses and Jockeys admitted 5%. It is true that the law says that out of the total wager funds 12% shall be set aside as the 'commission' of the track owners but the law itself takes official notice, and virtually approves or directs payment of the portion that goes to owners of horses as prize and bonuses of jockeys, which portion is admittedly 5% out of the 12% commission. As it did not at that time contemplate the application of 'gross receipts' revenue principle, the law in making a distribution of the total wager funds, took no trouble of separating one item from the other; and for convenience, grouped three items under one common denomination. "Needless to say, gross receipts of the proprietor of the amusement place should not include any money which although delivered to the amusement place has been especially earmarked by law or regulation for some person other than the proprietor." (The Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Manila Jockey Club, Inc. G.R. Nos. L-13890 and L-13887, June 30, 1960) It is to be noted that, under Section 260 of the Tax Code, a race-track is subject to an amusement tax of 20% of its gross receipts and the term 'gross receipts' embraces all the receipts of the proprietor, lessee, or operator of the amusement place." Notwithstanding the broad and all-embracing definition of the term "gross receipts" found in our amusement tax law, our Supreme Court did not adopt a literal interpretation of the said term in the case of the Manila Jockey Club, Inc., supra ." In fact Our ruling in the aforesaid decision has already been affirmed by the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Citytrust Investment Phils., Inc . CA-G.R. SP No.52707, dated August 17, 1999 . "Accordingly, the 20% final tax withheld against the Respondent's passive income was already remitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the correspondent year that the same was actually withheld and considered final withholding taxes under Section 50 of the same Code. Indubitably, to include the same to the Respondent's gross receipts for the year 1994 would be to tax twice the passive income derived by the Respondent for the said year, which would constitute double taxation anathema to our taxation laws." The legal issue having been settled, We now delve on the factual aspect of this case which is the second issue at bar. DAHaTc Section 230 of the Tax Code, as amended, provides that a claim for refund, both with the Bureau of Internal Revenue and with this Court, must be filed within two years from the date of payment of the tax. Furthermore, in computing for the two-year prescriptive period, the filing of the quarterly percentage tax return should be considered as the "date of payment of the tax" (Solid Bank Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 5408, April 14, 1999 ; and Citytrust Investment Philippines, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 5403, April 19, 1999) . The records show that Petitioner's claim for refund was timely filed within the two-year reglementary period, considering that the 1995 first quarter percentage tax return was filed on April 19, 1995, while the instant petition was filed on April 18, 1997. What is now left for the Petitioner to prove is its compliance with the following requisites: 1. that it paid the gross receipts tax; 2. that it erroneously overpaid its gross receipts tax by including the 20% final withholding tax on its passive income as part of the gross receipts declared in the quarterly percentage tax returns for the year 1995; and 3. that the withholding agent certifies that there is 20% final withholding tax on such passive income. (Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 5458, February 15, 1999 ; and BPI Capital vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case 5457, March 1, 1999 ; cited in Solid Bank Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 5408, April 14, 1999, supra) . A meticulous examination of all the evidence at hand reveals that Petitioner was able to show that it paid gross receipts tax for the year 1995 as evidenced by the machine validations appearing on the lower portion of Petitioner's quarterly percentage tax returns (Exhs. A to D, inclusive of submarkings). The evidence also established that the 20% final withholding taxes on interest income was included in the gross receipts reflected in Petitioner's quarterly percentage tax returns. This was attested to by the commissioned independent Auditor, Mr. Renato Galve, and as verified by the Court (Exhs. H, H-1 to H-4, I-1 to I-3). From among the passive income which Petitioner alleges to have been subjected to 20% final withholding tax, only the interest income on treasury bills purchased from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and from Citytrust Banking Corporation have certifications of withholding and remittance (Exhs. I-3 and I-3-a). The other listed passive income such as interest income on deposit with banks and interbank call loans receivables, trading gain, and from other sources have no certification of payment of final tax. It would appear then that Petitioner is only entitled to a partial refund of overpaid gross receipts tax pertaining to 20% final taxes paid on interest income arising from Petitioner's purchase of treasury bills since this type of investment satisfies all the requirements aforementioned. However, from among the documents supporting the payments of withholding tax on treasury bills, namely: Comparison of Provision for Income Tax (Per FS and Per Return) (Exhs. I-3 and I-3-a), Certifications from Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (Exhs. L and N to N-5), Schedule of Treasury Bills Purchased From Secondary Market (Exhs. M to M-2), and the various Outright Purchase documents (Exhs. M-3 to M-36), Petitioner failed to prove how much final taxes on treasury bills was subjected to gross receipts tax. The Court finds no evidence where it can base the computation of overpaid gross receipts