Sandigan ng mga Empleyadong Nagkakaisa sa Adhikain ng Demokratikong Organisasyon v. Dulay

THIRD DIVISION [C.T.A. CASE NO. 10134. September 17, 2020.] SANDIGAN NG MGA EMPLEYADONG NAGKAKAISA SA ADHIKAIN NG DEMOKRATIKONG ORGANISASYON (S.E.N.A.D.O.) , petitioner , vs. HONORABLE CAESAR R. DULAY, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE , respondent . DECISION MODESTO-SAN PEDRO , J p : The Case Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on 25 July 2019 ("Petition"); 1 with respondent's Motion for Early Resolution on the Issue of Jurisdiction of the Honorable Court filed on 10 February 2020 ("Motion"); 2 and petitioner's Comment (On Respondent's Motion for Early Resolution on the Issue of Jurisdiction of the Honorable Court) filed on 4 March 2020 ("Comment"). 3 HTcADC The Parties Petitioner SANDIGAN NG MGA EMPLEYADONG NAGKAKAISA SA ADHIKAIN NG DEMOKRATIKONG ORGANISASYON (S.E.N.A.D.O.) is an association of employees in the Senate of the Philippines which may be served with summons and other court processes at its offices at S.E.N.A.D.O. Ground Floor, Senate of the Philippines, GSIS Bldg., Financial Center, Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City. Respondent is the present head of the Bureau of Internal Revenue ("BIR") and may be served with summons at the BIR National Office Building, BIR Road, Diliman, Quezon City. The Facts On 20 June 2014, respondent issued Revenue Memorandum Order No. 23-2014 ("RMO 23-14"), setting forth the "Obligations of Government Agencies, Bureaus and Instrumentalities as Withholding Agents." 4 Under RMO 23-14 , government agencies, including the Senate of the Philippines, are to withhold taxes on the allowances, bonuses, compensations for services, and other benefits allotted to and received by government officials and employees. 5 Previous to RMO 23-14's issuance, then Senate President Senator Juan Ponce Enrile allegedly wrote respondent a letter, dated 21 March 2013, to dissuade respondent from issuing any order further imposing taxes on and requiring the withholding of said taxes from the allowances, bonuses, compensation for services, and other fringe benefits granted to officials and employees of the governments, offices, and other institutions. 6 After one (1) year and four (4) months, respondent replied through a letter, dated 2 July 2014, that: "if the 'institutionalized benefits' mentioned by Senator Enrile fall under the definition of compensation for services rendered by an employee for his employer under an employer-employee relationship or that they are allowances, bonuses and other benefits of similar nature or that they fall under the aforesaid enumeration of taxable benefits insofar as the Legislative Branch is concerned, then, they are subject to income tax, and consequently, to withholding tax on compensation unless specifically excluded by the NIRC." 7 Thereafter, Senate President Pro-Tempore Senator Ralph Recto sent a letter, dated 3 July 2014, to the Secretary of Finance ("SOF") requesting the latter to exercise his power of review under Section 4 of the NIRC . In said letter, Senator Recto argued that the "vague and imprecise wording" of parts of RMO 23-14 made it unclear "whether or not fringe benefits given to government employees are subject to fringe benefits tax ("FBT")." Senator Recto also alleged that Revenue Regulations No. 5-2011 , "in so far as it limits the scope of de minimis benefits to those enumerated by the BIR, unreasonably restricts the rationale and essence of such benefits" and that "the limitation of what may be considered as de minimis benefits is inherently a legislative function that has not been delegated to the BIR." 8 Not willing to wait for a slow-paced response, petitioner, together with other organizations representing various government employees, filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Supreme Court. 9 On 3 July 2018, the Supreme Court ruled that Sections III, IV and VII of RMO 23-14 are valid in as much as they mirror the provisions of the NIRC . It also declined to rule on petitioner's claim for exemption from withholding tax on compensation income because these involve issues that are essentially factual or evidentiary in nature, which must be raised in the appropriate administrative and/or judicial proceeding. 10 Petitioner then filed the present Petition 11 (challenging the constitutionality of Sections III (A) and IV of RMO 23-14 ) alleging that in Banco de Oro, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines ("BDO Case") , 12 the Supreme Court En Banc ruled that the Court of Tax Appeals ("CTA") "may likewise take cognizance of cases directly challenging the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation or administrative issuance (revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, rulings)." On 1 August 2019, this Court issued Summons to respondent to file an Answer to the Petition. The Summons was received by respondent on 8 August 2019. 13 On 20 August 2019, respondent filed a Motion for Extension to File Answer, 14 which was granted by this Court in a Resolution dated 27 August 2019. 15 On 20 September 2019, respondent filed his Answer questioning this Court's jurisdiction to decide on the Petition. 16 On 25 September 2019, a Notice of Pre-Trial Conference was issued by this Court setting the Pre-Trial on 28 January 2020. 17 On 23 October 2019, this Court issued a Resolution ordering respondent to elevate the BIR Records. 18 On 29 October 2019, respondent filed a Manifestation that no BIR Records will be elevated to this Court, 19 which was noted in a Resolution dated 7 November 2019. 20 On 7 January 2020, respondent filed a Pre-Trial Brief Ad Cautelam . 