tax. The amounts of withholding tax reflected in the certificates issued by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas in the amount of P3,245,910.99 and those reflected in the outright purchase documents in the sum of P21,712,433.25 are still in their original values. If We base the refund on these figures, it will lead to an erroneous amount because treasury bills are bearer securities which can be passed on to subsequent buyers and it is probable that final taxes initially paid by Petitioner were also shifted. Petitioner may argue that final tax in the amount of P8,047,785.00 arising from interest income from trading account securities (TAS) and government securities (GS) reflected in Exh. I-3 can be the basis of the partial refund. However, such possible argument will fail because TAS and GS are not all treasury bills. Trading accounts securities may include commercial paper while government securities may include treasury notes. Without the details as to how much interest income was earned from treasury bills and how much 20% final withholding taxes were included in the 1995 quarterly percentage tax returns, Petitioner's prayer for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate can not be granted. HEDSCc In sum, We find the agreed upon procedure taken by the auditing firm, SGV & Co., and Petitioner to be insufficient to come up with the desired result of ascertaining the correctness of Petitioner's claim for refund. The procedures merely limited the examination and verification of the amounts of passive income and final taxes for the year 1995 by comparison and reconciliation of amounts reflected in the financial statements and returns (Exh. I-1 to I-3). The agreed upon procedures failed to include the performance of an audit with respect to the interest income accounts and quarterly gross receipts tax (Exh. H-3). This procedure is vital in determining the accuracy of Petitioner's claim for refund and the independence of the auditing firm. It should be stressed that reconciliation of income per audited financial statement and per GRT returns and comparison of provision for income tax per audited financial statements and income tax returns are not sufficient procedures in determining the correctness of Petitioner's claim for refund. The procedures therein adopted only guided the Court in determining whether or not the income tallies with the provision for income tax per financial statements and per GRT returns. It failed to guide the Court how much overpaid gross receipts tax was rightfully due to Petitioner. Well-settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that a claim for refund is in the nature of a claim for exemption, hence should be construed in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer (Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Tokyo Shipping Co., Ltd . , 244 SCRA 332) . WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED due to insufficiency of evidence. SO ORDERED. (SGD.) RAMON O. DE VEYRA Associate Judge I CONCUR: (SGD.) ERNESTO D. ACOSTA Presiding Judge Separate Opinions The majority opinion denied the claim for refund due to insufficiency of evidence but upheld the ruling that the final withholding tax on certain passive income of a bank should be excluded from its gross receipts for purposes of computing the gross receipts tax. I humbly disagree with the aforementioned ruling primarily because this is based on this Court's decision in the case of Asian Bank Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 4720 promulgated on January 30, 1996 . The decision in the Asian Bank case which established a precedent for cases having a similar issue, has as its legal basis Section 4(e) of Revenue Regulations No. 12-80 dated November 7, 1980 which states, thus: "Section 4. . . . (e) Gross receipts tax on banks, non-bank financial intermediaries, financing companies, and other non-bank financial intermediaries not performing quasi-banking activities . The rates of taxes to be imposed on the gross receipts of such financial institutions shall be based on all items of income actually received. Mere accrual shall not be considered, but once payment is received on such accrual or in cases of overpayment then the amount actually received shall be included in the tax base of such financial institutions, as provided hereunder." (Emphasis supplied) Note that in the Asian Bank case, said bank was being assessed for deficiency gross receipts tax of 5% for taxable year 1986 which at that time the aforequoted Section 4(e) of Revenue Regulations No. 12-80 had already been amended, superseded and omitted in the amendatory Revenue Regulations No. 17-84 dated October 12, 1984. In other words, the citation of Section 4(e) of Revenue Regulations No. 12-80 by Petitioner's counsel was erroneous in the sense that it misled this Court to adopt Petitioner's legal basis. The legal basis that should have been cited is Section 8(c) of Revenue Regulations 12-80 which became Section 7(c) of Revenue Regulations No. 17-84 which provides, thus: "Section 8. . . . (c) If the recipient of the above-mentioned items of income are financial institutions, the same shall be included as part of the tax base upon which the gross receipts tax is imposed." AHCTEa Petitioner's counsel purposely did not cite said section because certainly it won't be able to get a refund or tax credit for the alleged overpaid gross receipts tax for obvious reasons. Section 4(e) of Revenue Regulations No. 12-80, as worded, is not a computation which is determinative of the amount to be used as basis of the 5% gross receipts tax. Rather, said Section is reflective of the method of accounting being adopted by the taxpayer, such as the cash receipts and disbursement method or the accrual method of accounting. Said methods of accounting comprise a set of rules for determining when and how to report income and deduction (Consolidated Mines, Inc . vs . Court of Tax Appeals, L-18843, August 29, 1974) . Thus, under the cash receipts and disbursements method, income earned by the taxpayer is not included in gross income until received and expenses are not deducted until paid within the taxable year. And in the case of the accrual method, income is included in gross income when earned, whether received or not, and expenses are allowed as deductions when incurred although not paid (BIR Ruling No. 35-98, April 13, 1998). The 5% gross receipts tax under Section 120 of the Tax Code is collectible from all finance companies doing business in the Philippines from interests, discounts and all other items treated as gross income under the Tax Code. Accordingly, its income derived from investing the excess funds in short-term market placements through commercial banks constitute income, hence, subject to the 5% gross receipts tax under said section. The fact that it has been subjected to the 20% final withholding tax under Section 50(a) is immaterial. Besides, the withholding tax is imposed under Title II of the Tax Code while the finance tax is provided under Title V thereof (BIR Ruling No. 223, November 2, 1989). The fact that the same income is subjected to two (2) different kinds of taxes would not make such payments a case of double taxation. By quoting a superseded revenue regulation, Petitioner in the Asian Bank case, led this Court to believe that indeed the basis of the gross receipts tax is total gross receipts exclusive of the 20% final withholding tax deducted and withheld under Section 50(a) of the Tax Code. Section 7(c) of Revenue Regulations No. 17-84 clearly and categorically provides that the basis of such tax is inclusive of the final withholding tax. The High Court's decision in the case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. The Manila Jockey Club, Inc . , 108 Phils . 821, June 30, 1960, which was reaffirmed by the said Court in the case of Visayan-Cebu Terminal Co . , Inc . vs . Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA 357, February 27, 1965 cannot be considered as precedent cases, hence, inapplicable to the two cases decided by this Honorable Court in the cases of Compaia Maritima vs . Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No . 1426 dated November 14, 1966 and Asian Bank Corporation vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No. 4720 dated January 30, 1996, for the following reasons: In the Manila Jockey Club, Inc. case, the Club was authorized to operate horse races in which betting was made through the sale of tickets to the public. The total amount of bets called "wager fund" were distributed pursuant to Executive Order No. 320 and Republic Act No. 309, as follows: 87% as dividends to holders of winning tickets 12 as "commissions" of the Manila Jockey Club, of which % was assigned to the Board on Races and 5% was distributed as prizes for owners of winning horses and authorized bonus for jockeys. According to the above-mentioned distribution of the "wager fund", the then Collector of Internal Revenue assessed the Club on the whole amount of its "commission" of 12. But since the Club had already paid the amusement tax based on its 7% share of the "commission", the amount assessable pertains only to the 5% for the period from November 1946 to October 1950. On various instances, the Club protested the proposed assessments and was sustained by the opinions of the Secretary of Justice rendered on three different occasions (Opinion No. 345, series of 1941; Opinion No. 249, series of 1952 and Opinion No. 340, series of 1955). Notwithstanding the opinions of the Secretary of Justice to the effect that the amount corresponding to the 5% was held only by the Club in trust for the owners of winning horses and authorized bonuses of jockeys, the then Collector of Internal Revenue demanded payment of amusement taxes for the period November 1946 to October 1950. Said demand letter was timely appealed to the Court of Appeals wherein a unanimous judgment was obtained reversing the Collector's stand on the matter. In the High Court, the position of the Secretary of Justice was sustained thereby upholding the Court of Tax Appeals' decision. Accordingly, gross receipts of the proprietor of the amusement place should not include any money which, although delivered to the amusement place was " especially earmarked " by law or legal rule and regulations for some persons other than the proprietor. Undeniably, they are money received by the racing club but they are moneys earmarked by law or regulations for winning horse owners and jockeys and never for a minute become the property of the race track. The same is true in the case of the % which the law directs the club to deliver to the Board on Races. The High Court therefore agrees with the stand of the Court of Tax Appeals that such funds representing 5% of the 12% "commissions" of the race track do not form part of the gross receipts, hence not subject to the amusement tax of 20%. The above-mentioned decision of the High Court was also applied in the case of Visayan Cebu Terminal Co . , Inc . vs . Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 13 SCRA 357, Nos . L-19530 and L-19444, February 27, 1965 . The legal issue involved in this case is the interpretation of the management contract entered into by and between the Bureau of Customs and Visayan Cebu Terminal Co., Inc. whereby the latter as contractor was appointed the sole manager of the Arrastre Service at the Port of Cebu City. In the said Management Contract, it was further agreed and understood that in consideration of the rights and privileges granted the Contractor for the management of the Arrastre Service, the Bureau of Customs shall receive twenty eight (28%) percent of the total monthly gross income derived from whatever source in connection with the operations of the Arrastre Service, payable within ten (10) days of the succeeding month. The main legal issue involved in this case is whether or not the gross receipts corresponding to the 28% of the total gross income of