21 On 23 January 2020, petitioner filed its Pre-Trial Brief 22 and a Motion to Reset Pre-Trial Conference, alleging that petitioner has a new set of officers who will meet and study on how to go about the current Petition. 23 On 27 January 2020, the Court issued a Resolution resetting the Pre-Trial to 10 March 2020, 9:00 am. 24 On 10 February 2020, respondent filed the Motion. 25 On 13 February 2020, this Court issued a Resolution ordering petitioner to file a Comment on the Motion within ten (10) days from notice. 26 On 4 March 2020, petitioner filed the Comment. 27 On 9 March 2020, this Court issued a Resolution submitting the Motion for Resolution. 28 The Assigned Errors Petitioner raises the issue of whether respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by imposing taxes on and requiring the withholding of taxes from the allowances, benefits, compensation for services, and bonuses received by employees and officials in the legislative branch. 29 Arguments of the Parties Petitioner raised the following arguments in the Petition: 1. The allowances, bonuses, compensations for services, and other benefits sought to be taxed by Sections III (A) and IV of RMO 23-14 are fringe benefits allotted to officials and employees of the legislative branch and therefore exempt from withholding tax on compensation income; 30 a. Fringe benefits are not subject to income tax and/or withholding tax but are subject to FBT payable by the employer. Moreover, if the fringe benefit is required by the nature of or necessary to the trade, business, or profession of the employer, or when the fringe benefit is for the convenience or advantage of the employer, the same is not subject to any tax. 31 The benefits currently being enjoyed by Petitioner as employees of the Senate are given "to improve the welfare of its officers and employees," and in return, "the Senate's interest would be promoted." Hence, the same should not be taxed. 32 Further, fringe benefits granted to rank and file employees, like many members of petitioner are not subject to FBT under Section 33 (C) of the NIRC ; 33 b. The definition in Section 22 of the NIRC of "person" subject to FBT does not include government departments, agencies, offices, or institutions, particularly those that do not exercise proprietary or income generating activities like the Senate of the Philippines. To subject the allowances, bonuses, compensations for services, and other benefits enumerated under Sections III (A) and (IV) of RMO 23-14 would result in the government taxing itself, for at the end of the day, the person liable for the FBT would be the government itself, in this case, the Senate of the Philippines. 34 Under the circumstances, the government would gain nothing by taxing the fringe benefits enumerated in RMO 23-14 for the simple reason that the money for the payment of the taxes will necessarily come from its own coffers; 35 aScITE c. Also, the enumeration in RMO 23-14 of non-taxable de minimis benefits not only unreasonably restricts the rationale and essence of such benefit but also imposes tax on benefits given to the officials and employees of the Senate, which have not been subjected to tax since its grant; 36 2. The implementation of RMO 23-14 will diminish the benefits received by petitioner's members derived from its Collective Negotiation Agreement ("CNA"); a. The taxes, imposed on and collected from the allowances and benefits of government officials and employees with the implementation of RMO 23-14 will diminish the actual benefits received by these employees. The intent of the grant of these benefits, which were agreed upon in a CNA between petitioner and the Senate, was for the employees to receive the full amount of these benefits without any deduction. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is embodied concretely in the CNA. To impose income tax on these benefits runs counter to the principle agreed to by the parties to the CNA; 3. Fringe benefits and de minimis benefits currently given to officers and employees of the Senate do not form part of their salaries or wages subject to compensation income tax; and a. The benefits received by Senate officials and employees do not form part of their regular income and wages as they may be withdrawn and/or adjusted anytime. In fact, in salary increases for government officials and employees, it is only the regular yearly salaries, exclusive of the allowances, bonuses, and other fringe and de minimis benefits, which is considered. In his Answer, 37 respondent refuted the arguments of petitioner, as follows: I. The CTA has no jurisdiction over the instant case; 1. A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition can only be filed against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person exercising "judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions." As the present Petition seeks to nullify portions of RMO 23-14 , which is a product of respondent's exercise of his "quasi-legislative" functions, petitioners incorrectly availed of the remedies under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ; 38 2. Even assuming that petitioners availed of the correct remedies under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court , the CTA still has no jurisdiction to entertain the present Petition because it is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction to entertain the same; a. The CTA is a court of special jurisdiction. Hence, it can only decide cases permitted by statute ( i.e. , Republic Act No. ("RA") 1125, as amended by RA 9282 ("RA 1125") ); b. Neither RA 1125 nor Section 3, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of the CTA provide that the CTA can entertain Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition; c. The authority to declare an administrative issuance as void is part of the general powers conferred by Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution 39 to courts of general jurisdiction but not to courts of special jurisdiction; 3. Petitioner justifies the filing of the instant Petition by invoking the "other matters" jurisdiction of the CTA under Section 7 (a) (1) of RA 1125 . However, the "other matters" jurisdiction of the CTA should be understood as matters of the same kind as disputed assessments and claims for refund. The Petition concerns the validity of RMO 23-14 . Unlike assessment and refund cases, the same does not have direct relation to government collection; 4. Respondent does not agree with the Supreme Court's ruling in the following cases: a) The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company v. The Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Philamlife Case") , 40 b) Banco de Oro, et al. v. Republic of the Philippines ("BDO Case") , 41 and c) Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Tax Appeals and Petron Corporation ("Petron Case") ; 42 a. In the Philamlife Case , when the Supreme Court ruled that the proper mode of appeal for decisions by the Secretary of Finance with respect to appeals of tax rulings issued by respondent ("SOF Decisions") was to appeal the same before the CTA, the High Court was of the view that there was a supposed gap in the law as to the remedy in appealing SOF Decisions. For respondent, no gap in the law exists. Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution , SOF Decisions can be questioned before the regular courts by invoking the power vested by the Constitution to determine the validity or constitutionality of administrative issuance; b. The rationale in the BDO Case and Petron Case is similarly weak when the High Court declared that the determination of the validity of administrative issuances ( i.e. , revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, or rulings) clearly falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the CTA under Section 7 (a) (1) of RA 1125 , subject to prior review by the Secretary of Finance. Section 7 (a) (1) of RA 1125 only declares that decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, and Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions, are appealable to the CTA. This has been the previous practice of the CTA; 5. The Supreme Court erroneously declared that the CTA has blanket authority to hear and decide all tax cases. This is contrary to the rule of expression unius est exclusion alterius . Had Congress intended to grant the CTA jurisdiction over all tax cases, it would not have bothered to make an enumeration of the cases falling under its jurisdiction in RA 1125 . The CTA was never intended to be a trier of any and all tax problems. It was meant to have a narrower attention span solely for the expeditious resolution of cases having direct correlation to government collection; 6. Petitioner failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by failing to file a proper appeal before the Secretary of Finance; II. The Petition should be dismissed due to res judicata ; 1. In Yanga v. Commissioner Kim Henares 43 and Confederation for Unity v. CIR , 44 the Supreme Court already ruled that Sections III and IV of RMO 23-14 are valid. Hence, it is clear that the issue being raised by petitioner has already been finally disposed of in a case where it is a party; III. Petitioner's reliance in Yanga v. Commissioner Kim Henares and Confederation for Unity v. CIR is misplaced. The said cases, in which petitioner is a party, clearly shows that Sections III (A) and IV of RMO 23-14 are valid; IV. Assuming that the CTA has jurisdiction, the Petition deserves no merit because RMO 23-14 is valid; 1. Petitioner's contention that the benefits of its members should not be subjected to FBT because it would result to the government taxing itself is specious and absurd; 2. Petitioner's contention that de minimis benefits will be subject to compensation income tax is bereft of merit; and 3. Petitioner's contention that upholding the challenged provisions of RMO 23-14 would result in a diminution of its benefits under its CNA is erroneous. In the Motion, respondent prays that the Petition be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, replicating his arguments in the Answer. 45 HEITAD Petitioner refuted respondent's arguments in its Comment, as follows: 1. The CTA has jurisdiction over the instant case. The High Court recognized the power of the CTA to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction in the case of City of Manila v. Hon. Grecia-Cuerdo ; 46 2. This ruling on the jurisdiction of the CTA was affirmed in the Philamlife Case when the High Court declared that the CTA, through its power of certiorari , has authority to rule on the validity of a particular administrative rule or regulation as long as it is within its appellate jurisdiction; 3. In the BDO Case , the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the CTA can now rule not only on the propriety of an assessment or tax treatment of a certain transaction, but also on the validity of revenue regulations or revenue memorandum circulars on which an assessment is based; 4. The instant Petition involves respondent's power to interpret tax laws under Section 4 of the NIRC . It questions the validity of Sections III (A) and IV of RMO 23-14 as being arbitrary tantamount to grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, the propriety of taxing particular benefits under the said issuance. Hence, the CTA has jurisdiction to try the present Petition; 5. Further, the High Court, in its 3 July 