the Service Contractor delivered to the Bureau of Customs within ten (10) days of the following month should form part of the gross receipts subject to 3% contractor's tax under Section 191 of the Tax Code. The Court of Tax Appeals ruled in favor of the petitioner, holding the view that the said 28% payment by the Arrastre Contractor based on its monthly gross income should not form part of the gross receipts subject to 3% contractors tax and that paragraph 23 of the said Management Contract can legally be construed as a " regulation ". As the learned trial court has aptly observed: " . . . the government could not have intended to consider as gross receipts the 28% that went to one of its institutions, the Bureau of Customs, and thereby collect percentage tax on it from petitioner. To hold petitioner liable for the payment of percentage tax is unquestionably unjust and not contemplated by Section 191 of the Tax Code." All the above-mentioned decisions of the High Court made specific reference to gross receipts which are especially " earmarked by law or legal rule or regulation " as not forming part of the taxable gross receipts for purposes of the gross receipts tax under the Tax Code. For this purpose, it is pertinent to define the word "earmark" as a mark put upon a thing to distinguish it from another. Originally and literally, a mark upon the ear, a mode of marking sheep and other animals. Property is said to be earmarked when it can be identified or distinguished from other property of the same nature. To set apart from others (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, p. 508). In the case of the Manila Jockey Club, Inc. Executive Order No. 320 and Republic Act No. 309 made the specific "earmarking" for distribution of the total wager fund to different persons other than the proprietor. The same is true in the case of Visayan Cebu Terminal Co., Inc. where the specific earmarking of the 28% of the total monthly gross income to be delivered to the Bureau of Customs by the Contractor was provided in paragraph 23 of the Management Contract. Such specific earmarking of the twenty percent (20%) final income tax as not includible in the gross receipts for purposes of the gross receipts tax was not provided by any law or legal rule or regulation, hence the non-applicability of the above-cited High Court decisions to the Asian Bank Corporation case. This legal observation is also in point in the case of Compaia Maritima case where the non-inclusion of the 10% reserve from the total cash collection to avoid claim for refund on freight and passengers tickets not taken is not provided by any law or legal rule or regulation. In the Asian Bank Corporation case, petitioner bank alleges that subjecting the gross receipts to the 20% final withholding income tax and later to the 5% gross receipts tax is not only oppressive and obnoxious but even a confiscatory form of double taxation. Double taxation has been defined "as the taxing of the same item or piece of property twice to the same person, or taxing it as the property of one person and again as the property of another, but this does not include the imposition of different taxes concurrently on the same property or income (e.g. federal and state income taxes), nor the taxation of the same piece of property to different persons when they hold different interests in it or when it represents different values in their hands, as when both the mortgagor and mortgagee of property are taxed in respect to their interests in it, or when a tax is laid upon the profits of the corporation and also upon the dividends paid to its stockholders" (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, p. 491). This acceptable form of double taxation is reflected in BIR Ruling No. 223 dated November 2, 1989, thus: "The 5% gross receipts tax under Section 120 of the Tax Code is collectible on all finance companies doing business in the Philippines from interests, discounts, and all other items treated as gross income under the Tax Code. Accordingly, your income derived from investing the excess funds in short-term market placements through commercial banks constitutes income hence, subject to the 5% gross receipts tax under said Section. The fact that it has been subjected to the 20% final withholding income tax under Section 50(a) is immaterial. Besides, the withholding tax is imposed under Title II of the Tax Code while the finance tax is provided under Title V thereof." (BIR Ruling No. 223, November 2, 1989) For as long as the basis for the claim for refund or tax credit certificate is based on the non-inclusion of the amount representing the final withholding income tax under Section 50(a) as part of the gross income subject to gross receipts tax, this dissenting opinion will stand. For purposes of the amusement tax under Section 260 of the Tax Code, the term 'gross receipts' embraces 'all the receipts' of the proprietor, lessee, or operator of the amusement place. The words 'all the receipts' refer to the total amount of cash received which becomes part of the funds of the taxpayer and does not include any money which has been specially earmarked by any law or legal rule or regulation for some other person other than the proprietor, lessee or operator of the amusement place. Receipts means actually received (Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co . vs . Collector of Internal Revenue, G . R . No . L-3222, January 21, 1952) for itself and not for others, for otherwise they would not be receipts (Manila Jockey Club, Inc . vs . Collector of Internal Revenue, CTA Case No . 205, April 15, 1958 ; Jai Alai Corporation of the Philippines vs . Araneta, CTA Case No . 108, July 31, 1956 [Annotated, NIRC by Commissioner Jose Araas, 1988 Edition, p . 687). HEScID WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, I hereby register my dissent to the majority opinion and vote for the denial of the claim for refund for lack of legal basis. (SGD.) AMANCIO Q. SAGA Associate Judge