2018 Decision, 47 declared that it cannot rule on petitioner's claim for exemption from withholding tax on compensation income because these matters are essentially factual or evidentiary, which must be raised in the appropriate administrative and/or judicial proceedings; 6. Petitioner has no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, thus the resort to the present special civil action for Certiorari . As stated in the Petition, it took respondent one (1) year and four (4) months to reply to the communication made by then Senate President Senator Juan Ponce Enrile. Moreover, the letter sent by Senate President Pro Tempore Senator Ralph Recto to the Department of Finance, which may be considered a "motion for reconsideration" in the exercise of the SOF's authority to review RMO 23-14 under Section 4 of the NIRC , has yet to be acted upon; and 7. Following these correspondences, it cannot be said that petitioner failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Nonetheless, the exceptions to the exhaustion of administrative remedies is present in the case at bar ( i.e. , when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, and when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention). The Ruling of the Court in Division Following a studied review of the arguments, we rule to DISMISS the Petition due to petitioner's failure to avail of the correct remedy under Section 4 of the NIRC . The CTA has jurisdiction over actions assailing the validity and constitutionality of tax laws, regulations, and revenue issuances ( i.e. , revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, or rulings). Respondent argues that the CTA has no jurisdiction over challenges against the validity and constitutionality of tax laws, regulations, and revenue issuances ( i.e. , revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, or rulings). This is misplaced. The High Court, in several cases, has definitely ruled that the CTA can rule upon the validity and constitutionality of tax laws, regulations, and revenue issuances ( i.e. , revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, or rulings) in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 48 Indeed, in the BDO Case , 49 the Supreme Court had a chance to finally declare that the CTA even has jurisdiction over direct actions against the validity or constitutionality of tax laws, regulations, and revenue issuances ( i.e. , revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, or rulings), viz. : "The Court of Tax Appeals has undoubted jurisdiction to pass upon the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation when raised by the taxpayer as a defense in disputing or contesting an assessment or claiming a refund. It is only in the lawful exercise of its power to pass upon all matters brought before it, as sanctioned by Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended. This Court, however, declares that the Court of Tax Appeals may likewise take cognizance of cases directly challenging the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation or administrative issuance (revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, rulings). Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, is explicit that, except for local taxes, appeals from the decisions of quasi-judicial agencies (Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Commissioner of Customs, Secretary of Finance, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Secretary of Trade and Industry) on tax-related problems must be brought exclusively to the Court of Tax Appeals. In other words, within the judicial system, the law intends the Court of Tax Appeals to have exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all tax problems. Petitions for writs of certiorari against the acts and omissions of the said quasi-judicial agencies should, thus, be filed before the Court of Tax Appeals. Republic Act No. 9282, a special and later law than Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides an exception to the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts over actions questioning the constitutionality or validity of tax laws or regulations. Except for local tax cases, actions directly challenging the constitutionality or validity of a tax law or regulation or administrative issuance may be filed directly before the Court of Tax Appeals. Furthermore, with respect to administrative issuances (revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, or rulings), these are issued by the Commissioner under its power to make rulings or opinions in connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal revenue laws. Tax rulings, on the other hand, are official positions of the Bureau on inquiries of taxpayers who request clarification on certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, other tax laws, or their implementing regulations. Hence, the determination of the validity of these issuances clearly falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals under Section 7(1) of Republic Act No. 1125, as amended, subject to prior review by the Secretary of Finance, as required under Republic Act No. 8424." These definite pronouncements by the High Court constitute jurisprudence and are part of the Philippine judicial system. Until and unless the same are overturned by the Supreme Court En Banc , it will remain as such and prevail as legal doctrines. 50 Petitions for Certiorari can only be availed of if there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available. Elementary is the rule that writs of certiorari and prohibition cannot be availed of when there is an appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provide, as follows: " RULE 65 Certiorari , Prohibition and Mandamus Section 1. Petition for certiorari . When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law , a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a) Section 2. Petition for prohibition . When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law , a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require." (Emphasis, Ours) Moreover, the case of Marvin Cruz and Francisco Cruz v. People of the Philippines 51 is instructive, viz. : "The writ of certiorari is not issued to correct every error that may have been committed by lower courts and tribunals. It is a remedy specifically to keep lower courts and tribunals within the bounds of their jurisdiction. In our judicial system, the writ is issued to prevent lower courts and tribunals from committing grave abuse of discretion in excess of their jurisdiction. Further, the writ requires that there is no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to correct the error. Thus, certiorari may not be issued if the error can be the subject of an ordinary appeal . As explained in Delos Santos v. Metrobank : We remind that the writ of certiorari being a remedy narrow in scope and inflexible in character, whose purpose is to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction, or to prevent an inferior court from committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction, or to relieve parties from arbitrary acts of courts ( i.e. , acts that courts have no power or authority in law to perform) is not a general utility tool in the legal workshop, and cannot be issued to correct every error committed by a lower court. ATICcS In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court's judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts. The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose[.] xxx xxx xxx Pursuant to Section 1, supra , the petitioner must show that, one, the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and, two, there is neither an appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of amending or nullifying the proceeding . (Citations omitted)" (Emphasis and Underscoring Ours) The crucial question, then, is whether there was no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to petitioners to allow the filing of the instant proceedings. A plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available for questions on the validity or constitutionality of revenue issuances ( i.e. , revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, or rulings), which is an appeal before the SOF. As petitioner failed to properly avail of this remedy beforehand, the present Petition has no leg to stand on. As pronounced in the BDO Case , 52 while this Court has jurisdiction over direct actions questioning the validity and constitutionality of tax laws, regulations, and revenue issuances ( i.e. , revenue orders, revenue memorandum circulars, or rulings), actions assailing revenue issuances must first be reviewed by the SOF prior to a recourse before this Court. The reason for this exception is that revenue issuances are exercises of respondent's power to interpret the NIRC under Section 4 thereof, which provides: "SECTION 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax Cases. The power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance. The power to decide disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under this Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the Commissioner, subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals." As respondent is under the general supervision of the SOF, respondent's revenue issuances are subject to review by the SOF. This review by the SOF under Section 4 of the NIRC is a plain, speedy, and adequate administrative mode of appeal on questions on the constitutionality or validity of revenue issuances. Accordingly, this remedy must first be exhausted prior to an action questioning a revenue issuance before this Court under Section 7 (a) (1) of RA 1125 . In the case at bar, petitioner seeks to have a writ of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court issued by this Court against respondent as he allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by imposing taxes on and requiring the withholding of taxes from, the allowances, benefits, compensation for services, and bonuses received by employees and officials in the legislative branch through Sections III (A) and (IV) of RMO 23-14 . Since a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to question the validity of RMO 23-14 is available under Section 4 of the NIRC ( i.e. , review before the SOF), the present action for certiorari and prohibition has no leg to stand on. Petitioner should have first appealed and questioned the validity of RMO 23-14 before the SOF. In fact, petitioner admitted in the Petition that it was cognizant of the remedy available before the SOF when it alleged therein that the Senate President Pro-Tempore Senator Recto sent a "motion for reconsideration" to the SOF requesting him to "exercise (his) authority to review RMO 23-14 pursuant to Section 4 NIRC before its implementation" 53 but did not wait for its resolution as the said process was slow paced and instead filed a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus with Application for a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Supreme Court. 54 It cannot be denied that no appeal was presented by the petitioner before the SOF. Instead, it holds out that the letter, dated 3 July 2014, sent by Senate President Pro-Tempore Senator Recto to SOF Cesar V. Purisima, which was attached as Annex "D" to the Petition, may be considered as its Motion for Reconsideration. Granting, without conceding, that such letter can serve as petitioners Motion for Reconsideration before the SOF, it still does not save the day for petitioner. As may be demonstrated below, it is not a valid request for review of revenue issuances by respondent as it is not compliant with Department Order No. 07-02 of the Department of Finance ("DO 07-02") . 55 While DO 07-02 specifically governs BIR Rulings issued by respondent, it equally applies to other revenue issuances by respondent, which include RMO 23-14 . This was confirmed by Yanga v. Commissioner Kim Henares 56 and Confederation for Unity v. CIR , 57 in which petitioner is a party, when the Supreme Court ruled, viz. : "The CIR's exercise of its power to interpret tax laws comes in the form of revenue issuances, which include RMOs that provide 'directives or instructions; prescribe guidelines; and outline processes, operations, activities, workflows, methods and procedures necessary in the implementation of stated policies, goals, objectives, plans and programs of the Bureau in all areas of operations, except auditing.' These revenue issuances are subject to the review of the Secretary of Finance. In relation thereto, Department of Finance Department Order No. 007-02 issued by the Secretary of Finance laid down the procedure and requirements for filing an appeal from the adverse ruling of the CIR to the said office. A taxpayer is granted a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the adverse ruling of the CIR to file with the Office of the Secretary of Finance a request for review in writing and under oath." Section 3 of DO 07-02 provides a list of mandatory requirements necessary to effect an appeal before the SOF, and failure to comply with the same may result in the dismissal of the request for review with prejudice, viz. : Section 3. Rulings adverse to the taxpayer. A taxpayer who receives an adverse ruling from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may, within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of such ruling, seek its review by the Secretary of Finance. The request for review shall be in writing and under oath , and must: a) be addressed to the Secretary of Finance and be filed with the Legal Office, Department of Finance, DOF Building, BSP Complex, Roxas Boulevard corner Pablo Ocampo St., City of Manila; b) contain the heading "Request for review of BIR Ruling No. _____"; c) allege and show that the request was filed within the reglementary period; d) indicate the Tax Identification Number of the taxpayer; e) allege the material facts upon which the ruling was requested; f) state that exactly the same facts were presented to the BIR; g) define the issues sought to be resolved; h) contain the facts and the law relied upon to dispute the ruling of the Commissioner; TIADCc i) be signed by or on behalf of the taxpayer filing the appeal; provided that, only lawyers engaged by the taxpayer and/or tax agents accredited by the BIR may sign on behalf of the taxpayer ; j) be accompanied by a copy of the Commissioner's challenged ruling; and k) contain a stamp of the Office of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, indicating that a copy of the request to review the ruling was received by the Commissioner; and l) specifically state that the taxpayer does not have a pending assessment or case in a court of justice where the same issues are being considered . Furthermore, the taxpayer must, at the time of filing of the request for review, submit a duplicate copy of the records on file with the BIR pertaining to his request, which set of records must be authenticated and certified by the BIR. The Secretary of Finance may dismiss with prejudice a request for review that fails to comply with these requirements. (Emphasis, Ours) Here, several mandatory requirements have not been met by the subject letter. First, as outlined, above, a taxpayer adversely affected by a revenue issuance must appeal the same with the SOF in writing and under oath. The 3 July 2014 letter by Senator Recto, though in writing, was not written under oath. No Verification, Affidavit, or even a mere statement whatsoever was made that the allegations contained in the 3 July 2014 letter are true and correct based on personal knowledge or based on authentic records. Second, neither can the 3 July 2014 letter be deemed an appeal to the SOF by petitioner because the signatory therein is Senator Recto. Section 3 of DO 07-02 requires that a request for review must be signed by the taxpayer himself or on his behalf by only his lawyers or accredited tax agents. The letter neither discloses that Senator Recto sent the 3 July 2014 letter on behalf of petitioner nor states that Senator Recto is a lawyer or accredited tax agent of petitioner. Third, the 3 July 2014 letter also does not provide a certification that no other case is pending with other courts or tribunal containing the same issues in the request for review. DO 07-02 requires that an appeal before the SOF "specifically state that the taxpayer does not have a pending assessment or case in a court of justice where the same issues are being considered." Again, even assuming that it is, indeed, petitioner's request to review RMO 23-14 before the SOF, the 3 July 2014 letter is inadequate for its failure to comply with the requirements under DO 07-02 . For such failure, the last paragraph of DO 07-02 , as quoted above, expressly directs its dismissal without prejudice. Consequently, petitioner should not be allowed to correct an error through an action for certiorari and prohibition when it should have done so in an appeal which it did not properly avail of. Also fatal to the petitioner's cause is its failure to wait for the resolution of the 3 July 2014 letter, 58 assuming that it is its request for review before the SOF. As the 3 July 2014 letter remains unresolved, petitioner did not fully avail of the remedy available to question the validity and constitutionality of RMO 23-14 . All told, the present action for certiorari and prohibition must fail. It is premature for this Court to rule whether the allowances, bonuses, compensation for services and other benefits received by officers and employees of the legislative branch are covered by Sections III (A) and IV of RMO 23-14. While the above discussions tackle the issue on whether this Court may rule on the validity and constitutionality of Sections III (A) and (IV) of RMO 23-14 as a result of the arguments raised by respondent on said issue in the Motion, a perusal of the Petition readily shows that petitioner is also questioning the applicability of RMO 23-14 with respect to the allowances, bonuses, compensation for services, and other benefits received by officers and employees of the legislative branch, rather than solely assailing the constitutionality or validity of said revenue issuance. In fact, in petitioner's Comment, petitioner admitted that the instant Petition not only questions the validity of Sections III (A) and IV of RMO 23-14 as being an arbitrary exercise of respondent's power of interpretation of tax laws and regulations, but also, in the alternative, questions the propriety of taxing particular benefits under RMO 23-14 . 59 In effect, petitioner is raising an alternative contention that the allowances, bonuses, compensation for services, and other benefits received by officers and employees of the legislative branch are not covered by Sections III (A) and IV of RMO 23-14 , assuming said revenue issuance is valid. It would, however, be premature at this stage for this Court to rule on the applicability of RMO 23-14 as to said allowances, bonuses, compensation, and other benefits. Rule 4 Section 3 of the Revised Rules of the Court of Tax Appeals 60 enumerates the cases within the jurisdiction of this Court, and the present Petition does not fall under any. First , no deficiency tax assessment has been issued by respondent against petitioner as a result of the application of said revenue issuance. Second , petitioner did not allege that its members erroneously paid compensation income taxes or that the same have been withheld by the Senate of the Philippines, which amount they are praying for a refund. Moreover, no other matters or incidents relating to an assessment or refund or in relation to the enforcement of the NIRC or other laws administered by respondent were alleged in the Petition, as it simply seeks the nullity of Section III (A) and IV of RMO 23-14 or the declaration of its inapplicability to the allowances, bonuses, compensation, and other benefits of officers and employees of the legislature. As such, it would be premature to seek recourse from this Court to determine whether the allowances, bonuses, compensation, and other benefits of officers and employees of the legislature are subject to compensation income tax and consequently withholding tax as there is no pending controversy. Given that there was neither a deficiency tax assessment nor an alleged erroneous payment of compensation income taxes as a result of the enforcement of RMO 23-14 which is sought to be refunded, petitioner should have first requested from respondent a BIR Ruling on the matter after presenting all documentary evidence, explaining the nature of each allowance, bonus, compensation for services and other benefits received by officers and employees of the legislative branch and discussing all other factual matters involved to determine the applicability of RMO 23-14 to said allowances, bonuses, compensation, and other benefits. Then, petitioner should have availed of the SOF's review from a detrimental BIR Ruling before filing an appeal to this Court from a denial by the SOF as highlighted by the Philamlife Case . As petitioner failed to properly avail of these remedies, this Court cannot take cognizance of the present Petition. WHEREFORE , respondent's Motion for Early Resolution on the Issue of Jurisdiction of the Honorable Court filed on 10 February 2020 is hereby GRANTED . Petitioner's Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed on 25 July 2019 is hereby DISMISSED for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 the Rules of Court that a plain, speedy and adequate remedy is unavailable, and for prematurity. SO ORDERED. AIDSTE (SGD.) MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO Associate Justice Erlinda P. Uy and Ma. Belen M. Ringpis-Liban, JJ. , concur. Footnotes 1. Records, Vol. I., pp. 10-36. 2. Id. , pp. 169-189. 3. Records, Vol. I. 4. See Petition, Records, Vol. I., p. 11. 5. See Petition, Records, Vol. I., p. 11, See certified true copy of RMO 23-14 , Annex "A" of the Petition, Records, Vol. I., pp. 37-45. 6. See Petition, Records, Vol. I., p. 16, See copy of letter, dated 21 March 2013, Annex "B" of the Petition, Records, Vol. I., pp. 46-49. 7. See Petition, Records, Vol. I., p. 16, See copy of letter, dated 2 July 2014, Annex "C" of the Petition, Records, Vol. I., pp. 50-51. 8. See Petition, Records, Vol. I., p. 16, See Copy of letter, dated 3 July 2014, Annex "D" of the Petition, Records, Vol. I., pp. 52-56. 9. See Petition, Records, Vol. I., p. 17. 10. See Petition, Records, Vol. I., p. 17; CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), et al. v. Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Secretary, Department of Finance , G.R. No. 213446, 3 July 2018. 11. See Petition, Records, Vol. I., p. 20. 12. G.R. No. 198756, 16 August 2016. 13. Records, Vol. I., p. 94. 14. Id. , pp. 95-99. 15. Id. , pp. 100-101. 16. Id. , pp. 103-137. 17. Id. , pp. 138-139. 18. Id. , pp. 141-143. 19. Id. , pp. 144-147. 20. Id. , pp. 148-149. 21. Id. , pp. 150-155. 22. Id. , pp. 157-164. 23. Id. , pp. 164-166. 24. Id. , pp. 167-168. 25. Id. , pp. 169-189. 26. Id. , pp. 190-191. 27. Records, Vol. I. 28. Ibid . 29. See Petition, Records, Vol. I., p. 20. 30. Id. , pp. 20-21. 31. Id. , p. 22. 32. Id. , p. 25. 33. Id. , p. 22. 34. Id. , p. 23. 35. Id. , p. 25. 36. Id. , pp. 25-26. 37. See Answer, Records, Vol. I, pp. 103-137. 38. RULE 65 Certiorari , Prohibition and Mandamus Section 1 . Petition for certiorari . When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (1a) Section 2 . Petition for prohibition . When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (2a) 39. ARTICLE VIII JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. 40. G.R. No. 210987, 24 November 2014. 41. G.R. No. 198756, 13 January 2015. 42. G.R. No. 207843, 14 February 2018. 43. G.R. No. 213658, 3 July 2018. 44. G.R. No. 213446, 3 July 2018. 45. See Prayer of the Motion, Records, Vol. I, pp. 169-189. 46. G.R. No. 175723, 4 February 2014. 47. CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE), et al. v. Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Secretary, Department of Finance , G.R. No. 213446, 3 July 2018. 48. Rodriguez v. Blaquera , G.R. No. L-13941, 30 September 1960; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Leal , G.R. No. 113459, 18 November 2002; Asia International Auctioneers, Inc. v. Hon. Guillermo L. Parayno, Jr. , G.R. No. 163445, 18 December 2007; The Philippine American Life and General Insurance Co. v. Secretary of Finance , G.R. No. 210987, 24 November 2014. 49. G.R. No. 198756, 16 August 2016. 50. Miranda v. Imperial , G.R. No. L-49090, 28 February 1947. 51. G.R. No. 224974, 3 July 2017. 52. G.R. No. 198756, 16 August 2016. 53. See Petition, Records, Vol. I., pp. 16-17. 54. Id. , p. 17. 55. 7 May 2002. 56. G.R. No. 213658, 3 July 2018. 57. G.R. No. 213446, 3 July 2018. 58. See Petition, Records, Vol. I., p. 17. 59. Records, Vol. I. 60. RULE 4 JURISDICTION OF THE COURT SEC. 3. Cases within the jurisdiction of the Court in Divisions . The Court in Divisions shall exercise: (a) Exclusive original or appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal the following: (1) Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (2) Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code or other applicable law provides a specific period for action: Provided, that in case of disputed assessments, the inaction of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue within the one hundred eighty day-period under Section 228 of the National Internal Revenue Code shall be deemed a denial for purposes of allowing the taxpayer to appeal his case to the Court and does not necessarily constitute a formal decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the tax case; Provided, further, that should the taxpayer opt to await the final decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the disputed assessments beyond the one hundred eighty-day period abovementioned, the taxpayer may appeal such final decision to the Court under Section 3 (a), Rule 8 of these Rules; and Provided, still further, that in the case of claims for refund of taxes erroneously or illegally collected, the taxpayer must file a petition for review with the Court prior to the expiration of the two-year period under Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code; (3) Decisions, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax cases decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original jurisdiction; (4) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release of property affected, fines, forfeitures of other penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws administered by the Bureau of Customs; (5) Decisions of the Secretary of Finance on customs cases elevated to him automatically for review from decisions of the Commissioner of Customs adverse to the Government under Section 2315 of the Tariff and Customs Code; and (6) Decisions of the Secretary of Trade and Industry, in the case of nonagricultural product, commodity or article, and the Secretary of Agriculture, in the case of agricultural product, commodity or article, involving dumping and countervailing duties under Sections 301 and 302, respectively, of the Tariff and Customs Code, and safeguard measures under Republic Act No. 8800, where either party may appeal the decision to impose or not to impose said duties; (b) Exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving criminal offenses, to wit: (1) Original jurisdiction over all criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Bureau of Customs, where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is one million pesos or more; and (2) Appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in their original jurisdiction in criminal offenses arising from violations of the National Internal Revenue Code or Tariff and Customs Code and other laws administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or Bureau of Customs, where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than one million pesos or where there is no specified amount claimed; (c) Exclusive jurisdiction over tax collections cases, to wit: (1) Original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees, charges and penalties, where the principal amount of taxes and fees, exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is one million pesos or more; and (2) Appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases originally decided by them within their respective territorial jurisdiction.